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Abstract: The United Nations Human Rights Council was created in 2006 to 
replace the UN Commission on Human Rights. The Commission‘s failure had 
been attributed to its increasing politicisation and decreasing ability to 
discharge its mandate. Many radical reforms were not taken up at the 
Council‘s creation. The Council‘s constituent instrument did provide 
theoretical methods for avoiding the Commission‘s failings, all of which 
required implementation by states, regional groups and political blocs. Despite 
efforts at the Council‘s creation, and during early sessions, to avoid selectivity, 
partiality and bias, the new body has seen little change in the problems that 
had beset its predecessor. Many of the issues at the new body can be found in 
other international organisations. Unlike other bodies, however, those failings 
undermine the Council‘s ability to discharge its mandate. In order to examine 
the Council, I have used international law alongside general theories of 
international relations as applied to international organisations. Council 
sessions, procedures and mechanisms have been examined, and politicisation 
of the new body has been compared with the Commission‘s failings. 
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Introduction 
 
The United Nations Human Rights Council was created in 2006 to replace the UN 
Commission on Human Rights. The Council‘s form, nature, and many of its roles and 
functions are not markedly different to the Commission‘s, despite the need to 
overcome that body‘s failings. The Council‘s mandate and founding principles, 
however, demonstrate the main aim that the body should overcome the Commission‘s 
flaws. The purpose of this work is to assess the extent to which the Council has 
achieved that aim. Assessing the body requires examination of the Commission‘s 
demise, the Council‘s creation, its mandate, and finally the body‘s work during its 
formative years. The Council is mandated to conduct an internal review of its initial 
five years. This work offers a scholarly assessment of the Council‘s formative years.  
Key for the present assessment is a focus on the body‘s responsibilities and 
duties, as well as the impact of the body‘s intergovernmental form on its work and 
proceedings. The work seeks to identify the Council‘s problems and weaknesses 
rather than proposing reforms. Although proposals for major reform will not be a 
central part of this thesis, the Council is constantly honing new mechanisms and 
procedures. Potential minor reforms that may change and improve Council procedures 
will be noted throughout. The work contained within this thesis is limited to the 
Human Rights Council. Much of the assessment will nevertheless be relevant to other 
international, intergovernmental or human rights institutions. Whilst systematic 
comparison with other institutions goes beyond the scope of this thesis, the problems, 
weaknesses and flaws identified, which impact on the Council‘s fulfilment of its 
mandate, are also present within other bodies and organisations.  
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The final nail in the coffin for the Commission was Kofi Annan‘s damning 
2005 report
1
, which condemned its selectivity and politicisation. The report 
recommended abolishing the Commission, advising the creation of the Human Rights 
Council as its replacement body. That move was welcomed by many states and 
organisations, who argued that the only way for the UN to move forward on human 
rights would be with a clean slate. The Commission had achieved numerous 
successes, such as the preliminary drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,
2
 the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights,
3
 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
4
  The Commission nevertheless 
became politicised in its final years and was accused, amongst other things, of 
hypocrisy.  
That accusation was exemplified when Muammar Gaddafi‘s Libya, with its 
own serious human rights record,
5
 was elected to chair the Commission in 2003. The 
Council‘s founding principles6 aim to eliminate such problems. Current scholarship 
on the Council is lacking, resulting in the need for a detailed and descriptive 
assessment of the body prior to work commencing on possible reforms. Many 
observations draw from the author‘s attendance at Council proceedings. United 
Nations documents are utilised, as well as scholarship on the Council‘s creation and 
early proceedings. Other works cited include commentary on the Commission, articles 
                                                 
1 General Assembly, ‗In larger freedom; towards development, security and human rights for all‘ Report of the 
Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005 
2 ‗Universal Declaration of Human Rights‘, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).  
3 GA Res. 2200A (XXI), ‗International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‘, 16 December 1966, 
UN Doc. A/6316, entered into force 3 January.1976. 
4 GA Res. 2200A (XXI), ‗International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights‘, 16 December 1966, UN Doc. 
A/6316 (1966), entered into force 23 March 1976 
5 See, for example, UN Human Rights Committee, ‗Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya‘, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.101 (1998), paras.6-22 
6 GA Res. 60/251, ‗Human Rights Council‘, 15 March 2006, UN Doc. A/RES/60/251 
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on international human rights, and scholarship on the theories of international 
organisations.   
One technique deployed for evaluating the Council‘s work is to compare it to 
that of the treaty-based human rights committees. There are key differences between 
the Council and the treaty-based bodies. The Council is universal whereas the 
committees deal only with states parties to each treaty. The treaty-based bodies are 
limited to each treaty‘s substantive norms, whereas the Council deals with all aspects 
of international human rights.  The treaty-based committees generate a steady flow of 
written documentation grounded firmly within the interpretative frameworks of their 
respective treaties, officially comprised of experts who seek to maintain independence 
from the politics of their sending state governments. The Council, by contrast, lacks 
any such normative strictures. It requires a very different analytic framework.  
Accordingly, considerable attention will be paid to international relations theories 
specifically designed for the analysis of an intergovernmental political body.  Other 
sources used when assessing the Council‘s work are well-established non-
governmental organisations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch 
and Reporters Without Borders. NGOs provide helpful information on human rights 
violations, particularly about the most egregious abusers, which tend not to be party to 
human rights treaties.   
 Part 1 examines the Council‘s legal basis and its mandate under General 
Assembly Resolution 60/251 which created the body. It focuses on GA Res 60/251, 
negotiations leading up to its drafting and adoption, the mandate that it sets out for the 
new body, and the powers it confers on to the body. In order to explore the Council‘s 
creation, form and mandate, Chapter 1 sets out the background by examining the 
Commission and the reasons for its demise. The Commission‘s demise is discussed in 
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order to examine the main criticisms that led to its abolition. Academic scholarship 
and comments from other observers are used to explore the Commission‘s failings, 
allowing later assessment as to whether the Council has overcome its predecessor‘s 
flaws. This background is built on throughout the thesis, with particular focus on 
comparing the two bodies throughout the thesis. Chapter 2 explores the reform 
proposals for the UN human rights body in order to examine the positions taken by 
various state and non-state actors. Many of the recommended reforms, intended to 
address the problems that beset the Commission, were not implemented in the 
Council‘s creation. The failure to implement those recommendations will be 
examined. Chapter 3 then examines the Council‘s creation, looking in detail at its 
founding Resolution
7
 and comparing it with the proposed reforms, in order to analyse 
how effective it might be as a replacement body. In order to allow later assessment of 
the Council‘s fulfilment of its mandate, Chapter 3 explores the body‘s constituent 
instrument with a particular focus on the Council‘s legal mandate and powers.  
Part 2 puts forward the criteria by which the Council will be assessed. Beyond 
the body‘s express mandate, there are three broad areas which provide criteria for 
assessing the Council: Theories of international relations, theories on the roles and 
functions of international organisations, and theories of politicisation. These theories 
enable a broader understanding of the Council‘s mandate by providing an 
interdisciplinary approach to this intergovernmental, political body. 
 Chapter 4 sets out five main international relations theories, applying them to 
international organisations in order to shed light on the Council‘s proceedings and the 
problems it faces. This is key for understanding how states operate within the 
Council, as well as for identifying the various discourses used by states, groups and 
                                                 
7 Id.  
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blocs. Chapter 5 then turns to roles and functions of international organisations, 
applying these concepts to the Council. Finally, Chapter 6 explores the concept of 
politicisation, examining its different forms across the UN and at human rights bodies. 
Politicisation was a major cause of the Commission‘s demise and is crucial for 
understanding the problems already identified at the Council.  
Part 3 provides the assessment of the Council‘s formative years using three 
case studies. The thesis will not give a detailed appraisal of Special Procedures as the 
nature of the system, which runs concurrent to the Council and other UN bodies, is 
outside the scope of this thesis,  although aspects of the system will be explored in 
context. Critiquing the Council entails comparisons with the Commission in order to 
ascertain whether it has overcome its predecessor‘s failings. In order to make this 
evaluation in relation to politicisation of the Council, Chapters 7 and 8 focus on two 
different aspects of politicisation that were direct causes of the Commission‘s demise, 
exploring whether, and to what extent, they are prevalent at the new body.   
Chapter 7 focuses on politicisation through lack of even-handedness and 
disproportionate scrutiny of certain states. Those issues are explored by examining the 
Council‘s relationship with the US. The US had voiced serious concerns at the time of 
the Council‘s creation as to whether the body‘s mechanisms and structure were 
sufficient to eliminate many of the Commission‘s failings, especially the membership 
of known human rights abusers. The US, widely perceived as the sole superpower,
 
despite emerging powers such as China and India becoming increasingly stronger on 
the global stage (e.g., Emmott, 2009), arguably allowed its position in international 
affairs to impact upon its relationship with the new body. Registering its protest, the 
US chose not to stand for election to the Council instead maintaining a permanent 
observer status. Ongoing problems during the Council‘s first two years, as explored in 
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depth in Chapter 7, resulted in the US withdrawing from the body altogether. 
Examination of the relations between the Council and the US permits analysis of 
whether issues such as selectivity and bias remain at the new body, as well as the 
possible reasons, including the pursuit of national agendas, for such politicisation.  
 The Council‘s inaction on certain human rights situations mirrors similar 
inaction at the Commission that was heavily criticised by states and observers. 
Chapter 8 looks specifically at the Council‘s inaction on Darfur, and the methods by 
which Sudan was protected by its allies. Regionalism, a form of politicisation 
prevalent at the Commission, can be seen to impact upon the Council‘s proceedings in 
its early years. Using the example of Darfur, the issue of regional groups blocking the 
Council‘s work is examined in depth. Regionalism, and the tactics used by groups 
seeking to dominate proceedings and exert collective influence, is explained in 
relation to the Council. Comparisons are drawn with similar problems at the 
Commission.  
Chapter 9 explores two innovative Council mechanisms set up to deal with 
some of the Commissions main flaws. A key reform proposal taken up at the 
Council‘s creation was the Universal Periodic Review mechanism. The mechanism 
examines the human rights record of each UN member state. The chapter explains 
how the review works, analyses discussions creating the mechanism, and assesses the 
extent to which UPR can address the Commission‘s weaknesses. Early UPR cycles 
are examined to ascertain its usefulness in the Council‘s fulfilment of its mandate. 
Another new mechanism is the Council‘s ability to convene Special Sessions dealing 
with crises situations. The Council‘s first Special Sessions will be examined in detail, 
including who called the sessions, what positions were adopted, and the outcome. 
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Analysis of these sessions will focus on their contribution to the Council‘s fulfilment 
of its mandate, as well as their use of states or regional groups for political motives.  
Within the current University of London guidelines for doctoral theses, some 
passages from my thesis have previously appeared. ‗Improvement on the 
Commission?: The UN Human Rights Council‘s Inaction on Darfur,‘ University of 
California-Davis Journal of International Law & Policy (Vol.16 (1) 2009), pp. 81-
129, uses materials that form part of Chapter 8. ‗The United States and the Human 
Rights Council: An Early Assessment,‘ St Thomas Law Review (Vol. 23 (1), 2010), 
pp. 23-70 uses materials that form part of Chapter 7. ‗New Mechanisms of the UN 
Human Rights Council‘, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (forthcoming 
September 2011) uses materials that form part of Chapter 9. 
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PART I: The Human Rights Council‟s Mandate 
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Chapter 1 - Background: From Commission to Council 
 
1.0 Introduction  
The Council‘s predecessor, the UN Commission on Human Rights, was the first 
international organisation mandated to deal with international human rights. Created 
in 1946,
8
  the Commission operated for 60 years before being disbanded and replaced 
by the Council in 2006. Much has been written about the Commission‘s demise by 
human rights scholars, practitioners and experts. Various positions on the 
Commission were put forward by states, regions, and observers.  
Understanding the Commission‘s flaws, especially those contributing to its 
ultimate failure, lays foundations for analysing the new Human Rights Council. 
Reform of the Commission has led to significant changes, reflected in the Council‘s 
mechanisms and proceedings. Other features of the old body remain in place at the 
HRC. In order to analyse the composition of the new body I shall first explore the 
issues raised regarding the Commission, the reform proposals, and the impact upon 
the new body.  
 
 
1.1. History of the Commission on Human Rights 
1.1.1 Human Rights Organisations Background 
Human rights present problems different from other international matters. 
Traditionally, human rights have been viewed as a domestic issue, not based on 
material interdependencies between states (Donnelly, 1998:55). Some observers argue 
that international human rights derive from moral interdependencies between states 
(Rittberger et al, 2006:193-208).  However, in practice human rights remains almost 
                                                 
8 ECOSOC Resolution 5(I), ‗Commission on Human Rights‘, 16 Feb 1946, UN Doc. E/Res/5(I) 
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exclusively a domestic issue. Temptation therefore exists for states to limit resources 
and expenditures on human rights. Typically, poorer states devote fewer resources 
and place less emphasis on human rights than richer countries. Where resources are 
scarce, human rights are less likely to be a priority. Corruption and authoritarianism 
are more likely to exist within poorer, especially developing, nations. Autocratic 
regimes often pay scant attention to human rights. Owing to the disparate attention 
given to human rights issues, international attention is required in order to ensure state 
compliance with human rights standards. Such compliance with international 
standards is easier to organise amongst richer democratic states than poorer 
authoritarian countries, despite the greater need to implement human rights within the 
latter group (Moravcsik, 2000:217-52). 
 Conflicts on human rights issues are often presented as conflicts between 
states‘ values. Governments frequently use cultural or religious values to justify 
taking positions that conflict with human rights norms (Kausikan, 1993:21–24). 
Resolving such conflicts becomes politically sensitive, and compromise often appears 
unfeasible (Rittberger et al, 2006:193-208). Invocations of cultural differences may be 
legitimate, for example when States rely on those differences during the setting of an 
educational curriculum. Such invocations, however, typically relate to uncontroversial 
human rights matters upon which the Council may undertake work, but which seldom 
arise within Council discussions. Franck argues that, although cultural sensitivities 
can affect the way a fact is perceived, it is more likely that ―disagreement over the 
facts merely reflects wishful thinking or wilful deception, a hypocritical avoidance of 
the fundamental rules of international conduct by lying.‖ (Franck, 1984 831-832)  
One example is where questionable claims about ―cultural sensitivities‖ are invoked 
to justify oppression of homosexuals (Heinze, 2001:283-309).  Although some states, 
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particularly those heavily influenced by faiths such as Roman Catholicism or Islam, 
might disagree with homosexual rights, recent events in some African states have 
demonstrated the misuse of ―cultural sensitivities‖ to oppress homosexuals (e.g. 
Mapondera & Smith, 2010; Rice, 2010; Editorial, 2010). Divergence between 
developing and developed states, under the guise of ―cultural sensitivities‖, hampers 
efforts to take action on many human rights issues (Jolly et al, 2009:61).   
International human rights organisations with broader global representation 
have greater overall potential for conflicts of that type, in comparison to regional 
organisations. An organisation like the European Court of Human Rights deals with 
states that may have cultural differences, but enjoy a relatively greater level of 
agreement on human rights. All European Union states are party to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, binding them to these norms. UN members are not all 
party to the same human rights treaties, nor are they subject to enforcement 
mechanisms such as the European Court of Human Rights. Regional differences can 
therefore be more easily manipulated within international organisations in order to 
justify non-compliance with human rights.  
The African and American human rights courts encounter more difficulties 
than the European Court. State capacity, which is far lower within developing 
countries, impacts upon the implementation of human rights. That limitation in turn 
creates internal conflicts between and institution and its members. Tensions also arise 
within developing states regarding the Western-influenced human rights, which 
arguably creates conflicts that do not exist within the Western world. Many non-
Western states lack the natural rights traditions that led to today‘s human rights 
regimes. Developing states also label human rights as ―Western imperialism.‖ Weiss 
(2008:61) argues that this ―inability to move beyond a simplistic and ritualized North-
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South pattern is definitely a debilitating ailment‖ at the UN and non-homogeneous 
regional institutions.  
Politicisation of international organisations is a difficult concept. Many states 
accused of violations, however justifiably, complain of being victimised by a 
―politicised‖ process. Lyons et al (1977:89) define politicisation of international 
organisations as the introduction of unrelated controversial issues by countries 
seeking to further their own political objectives. The term ―politicisation‖ is used 
where political discussions unrelated to the particular debate occur at an organisation 
or body. Politicisation of that particular kind was not commonplace throughout all of 
the Commission‘s existence.  It did, however, increase towards the end, and 
contributed to its demise.  Heinze (2008:41) adds that politicisation does not just 
occur at the discursive level, although that level may make the politicisation more 
overt. State actions at the Commission, for example voting in blocs and selectivity 
regarding country-specific human rights situations, demonstrate politicisation in the 
body‘s work (Heinze, 2008:41).  
Overt and subtle forms of politicisation are both capable of affecting a body‘s 
ability to fulfil its mandate. Keohane and Nye (1973:116-18) foresaw the threat to an 
organisation‘s existence where extreme politicisation occurs. Accusations of 
politicisation - often, but not always justified - are more likely to occur when states‘ 
foreign policy goals conflict with each other, leading to criticism where a 
controversial issue is raised. Where there is agreement between state members, the 
organisation‘s actions will be viewed as routine or non-political and they will be non-
controversial to all countries. Any conflicting positions taken by states are subject to 
charges of politicisation. Organisations that deal with controversial issues are more 
likely to become politicised than those involving less sensitive matters. 
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Regionalism is a form of politicisation that played a key role in the 
Commission‘s failure. It continues to dominate the Council‘s proceedings. States tend 
to form alliances with other countries from the same region. Odum (1942) claimed 
that a region should be relatively homogeneous across various purposes or 
benchmarks. At the UN there are five regional groups: the African Group; the Asian 
Group; the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC); the Western European 
and Other Group (WEOG); and the Eastern European Group. Member states join the 
appropriate regional group based on their geographic location.
9
 The five regional 
groups (e.g. Thakur, 1999) were established in 1963 and are used by the UN to ensure 
proportionate geographic representation when apportioning seats or membership to 
UN bodies. However, geographic regional groups are not the only form of alliances at 
the UN.  
Political coalitions have, over time, become as influential as the 
geographically-linked groups (Nicol, 1979:102). Developing nations have formed 
subgroups, within or across regional groups, asserting collective strength to pursue 
collective aims. Weiss (2008:50) maintains that, ―the various roles on the 
international stage and in the global theater are played by actors from the two major 
troupes, North and South.‖ He argues that the end of East-West tensions, with the fall 
of the Soviet Union, saw a shift to another world rift, this time between the North and 
the South (Weiss, 2008:50-51). Quoting Black (2007:16) that ―axis descriptors – 
developing/developed, non-industrialized/industrialized, rich/poor – are crude and 
value-laden‖, Weiss (2008:50) argues that membership of the South/North has 
nothing to do with geographic location but is rather about economic, social and other 
similar factors.  
                                                 
9 The only state not to be a member of a regional group is Israel. Arab states within the Asian Group, particularly 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia, consistently blocked Israel‘s attempts to join that regional group.  
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The UN‘s main political groups give strength to Weiss‘ argument. Political 
groups form alliances between either developed or developing states. Furthermore, 
developing states have formed much stronger political alliances than developed 
nations owing to far greater need for collective strength on their part. The UN was 
designed and created by colonial powers and strong states. With increasing self-
determination of former colonies, political alliances were needed for new states‘ 
interests to be collectively represented at the body. Strong alliances between 
developing countries allowed them to challenge the world economic order as set out 
by industrialised nations, (Nye, 1973:334-370) and to secure methods for trade, 
development, and economic growth. 
 
1.1.2 The UN Commission on Human Rights 
Human rights ceased to be predominantly viewed as a fundamentally domestic 
concern after the Second World War (e.g. Lauterpacht, 1950:416-431). The atrocities 
of that war underscored the need for international guarantees for human rights 
protection. Recognition of this need began during the Second World War. In 1941 the 
Atlantic Charter was enacted between the UK and the US (Roosevelt & Churchill, 
1941). The League of Nations‘ failure to prevent the Second World War, and the 
atrocities committed during those years, demonstrated the weaknesses in normative 
idealism as related to international organisations. The use of an international 
organisation to protect human rights reflected the social constructivist theory that 
emerged after World War II.
10
  
                                                 
10 See, Chapter 4, Section 4.3 
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The second aim stated in the UN Charter‘s preamble is ―to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights‖ (preamb. para.2).11 The Charter did not, however, 
establish a principal organ to deal with human rights issues. Instead, Article 68 
specifically mandated ECOSOC, one of the UN‘s principal organs, to set up a 
Commission on Human Rights: ―The Economic and Social Council shall set up 
commissions in economic and social fields for the protection and promotion of human 
rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its 
functions.‖12 Charter-based human rights bodies are created pursuant to the UN 
Charter. They have jurisdiction over all UN members and may deal with any aspects 
of human rights (cf. Kälin & Künzli, 2009:239). In contrast, treaty-based bodies are 
established pursuant to specific conventions, and monitor implementation of the 
respective treaties by state parties (cf. Kälin & Künzli, 2009:206-208).  
There is a strong case that maintenance of international peace and security is 
the UN‘s primary purpose with development coming a close second. The argument 
fails to acknowledge that, under the UN Charter, human rights are the organisation‘s 
―third pillar‖ (cf. preamb. para.1(2); Articles 1(2), 1(3), 13(1), 55, 56, 62, 68, 76). The 
failure to create a human rights organ, as opposed to a subsidiary Charter-based body, 
does indicate that human rights remained a secondary issue from the outset.  
The Commission was created as a functional ancillary of ECOSOC. It was 
hoped that power struggles and national agendas, found in organs such as the Security 
Council and General Assembly, could be eliminated from the Commission and that 
body allowed to solely focus on protecting and promoting human rights. Initial 
recommendations called for member states to send experts as delegates to the 
Commission rather than government representatives. That would have allowed the 
                                                 
11 United Nations Charter (1945) 
12 Id., Art.68   
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Commission to provide human rights expertise, as well as technical and practical 
assistance, without national agendas dominating proceedings. That proposal was not 
followed, for reasons discussed below, and the Commission indeed became a political 
body. 
Initially the Commission had 18 members. Membership increased to 21 states 
in 1962, 32 states in 1967, 43 states in 1980, and 53 states in 1992. Membership 
increases reflected the growing number of states joining the UN due to 
decolonisation. Farer and Gaer (1993:261) comment that developing nations sought 
expansion of the Commission in order to gain control of the body. Indeed, 
composition of the Commission changed as a result of increased membership. In 1946 
the Commission reflected Western dominance, but as it grew the body became more 
representative. Increased membership allowed for a more representative membership, 
in many ways legitimising that body through more universal representation of 
different governance. Change in composition, whilst allowing greater representation 
and countering Western dominance, resulted in more national political agendas being 
raised at proceedings and increased power struggles between states and regions.  
Commission sessions were popular among state and non-state actors keen to 
engage with human rights issues. Sessions were viewed as an opportunity to discuss 
human rights issues in a representative and public forum. Many non-member states 
sought to, and indeed did, participate in Commission proceedings. It also became 
established practice for NGOs to address that body on human rights issues (Schrijver, 
2007:812).  Despite increasing participation from state and non-state actors, the 
Commission only held one annual six-week session. That limited the number of 
agenda items that could be discussed, and the depth of any such debates. The 
Commission had limited facilities, such as meeting rooms and translators amongst 
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others, which again impacted upon its work. However, the Commission‘s work 
covered many major areas and it had many accomplishments before its eventual 
demise.  
 
1.1.3 The Commission‟s Work  
The Commission‘s mandate was safeguarding and promoting international human 
rights. Its work can be divided into two main areas: standard-setting and the 
protection and promotion of human rights. Standard-setting was the Commission‘s 
primary focus during the body‘s first twenty years. From 1967, when ECOSOC 
authorised the Commission to deal with human rights violations, its work extended to 
human rights monitoring, implementing, and promoting, amongst others. Rahmani-
Ocora (2006:15) comments that, having been given the task of standard-setting, 
during its early years the Commission focused on universal human rights as well as 
specific thematic issues such as racial discrimination, torture, and women‘s rights, 
amongst others. 
The Commission‘s first task was creating the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights
13
 in 1948 (e.g. Humphrey, 1984:25-36
14
). Although not an international 
treaty,
15
 and thus not binding, it has been universally accepted (e.g. Bernstorff, 
2008:903) and many states have incorporated its provisions into national law (e.g. 
Brownlie, 2003:534-535). Two legally binding treaties were adopted in 1966, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
16
 and the 
                                                 
13 ‗Universal Declaration of Human Rights‘, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). 
14 Providing a first-hand account of the drafting of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
15 ―Mrs. Roosevelt made it very clear in her leadership (and in her statement before the General Assembly in 
December 1948) that the declaration was not to be a treaty but a declaration of general principles of human rights 
and freedoms to serve as a common standard‖, (Jolly et al, 2009:56). 
16 GA Res. 2200A (XXI), ‗International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‘, 16 December 1966, 
UN Doc. A/6316, entered into force 3 January.1976. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
17
 These Commission documents 
comprise the so-called International Bill of Human Rights (e.g. Meyer, 1981), and 
reflect different positions towards human rights taken, at the time, by the West, 
Eastern Europe and developing nations (e.g. Evans, 2004:122-124; Normand & Zaidi, 
2008:216-217). Farer and Gaer (1993:248) comment that the USSR delegate 
abstained from the vote on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
delegate‘s argument that ―a number of articles completely ignore the sovereign rights 
of democratic governments‖18 appears to be at odds with the USSR‘s approach to 
statehood and sovereignty of countries, other than Russia, belonging to the Soviet 
Union.  
From the 1960s, the Commission began monitoring standard implementation, 
often undertaken by mandate holders, treaty bodies, and the Sub-Commission. State 
self-determination changed the Commission‘s focus. Until then, the Commission was 
set up and run by Western states, many of which were still colonial powers, applying 
double standards between human rights aspirations and the treatment of peoples under 
their control (e.g. Ibawoh, 2008:17). Decolonised countries, as a result of recent 
colonial practices, tended to distrust the UN human rights machinery. Mechanisms 
including working groups, Special Rapporteurs, and independent experts, were 
created and used by the Commission. As worldwide concern for human rights grew, 
and violations became more publicised, the Commission‘s work expanded to 
undertake specific investigations of human rights situations. In 1967 the Commission 
was empowered to investigate human rights practices in individual states without their 
                                                 
17 GA Res. 2200A (XXI), ‗International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights‘, 16 December 1966, UN Doc. 
A/6316 (1966), entered into force 23 March 1976. 
18 GAOR, 3rd Session, part 1, plenary meetings, 10 December 1948, 923-924. 
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permission, through confidential complaints being made under the 1235 Procedure.
19
 
That procedure enabled an annual public debate between states on country-specific 
human rights violations. The 1503 Procedure,
20
 created in 1970, went further. It 
enabled a confidential complaints procedure open to states, NGOs and individuals 
(e.g. Farer & Gaer, 1993:279). Countries could be investigated and Commission 
action taken even without national cooperation. As cross-border violations became a 
―major phenomena of human rights violations worldwide‖ (Alston, 1995:126), 
country-specific mandates were unable adequately to deal with all human rights 
situations. The Commission responded by creating thematic mandates to examine 
human rights issues across a number of states or regions. The Commission was able to 
address widespread violations of a specific right as well as dealing with gross and 
systemic abuses of a number of rights within a specific country. Expansion of the 
Commission‘s work enabled it to respond to human rights violations and to 
implement the standards that it had originally been created to set. However, the 
Commission‘s failure to adequately respond to human rights situations, especially in 
its final years, was a main reason for the body‘s eventual demise. 
 
 
1.2 The Commission‟s Demise 
The Commission‘s demise has been widely attributed to the body‘s increasing failings 
during its final years. The Commission‘s final years were steeped in controversy and 
criticism as the body‘s increasing deficiencies undermined its ability to fulfil its 
mandate. The expansion of international human rights to cover ever more issues 
                                                 
19 ECOSOC Res 1235 (XLII), 6 June 1967, UN Doc. E/4393. 
20 ECOSOC Res 1503 (XLVIII), 27 May 1970, UN Doc. E/4832. 
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coupled with the body‘s increasing loss of credibility in the eyes of states and 
observers resulted in the Commission being widely deemed to be unable to fulfil its 
mandate. Schrijver (2007:812) comments that heightened expectations of the 
Commission‘s work, and criticisms when such expectations were not met, expanded 
as general interest in human rights grew. The Commission became a target for more 
general attacks against the UN by neoconservatives, governments, and even some 
NGOs, due to perceptions that it was not fulfilling its mandate (Schrijver, 2007:812). 
Criticisms came from different, and sometimes diametrically opposing, 
perspectives. Alston (2006:188) observes that ―[w]hile many of the critics called for a 
conciliatory approach that would avoid confrontation with governments, others 
impugned its credibility precisely because it had failed to condemn governments that 
they considered to be responsible for egregious cases of human rights violations.‖ As 
attacks on the Commission came from different angles, the body‘s ability to deal 
effectively with the criticisms waned. 
A number of specific issues were raised by states, non-state actors, and 
observers. Redondo (2008:721-734) lists major criticisms of the Commission, 
including: membership of known abuser states; ―naming and shaming‖ of countries 
through country-specific resolutions, which developing nations viewed as a neo-
colonial tool; protection of states through group-blocking action; absence of 
membership criteria; and ―bad practice‖ of the Commission, for example use of 
―technical cooperation‖ rather than taking stronger measures against abusers, or 
political use of ―non-action‖ to avoid country-specific resolutions (Redondo, 
2008:721-734). I shall examine five not dissimilar areas: Commission membership, 
inaction, country-specific resolutions, insufficient time for dealing with human rights 
issues, and regionalism. Exploring these themes will provide a framework for 
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analysing reform proposals, negotiations and indeed for assessing the Council‘s 
founding Resolution.  
It is important to note that not all states nor observers expressed, or even 
agreed with, criticisms of the Commission. Recent scholarship demonstrates that 
some observers still view criticism of the Commission as unnecessary and 
undeserved, arguing that the body was not flawed and did fulfil its mandate (e.g. 
Leibovic & Voeten, 2006:861-888). Some observers maintain that the Commission‘s 
disbanding resulted from a more general reformation atmosphere at the UN rather 
than due to an inherent need to end that body. Ghanea (2006:704-705) asserts that in 
all of the general UN reform proposals, the Commission‘s potential to fulfil its 
mandate appeared to have been forgotten. Since the Commission‘s demise, arguments 
have been made that the body‘s failure is attributable not to its flaws but rather to the 
UN‘s political atmosphere whereby many member states and administrative staff 
sought to reform various aspects of the organisation.  
Some observers insist that the weaknesses identified could be viewed as 
strengths. For example, Ghanea (2006:702) argues that use of the Commission to 
advance national political agendas made the body relevant to individual states. She 
asserts that politicisation was the Commission‘s ―greatest asset as well as its greatest 
liability.‖ Amnesty International‘s 2005 report provided a nuanced view on the 
Commission, which highlighted the body‘s good work and provided constructive 
reform proposals (Amnesty International, 2005). That report distanced AI from other 
NGOs which, at that time, solely attacked the Commission. Amnesty reported, for 
example, that the Commission had always been ―a unique international forum for 
human rights discourse‖ ((Amnesty International, 2005). Defending many aspects of 
the Commission, the report argued that some aspects of the Commission‘s work 
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should be preserved and strengthened at the new body as, despite criticisms of the 
Commission, the body did have valuable aspects (Amnesty International, 2005). The 
report listed Commission accomplishments, and argued that states‘ behaviour in 
attempting to avoid Commission scrutiny can be used as evidence of the body‘s 
reputation and impact on human rights.
21
 
 
 
  
1.2.1 Membership Issues 
The main, or at least the most voiced, reason for the Commission‘s demise was the 
presence of known human rights abusers as members of the Commission. Moss 
(2006:11) comments that membership of known and grave human rights abusers 
severely damaged the Commission‘s credibility. Similar sentiments were expressed 
by many scholars seeking to explain the reasons for the Commission‘s failure.  
Initially, at the Commission‘s creation (Humphrey, 1984:17), it was 
recommended that the body should consist of ―highly qualified persons‖, and that 
―members should serve as non-governmental representatives‖.22 Highly qualified 
persons would have been experts or jurists from the human rights field. Such persons 
are distinguished from government representatives as they hold a specialist 
knowledge in the subject area, and have a high degree of independence from their 
sending states‘ government, allowing them to engage in impartial and non-bias 
                                                 
21  ―Although it can be difficult to measure the impact of the Commission‘s actions, especially at the national level, 
the lengths to which states go to evade Commission scrutiny are a clear indication of their sensitivity to criticism 
by that body.‖ (Amnesty International, 2005) 
22 ECOSOC Res 38 ‗Report of the Commission on Human Rights to the Second Session of the Economic and 
Social Council‘, 21 June 1946, UN Doc. E/38, 230-231. 
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activities. Those recommendations reflect the functionalist theory
23
 that states ought 
to grant powers to the organisation, minimising national political roles in international 
human rights issues. The recommendations were not adopted in practice. A 
compromise required all members to be confirmed by ECOSOC in order to ensure 
they were of a high calibre and expertise (Alston, 2006:190). Although nominally 
followed, ECOSOC did not reject any nominations, resulting in the Commission‘s 
membership soon becoming ―governmentalised‖ despite some states sending human 
rights experts as their representatives, such as Eleanor Roosevelt of the US and René 
Cassin from France (Alston, 2006:190). The impact was the creation of a political 
rather than expert body. Delegates advanced national agendas rather than solely 
focusing on the Commission‘s mandate.  
Power struggles occurred between states at the UN even before its creation, 
with countries seeking to exert influence even during its formation. During 
negotiations on the UN, many states sought to limit the power held by the five ―great 
powers‖ for example through permanent seats and vetoes at the Security Council. All 
UN members sought to retain and exert influence at the new organisation, and the 
Commission was another opportunity for interstate power struggles. That opportunity 
resulted in governments‘ reluctance to send experts rather than delegates to the 
Commission. Governments‘ insistence on sending delegates rather than expert 
representatives underscores arguments that the Commission was viewed by most 
states as a political arena. State representatives advanced national policies and 
agendas, whereas experts would have had a high degree of autonomy and 
independence from their countries of origin. 
                                                 
23 See Chapter 4, Section 4.5 
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Weaker states‘ positions towards the Commission may be somewhat 
understood in light of the importance of bargaining power across a range of issues 
dealt with by an international organisation. Weak states recognised that Commission 
membership would afford them greater influence and bargaining power regarding 
other UN issues. Weaker states at ECOSOC, sensing the ability to exert influence at 
the Commission through bargaining power, therefore rejected proposals
24
 to send 
independent experts who would not advance national agendas and were outside the 
sphere of government control. They instead preferred to send representatives that 
were controlled by their sending government and who would further national policies 
and agendas.  
 Another interpretation is that states‘ continuing reluctance to relinquish 
control was an attempt to preserve autonomy over human rights. Having seen human 
rights enter the international arena, many states were keen to ensure a degree of 
control over monitoring of countries‘ compliance with international human rights 
standards. Even powerful, democratic states would have been reticent about allowing 
a national issue to become international without seeking to retain some control. 
Alston argues that, had the recommendations regarding members been accepted, 
problems regarding grave human rights abusers being Commission members would 
have been far less significant. Experts on human rights would not have been bound by 
national policies and agendas in the manner that government representatives have 
been. Alston (2006:190) further argues that it would be easier to enforce minimum 
human rights criteria for such nominees than it was for state members.   
Presence of known abusers as Commission members may be attributed to a 
lack of membership criteria at that body. Membership criteria could have ensured that 
                                                 
24 ESC Res 9(II), UN ESCOR, 2nd session, Annex 14, 21 June 1946, UN Doc. E/RES/9(II). 
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grave violators were excluded from such a position. Alston (2005-2006:60) comments 
that the Commission‘s membership criteria were solely concerned with its geographic 
composition, ensuring that different cultures and regions were represented along the 
usual UN divide amongst the five regional groupings. Equitable distribution of seats 
is of central importance at an organisation with universal membership, as evidenced 
through the emphasis placed on this requirement at most UN organs and bodies. 
However, lack of any other membership criteria resulted in states with dubious human 
rights records being allowed membership. Indeed, throughout the Commission‘s 
existence, grave human rights violators were members of the body. 
Alston (2005-2006:57-58) attributes tolerance of known abusers as 
Commission members to the Cold War politics that engulfed the UN until the USSR‘s 
dissolution. States viewed as human rights violators by one side ―were the other side‘s 
champions of resistance‖ . He argues that membership problems surfaced after the 
Cold War owing to a shift in the international political atmosphere. 
 Use of human rights as part of the Cold War power struggle demonstrates the 
realist approach towards international organisations. With the fall of the USSR, the 
US used its position as the remaining superpower to champion democracy, exerting 
its influence against non-democratic regimes that had previously been allied with the 
Soviet Union. The shift in global politics from an East-West to a North-South divide 
resulted in membership problems increasing at the Commission as states and alliances 
from the South became stronger. The US considered a number of Commission 
members, many of whom were from the global South, to be human rights abusers, and 
was critical of their membership and ability to play an active role in the Commission‘s 
decision-making and work (Alston, 2005-2006:60).  
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Criticism of the Commission‘s membership became a greater issue after the 
US failed in its 2001 re-election bid, a failure largely due to North-South politics. 
That was the first time the US had failed to be re-elected since the body‘s creation. 
Although membership was already recognised as a serious flaw, this event provided a 
catalyst for criticisms especially from US observers. Schoenbaum (2006:250) 
comments that the Commission‘s failure to elect the US in 2001, giving its seat to 
Austria, was portrayed in the media, and widely seen as, ―a slap in the face for the 
new Bush administration at the United Nations.‖ Austria at the time of replacing the 
US had been subject to international scrutiny and criticism regarding human rights 
due to Austria‘s Freedom Party¸ widely perceived as racist, anti-immigrant and 
sympathetic to Nazism, recently joining its governing coalition (Schoenbaum, 
2006:250).  
Alston (2005-2006:59) comments that, although there had been some criticism 
of ―pariah‖ states‘ membership at the Commission, the issue came to the fore when 
the US began to consider seriously the issue of membership criteria, after it failed to 
be re-elected in 2001 for the first time in the Commission‘s existence. Condoleezza 
Rice, at that time US National Security Adviser, condemned the vote. She described 
Sudan‘s election, whilst the US had failed in its bid, as ―an outrage‖ (Alston, 2005-
2006:59).  Critical of non-democratic regimes, the US argued that those regimes were 
incompatible with human rights principles.  
That event offers an example of an alliance of states from the global South 
fighting Western imperialism and hegemony by refusing to re-elect the sole 
superpower. States used their combined strength to exert influence over the strongest 
country as part of an ongoing power struggle. The US position, immediately after the 
Cold War, as the most powerful and influential country had resulted in attacks from 
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groups of weaker states at other UN bodies. Indeed Schoenbaum (2006:252) 
comments that non-election of the US whilst Sudan – ―in the midst of committing … 
‗genocide‘‖ - retained its seat, was simply a display of power politics by ―the African-
Muslim block at the United Nations, demonstrating its disdain for Western 
sensibilities‖. That power politics had surfaced at the Commission against the US 
should come as no surprise bearing in mind the international political atmosphere.  
A number of reasons have been cited for the failed re-election bid. General ill-
will towards the Bush administration undoubtedly played a role. Even prior to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent US response, the Bush 
administration had become unpopular within the international community, owing to 
increasing US exceptionalism and unilateralism. Steiner, Alston and Goodman argue 
that China‘s lobbying against US re-election played a large role in the outcome. 
Chinese representatives said that the US had failed to be re-elected because it had 
used ―human rights as a tool to pursue its power politics and hegemony in the world‖ 
(Opinion, People’s Daily (China), 2001). While the US did engage in power politics, 
by lobbying for collective action against China, China arguably acted in the same 
manner. Tactics employed by China and her allies in ousting the US were most likely 
a result of national power struggles. Undeniably, the Commission‘s work and the US 
contribution to it were not at the fore of this decision. Politicisation, regardless of the 
reason, was clearly the motivating factor. 
The US regained election the following year, using tactics to ensure that it 
could not fail to be elected, including threatening to withhold its dues and ensuring a 
closed regional slate.  A closed slate occurs where a regional group proposes only the 
same number of candidates as seats available, thus ensuring that all candidates are 
elected owing to no other options being available. Dennis (2003:385) notes that the 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.35 
 
US only announced its candidacy once Spain and Italy had withdrawn from election. 
He argues that the US wished to ensure a closed slate for the Western and Other 
States Group, that is nomination for election of only as many states as there were seats 
in order to ensure that those countries gain membership. Withdrawal of those two 
countries was, according to Dennis (2003:385), due in part to US pressure as well as a 
widespread belief that the Commission would only maintain credibility with the US as 
a member.  
Despite the US regaining its Commission seat, debate on membership 
continued. Proposals by Human Rights Watch in 2003 called for membership criteria 
which demonstrated growing dissatisfaction with the lack of membership rules. 
Although that NGO did subsequently change its position, retracting its endorsement 
of formal membership criteria altogether, Human Rights Watch originally proposed 
that membership should require ratification of core human rights treaties, compliance 
with reporting obligations, and that no recent condemnations of that country had been 
issued by the Commission (Human Rights Watch, 2003).  
Discussions were exacerbated in 2003 by the election of Libya as Chair of the 
Commission.
25
 That state was known for its grave abuses, and its election undermined 
the Commission‘s credibility. Dennis (2003:385) outlined reasons for the decision. 
The African Group, whose turn it was to nominate a chairperson, unanimously 
endorsed Libya. Weiss (2008:38) comments that states from the South see ―state 
sovereignty or cultural solidarity [as] routinely trump[ing] UN efforts to protect 
rights.‖ The African Group emphasised that it was its turn to nominate, encouraging 
other states to accept the nomination based on the need for friendly relations with the 
Group‘s members (Weiss, 2008:38). 
                                                 
25 Despite the controversy in 2003, in 2010 Libya was elected to the Human Rights Council with 155/192 votes.  
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No UN body had ever rejected the candidate endorsed by the region whose 
turn it was to nominate. The US insisted a vote was called due to Libya‘s poor human 
rights record. The vote failed to overturn the nomination, although a number of states 
abstained rather than endorse Libya. Dennis reports that many EU members, despite 
being ―shocked‖ by Libya‘s nomination, abstained from the vote in order not to 
offend the African states who had nominated that country (Weiss, 2008:38). EU 
states‘ behaviour demonstrates national agendas, regarding political and other 
relations with the African states, being prioritised over human rights principles. 
Interstate relations were arguably more important to those abstaining countries than 
acting in accordance with the values that stopped them being able to endorse Libya‘s 
candidacy. 
Alston (2006:192) argues that US failure to be elected, followed by Libya 
becoming chair of the Commission, allowed states and observers finally to confront 
the membership issues that had been quietly debated for some time. Sudan‘s re-
election in 2004, at a time when grave violations were occurring within that state and 
especially in Darfur, led to strong protests, especially from the US (Leopold, 2004). 
During the Commission‘s 2004 annual session, US Ambassador Richard S. 
Williamson said that the body ―should not be allowed to become a protected 
sanctuary for human rights violators who aim to pervert and distort its work‖, arguing 
that only democratic countries be allowed membership.
26
 The US position reflects its 
general approach towards non-democratic regimes. Strong language by its 
representative demonstrates the severe criticism of the Commission within that 
country at that time. 
                                                 
26 Oral statement of US delegate, Commission on Human Rights, 60th Session. 
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Ghanea (2006:699) notes the involvement of non-state actors in membership 
discussion. She comments that those NGOs who had criticised membership of known 
abusers were particularly supportive of the increasing calls for membership criteria.  
NGO criticisms were at times more severe than even state criticisms. Human Rights 
Watch Executive Director, Kenneth Roth, wrote a particularly damning article in 
2001 in which he observed:  
 
―Imagine a jury that includes murderers and rapists, or a police force run in 
large part by suspected murderers and rapists who are determined to stymie 
investigation of their crimes. Sadly, such spectacles are not far from reality at 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights . . . . It features the sordid 
ritual of the world‘s despots and tyrants scrambling to join a commission that 
is tasked with investigating and condemning the world‘s despots and 
tyrants . . . .  Dictatorships are as free as democracies to serve. The latest batch 
of new members illustrates how poorly this system works. They include such 
dubious paragons of human rights virtue as Algeria, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Kenya, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Vietnam. Needless to 
say, such governments do not seek membership out of a commitment to 
promote human rights abroad or to improve their own abysmal human rights 
records. Rather they join the commission to protect themselves from criticism 
and to undermine its work.‖ (Roth, 2001)  
 
Similar observations (e.g. Schoenbaum 2006:250) were made, sometimes in 
less strident fashion, by renowned human rights scholars.  For example Dennis 
(2003:385-386) wrote:  
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―Unfortunately, many UN member states, where human rights are not properly 
accepted and implemented, have realized that the best way to protect oneself 
from scrutiny is to be elected to the Commission and divert attention from 
implementation to the ever greater elaboration of new rights and principles. 
Largely through their efforts, the fifty-eighth session of the Commission saw 
an unprecedented erosion of its prestige and credibility and regression of 
human rights norms.‖  
 
Criticism of Commission membership, then, came mainly from Western states, NGOs 
and observers. Many human rights abusers that sought membership to protect 
themselves from scrutiny were non-Western states, and those countries were therefore 
unlikely to criticise the lack of membership criteria. 
 
1.2.2 Commission Inaction  
Criticism of the Commission‘s failure to take action on grave human rights situations 
emphasised serious failings that significantly contributed to its demise. Lack of action 
in protection of human rights led to accusations that it failed to address human rights 
issues adequately. In 2005, for example, the Commission adopted four resolutions 
against Israel and four against other states (Belarus, Cuba, Democratic People‘s 
Republic of Korea (North Korea), and Myanmar).
27
 The Commission ignored ongoing 
grave violations in other countries such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, or the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, amongst others, largely due to the regional and political 
objectives of Commission members.  
                                                 
27 ECOSOC, ‗Commission on Human Rights: Report on the Sixty-First Session‘, 22 April 2005, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/135, p.xiv  
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Inaction on human rights situations occurred through various means. Ghanea 
(2006:697) comments that abuser states used increasingly ―ingenious‖ methods to 
avoid Commission action. Those methods included withdrawal of draft resolutions, 
blocking action through voting against resolutions, and through misuse of the ―no-
action motion‖, which was a procedural mechanism used by members to vote against 
taking action on a specific agenda item. All were forms of politicisation whereby the 
Commission was used to advance agendas other than its mandated protection and 
promotion of human rights. Regionalism affected the Commission by groups blocking 
action against members. Inaction also occurred because political alliances exerted 
collective strength and influence over proceedings to protect know abusers.  
Powerful states allegedly avoided scrutiny at the Commission due to 
difficulties in holding them accountable for human rights abuses. Power politics 
played a role in ensuring that the most powerful states, especially Russia, China and 
the US, were able to commit violations without Commission condemnation. This was 
illustrated by events in the 2004 session, when a draft resolution against Russia 
regarding grave abuses in the Chechen Republic was rejected;
28
 China successfully 
proposed a no-action motion on a draft resolution regarding its own record;
29
 Cuba 
withdrew a draft resolution against the US regarding Guantanamo when it became 
clear that it lacked support from other states despite approval from experts. 
Moss (2006) attributes lack of action taken at the Commission to broad 
political relations between states. He argues that even liberal democratic states failed 
                                                 
28 CHR Draft Resolution, ‗Situation of human rights in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation‘, 8 
April 2004, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/L.29 , rejected by 23 votes to 12, with 18 abstentions. 
29 CHR Draft Resolution, ‗Situation of human rights in China‘, 9 April 2004, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/L.37. Under 
rule 65 para.2 of the rules of procedure of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council, the 
representative of China moved that the Commission take no decision on the draft resolution, which was carried by 
28 votes to 16, with 9 abstentions. 
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to condemn human rights abuses in other countries where to do so could harm 
interstate relations. Moss comments that economic, security, religious, cultural, and 
other ties, prevented states from insisting upon action being taken against human 
rights violators. In support of this argument, Moss gives the example of the US 
encouraging resolutions against China, Iran, Sudan and Cuba, while simultaneously 
refusing to condemn gross violations in countries with whom it had important 
relations, such as Iraq in 1989. 
Gutter (2003:93-107) notes Lauterpacht‘s criticism of the ―no-power‖ doctrine 
as early as 1947. Lauterpacht (1950:236) described the mechanism as ―an 
extraordinary degree of … abdication of the UN‘s proper functions‖. The no-action 
motion was misused by states seeking protection from Commission scrutiny or action. 
Rahmani-Ocora (2006:16) argued that state misuse of that mechanism impeded the 
Commission‘s fulfilment of its mandate, and encouraged selectivity by allowing states 
to block discussions on gross and systemic violations in, for example, China and 
Sudan. Providing members with a tool for blocking action where sufficient votes 
could be garnered, encouraged abuser states to take collective action protecting each 
other. Misuse of this mechanism by known violators was arguably inevitable once 
such states had gained membership. 
 Human Rights Watch Executive Director Roth criticised the Commission‘s 
inaction:  
 
―Abusive governments can usually be counted on to reject efforts to criticize 
other abusive governments. For example, each year when China lobbies 
against condemnation of its repressive rule it can count on a sympathetic ear 
from the many other abusive countries on the commission . . . . That, in part, is 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.41 
 
why, even in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the 
commission never mustered enough votes to condemn China, and why the 
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein could gas and execute tens of thousands of 
Kurds with impunity before his ill-fated invasion of Kuwait.‖ (Roth, 2001)  
 
NGOs viewed inaction with frustration, arguing that the Commission had 
become a forum for legitimising human rights abuses rather than to take action 
against such situations. Another respected NGO, Reporters Without Borders, was 
similarly critical of the Commission‘s inaction. In its 2003 Report, that NGO 
criticised the political allegiances that blocked the Commission from taking needed 
action against Russia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Cuba, and Iran, for example, where gross 
violations of human rights had occurred. It reported that NGOs had condemned the 
2002 session, but then commented that 2003 was even worse (Buhrer, 2003). 
Politicisation of the Commission and misuse of its procedures resulted in a body that 
was increasingly unable to fulfil its mandate.  
 
1.2.3 Country-Specific Issues 
Country-specific discussions were introduced to allow the Commission to deal with 
specific human rights situations. Such discussions and resolutions allowed the 
Commission to focus on gross and systemic situations and generally poor human 
rights practices within one state. Despite heavy criticism, that practice led to human 
rights improvements within some states. The Working Group on Chile, for example, 
resulted in greater protection from human rights abuses such as enforced 
disappearances. However, successes tended to occur where a state sought assistance, 
as was the case with Chile, or where a state was politically isolated and had few allies 
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to shield it from scrutiny, as occurred with South Africa. Since the Commission‘s 
demise, some observers have continued to express support for the country-specific 
mechanisms. Scannella and Splinter (2007:50) comment that some governments and 
many NGOs regarded country-specific mechanisms as fundamental to the 
Commission‘s work.  
There has been some defence of these resolutions, including a recent study by 
Lebovic and Voeten (2006:861-888) examining which states were the targets of 
country-specific resolutions in the years following the Cold War. Lebovic and Voeten 
conclude that country-specific resolutions resulted from Commission members 
seeking governmental accountability regarding human rights norms. The problem 
with their argument is that many Commission members were themselves not 
upholding the norms and standards that they officially sought to promote through 
country-specific resolutions. Indeed, Lebovic and Voeten‘s argument becomes 
untenable when examining the human rights records of some member states.   
Lebovic and Voeten‘s study seeks to prove that, using country-specific 
mechanisms, ―the commission went after the worst offenders‖ in the post-Cold War 
years (Lebovic & Voeten:884). Indeed the authors argue that country-specific 
resolutions were not used primarily to pursue political objectives, but that the 
Commission targeted states due to their human rights practices rather than according 
to national political motivations. Of course, states targeted under this mechanism can 
be shown to have committed human rights abuses, but so had many other countries 
who were not subject to that scrutiny. Delegates articulated valid human rights 
reasons for targeting specific states, but it is naïve to take at face value the rationales 
put forward by governments, especially those which altogether ignored other similar 
or graver situations. Governments‘ official positions for seeking country-specific 
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resolutions must be read alongside their national policies and objectives. Moreover, 
even where the Commission did target known abusers, that does not entail the 
conclusion that all, or even most, abusers were targeted.  
Lebovic and Voeten attribute the rise in country-specific resolutions in the 
1990s to the emergence of new states following the USSR‘s dissolution. Many of the 
new states still had oppressive governments that failed to comply with international 
human rights standards. The number of country-specific resolutions rose in order to 
deal with this increase in the number of states with gross and systemic violations. The 
authors fail to deal with the more obvious reason for the rise in country-specific 
resolutions, namely that, following the end of the Cold War, states and groups used 
this mechanism to demonstrate their strength during the power struggles occurring 
within the new international atmosphere. 
The authors argue that a country‘s record for repression directly impacted 
upon whether it was punished by the Commission. However, they fail to deal with 
those countries that were not targeted at all, choosing only to look at the ones who 
were raised at the Commission‘s sessions. Therefore, the authors do not deal with the 
biased motives for selecting certain states for country-specific resolutions yet 
simultaneously ignoring other similar, grave situations. Similarly, they recognise that 
the Commission failed to deal with human rights abuses in known abuser states, but 
defend it by arguing that the country-specific mechanisms were used against some 
known abusers (Lebovic & Voeten, 2006:884). This argument misses the point that 
use of the mechanisms was politicised and selective, as only a small number of known 
abuser states were targeted.  ―In practice the Human Rights Commission advanced 
only with studied caution beyond Southern Africa and the territories occupied by 
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Israel‖ (Farer and Gaer, 1993:276). The Commission‘s selection of a few states was 
inadequate as the body altogether ignored so many other human rights abusers.  
Support for country-specific resolutions was not widespread. Despite some 
scholarship such as Lebovic and Voeten‘s study, it has widely been accepted that 
states did indeed often misuse that procedure to attack countries for political purposes. 
Two main criticisms of that mechanism led to two very different approaches about its 
contribution to the Commission‘s demise. One argument, proposed mainly by 
Western states, NGOs and observers, is that this mechanism was used for political 
purposes to take a disproportionate amount of action against politically isolated 
states.
30
 The other argument, put forward by China and its allies in the Like Minded 
Group, an alliance of developing nations led by China, criticised this mechanism as a 
neo-colonial tool used against developing nations. Both views will be further explored 
as weaknesses contributing to the Commission‘s demise.  
Donnelly (1988:288) echoes other writers in observing that ―certain countries 
are singled out, for partisan purposes, to the exclusion of other, no less reprehensible 
regimes.‖ Use of country-specific discussions and resolutions to attack particular 
states was exemplified through their use against Israel. Although most observers 
recognise serious human rights problems in the Israeli Occupied Territories, 
politicisation in this regard occurred to emphasise strength of feeling against that 
country. In particular, many states favoured the return of occupied territories to Syria 
and the creation of a Palestinian state.  The disproportionate focus on Israel ensured 
that the Commission spent time focusing on that one state in order to shield other 
countries from scrutiny owing to limited time at Commission sessions.  
                                                 
30 For example, Franck, (1984: 819-825) examines issues of double standards, in particular regarding the 
Commission‘s treatment of Israel.  
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Dennis (2003:384) noted that ―Israel remains the only country that is subjected 
to multiple resolutions and for which a rapporteur has an open-ended mandate (all the 
other mandates are for one year). It is also the only UN member that remains barred 
from a seat on the Commission (or any other UN body except the General Assembly) 
since it is not a member of a regional group.‖ Israel has been denied membership of 
the Asian Group by Arab members of that group. Although Israel was afforded 
temporary membership of the Western European and Others Group in 2000, 
conditions of that membership include not seeking membership of key rotating seats 
at bodies including ECOSOC and the Human Rights Council. Therefore, despite 
known abusers having the opportunity to sit on the Security Council, hold 
membership of other UN bodies, and generally participate in international affairs, 
Israel is effectively excluded from those bodies where membership is proportionately 
distributed amongst the regional groups. As a result, Israel is regularly reproached in 
international institutions, especially through bodies, such as the Commission, where it 
is effectively barred from membership.  
Ghanea (2006:697) argues that the only countries targeted under country-
specific resolutions were those sufficiently removed from global and regional 
alliances as to allow the international community to take a strong position against 
them without serious repercussions in interstate relations. Power and influence was 
used to focus the Commission‘s attention disproportionately on one state, whilst 
deflecting attention away from other abusers. Misuse in this manner was heavily 
criticised by observers, for example Scannella and Splinter (2007:45) argue that 
politicisation and selectivity, two of the Commission‘s main flaws, were at the heart 
of country-specific discussions. These characteristics took precedence over human 
rights issues during country-specific considerations.  
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 The second criticism of country-specific resolutions came from developing 
states who argued that the resolutions were used by powerful, western states to 
ostracise and oppress developing nations. Alston (2006:196) comments that 
developing countries, led by China, actively sought to eliminate country-specific 
resolutions. The Like Minded Group viewed country-specific resolutions as a form of 
oppression used by the ―West against the rest‖ (Alston, 2006:203-205). China, 
deploying a Third World discourse, encouraged her allies, especially developing and 
ex-colonial states, to join China‘s fight against powerful, rich countries seeking to 
repress poorer, weaker states. China reasoned that use of country-specific resolutions 
against developing states was made worse because that mechanism had been 
introduced, ostensibly, to enable developing nations to fight human rights violations 
by colonial powers (Wheeler, 1999:75-76; Steiner, Alston, & Goodman, 2008:754). 
The discourse was taken up by other states from the South, including Pakistan, Egypt 
and Cuba (e.g. Alston, 2006:205-206), who complained that developing nations were 
―the defendants‖ in the Commission.31  
Despite China‘s reasoning, and the support of at least some states who took a 
post-colonial approach,
32
 China‘s position against the West, specifically the US, 
arguably resulted from an ongoing power struggle. China‘s statement to the 
Commission in 1997 alleged that, since the Cold War, almost all of the country 
resolutions focused on developing nations (Steiner, Alston & Goodman, 2008:791). 
China commented that this caused resentment because Western countries themselves 
had terrible historic human rights records, so they ought not to judge developing 
nations. It further argued that Western nations are responsible for world poverty 
                                                 
31 For Cuban delegate‘s oral remarks, see ‗Commission on Human Rights opens Sixty-First Session‘, 14 March 
2005, UN Doc. HR/CN/1107.  
32 Franck (1982) examines the transposition of western human rights laws on non-western states, exploring issues 
of such human rights laws in developing nations. 
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which leads to human rights violations. China proposed that the Commission should 
encourage democracy, not impose it, and that it should abide by principles of equality 
and mutual respect through dialogue and cooperation, not allow bullying and 
oppression by dominant strong states (Steiner et al, 2008:791-792). China‘s 
arguments not only attacked Western states, but also sought to weaken the application 
of universal human rights, thus undermining the Commission‘s work and mandate.  
Powerful states had long used country-specific resolutions for political 
motives. Alongside the allegations of neo-colonialism was the position that powerful 
countries used this mechanism to further Cold War political agendas. The US attacked 
Cuba both during and after the Cold War. The USSR focused on US allies, such as 
Chile, while ignoring graver situations within the Soviet Union itself.  Despite 
diverging views on the misuse of country-specific resolutions, the main criticisms 
attacked their selective and politicised use. Misuse of country-specific considerations 
undermined the Commission‘s role and function. States‘ misuse of this mechanism to 
achieve political aims affected the body‘s credibility and ability to fulfil its mandate. 
 
1.2.4 Commission‟s Lack of Resources 
A main Commission flaw was insufficient time allocated to deal with human rights 
issues. The Commission held one annual six week session during which it dealt with 
increasing numbers of agenda items each year due to emergence of ever-more human 
rights issues. The Commission‘s annual session was criticised for being too brief. 
Sessions did not allow sufficient time to address all issues raised, let alone to 
adequately deal with them. Observers such as Scannella and Splinter (2007:46) 
emphasise the impact of insufficient time on the Commission‘s work. Scannella and 
Splinter observe that the volume of items of the annual meeting‘s agenda prevented 
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the Commission from adequately addressing any individual issue. Many members 
were unable to participate in all discussions due to delegations lacking resources to 
engage with all agenda items. They argue that informal negotiations became the focal 
point for most states due to the impact these had on formal decision-making. 
 The Commission was ill-equipped to respond to human rights crises as it was 
not a standing-body with its own permanent resources. Crisis situations could not be 
adequately addressed, and sometimes could not even be raised, at an already-packed 
regular session. Rahmani-Ocora (2006:16) comments that the Commission was 
unable to deal with crisis situations, and could not devote sufficient time or attention 
to preventative measures and strategies. The Commission was given the possibility of 
intersessional meetings,
33
 but this rarely occurred in practice.
34
  
It could be argued that the overwhelming amount of human rights issues 
presented to the Commission impeded its work. A different approach was taken by 
HRW‘s Executive Director Roth who suggested that the problem was not a lack of 
resources, but rather politicisation and the refusal of some states to engage with the 
Commission and the resources that body made available:   
 
―Abusive governments have become quite creative in proposing ‗reforms‘ that 
would impair the commission‘s ability to generate pressure on behalf of 
human rights . . . . The abusive governments that flock to the commission 
frequently refuse to cooperate with UN investigators. Cuba refused for years 
                                                 
33 ECOSOC Resolution 1990/48, ‗Enlargement of the Commission on Human Rights and the further promotion of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms‘, 25 May 1990, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, authorised the Commission to 
agree by majority to meet exceptionally for special sessions in order to be able to deal with urgent and acute 
human rights situations.  
34 It met in 1992 regarding the situation in the former Yugoslavia; in 1994 regarding Rwanda; in 1999 regarding 
East Timor; in 2000 regarding the Palestinian people. 
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to allow a visit by the rapporteur assigned to monitor its human rights record. 
China and Algeria are stonewalling on requests for visits by the rapporteur on 
torture. Russia has blocked visits to Chechnya by the rapporteurs on torture 
and extrajudicial execution. The most egregious case was Sudan. When a 
rapporteur denounced its violations of religious freedom, it called him an 
‗enemy of Islam.‘ Yet Sudan was later rewarded for this rejectionism with the 
deputy chairmanship of the commission.‖ (Roth, 2001)  
 
That position demonstrates that the impact of the Commission‘s insufficient resources 
on its ability to fulfil its mandate was often made worse by those countries who were 
most worried about becoming focal points of its work. Scarce resources coupled with 
politicisation resulted in a level of inaction that was heavily criticised in the 
Commission‘s final years.   
 
1.2.5 Regionalism  
Politicisation in the form of regionalism occurred throughout the Commission‘s 
existence, but was a growing concern during the body‘s later years due to it 
increasingly overshadowing the Commission‘s proceedings and work. Regionalism 
was recognised as a main problem at the Commission. Rahmani-Ocora (2006:16) 
comments that the body ―came to resemble a club where friendships easily 
overlooked wrongdoing‖. 
Humphrey (1984:24) recounts that such politicisation took place even during 
the Commission‘s first session. He notes that the Cold War had already started ―and 
all the uncertainties inherent in a new undertaking were compounded by political 
controversy and recrimination.‖ According to Dennis (2003:374), regionalism 
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occurred at the Commission throughout the Cold War. He argues that Western states 
pushed for liberal, democratic institutions that mirrored their political ideology, 
whereas Communist states, following a Marxist discourse, viewed capitalism as the 
main source of human rights violations. That division still exists in the UN human 
rights machinery, although it now takes the form of a North-South divide. 
Weiss (2008:63-64) argues that during the Cold War, developing nations 
would stand at the sidelines, supporting whichever superpower appeared to be 
winning. Indeed some developing states‘ political affiliations led them to participate 
actively in the Cold War. The result, according to Weiss, was ―mainly a shouting 
match‖ with little emphasis placed on providing practical assistance for national 
human rights issues. 
 The Commission was accused of allowing ever greater politicisation through 
regional politics. After the Cold War, regionalism focused solely on protecting group 
members from scrutiny. Wheeler (1999:81), commenting on resolutions about grave 
situations, reports on regional pressure to protect group members. He notes that 
Commission members were regularly encouraged, especially by regional allies, to 
vote against resolutions. Harris (2006) cites examples of regional politics protecting 
states such as Libya, Sudan and Zimbabwe, enabling them to become members and 
indeed leaders at the Commission. The impact of those states gaining membership 
went further than affecting the body‘s credibility, extending to affect NGOs working 
in those countries. Regionalism impacted on the Commission and also on the ability 
to protect and promote human rights on the ground in grave situations. 
 Scannella and Splinter (2007:68-69) describe regionalism at the Commission 
as conducting business using regional groups and other blocs. The impact on 
Commission proceedings resulted in the lowest common denominator being reached 
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within each group, and then a further lowest common denominator negotiated 
between the groups. The authors cite the Commission‘s final session as a ―pathetic 
illustration‖ of regionalism whereby work ―was negotiated through regional groups 
and was totally devoid of substance.‖ (Scannella &Splinter, 2007:68-69) 
Schrijver (2007:812) sets out the Commission‘s main regional alliances in its 
latter years in terms of politicisation of that body, naming Group 77, the Non-Aligned 
Movement, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as newer groups 
opposing the established European Union or the Western bloc. Weiss (2008:37-38) 
notes that India and the Philippines, both during and after Marco‘s rule, constantly 
opposed initiatives which placed protection of individuals over state sovereignty, 
seeking to encourage alliances between developing nations and promote the collective 
Southern agenda of avoiding human rights criticisms from Western nations. Schrijver 
(2007:812) similarly argues that the Commission‘s increased politicisation resulted in 
almost regional battles of ―the Rest against the West‖. Dennis (2003:366), writing 
about the 2002 Commission session where the US was an observer for the first time, 
also singles out the Group 77 as demonstrating regionalism, observing that many 
members supported Cuba‘s position on resolutions out of solidarity with that state 
rather than based on the resolution itself. Weiss (2008:37-38) similarly comments that 
Latin American states sought to shield Cuba, and other repressive Latin American 
regimes, from Commission scrutiny. 
Regionalism did not just occur in relation to groups and blocs from the Global 
South. Western states significantly contributed to the rise of regionalism at the 
Commission. After the adoption, in 1993, of the requirement for a common foreign 
policy, the EU‘s ability to negotiate and compromise with other groups and blocs was 
significantly reduced. That common foreign policy required all EU member states to 
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adhere to an often fragile compromise between members of that bloc (Khaliq, 
2008:88-89). As a result, positions taken by the EU were difficult to amend within the 
Commission without revisiting internal group discussions. Although the EU did not 
abuse its group tactics by advancing political agendas in direct conflict with the 
Commission‘s mandate, the impact of the common foreign policy was significant at 
the Commission. By closing the door to negotiations with non-EU members, that bloc 
paved the way for other groups and blocs to adopt similar, if less-needed, tactics.   
The impact of regionalism, according to Roth, was to create a farcical body 
where human rights abusers used alliances to block scrutiny: 
 
―[A] mafia-like code of silence reigns in Geneva, with one abuser covering for 
another, knowing that, when necessary, the favor will be reciprocated. It 
would be a mistake to attribute responsibility for this sorry state of affairs to 
the United Nations itself. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the human rights 
commissioner, Mary Robinson, have spoken out with unprecedented candor 
on behalf of human rights. Rather, blame lies with the member states, the 
governments that allow this farce to continue year after year.‖ (Roth, 2001) 
 
Regionalism may attract heavy criticism, but any political body consisting of 
proportionate geographic representation will find that its members divide into regional 
groups and alliances. Regionalism is a form of power struggle, and also a method by 
which states with similar positions on issues can support each other. Regionalism is a 
form of politicisation. Commission mechanisms, such as the no-action motion, 
allowed regionalism to dominate proceedings and to politicise that body to such an 
extent as to attract severe criticism from states and observers. 
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Chapter 2 – Reforming the UN Principal Charter-Based Human 
Rights Body 
 
2.1 Reform Proposals  
Reforms were proposed, and implemented, at various points throughout the 
Commission‘s existence. More concerted reform efforts occurred during its final 
decade. After the Cold War, focus on human rights magnified. Previously, human 
rights issues were used as a pawn in that conflict or were marginalised as security 
issues were prioritised. As attention grew on human rights issues, ensuring major 
Commission reform became a key goal of certain states and observers. Debate on 
major criticisms of the Commission was ignited after the US failed in its 2001 re-
election bid. Those discussions paved the way for increasing numbers of more 
concrete reform proposals.  
Proposals were generated in the Commission‘s final years in various ways. 
The UN as a whole was debating reform proposals as the organisation neared its 60
th
 
anniversary. The Secretary General set out more specific proposals regarding the 
Commission as part of these general reforms. Of course, there were states, non-state 
actors, and observers, including legal scholars, who set out complementary or 
competing proposals. Reform proposals occurred within a relatively short timeframe, 
providing impetus for change that had not previously existed despite reform 
discussions being part of the public discourse for some time (Alston, 2006:223).  
 Reform proposals (cf. Hampson, 2007) are key to understanding the Council 
because they demonstrate the main issues to be dealt with in disbanding the 
Commission and creating the Council. Some radical proposals display the impetus for 
definitive change that could have altered the UN human rights machinery. However, 
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many reform proposals were ignored or diluted, leaving issues unresolved, much to 
the Council‘s detriment. Reform proposals can be examined in three stages: recurring 
Commission reforms, general UN reform proposals affecting the Commission, and 
specific proposals that led to the HRC‘s creation. 
 
2.1.1 Recurring Reforms  
Over six decades the Commission underwent major reforms. The changes included 
increased membership and new mechanisms. Reform processes were not always 
coherent, instead often occurring on an ad hoc basis. As a result, not all reform 
proposals were acted upon, even where to do so would have improved that body‘s 
work. Ghanea (2006:695) observes that reform of the Commission had taken place at 
the body for some time, but that those reforms had been sporadic and focused on 
procedural issues rather than dealing with the salient issues.  
The Commission originally had 18 members. The membership expanded to 
reflect the organisation‘s increased membership. States were keen to be involved at 
the Commission, reflecting both the importance of its work, but also states‘ reticence 
to relinquish control over domestic human rights issues to a few, non-geographically 
representative countries. Alston (1992:194) notes that the Commission membership 
expanded gradually, with each increase citing the need for more equitable geographic 
representation. Increased membership allowed a cross-section of political systems to 
gain access to the Commission. Failure to increase membership, especially as the 
Commission predominantly consisted of Western states, would have appeared as 
attempts by developed states to interfere with the internal affairs of newly self-
determined nations.  
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Increased membership had negative impacts on the body‘s work. 
Representation of various cultures and systems made the Commission‘s work more 
difficult owing to competing positions being taken by governments on human rights 
issues. Politicisation increased with the number of members, as more national agendas 
were brought into proceedings. Regionalism increased as the more members there 
were, the more countries belonged to groups and alliances. Howard Tolley (1987:154) 
described Commission efforts at institutional developments as ―largely futile‖ due to 
―irreconcilable differences between the blocs about both means and ends‖. 
Two procedural reforms had a significant impact on the Commission‘s work 
and on its demise. Two separate complaints mechanisms were created: the 1235 
Procedure in 1967
35
 and the 1503 Procedure in 1970.
36
  The 1235 Procedure 
authorised the Commission to hold an annual, public debate on country-specific 
violations (para.1). The ECOSOC Resolution establishing the Procedure authorised 
the Commission to examine information on ―gross‖ human rights violations (para.2), 
and to respond to situations with a ―consistent pattern‖ of abuses (para.3). That 
language, first mentioned in Resolution 1235 increasingly became central to the 
Commission‘s mission, and to human rights generally. Although there is no legally-
defined category of ―gross and systemic‖ human rights violations (cf. Rombouts, 
2004:10), the language has widely been used when identifying particularly grave 
human rights situations. ECOSOC Resolution 1503 enabled confidential complaints 
to be made about ―a consistent pattern of gross‖ violations committed by a state 
(para.1). The 1503 Procedure authorised the Commission to undertake country-
specific investigations where necessary (paras.6 & 7).  
                                                 
35 See text accompanying note 19 supra. 
36 See text accompanying note 20 supra. 
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These procedural developments allowed the Commission to circumscribe the 
original decision, in 1947, not to take action or complaints relating to country-specific 
human rights. At the Commission‘s outset, Western states had insisted that focusing 
on individual states would undermine the Commission‘s work and could result in bias 
and politicisation. Many of those states were themselves imperial powers which, 
arguably, sought to avoid scrutiny of violations occurring within their colonies. As the 
Commission expanded to include decolonised states, the body faced increasing 
pressure to address country-specific human rights violations and condemn colonial 
abuses. Scholars have attributed creation of the 1235 and 1503 Procedures to that 
pressure from new developing nations supported by Eastern European states (cf. 
Wheeler, 1999: 75-76). As weak states, these countries required tools to counter 
human rights violations especially in Southern Africa. ECOSOC Resolution 1235 
referred to ―the policy of apartheid‖ and identifying the government of South Africa 
in two out of six paragraphs. The procedures were created ―to pursue the struggle 
against racist and colonialist policies‖ (Steiner et al, 2008:754). Many developing 
states used a post-colonial discourse to underscore the struggle between nations and 
their former empirical masters. The 1235 and 1503 procedures allowed public 
scrutiny of violations committed by colonial powers in the developing world. Indeed, 
these mechanisms were seen as providing tools to be used in power struggles by new, 
weak states against established, powerful nations.  
Scrutiny extended to all states, not just colonial territories, at the insistence of 
Western nations who sought to deflect the spotlight away from colonial practices 
(Farer & Gaer, 1993:274). Western states also sought to ensure that the Commission 
scrutinised human rights violations occurring within decolonised states which, 
typically, had limited capabilities for human rights compliance. Ultimately the Special 
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Procedures system stemmed from individual mandates established under those 
procedures. These mechanisms were eventually misused, with politicisation, bias and 
selectivity particularly prevalent with regard to the country-specific mandates 
established under the 1503 Procedure.  
Several states and observers insisted that the UN and its organs should be used 
to enable emerging nations in their struggle against oppressive powers and assist in 
their capacity-building, as opposed to focusing on criticising underdeveloped national 
human rights systems. UN emphasis on capacity-building took hold in the 1990s, and 
increasing provision of assistance with capacity-building has continued since that 
time. Former-High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, insisted that 
capacity-building was key for preventing human rights violations.
37
 The United 
Nations Development Programme defines capacity-building as ―the process through 
which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the 
capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time‖.38 
Capacity-building provides a strong mechanism through which states may exercise 
their right to development (cf. Eade, 1997). Known human rights abusers, however, 
have increasingly called for ―capacity-building‖ in order to avoid scrutiny by UN 
human rights bodies, as will be explored in Chapter 8 with regard to Sudan. 
Another major reform proposal resulted in the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights being created. The 1993 World Conference in 
Vienna appointed a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali reminded the conference of the desperate need for a concerted 
                                                 
37 Mary Robinson, ‗Human Rights: Challenges for the 21st Century‘, First Annual Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture, 1 
October 1998. 
38 United Nations Development Programme, ‗Capacity Development Practice Note‘, May 2008, pp.4-5, available 
at http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/sofia/CD%20PN%20May%202008.pdf 
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response to various, but poorly co-ordinated, UN procedures. Appointment of the 
UNHCHR led to reform of the Department for Human Rights (now called OHCHR).  
Citing the Capacity Study (Jackson, 1969), Smithers (1979:32) argues that 
piecemeal reform, due to a lack of general reform, tends to do an international 
organisation more damage than good. Commission reforms occurred in a haphazard 
manner, reflecting the body‘s many tensions not least due to growth in UN 
membership. Reforms occurred in response to UN and international political change, 
rather than as part of a coherent framework. Rahmani-Ocora (2006:16) comments that 
the Commission debated a range of reform proposals but did not implement reforms 
that could effectively impact upon the body‘s work. That failure led to the Secretary-
General‘s suggestion that the Commission be disbanded and replaced by a new UN 
human rights body.  
 
2.1.2 Inclusion of Commission in General UN Reform Proposals  
Reforming the UN was an oft-raised issue between 1996 and 2006. Schrijver 
(2007:812) notes that reforming the Commission became part of those general UN 
reform discussions. Reforming the Commission was discussed although, as Gutter 
(2006:93-94) notes, the objective was not to replace the body. Debate focused on the 
need to depoliticise the Commission‘s work in order to allow better fulfilment of the 
body‘s mandate. Commission politicisation and its use by members to advance 
national political agendas had become a recognised problem. Despite a lack of 
coherent reform strategies for the Commission, Steiner et al (2008:814) note that 
support for the Commission was limited to a very small number of states and NGOs. 
As a result, the Commission‘s ―death knell soon started to be heard.‖ Lack of support 
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for the Commission indicated that reform proposals were insufficient, and that 
attention should focus on Commission abolition and creation of a new body. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave a speech to the General Assembly in 
September 2003 in which he recognised need for reforms on the UN collective 
security mandate.
39
 Annan identified that collective security was inherently linked 
with, amongst others, ―development and poverty eradication [and] the struggle for 
human rights, democracy and good governance.‖40 In order to implement UN reforms, 
Annan established a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2003. 
He insisted that the Panel was needed to ―assess current threats to international peace 
and security; to evaluate how our existing policies and institutions have done in 
addressing those threats; and to make recommendations for strengthening the United 
Nations‖.41 After the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York City, in a 
political atmosphere dominated by terrorism issues, global security had become an 
area with wide-reaching consequences for human rights. The High Level Panel was 
an appropriate place to discuss human rights due to its relationship with security 
issues at that time. ―Collective security for all‖ refers as much to human rights 
violations as to war and terrorism. Discussions reflected the change in UN focus from 
interstate war after the Second World War to recognition of other global issues, such 
as human rights, that impacted upon states‘ collective security.  
The idea for the Commission‘s replacement with the Human Rights Council 
was originally a Swiss initiative that began to be developed after the Commission‘s 
59
th
 Session. The Swiss government asked the Bern Institute of Public Law to 
                                                 
39 The Secretary- General Address to the General Assembly New York, 23 September 2003, available at 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm 
40 Id. 
41 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‗A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility‘, Note by the Secretary-General, 2 December 2004, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, para.3 
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produce reform proposals regarding the UN human rights body (Brülhart, 2007:16). 
Walter Kälin and Cecilia Jimenez produced a draft proposal which contained the idea 
of creating a Human Rights Council to replace the Commission (Brülhart, 2007:16). 
A proposal to that effect was put forward by Swiss Ambassador Calmy-Rey at the 
body‘s 60th Session.42  
The Swiss initiative was discussed by the High Level Panel but was reported 
not to have been unanimously accepted by states or non-state actors (Scannella & 
Splinter, 2007:68-69). Scannella and Splinter (2007:68-69) assert that some states 
viewed it as an opportunity to strengthen and improve the UN human rights 
machinery, while others argued that the proposal risked the UN‘s principal human 
rights body which had continuously developed throughout the UN‘s existence.  
In 2004 the Panel published its report ―A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility‖.43 Although the Panel did not formally recommend the Commission‘s 
abolition, Ghanea (2006:698) traces the Council‘s creation to that report, arguing that 
it signalled the end of the Commission. The report stated that the Commission had 
lost credibility and professionalism.
44
 It further noted that ―in recent years States have 
sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect 
themselves against criticism or to criticize others‖.45 However, rather than 
recommending its abolition, the report called for reform of the Commission.
46
 In 
particular, it recommended expansion of the Commission to universal membership
47
 
in order to deal with the various criticisms regarding that body‘s membership. 
                                                 
42 Oral Statement of Swiss Ambassador Calmy-Rey, ‗Commission on Human Rights Sixtieth Session: Summary 
Record of the 4th Meeting‘, 17 March 2004, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/SR.4 
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Moreover, it further proposed that all Commission members ―designate prominent 
and experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations‖48 which 
directly addressed criticisms regarding state delegates. Gutter notes that various 
recommendations that were put forward on which no consensus could be found. 
Alston (2006:197) comments that the High Level Panel chose not to set membership 
criteria despite the many issues raised regarding the Commission‘s membership. The 
High Level Panel determined that membership criteria would not solve these issues, 
and that they regarded setting membership criteria as risking further politicisation. 
The High Level Panel, having noted the Commission‘s decreasing credibility, 
accused the body of failing to fulfil its mandate. Owing to the integral problems at the 
Commission, including its double standards and lack of professionalism, the Panel 
discussed its abolition and replacement (Ghanea, 2006:698). Crucially, the report did 
not recommend the Commission‘s abolition and replacement with a Human Rights 
Council, but instead simply encouraged states to, in the longer term, ―consider 
upgrading the Commission to become a ‗Human Rights Council‘ that is no longer 
subsidiary to the Economic and Social Council but a Charter body‖.49  
Reforming the Commission was an attractive option to those states that had 
used the Commission to shelter from scrutiny. Proposals for a substantially different 
body, where politicisation and regionalism would be marginalised, threatened to 
undermine states‘ position within the UN human rights framework. Non-democratic 
and known abuser states felt threatened by the proposals, and instead advocated 
reforming the old body. Other states argued that the Commission was an effective 
body in need of reform rather than replacement. Those positions were not adopted by 
the majority of states, nor indeed by the UN Secretary-General for whom creation of 
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the Council became a priority. Despite the lack of consensus, and the Panel‘s failure 
to recommend such action in its final report, the Swiss delegation again proposed 
creating a Human Rights Council at the Commission‘s 61st Session.50  
 
2.1.3 Specific Proposals  
At the Commission‘s 61st Session Swiss Ambassador Calmy-Rey reiterated the idea 
of replacing the Commission with a Human Rights Council. Five days later, Kofi 
Annan dealt with that same topic in the 2005 report ―In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Security, Development and Human Rights for All‖.51 The Secretary-General argued 
that human rights could not become secondary to security or development issues, and 
must be at the fore of all UN activities. Annan emphasised the importance of human 
rights by reiterating its position as the third pillar of the United Nations.
52
 Annan 
underlined the interdependence of security, development and human rights, insisting 
that none could be achieved without the others.
53
 The report recognised the expansion 
of human rights within the UN system, emphasising that new and old mechanisms, 
such as technical support or institution building, would not succeed ―where the basic 
principle of protection is being actively violated‖.54 Despite dealing with various 
aspects of the UN human rights machinery, the strongest reform proposals were 
directed towards the Commission. Annan acknowledged this in a speech to the 
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Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting‘, 14 March 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/SR.3  
51 General Assembly, ‗In larger freedom; towards development, security and human rights for all‘ Report of the 
Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005 
52 Id., para.183 
53 Id., para.17 
54 Id., para.143 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.63 
 
Commission the following month, saying that these were the report‘s ―most dramatic‖ 
proposals.
55
  
Criticising the Commission‘s lack of credibility, Annan argued that it ―casts a 
shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.‖56 The Secretary-
General proposed replacing the Commission with a smaller body, a proposal in stark 
contrast with the High Level Panel‘s reform proposals for the Commission‘s 
membership to become universal. In his explanatory note
57
 Annan explained that a 
smaller body would allow ―more focused debate and discussions.‖58 It was 
recommended that the body be either a primary organ, equal to the Security Council 
and ECOSOC, or a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. Creating a primary 
organ would have elevated the status of human rights within the UN, but would have 
presented practical difficulties, as it would have required amendments to the UN 
Charter. 
On 20 June 2005, the Commission held informal consultations
59
 with states 
and the High Commissioner for Human Rights
60
 on the recommendations from ―In 
Larger Freedom‖ and the Explanatory Note. While many states supported the 
Commission‘s replacement, and the elevation of the Council to a standing body,61 
several delegations were sceptical about whether those steps would overcome the 
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57 General Assembly, Addendum to ‗In larger freedom; towards development, security and human rights for all‘ 
Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.1 
58 Id., para.4 
59 GA; ECOSOC, ‗Summary of the open-ended informal consultations held by the Commission on Human Rights 
pursuant to Economic and Social Council Decision 2005/217, prepared by the Chairperson of the sixty-first 
session of the Commission‘. 21 June 2005, UN Doc. A/59/847; E/2005/73 
60 Id., para.4 
61 Id., para.12 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.64 
 
Commission‘s shortcomings.62 Moreover, the view was expressed that reform of the 
Commission was more appropriate than its abolition.
63
 Issues discussed included, 
amongst others, the role and functions of the proposed new body, possible new 
mechanisms, and the body‘s status and composition. Divergence of opinion was 
common throughout the discussions with states frequently expressing opposed views 
on key issues. Those differences continued throughout negotiations on the Resolution 
establishing the Council, and were manifested in the body‘s early sessions through 
contrasting approaches to the Council‘s mandate, work and proceedings. 
In 2005, the General Assembly held its 60
th
 Session during which a High 
Level Plenary meeting took place. The 2005 World Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, brought together world leaders and agreed on fundamental changes and 
pledges relating to the UN‘s mandate. The Secretary-General‘s Explanatory Note had 
identified key issues regarding the Council to be discussed by states and non-state 
actors before the 2005 World Summit.
64
 Those issues included the Council‘s mandate 
and function, composition, size and whether it would be a principal or subsidiary 
body.  
The World Summit sought to address issues within the UN human rights 
machinery by creating a new Human Rights Council to address ―violations of human 
rights, including gross and systemic violations, and make recommendations 
thereon.‖65 Schoenbaum (2006:277) insists that ―regretfully this tepid idea does not 
address the real problems: the hypocrisies of the U.N. Human Rights Commission‖. 
Indeed, little was mentioned as to the Commission‘s failings nor how they would be 
overcome at a new body. The Human Rights Council was briefly mentioned in the 
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World Summit‘s Outcome Document,66 saying generally that its mandate would 
include promoting and protecting human rights and addressing situations of gross 
violations. The World Summit requested that the GA conduct negotiations to establish 
the HRC‘s practicalities and to create the body.67  
Recommendations on three key areas can be examined from the years leading 
to the Council‘s creation. The three main proposal areas reflect the most severe 
criticisms of the Commission: membership and election, mechanisms and 
proceedings, and universal periodic review.  
2.1.3.1. Membership and Election   
Membership issues, as already discussed, were a serious concern that undermined the 
Commission‘s credibility. A major area for reform focused on membership and 
elections to the new body. Alston (2006:189) comments that debates on the number of 
members, criteria, if any, for membership, and election processes, dominated the 
reform discussions. The emphasis placed on these issues reflected the gravity of 
concerns of almost all states and regional groups.  
 One significant issue was the number of Council members. The Commission, 
as previously explained, had expanded from 18 to 53 states reflecting increased UN 
membership. The High Level Panel recommended universal membership
68
 in order to 
―get rid of the politicization‖ and ―underscore universal commitment to the Charter‖ 
(Ghanea, 2006:699-700). It aimed to remove attention from national political agendas 
and refocus it on human rights issues.  Kofi Annan took the opposite approach, 
proposing that the Council be composed of 15 states as compared with the 
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Commission‘s 53.69 This proposal was Annan‘s only real dissent from the Panel‘s 
recommendations. A smaller body reflected prioritising fulfilment of mandate over 
power struggles and advancing national agendas. Fewer members would result in 
fewer national policies being represented at the body. Decreasing membership would 
eliminate some of the power struggles affecting the body‘s work. Although politics 
could not be entirely divorced from the body without changing its composition, 
impact of national agendas could have been minimised through limiting membership 
to a few states.  Annan‘s recommendation demonstrated his desire that the Council 
focus more on fulfilling its mandate and less on politics. 
Most states involved in the Commission‘s informal consultations on the 
creation of the Council recommended a larger membership for reasons of 
transparency and inclusion of developing nations.
70
 However, some states supported 
Annan‘s proposals citing issues of efficiency and effectiveness and reduction of 
politicisation.
71
 Membership numbers were discussed by Kälin and Jimenez (2003:6-
7). They noted that while a smaller body would work more efficiently, the underlying 
political tensions would remain. Kälin and Jimenez took a realist approach; 
disagreements would always occur between states at such a body owing to its role and 
functions. Without legally binding powers - which was not formally recommended by 
anyone involved in the reform proposals - the body would remain a political arena at 
times used by states to advance national agendas. They recommended that 
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membership numbers not be altered, as they argued that a smaller membership would 
not produce any changes in this regard.  
Another discussion focused on membership criteria. The High Level Panel‘s 
2004 proposals had rejected membership criteria ―because it believed it would risk 
politicizing the Commission yet further.‖ (Ghanea, 2006:699-700)  Representatives 
from post-colonial states or developing nations would argue that membership criteria 
favours one particular political system, negating the body‘s credibility as an 
international organisation. The majority of states were not in favour of election 
criteria (Rahmani-Ocora, 2006:17), or proposed that soft criteria, such as voluntary 
pledges and commitments, would be preferable.
72
 Rahmani-Ocora argued that it 
would be impossible to have membership criteria as there is no single universal view 
of human rights, and all states could be shown to violate the UDHR in some manner.  
 In 2004 the US proposed that only ―real democracies‖ should be granted 
membership.
73
 That proposal reflected the idea that democratic values underpin much 
of the field of human rights. Indeed, that view is supported by both the Commission 
and the General Assembly having adopted a number of resolutions reaffirming that 
democracy is important for the protection of other rights (Khaliq, 2008:72-74). A 
main problem with the US proposal is that it would not have gained sufficient 
support, as most states would not meet this criterion. Other proposals built on the US 
proposal, or at least called for membership criteria along similar lines. Human Rights 
Watch (2003) initially asserted - although they later amended these proposals in 2006 
when it became clear that they would not be adopted - that membership criteria should 
include ratification of core human right treaties, compliance with reporting 
                                                 
72 Id., para.33 
73 Ambassador Richard Williams, US Representative to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, US 
Government Delegation to the 60th Commission on Human Rights, discussion on ‗Item 4: Report of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights (2004). 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.68 
 
obligations, and lack of recent condemnation by the Commission, amongst others. 
Rahmani-Ocora (2006:17) suggested that excluding certain states from membership, 
such as countries with recent human rights resolution passed about them, would 
increase the body‘s credibility.  
 Alston (2005-2006:58-59) noted the difficulty with only including states with 
good human rights records or democratic countries. He argues that excluding known 
abusers was both impractical and undesirable, politically and diplomatically, as it 
would instead create an exclusive and homogenous regime, consisting primarily of 
Western states, imposing international human rights law. From the point of view of 
developing nations, exclusionary membership criteria would result in a body with 
homogenous membership, thus undermining its credibility. 
Protecting and promoting universal human rights standards requires a 
representative membership for the body to have legitimacy in the eyes of all states. 
Excluding certain political systems or groups of states reinforces arguments that 
human rights are used to oppress developing or non-democratic countries. A non-
representative human rights body would serve to strengthen the position that human 
rights are a preserve of Western and developed UN member states. However, 
excluding countries from standing for election is fundamentally at odds with the key 
UN Charter principle of sovereign equality of member states. That crucial principle is 
the basis for the UN‘s legitimacy as a universal organisation, and the notion of its 
principal human rights body overriding that principle directly contradicts the Charter 
itself. Moreover, exclusionary tactics would similarly contravene the need to balance 
the legitimacy of UN bodies with member states. A main mechanism for legitimacy 
rests on membership of UN bodies, particularly principal ones, being open to all states 
to seek membership.  
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 An alternative proposal regarding membership focused on positive criteria 
rather than exclusionary ones. Kälin and Jimenez (2003:6-7) give examples, including 
ratifying UN human rights treaties and having national human rights institutions. 
They argue that agreement amongst the majority of states is necessary in order to 
protect and promote human rights, and that excluding states from the debate 
undermines the ability to achieve that consensus.   
Membership criteria would potentially allow powerful states to ensure that 
only their allies are granted membership, and that their positions are supported. One 
way of ensuring that powerful states could not control membership was distributing 
seats in a geographically proportionate manner. Rahmani-Ocora (2006:17) observes 
that proportionate geographic representation would stop any one region from 
dominating proceedings, thus maintaining the body‘s credibility.  
Reforms to the electoral process were proposed as another method for 
improving credibility and work of the UN human rights body. The Secretary-General 
insisted that the Human Rights Council ―must be a society of the committed‖.74 Such 
language was used to emphasise the need for elections to focus on states‘ commitment 
to human rights. Kofi Annan argued that, in order to be more accountable and 
representative than the Commission, ―those elected [to the HRC] should have a solid 
record of commitment to the highest human rights standards‖. He proposed election 
by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly would make the body more 
accountable and representative.
75
 Requiring a large majority would stop the practice 
of electing members based on political alliances, and instead focus attention on 
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positive criteria for membership. That would result in stronger international support 
for, and greater legitimacy of, the UN human rights body. 
Other proposals also focused on electoral rules ensuring better human rights 
credentials of member states. Amnesty International called for electoral rules that 
would encourage members‘ commitment to human rights protection and promotion. 
The NGO suggested that each state‘s election require a two-thirds majority of the 
General Assembly (Amnesty International, 2005). Rahmani-Ocora (2006:17) 
suggested that the OHCHR should publish reports on the human rights records of all 
potential members in order to assist in the election process. Publication of such 
reports would be used to encourage other states to not elect members that the OHCHR 
classified as having a dubious record. 
 
2.1.3.2 Mechanisms and Proceedings 
Another area requiring reform was the body‘s mechanisms and proceedings. 
Rahmani-Ocora (2006:17), amongst others, suggested that the Council could 
overcome the Commission‘s flaws by being a principal organ of the UN. Indeed, in 
May 2005 the Secretary-General commented that the Council ought to be a principal 
UN organ in order to ―raise human rights to the priority accorded to it in the 
Charter‖.76 As a principal organ, the Council would have independence, resources and 
powers not available to the Commission. As mentioned, however, that shift would 
have required changes to the UN Charter, a matter not easily undertaken. The 
Secretary-General emphasised the need for the new Council to be a standing-body, 
with a permanent meeting place and specific resources entirely devoted to it (Ghanea, 
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2006:701-702). In the ―In Larger Freedom‖ Report, Annan recommended that the 
HRC become a standing body through being either a UN principal organ or a General 
Assembly subsidiary body.
77
 Rahmani-Ocora (2006:19) insists that, as a standing 
body, the Council would be better equipped than the Commission to respond to crises. 
The Secretary-General asserted that, if the UN is ―to meet the expectations of men 
and women everywhere‖ and is ―to take the cause of human rights as seriously as 
those of security and development,‖ the Council must be a standing body.  
 Another improvement made by the HRC being a standing body would be that 
it could have regular meetings dealing with an ongoing agenda. The HRC could also 
reconvene at short notice to deal with crises situations. The emphasis on the body‘s 
ability to do more than simply ―fight fires‖ reflected an ongoing impetus that the 
Council‘s mandate be extended to include both human rights protection and 
promotion. That shift to a dual mandate will be explored later in detail. The 
Commission‘s informal consultations highlighted the need to increase the body‘s 
capacities for standard-setting, assistance and other forms of human rights 
promotion.
78
 Moreover, regular meetings would allow the Council to investigate 
grave and crisis situations, increasing its capacity in relation to human rights 
protection.  
Proposals for a standing body meeting regularly would, however, emphasise 
the difference in resources between powerful and weak states. Poorer countries would 
be unable to afford permanent delegations, or at least those of the size and expertise of 
richer countries. Impact on power struggles would demonstrate the difference in 
member states‘ resources and personnel, and their ability to engage with the Council 
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and its work. The EU proposed between 4 and 6 annual sessions lasting a minimum of 
12 weeks in total. As a group of powerful and rich nations, the EU was less concerned 
with state resources than many of those opposing longer and more frequent sessions. 
Other states proposed fewer sessions with less minimum weeks, although almost all 
agreed on the necessity of regular sessions and the ability to convene special sessions 
at the request of the Council. Proposals focused on how to convene special sessions in 
order to be able to respond to grave crises without allowing the sessions to become a 
political tool used to further national agendas. A balance was needed to determine 
how many members should call for a session to ensure that it was not used as a tool 
for politicisation. 
2.1.3.3 Peer Review of States‟ Human Rights 
Perhaps the most innovative reform proposals focused on peer review of all states‘ 
human rights records. Universal review was proposed to combat criticisms levelled at 
the Commission‘s members and at its monitoring work. Underlying this mechanism 
were the principle of universal standards and the practical approach of ensuring 
compliance with such norms. State and non-state actors constantly expressed the need 
for cooperation and consent of the states being reviewed, emphasising the need for an 
inclusive and interactive approach.
79
  Needless to say, any such criterion of sovereign 
consent effectively authorises the worst abusers to eschew scrutiny. 
Compliance with human rights monitoring, let alone standards, was sorely 
lacking amongst some Commission members. States would refuse entry to experts 
and mandate holders, or even ignore their requests, where monitoring conflicted with 
national agendas. Rahmani-Ocora (2006:17) observes that states‘ attitudes towards 
human rights monitoring had to change in order for the Council to overcome the 
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Commission‘s failings. Peer review was the main proposal for changing attitudes 
towards human rights evaluation.  
The Secretary-General introduced the concept of universal peer review as part 
of his proposal to disband the Commission and create a replacement body. The High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, emphasised the importance of peer 
review in her speech at the Commission‘s final session. Arbour acknowledged that no 
intergovernmental human rights body could, or even should, be devoid of national 
politics. Arbour insisted that peer review, alongside other reforms, would combat 
politicisation, allowing the new body to deal with human rights in a non-selective and 
credible manner (Rahmani-Ocora, 2006:20). It was perhaps naïve to suggest that even 
a perfect peer review system could combat politicisation. Selectivity and bias had 
occurred not only due to known abusers being members of the Commission, but also 
through regionalism and power politics. Whilst peer review might discourage abusers 
from seeking election, that only deals with part of the politicisation issue. Arbour, and 
indeed other peer review proponents, also failed to confront the possibility that the 
review mechanism itself would be subject to selectivity. 
Annan recommended that peer review be truly universal, with all UN member 
states being reviewed regarding all human rights obligations.
80
 Emphasis was placed 
on the voluntary involvement of states in discussions and cooperation with the 
reviewers. Although great support was expressed, states disagreed on the standards by 
which countries‘ human rights records were judged. Proposals ranged from judging 
states against their own human rights commitments to holding all states accountable 
against a proscribed international standard. Ensuring impartiality and transparency 
was hoped to minimise politicisation issues. However, without concrete proposals on 
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how the review mechanism would work in practice, peer review remained conceptual. 
Creation of the Council provided the opportunity for this and other proposals to be 
discussed as practical, rather than theoretical, matters. 
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Chapter 3 – Creation and Mandate 
 
In this chapter, I shall examine the Council‘s mandate as set out in its constituent 
instrument, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. In order to explore the 
mandate, I shall first set out the main provisions of Resolution 60/251, analysing 
whether they have significantly addressed the Commission‘s failings. The leading 
changes found in Resolution 60/251 are the HRC‘s founding principles, membership 
and election issues, procedures and mechanism, and the universal periodic review 
mechanism. Those changes reflect some of the most serious criticisms levelled at the 
Commission before and during reform negotiations. I shall explore whether 
Resolution 60/251 addressed the Commission‘s flaws whilst retaining its positive 
attributes, or whether it did not go far enough to adequately overcome criticisms of 
that body.  I shall then examine the Council‘s mandate under Resolution 60/251. The 
resolution sets out what the Council is mandated to do; the manner in which it is 
mandated to achieve those ends; the mechanisms it is mandated to use or create; and 
the powers afforded to the Council, including exploration of which powers it has not 
been given.  
 
3.1 Background to GA Resolution 60/251 
Negotiations on the new Human Rights Council took place between 2005 and 2006. 
Discussions focused on the body‘s composition, procedures, and functions, and on 
which aspects of the Commission should be retained, removed or reformed at the new 
body. The result was Resolution 60/251, creating the Council. Alston (2006:186) 
maintains that there was general agreement on the Commission‘s failure, the need to 
establish a new body, and the requirement to strengthen UN human rights machinery. 
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However, he observes that there were serious disagreements about why the 
Commission failed and what the Council should do to overcome these flaws. Alston 
(2006:186) argues that the final resolution only gave broad guidelines regarding the 
Council‘s procedural and institutional arrangements because of this failure to agree on 
what had previously gone wrong with the human rights body. 
Compromise was key to negotiations on the final text of Resolution 60/251. 
Controversial issues included the suspension clause, membership and election, and the 
UPR. However, the compromise agreement satisfied most, if not all, states. The US 
voted against the Council‘s creation. Crook (2006:697-699) commented that, despite 
the US strongly advocating replacing the Commission, it did not believe Resolution 
60/251 sufficiently safeguarded against states with poor human right records 
becoming members of the HRC.
81
 The US had supported the Secretary-General‘s 
proposal that for states to be elected they must secure a two thirds majority of the 
General Assembly. The US also proposed excluding known gross and systemic 
human rights abusers from membership. Neither of those proposals appeared in the 
final text of the Resolution. Ambassador John Bolton commented that the US ―did not 
have sufficient confidence…to be able to say that the HRC would be better than its 
predecessor.‖82 Despite voting against the resolution, the United States did not seek to 
introduce proposed changes to the draft resolution, a tactic that would have derailed 
the entire process (Maurer, 2007:35). The US nevertheless did not withdraw funds 
from the Council despite voting against its creation. Therefore, observers have argued 
that the US position was, in fact, a ―soft no‖ (Maurer, 2007:35).  
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On 15 March 2006 the General Assembly passed Resolution 60/251, 
establishing the Council. Resolution 60/251 is a constituent document that creates the 
Council as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. Article 22 of the UN Charter 
gives the General Assembly the power to ―establish such subsidiary organs as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions.‖ Subsidiary organs assist the 
GA in carrying out its tasks (Goodrich, et al, 1969:186).  The Council assists the 
Assembly in fulfilling its mandate on human rights through providing a subsidiary 
body solely focusing on human rights issues. 
There are various types of GA subsidiary organs (Simma, 1995:423-426), but 
all are subordinate to the Assembly. Subordination is a legal characteristic of these 
subsidiary organs (Simma, 1995:430-431), with the General Assembly retaining 
organisational power and control over the bodies‘ structure and activities. For 
example, the GA votes to elect the Council‘s members; has the power to suspend a 
Council member; may dictate which situations the body must address; and receives an 
annual report from the Council. According to Simma, (1995:431), the GA has 
―loosened its institutional relationship with the semi-autonomous organs‖, allowing 
them a wide degree of autonomy. Indeed, they are given similar powers to specialised 
agencies, (Simma, 1995:431-432). Regardless of that autonomy, the Council does 
directly report back to, and rely on, the General Assembly. The Council‘s lack of 
autonomy can be compared with, for example the Human Rights Committee, a treaty-
based body created by states party to the ICCPR, which retains a degree of 
autonomous decision-making (McGoldrick, 1994:52-53) not found within a 
subsidiary body.  
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3.2 GA Resolution 60/251 
GA Resolutions establishing the operations and framework of subsidiary organs have 
―far-reaching legal and practical effects for States‖ (Sloan, 1987:113-114). In order to 
explore Resolution 60/251, and its impact on states and the Council, rules of 
interpretation of international instruments must be used. The general rule for 
interpretation is set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(1969), which achieves a compromise between the two competing approaches to 
interpretation. It states that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose. Klabbers (2002:96) stresses the central importance 
of this rule despite interpretation being ―as much art as it is science‖.  
 General Assembly Resolution 60/251 creates the Council and establishes its 
modalities. It reiterates the central importance of human rights within the UN system. 
Referring to human rights as the UN‘s third pillar demonstrates the link between that 
field and those of development and security. ―Strong and uniting‖83 language is used 
to emphasise the message that human rights work requires dialogue, cooperation, and 
understanding between states, cultures and religions. Countries are entreated to work 
together to achieve fundamental freedoms and rights for all people. Moreover, the 
need for universality, objectivity, impartiality and non-selectivity in human rights 
work is repeated throughout, reflecting criticisms that the Commission was used for 
biased and politicised aims. 
The preamble reflects key concerns raised during discussions and negotiations 
on the Council‘s creation. It begins by emphasising relevant UN Charter principles 
and purposes, particularly the sovereign equality of all states, the fundamental nature 
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of rights and freedoms for all peoples, and the importance of international cooperation 
(preamb. para.1).
84
 The foundations of the UN human rights system (preamb. para.2), 
the equality of all rights, and their universal application, are reaffirmed (preamb. 
para.3), as is the need for all states to respect all rights of all peoples (preamb. para.5) 
regardless of cultural, or other, differences(preamb. para.4). Human rights is 
identified as the UN‘s third pillar (preamb. para.6), with the text acknowledging the 
role of both state and non-state actors in the human rights field (preamb. paras.7 & 
11). Although the preamble notes the Commission‘s work (preamb. para.8), it also 
recognises that body‘s main failings (preamb. para.9) and emphasises the need for 
cooperation, dialogue, and capacity-building (preamb. para.10) in order to overcome 
these flaws and effectively protect and promote (preamb. para.10) all human rights 
(preamb. para.12).  
The Resolution‘s operative paragraphs are divided into sections dealing with 
different topics: general paragraphs on the Council‘s creation; the Council‘s mandate, 
roles and functions; the body‘s interaction with wider UN human rights machinery; 
membership and election; sessions and special sessions; rules of procedure and 
working methods; timeline and method for creation and review. Common themes 
throughout include: underlying principles upon which work is based; dual mandate of 
protection and promotion of human rights; elimination of key Commission failings; 
importance and applicability of universal human rights; state consent and cooperation; 
types of rights, including the right to development; capacity-building; the Council‘s 
assumption of some aspects of the Commission. I shall examine Resolution 60/251, 
highlighting key passages and explaining important paragraphs and overall themes. 
 
                                                 
84 GA Res 60/251, supra n.6  
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.80 
 
3.2.1 The Council‟s Creation 
Paragraph 1 of Resolution 60/251 establishes the Council to replace the Commission, 
as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. As the Council is a standing body, 
permanent resources were made available to it, including meeting rooms and 
administrative staff, all of which could be used for long-term projects or at short-
notice. Such resources improved on those available to the Commission, ensuring that 
the Council could overcome its predecessor‘s failure to devote adequate time and 
resources to long-term and short-term human rights problems.  
 
3.2.2 Overview of the Mandate 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Resolution 60/251 introduce the body‘s two broad mandates 
and its underlying principles. Those paragraphs are explained and elaborated upon 
throughout the resolution. Paragraph 2 sets out the Council‘s first mandate, to be 
―responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights‖. 
The requirement to promote human rights recognises that states, particularly those 
from the Global South, require technical assistance, capacity-building, and practical 
help to develop national human rights capabilities. Emphasis is placed on the 
promotion mandate being conducted ―without distinction of any kind and in a fair and 
equal manner‖ (para.2). That language reflects some states‘ concerns that economic, 
social and cultural rights should be treated in the same way as civil and political 
rights, which can be traced back to Cold War politics.
85
 That passage also reiterates 
the importance of devoting equal time and resources to both non-controversial and 
controversial rights, stemming from criticisms that the Commission 
disproportionately focused attention and resources on some rights to the exclusion of 
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others. Moreover, emphasis on fairness and equality addresses the problem of the 
Commission‘s selectivity by mandating that all rights and freedoms of all peoples 
should be equally protected. This can be read as a general instruction not to single out 
countries, regions or peoples for unfair attention, nor to ignore others nor shield them 
from scrutiny. 
 Paragraph 3 outlines the second part of the Council‘s mandate which requires 
the body to protect human rights. The body is directed that it ―should address 
situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, 
and make recommendations thereon‖ (para.3). The word ―should‖ creates an 
affirmative duty to address those situations. The Council‘s mandate to deal with 
human rights situations is imperative for the body to protect individuals from abuses. 
Although the Council must specifically address ―gross and systemic violations‖, that 
provision is illustrative, not exhaustive. The word ―including‖ suggests that it is one 
example, and that this type of situation was deemed particularly important during 
negotiations. Singling out gross and systemic violations reflects criticisms that the 
Commission failed to address such situations. Alongside addressing them, the Council 
is mandated to make recommendations on those situations. Recommendations are a 
main power by which the Council can protect human rights. Although the body‘s 
powers are set out through Resolution 60/251, it is important to note that 
recommendations are the sole power enunciated in the opening, general paragraphs. 
Recommendations, as will be discussed, provide a practical and political tool for 
encouraging and assisting states to comply with human rights obligations.  
Paragraph 3 sets out another element of the Council‘s mandate which spans 
both protection and promotion of human rights. The Council ―should also promote the 
effective coordination and the mainstreaming of human rights within the United 
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Nations system‖ (para.3). The requirement (―should‖) to work as part of the wider UN 
machinery aims to ensure that human rights are not dealt with in a vacuum. Again, 
reform proposals and negotiations are crucial for understanding why this passage was 
included as part of the opening paragraphs. States were not only concerned that the 
Council should not duplicate the work of other bodies, but were also keen to ensure 
that the body continue to set standards and share information, and improve on the 
Commission‘s interaction with UN human rights machinery. The Council‘s mandate 
to raise human rights‘ profile and strengthen interactions with other UN concerns, 
such as development and security, further stem from calls for the body to be a UN 
principal organ and the proposals for the status of human rights as the UN‘s third 
pillar to be more rigorously acknowledged.  
Paragraph 4 directs that the Council ―shall be guided by the 
principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive 
international dialogue and cooperation‖. These underlying principles directly deal 
with many key criticisms of the Commission. Aspirations for the Council, particularly 
from the Global North, include promoting and protecting human rights in a universal 
manner; being impartial when doing so; taking an objective approach; not selecting 
which countries to focus on based on political factors extraneous to the human rights 
mandate. The Global South‘s concerns, for example about human rights being used to 
oppress developing states, are dealt with by requiring cooperation and dialogue to 
underpin the Council‘s work. Ensuring states‘ consent and cooperation is an integral 
feature of the Council‘s work and proceedings. It is based on the idea, promoted by 
the Global South, that such cooperation is required to ensure that states can, and 
indeed will, comply with human rights obligations. 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.83 
 
The founding principles are crucial for assessing the new body.
86
 They 
underscore that the Council must fulfil its mandate in a fair manner across all UN 
member states. Enunciation of universality reminds the body to protect and promote 
all rights within the UDHR and to ensure that they are upheld within all countries. 
Universality reiterates that all states must comply with their human rights obligations, 
and that the body must strive to hold any state accountable for non-compliance. 
Emphasis on impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity seeks to ensure that the 
Council will overcome the Commission‘s main failings. The founding principles also 
include the need for dialogue and cooperation, reflecting the Global South‘s concerns 
that human rights are an issue of exclusive domestic jurisdiction, and that 
international human rights are often used as a neo-colonial tool of oppression against 
states with limited human rights capacities or capabilities.  
Paragraph 4 further reiterates that the body‘s work should be aimed at 
―enhancing the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development‖. All 
categories of rights, as well as the right to development, are afforded equal treatment. 
That provision deals with positions taken by the Global South and former socialist 
states that economic, social and cultural rights should be afforded equal weight as 
civil and political rights. Economically weaker and de-colonised states were 
particularly concerned that the right to development should be emphasised in order to 
take into account states‘ capacities for human rights. Human rights and development 
are interlinked, as without national capabilities to protect and promote human rights 
states cannot fulfil their obligations. Recognition of this right underscored the body‘s 
duty to assist states with building national human rights infrastructure.  
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 3.2.3 Functions and Powers 
Resolution 60/251 next sets out the Council‘s functions and powers. Paragraph 5 
identifies the roles and functions that the Council ―shall‖ undertake. Each subsection 
provides a non-exhaustive list of the Council‘s roles and functions, with the word 
―shall‖ mandating the body to carry out the enumerated tasks. The paragraph is 
divided into promotion, protection and the Council‘s interactions with wider human 
rights machinery.  
Subsection (a) sets out ways in which the Council must promote human rights 
within individual states: ―Promote human rights education and learning as well as 
advisory services, technical assistance and capacity-building‖ (para.5(a)). Those 
functions aim to assist states in complying with human rights obligations within their 
territories. The four mandated methods are intended as ―forward-thinking‖ 
subheadings, by which the Council may determine the most appropriate methods of 
human rights promotion. The subsection directs that the promotion ―be provided in 
consultation with and with the consent of Member States concerned‖ (para.5(a)). As 
human rights remain predominantly a national matter, the themes of consent and 
cooperation are of particular importance for the promotion mandate, which focuses on 
building, amongst others, the knowledge, understanding, capabilities and institutions 
of individual states. 
Subsection (b) requires the new body to ―serve as a forum for dialogue on 
thematic issues on all human rights‖ (para.5(b)). The word ―serve‖ implies that the 
body should facilitate dialogue between state and non-state actors, as opposed to 
directing the dialogue itself. Subsection (b) again stresses the recurrent theme that no 
one right nor class of right should be given disproportionate time or resources. The 
express requirement, however, provides that the body be a forum for dialogue on 
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thematic issues. Although the Council is not precluded from being a forum for 
dialogue on country-specific matters, the lack of requirement to do so is crucial. 
Thematic human rights issues tend to be less controversial and less susceptible to 
politicisation than country-specific matters. Thematic discussion are, therefore, more 
likely than country-specific debates to be constructive and less likely to be sidelined 
by national or regional political agendas, thus better enabling the body to fulfil its 
mandate.  
Subsection (c) sets out one of the Council‘s key powers, to ―make 
recommendations to the General Assembly for the further development of 
international law in the field of human rights‖ (para.5(c)). As previously noted, 
subsidiary organs assist the General Assembly in carrying out its roles and functions. 
The Council does not exist in a vacuum. Its work promoting human rights, 
particularly standard-setting and development of human rights law, is specifically 
noted in subsection (c). The Council must provide recommendations for the General 
Assembly to utilise when undertaking human rights work. Recommendations, as will 
be explored below, are a ―soft‖ power, which, although not legally binding, are useful 
for drawing the General Assembly‘s attention to important matters and information.  
In addition to standard-setting, the Council must ―promote the full 
implementation of human rights obligations undertaken by States and follow-up to the 
goals and commitments related to the promotion and protection of human rights 
emanating from United Nations conferences and summits‖ (para.5(d)). ―Obligations‖ 
refers to universal rights that all UN members must uphold, whereas ―commitments‖ 
are voluntary undertakings, for example through treaties. This paragraph underlines 
that all of a state‘s human rights duties are treated equally by the Council. Promoting 
human rights includes monitoring states‘ compliance with the wider UN human rights 
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machinery, underscoring that the body‘s work does not exist in a vacuum. One 
mechanism for such monitoring is the Universal Periodic Review, as set out in 
subsection (e). That mechanism was created as a direct response to concerns that the 
Commission was selective in terms of which countries it monitored, and that 
Commission membership was sought by known abusers to shield themselves or allies 
from scrutiny. UPR was an innovative mechanism designed to improve member 
states‘ accountability. As in subsection (d), the Council is mandated to use this 
mechanism to monitor every UN states‘ human rights obligations and commitments.   
Subsection (e) sets out the UPR‘s aims and objectives: it must be ―based on 
objective and reliable information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights 
obligations and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and 
equal treatment with respect to all States‖ (para.5(e)). Again, emphasis is placed on 
the body‘s underlying principles, reaffirming the importance of universal application 
and equal treatment. Paragraph 5(e) repeats ongoing themes of cooperation, consent 
and capacity-building. The UPR is mandated (―shall‖) to be  ―a cooperative 
mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the country 
concerned and with consideration given to its capacity-building needs.‖  
UPR seeks both to protect and to promote human rights. Promotion occurs 
through monitoring states‘ compliance with obligations and commitments, as well as 
through providing assistance following the initial review. Rahmani-Ocora (2006:16) 
argues that equal, regular and public human rights monitoring of all states, if it occurs 
in practice, will encourage countries to change their attitudes towards human rights 
machinery. The Resolution only gives a broad outline of the methods to be used in 
undertaking the review. It does not, however, set out the UPR‘s modalities. Instead, a 
clear timeframe is given for that process to occur: ―the Council shall develop the 
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modalities and necessary time allocation for the universal periodic review mechanism 
within one year‖. Proposals were made for stricter standards to be applied in the 
review process than those finally adopted. 
The UPR‘s relationship with wider UN human rights machinery was of 
particular concern to certain states during the negotiating process. Subsection (e) takes 
into account criticisms that the Commission duplicated work of other bodies. In 
particular, the Council is required to ensure that the UPR ―shall complement and not 
duplicate the work of treaty bodies‖.  
The UPR is primarily aimed at promoting human rights, whereas subsection 
(f) sets out functions associated with the protection mandate. The body is required to 
―contribute, through dialogue and cooperation, towards the prevention of human 
rights violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies‖ (para.5(f)). 
Preventing human rights violations and responding to crisis situations are bound 
together in this subsection. Protection through prompt responses and through 
prevention of violations are both direct responses to human rights abuses. Promoting 
human rights, on the other hand, aims to prevent those violations from occurring in 
the first place. The word ―contribute‖ clearly demonstrates that the Council cannot, 
and must not, work in a vacuum. Human rights protection must, therefore, occur in 
tandem with other UN machinery and, perhaps, with other organisations and state and 
non-state actors. The central themes of dialogue and cooperation are again reiterated, 
reflecting concerns during negotiations that the Council should not be given the power 
to take unwanted or intrusive action in national jurisdictions.  
The following two subsections in Paragraph 5 relate to the Council‘s 
relationship with specific organisations and actors. Subsection (g) mandates the 
Council to ―assume‖ the Commission‘s relationship with the OHCHR under GA 
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Resolution 48/141. The OHCHR was created to assist with promoting and protecting 
human rights. Retention of this aspect of the Commission‘s work demonstrates the 
importance of the OHCHR‘s work. Subsection (h) requires the Council to ―work in 
close cooperation … with Governments, regional organizations, national human rights 
institutions and civil society‖. Emphasis on interactions with other actors and the need 
for cooperative working methods reflects key concerns throughout the negotiations. 
This, arguably, non-exhaustive list mentions key human rights actors with which the 
Council must work in fulfilling both aspects of its mandate.  
Lastly, Paragraph 5 sets out two key methods by which the Council must fulfil 
its mandate. The Council must ―make recommendations with regard to the promotion 
and protection of human rights‖ (para.5(i)). Making recommendations, rather than 
being able to take direct action, is the Council‘s main power. The reasons for this, and 
its impact on the body, will be explored in detail below.
87
 Subsection (i), as with other 
sections in the resolution, identifies recommendations as key to both the protection 
and promotion mandates. Submitting ―an annual report to the General Assembly‖ 
(para.5(j)) is the other power which the Council is required to use to discharge its 
mandate. As a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the Council assists that 
body with carrying out its human rights responsibilities. Annual reports allow the 
Council to identify key human rights issues for the Assembly to discuss and act upon. 
The report is heard by all UN members who can then participate in debates, offering 
an opportunity for non-members of the Council to play an active role on its work. 
Moreover, through this power, the Council is able to protect and promote human 
rights using wider UN machinery.   
                                                 
87 See Section 3.4 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.89 
 
Paragraph 6 deals with the Council‘s assumption of certain Commission 
functions. The Council must ―assume, review and, where necessary, improve and 
rationalize all [Commission] mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities‖ 
(para.6) within its first year. That process enables the body to ―maintain a system of 
special procedures, expert advice and a complaint procedure‖ (para.6). Those 
mechanisms were crucial to the Commission‘s work and most negotiating states had 
sought to ensure they were retained in some form. The Special Procedures system 
developed by the Commission consists of independent experts who operate within the 
broader UN system. Gutter (2007) comments that there was considerable tension 
regarding whether to keep, modify or scrap special procedures, complaints 
mechanisms, and other working methods. A compromise was reached whereby 
special procedures mechanisms were retained for the body‘s first year in order to 
conduct a review, rationalisation and improvement process on individual mandates 
(para.6).  
The Council‘s creation was guided by the need to preserve the Commission‘s 
achievements and fix its failings (Scannella and Splinter, 2007:68-69), as expressed in 
the resolution‘s preamble.88 Procedures that had been heavily criticised were modified 
and some, which were inherently flawed, were abolished altogether (Rahmani-Ocora, 
2006:19). The controversial ―no-action‖ motion, for example, does not appear in 
Resolution 60/251. On the other hand, procedures commonly recognised as positive 
were maintained without the review and rationalisation stipulation that was placed on 
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the Special Procedures system. Consultative status of NGOs, for example, was 
acknowledged in the preamble
89
 and insisted upon in Paragraph 11. 
 
3.2.4 Membership and Election  
Membership and election are discussed in Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. Increasingly 
problems with the Commission‘s membership and election undermined that body‘s 
credibility. Despite wide-ranging reform proposals, there is little fundamental change 
to the Council‘s composition, albeit with steps towards accountability of member 
states. The process by which states are elected to the Council is, however, an 
improvement on its predecessor.  
Council membership was determined to ―consist of forty-seven Member 
States‖ (para.7), as compared with the Commission‘s 53. Weiss (2008:146-147) 
insists that this small reduction in size was disappointing as it retained the status quo 
rather than taking up the radical reform proposals for either a far smaller body or, 
conversely, universal membership. Alston (2006:198) argues that the Council‘s size 
reflects a great number of states‘ desire to participate in proceedings which would not 
have occurred had membership been restricted to the US proposal of 20 states.  
Paragraph 7 dictates that membership be ―based on equitable geographical 
distribution‖. The African Group hold 13 seats, East European countries received 6 
seats, GRULAC 8, Asia 13, and Western Europe and Others 7. Schrijver (2007) 
compares the percentage proportion of Commission seats with those allocated to the 
Council for each regional group. The African Group‘s percentage share (28%) 
remained the same, the Asian Group (28%) gained an extra five percent and Eastern 
Europe (13%) gained four percent. Latin American states (17%) lost four percent, as 
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did Western Europe and Others (15%). African and Asian states hold the majority of 
Council seats, giving these groups significant power. Maurer (2007:35) comments 
that the impression was given that ―certain EU members realised only relatively late 
what the loss in terms of geographic distribution would mean for the group of 
Western states in a smaller Council.‖ The Global South controls the Council, with 
Western states marginalised despite close ties with countries, such as Japan, from 
other regional groups. The Council‘s composition does not take into account cross-
regional blocs, such as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Boyle (2009:129) notes the many political alliances 
within the Council, and Hampson (2007:14-15) argues that states will continue to 
work in these blocs at the new body.  
Members are ―elected directly and individually‖ (para.7) providing a more 
open process than at the Commission. The Commission allowed regional groups to 
nominate members, with ECOSOC usually rubber-stamping these nominations (cf. 
Boyle, 2009:126). Regional groups could present ―closed slates‖, with only the same 
number of nominated states as regional seats, resulting in inability to challenge 
inappropriate states‘ nominations (Moss, 2006). Electing states individually 
supposedly allows a candidate to be rejected by the General Assembly. This provision 
sought to end the practice of closed slates, whereby unsuitable candidates could 
become members owing to no other options being available. Collective action can no 
longer occur through using closed slates to ensure certain states are elected as 
members. However, regional groups frequently ensure that only one state is 
nominated for each of their allocated seats. States are, effectively, forced to re-open 
nominations in order to reject a candidate in such circumstances. It remains unlikely 
that this will occur in practice.   
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The Resolution also sets out that election occurs ―by secret ballot‖ (para.7). 
Votes are cast by writing the state‘s name in the appropriate box and anonymously 
posting the ballot paper. The result is that even with a closed slate, an inappropriate 
state may be rejected through abstentions of the majority of states. Individual states 
require a majority of the General Assembly to vote for them, which means that a state 
may be rejected even if that means a seat is left vacant and new nominations have to 
be made. This is a significant improvement on the Commission because secret ballots 
also allow states to vote without fear of repercussions from the country concerned, its 
regional group or allies.  
Despite reform proposals requiring a higher majority, the Resolution sets out 
that states are elected ―by the majority of the members of the General Assembly‖ 
(para.7). Observers criticised the choice of simple majority instead of the proposed 
two-thirds requirement (Terlinghen, 2007:167-178). However, the lower threshold 
arguably had little practical effect on whether known human rights abusers gained 
membership. Cuba, China, Russia and Libya, all with poor human rights records, each 
received more than two thirds of the vote
90
 despite only needing to secure a simple 
majority. Czech Republic and Poland, on the other hand, secured far fewer than two 
thirds of the vote
91
 despite having better human rights records than other candidates. It 
is clear, therefore, that political rather than human rights considerations were used 
during elections, and that the higher threshold would have had little impact on known 
abusers being elected to the body. The elections did, however, result in some known 
abusers failing to gain membership. Iran withdrew its candidacy once it became clear 
that it would not gain even a simple majority, while Belarus was defeated during the 
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vote. Those states‘ failure to be elected could arguably be based on their human rights 
records but, bearing in mind the known abusers which did gain membership, is more 
likely attributable to political factors. 
State members are elected ―for a period of three years and shall not be eligible 
for immediate re-election after two consecutive terms‖ (para.7). This ensures that no 
state has de facto permanent membership, which the five permanent SC members 
ended up having at the Commission. Blocking dominant states will reduce some of 
the power struggles that plagued the Commission. A two-term limit also encourages 
more states to engage with the Council as members, allowing smaller states and 
different forms of political systems to be represented. 
Although all states can seek Council membership (para.6), Paragraph 8 
outlines criteria that must (―shall‖) be taken into account during elections. Those 
criteria are ―the contribution of candidates to the promotion and protection of human 
rights and their voluntary pledges and commitments made thereto‖ (para.8). 
Regarding membership criteria, the Resolution adopted ―soft‖ criteria such as that 
states should have regard to candidates‘ voluntary human rights pledges and 
commitments. Redondo (2008:727) argues that the criteria have greater importance by 
the inclusion of these commitments and pledges as one factor in the Universal 
Periodic Review process, whereby states‘ human rights records are examined by the 
Council. Regardless of the degree of strength given to these criteria, they are a far cry 
from some of the stronger exclusionary proposals set out above. Alston (2005-
2006:67) comments that formal membership criteria were abandoned because they 
were viewed as unworkable and ineffective in practice. Voluntary, or ―soft‖, 
commitments were urged, and indeed reflected in the Resolution, although no 
enforcement mechanisms were provided. Encouraging state pledges on human rights 
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to be taken into account is still an improvement on the Commission which lacked any 
membership criteria. 
Arguably, certain countries did not run for election owing to these criteria, as 
rather than membership protecting human rights abusers, the criteria result in 
membership providing ―less cover than in the past‖ (Weiss, 2008:146-147). Weiss 
notes that Sudan, Libya, Syria, Nepal, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, North Korea, 
and Belarus,
92
 all former Commission members, did not place their hats in the ring. 
However, Gaer (2007:135) insists that membership of states such as China, Cuba, and 
Saudi Arabia undermined the Council‘s claim regarding improved membership. 
Paragraph 8 gives the General Assembly power ―by a two-thirds majority‖ to 
suspend any ―member of the Council that commits gross and systematic violations of 
human rights‖. Although this provision signals that grave violations may be dealt with 
through suspension, it is unlikely to be used as often as warranted due to political and 
diplomatic reasons as well as the difficulty in gaining a two thirds majority of the 
General Assembly. Alston (20062:202) nevertheless insists that the clause ―is an 
important symbolic component in the sense that it would allow for any country that is 
widely condemned for its human rights record to be suspended from membership‖. 
The high threshold for suspension discourages its use for power politics.
93
  
In 2011 Libya became the first state to have its membership of the Council 
suspended. While some might argue that this suspension demonstrates both that the 
mechanism works and is useful, the question must be asked as to why it took five 
years for this, or indeed any, suspension. Libya, arguably, should have been denied 
membership of the Council in the first instance, due to its human rights record. Even 
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once it had gained membership, the ongoing violations within that state could have 
triggered the suspension mechanism at any time. It took widespread condemnation, by 
the Security Council, NATO, the Arab League, the OIC and the media, of Libya‘s 
crimes against humanity for the GA to suspend that state from the Council. Moreover, 
far from testifying to the utility of that mechanism, Libya‘s suspension arguably raises 
questions as to the GA‘s previous and continued inaction on violations within that 
country and other, similar, states.    
Paragraph 9 reiterates that Council members ―shall uphold the highest 
standards in the promotion and protection of human rights‖. It then gives a formal 
mechanism for assessing whether states are complying with this requirement: all 
Council members ―shall … be reviewed under the universal periodic review 
mechanism during their term of membership‖ (para.9). That is a crucial difference 
from the Commission, where membership was often sought by states as protection 
from scrutiny of their human rights records.  
The soft criteria in Paragraph 8 regarding ―the contribution of candidates to 
the promotion and protection of human rights and their voluntary pledges and 
commitments‖ should be read alongside further accountability provisions in 
Paragraph 9 that members ―shall uphold the highest standards in the promotion and 
protection of human rights‖. Alston (2006:69) observes that one of the HRC‘s major 
challenges regarding member accountability is the best method to encourage states to 
elect members based on human rights records. He insists that educating states about 
human rights will be key to ensuring that this occurs.  
Moss (2006) comments that it was innovative for the Resolution to state 
expressly that the UN‘s principal human rights body should consist of states with 
good human rights records. The new provisions seek to set standards for HRC 
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membership, indicating the importance of members‘ national human rights 
compliance. Moss comments that these paragraphs demonstrate the hope that 
members will be elected according to human rights criteria rather than political 
motivations. I shall examine, throughout the thesis, whether these hopes were fulfilled 
in practice. 
 
3.2.5 Modalities and Working Methods 
The Council was mandated to meet more regularly than the Commission and for 
longer periods. Despite the EU‘s proposal for between 4 and 6 sessions over a 
minimum 12 week period, Paragraph 10 set out that the HRC would meet ―no fewer 
than three‖ times per year ―for a total duration of no less than ten weeks‖. This can be 
compared with the Commission‘s single annual session lasting 6 weeks. It was hoped 
that regular meetings would allow adequate time to deal with agenda items. The 
Resolution also set out that the body ―shall be able to hold special sessions when 
needed‖ (para.10). The Council is given the ability to convene such sessions, rather 
than being mandated to hold them.  
Moreover, the Resolution does not specify when special sessions should be 
held, but rather leaves this mechanism open for the Council to interpret and utilise as 
it sees fit. Special sessions can be held at the request of one member, but only if one 
third of Council members supports holding the session. It was hoped that the latter 
requirement would discourage the use of special sessions as a political tool, whilst 
still allowing them to be convened quickly and efficiently where required. Creation of 
special sessions dealing with crisis or grave human rights situations was a direct 
response to the criticism that the Commission responded inadequately to such 
situations. 
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 The Council must maintain the involvement of state and non-state actors, as 
had occurred at the Commission. The Council must ensure ―the participation of and 
consultation with observers, including States that are not members of the Council, the 
specialized agencies, other intergovernmental organizations and national human rights 
institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations.‖ The body is required, under 
Paragraph 11, to ensure ―the most effective contribution of these entities‖. This 
ensures that the body can utilise expertise from other actors. Wide participation also 
aims at ensuring legitimacy amongst non-members and civil society. That aim is 
repeated in Paragraph 12 which requires the Council to have ―transparent, fair and 
impartial‖ working methods, which deals with the criticism that much of the 
Commission‘s work was opaque and done behind closed doors, precluding non-state 
actors from participating. 
The Council‘s working methods ―shall enable genuine dialogue, be results 
oriented, allow for subsequent follow-up discussions to recommendations and their 
implementation and also allow for substantive interaction with special procedures and 
mechanisms‖. Those requirements underscore the need for the body to ensure 
effective follow-through on its work. The Council must seek to ensure that work is 
carried out within states‘ national jurisdictions. That requirement is linked to the 
body‘s promotion mandate, and seeks to ensure that effective changes are 
implemented within states through monitoring and assisting with compliance.  
 
 
3.3 The Council‟s Mandate 
Resolution 60/251 sets out the Council‘s mandate, but the text is open to 
interpretation. Kälin et al (2006:15-16) argue that the Council has three separate but 
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interlinked mandates: promotion, protection and prevention. Arguably, ―prevention‖ 
is subsumed under the protection mandate. Prevention of violations occurs during 
grave, crisis, or other situations (Kälin et al (2006:15-16), to protect individuals from 
human rights abuses. Prevention, although in some ways similar to human rights 
promotion, occurs as part of the protection mandate. The Council‘s interaction with 
wider UN machinery and wider human rights actors can also be seen as a separate 
mandate. That aspect of the Council‘s work nevertheless reasonably falls under both 
the protection and promotion mandates. Engagement with human rights actors enables 
the Council to promote human rights compliance; similarly, protection is enhanced 
through wider involvement with other UN bodies, which may act upon or support the 
Council‘s work. I shall therefore treat the Council‘s mandate as divided into two 
broad categories: promoting human rights and protecting human rights. Those 
mandates are expressly and tacitly set out throughout Resolution 60/251. The 
Council‘s roles, functions and powers broadly fall under either or both of those 
categories.  
Promotion Mandate The Council has been tasked with promoting human 
rights within all UN member states. Again, paragraph 2 states that ―the Council shall 
be responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all‖. Paragraph 4 requires the Council‘s work to be 
undertaken ―with a view to enhancing the promotion and protection of all human 
rights, without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal manner.‖ The resolution 
lists some activities that the Council must undertake to promote human rights. The list 
should be deemed non-exhaustive, serving only to illustrate the types of activities that 
are necessary to fulfil the mandate. 
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―Promotion‖ is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ―the action of 
helping forward; furtherance; advancement‖. The Council‘s promotion activities 
include those that help, support or enable states to implement their human rights 
obligations and commitments (Kälin et al, 2006:15). The promotion mandate requires 
the Council to identify gaps in states‘ human rights compliance or to respond to 
information from non-state actors, other UN bodies or the country concerned. 
Promotion activities, therefore, can respond to individual states‘ needs and provide 
specific assistance with particular problems.  
 Resolution 60/251 lists certain functions and activities that the body must 
undertake under its promotion mandate. Those functions seek to assist states with 
fulfilling their human rights obligations and commitments. Paragraph 5(a), for 
example, requires the Council to promote human rights education. Knowledge and 
understanding of human rights is crucial for implementing those rights at a national 
level. Moreover, education is key for civil society actors to advocate and promote 
rights and for individuals‘ awareness of their rights. The Council must provide human 
rights advisory services and technical assistance, which may include assistance and 
expertise from UN staff, other states, and human rights experts.  
The Council, crucially, is required to support and enable national human rights 
capacity-building. During negotiations on the Council‘s creation, states from the 
Global South called for assistance with national human rights implementation, 
arguing that the Commission‘s atmosphere of ―shaming and blaming‖ failed to assist 
underdeveloped human rights systems particularly within decolonised states. Many of 
those states raised concerns that capacity-building and technical assistance were 
needed for post-colonial and developing states to adequately fulfil human rights 
obligations and commitments to the same standards as Western nations.  Capacity-
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building activities promote human rights by providing states with tools for universal 
adherence to human rights norms. States nevertheless do, at times, request capacity-
building as a way to avoid scrutiny of human rights abuses, relying on weaknesses of 
national capabilities as an excuse for failing to comply with human rights.  
 Resolution 60/251 mandates the Council to promote human rights by enabling 
dialogue on thematic issues (para.5(b)). Such dialogue occurs throughout Council 
sessions. Discussions facilitate interactions between states, human rights experts, 
NGOs and other non-state actors. Dialogue promotes human rights by providing a 
forum for advice, assistance and support. That function continues beyond Council 
sessions, with UN staff and human rights experts providing further opportunities for 
dialogue, for example through country visits.
94
 The focus on thematic issues reflects 
the greater need to promote thematic rights, as opposed to country-specific matters 
where human rights tend to need protection. Thematic issues are frequently non-
contentious, thus often requiring dialogue and other non-intrusive methods to promote 
compliance.  
The Council‘s interactions with wider UN machinery requires the body to 
promote state implementation of goals, commitments and obligations ―emanating 
from United Nations conferences and summits‖ (para.5(d)). That function is key for 
the Council to support and further UN human rights work. Moreover, it is central to 
the Council‘s role as the UN‘s principal human rights body that it take responsibility 
for supporting, advising and monitoring implementation of broader UN human rights 
work.  
 Again, a new and central mechanism for promoting rights is the Universal 
Periodic Review. Resolution 60/251 does not set out the UPR‘s modalities, but rather 
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provides a broad overview of the mechanism and its aims.  The Council must review 
all UN member states in order to monitor compliance with their obligations under 
various human rights instruments. Emphasis is placed on state cooperation to enable 
effective promotion of rights. The Council is required, in particular, to address 
capacity-building needs. The promotion mandate includes preventing human rights 
abuses. Prevention goes further than identifying gaps in states‘ fulfilment of 
obligations. It implies the need to promote human rights where the potential for 
violations has been identified. Kälin et al (2006:15) argue that prevention is ―aimed at 
ensuring that human rights violations do not occur or re-occur.‖  
The Council‘s promotion mandate extends beyond monitoring, supporting and 
enabling states‘ compliance with human rights norms. The Council must contribute to 
the ―development of international law in the field of human rights‖ (para.5(c)). That 
mandate includes the body making recommendations to the General Assembly 
(para.5(c)). Promotion in this regard occurs by increasing and developing legal 
aspects of human rights, and by identifying areas needing further attention.  
 Protection Mandate The protection mandate requires the Council to protect 
individuals from abuses. It is primarily aimed at situations or ongoing violations 
within a particular state. Ongoing or systemic abuses are often committed, or 
tolerated, by governments. Protecting human rights within a state‘s national 
jurisdiction is more contentious than promoting rights, and often leads to tensions 
with the country concerned. Protection ideally includes a swift, strong, and short-term 
response to violations. Promotion, conversely, identifies long-term problems that do 
not always require immediate or strong action. The Council‘s protection activities are 
typically unlikely to be invited, or indeed cooperated with, by the country concerned.      
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 Protection is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ―the act of 
protecting; defence from harm, danger or evil‖. The Council must respond to human 
rights violations. The resolution‘s language implies that the Council must protect the 
victims, in contrast with the promotion mandate which focuses on the rights. Again, 
Paragraph 4 emphasises that the Council must address situations that include, but are 
not limited to, ―gross and systemic violations‖. Inclusion of ―other situations of 
violations of human rights‖ indicates that any situation of human rights abuses may be 
addressed under this mandate. Power is thus given to the Council to respond to 
violations whenever and however they occur.  
The Council is required to ―address situations of human rights violations‖. 
Addressing those situations is a broad mandate, but the body is required to ―make 
recommendations thereon.‖ Kälin et al (2006:16) argue that this provision allows the 
body to adopt country-specific resolutions outside of the UPR. Those 
recommendations are not limited to being solely condemnatory, as had occurred at the 
Commission, but can incorporate all aspects of the body‘s protection and promotion 
mandates. Recommendations on such situations can, and arguably should, for 
example, include ―emphasis on encouraging it and addressing its capacity-building 
needs‖ alongside condemning violations (Kälin et al, 2006:16).  
Another key protection mechanism is convening special sessions to discuss 
grave or crisis situations. Special Sessions is an innovative mechanism that enables 
the Council to respond to human rights situations. A main failing of the Commission 
was that its annual session allowed neither the time nor the swiftness of response to 
deal with crisis situations or crises within ongoing situations. As separate sessions, 
convening special sessions enables a quick and focused response to grave situations 
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without using time and resources that had been allocated for other human rights 
matters. 
The protection mandate will undoubtedly be more difficult to discharge than 
the promotion mandate, not least due to the contentious nature of acting on human 
rights violations. Other UN bodies have the power to intervene in, or to protect human 
rights during grave or crisis situations. Those bodies are not, however, principally 
concerned with human rights. The protection mandate requires the Council to fulfil a 
role not undertaken elsewhere.  
General Requirements  Resolution 60/251 also includes more general 
requirements that advance both the promotion and protection mandates. Those 
requirements relate to the Council‘s role in the wider field of human rights. The 
Council, for example, is mandated to work closely and maintain a relationship with 
other human rights bodies, organisations, and state and non-state actors.
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 Interaction 
with the wider field is of particular importance for the promotion mandate because it 
enables greater information-sharing as well as support and advisory services. 
Requirements for the Council to make human rights recommendations (para.5(i)) and 
submit an annual report to the GA (para.5(i)) ensure that the body‘s work is wide-
reaching, and that it enables protection and promotion by other actors.  
Resolution 60/251 mandates the Council to work with the Special Procedures 
system to protect and promote human rights. Special Procedures mandates are either 
thematic or country-specific. Thematic mandates focus more on promotion whereas 
country-specific are more involved with protection. All mandate holders promote 
human rights through fact-finding and work with all actors to identify gaps in national 
human rights systems. Similarly, all mandate holders protect rights by identifying and 
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reporting on violations. The Special Procedures system operates independently within 
the UN as a whole, which poses difficulties despite that system‘s importance to the 
Council fulfilling its mandate. This issue will be explored in Chapter 5. 
 Although both protection and promotion are key to the body‘s work, I shall 
focus more on the protection mandate when assessing the Council. Promotion of 
human rights is undertaken by various organisations, bodies, and non-state actors, and 
is crucial for long-term compliance with human rights norms. Protection, on the other 
hand, is often solely undertaken by the Council. Promoting rights is relatively non-
contentious. Protecting human rights is a more difficult mandate to achieve in 
practice, and difficulties often arise. It will take some time before the impact of 
promotion activities can be assessed, whereas protection, or the failure to do so, can 
be assessed relatively swiftly. Protection is crucial for the Council to achieve its aims.  
 
 
3.4 The Council‟s Powers 
There are four types of international instruments: binding (law-making); 
administrative (applying the law); household (relating to the internal functioning of 
the organisation); and non-binding (Klabbers, 2002:200-201). International 
organisations are generally limited in their abilities to undertake institutional acts 
which bind their members outside of the organisation (Sands & Klein, 2001:261-262). 
It is widely accepted that a body can only adopt binding acts if its constituent 
document expressly gives such powers (Sands & Klein, 2001:280). Although most 
bodies do not have binding powers (Sands & Klein, 2001:280), many are able to 
―make recommendations to members of the organisation within their field of 
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competence, in order to promote or help to achieve the organisation‘s objectives‖ 
(Sands & Klein, 2001:285-286).  
The Council has only non-binding powers. Despite some calls for it to be a 
principal UN organ, the Council is a subsidiary organ of the GA. Maurer (2007:36) 
comments that during negotiations on the Council‘s creation some states sought to 
limit further the Council‘s powers. China and Russia, for example, were adamant that 
the body should not be allowed to submit recommendations directly to any principal 
UN organs other than the GA. Attempts to limit the Council‘s powers resulted in 
Resolution 60/251 allowing the body to adopt only non-binding acts. However, non-
binding acts can have both legal effects and political implications (Sands & Klein, 
2001:261-262). Non-binding acts seek ―to influence behaviour, but without creating 
law‖ (Klabbers, 2002:201), but frequently form the basis for ―soft law‖ (cf. Shaw, 
2003:110-112. Such acts include recommendations, declarations, codes of conduct or 
other generally non-binding resolutions (Klabbers, 2002:201). These instruments 
require state cooperation and consent for implementation.  
Non-binding instruments provide international organisations with a pragmatic 
compromise for decision-making (Tammes, 1958:304). Unanimous decision-making 
results in greater legitimacy, but binding decisions will be almost impossible to reach. 
Majoritarian decision-making threatens states ―that have something to lose‖ (Tammes, 
1958:304). Tammes (1958:304) asserts that non-binding acts provide a method for 
taking action by majority decision because the act creates no legal obligations and 
therefore are less threatening to states which do not fully agree to them. Klabbers 
(2002:201) notes that despite their non-binding nature such instruments ―may be as 
effective (or ineffective) as legally binding ones.‖ (e.g., Kingsbury 1997) When the 
Council gains consensus, or at least wide agreement, on its acts, the nominally non-
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binding powers are expected to be adopted across most, if not all, states due to the 
countries‘ participation in and agreement to the decision-making. Moreover, 
consensus ensures that greater and more unified political pressure may be asserted 
regarding state implementation.  
The Council has various powers that assist fulfilment of its mandate. Klabbers 
(2002:197) notes that it only ―makes sense‖ to create an international organisation if it 
is capable of performing acts rather than merely being an arena for discussions. 
However, it is not always clear what powers a body holds, particularly as constituent 
documents may be ambiguous as to which acts may be undertaken (Klabbers, 
2002:197). Resolution 60/251 sets out certain powers that the Council must exercise. 
As with the body‘s mandate, the resolution is rather general and broad regarding the 
Council‘s powers. Therefore, some uncertainty exists regarding which powers the 
Council is, and is not, granted. The Council‘s four main powers are: 
recommendations, standard-setting, compliance powers, and technical powers.  
 
3.4.1 Recommendations  
The Council‘s main power, or at least the one most often mentioned in Resolution 
60/251 (paras.3, 5(c), 5(i), 12), is making recommendations. As a general matter, 
recommendations, whilst being important for politics,
96
 are not binding on member 
states outside of the organisation (Detter, 1996:389-390). Organisations may, 
however, use recommendations to state the current or suggested law (Sands & Klein: 
286-287). Recommendations may even have some legal effects, for example requiring 
members to implement and monitor the suggested measures (Sands & Klein, 
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2001:286-287). Implementation and follow-up is common practice at UN specialised 
agencies (Sands & Klein, 2001:286-287). 
The Council may make recommendations on a broad range of areas, including 
thematic human rights, country-specific situations, and gross and systemic violations. 
Recommendations may be used in relation to the Council‘s promotion and protection 
mandates. Kälin et al (2006:15) assert that the general language of Paragraph 5(i), 
giving the Council the power to make recommendations, requires the body to use that 
power to protect and promote rights across both thematic and country-specific issues. 
Recommendations seeking to promote rights are generally less contentious than those 
made under the Council‘s protection mandate. States are more likely to achieve 
consensus, or near-unanimity, on promoting rights. Protection focuses on more 
politically sensitive issues, thus requiring greater efforts to achieve state cooperation 
with creating and implementing recommendations. Kälin et al (2006:16) stress that 
recommendations on country-specific situations should not solely condemn violators, 
but should also promote state compliance with human rights obligations. Country-
specific recommendations could, or perhaps should, include focus on assisting the 
cessation of abuses and supporting prevention of recurrences.  
 
3.4.2 Standard-Setting 
Standard-setting is another key power set out in Resolution 60/251. Sands & Klein 
(2001:262) note that the power to adopt norms is common among international 
organisations. Standard-setting, particularly through adopting norms, is often central 
to those bodies‘ mandates (Sands & Klein, 2001:261). Human rights norms form the 
basis of states‘ obligations and commitments. A key aspect of the Commission‘s work 
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had been to set human rights standards which, as previously discussed, constituted 
much of the body‘s early work.  
The Council is mandated to assume the Commission‘s standard-setting role. 
The power to adopt norms extends to various aspects of the Council‘s mandate. The 
Council‘s standard-setting may produce acts which bind all UN members because the 
―norms enunciated … may be linked to one or another ‗classical‘ source of 
international law‖ (Sands & Klein, 2001:287-288). For example, the Council‘s 
contributions to the development of international law (para.5(c)) may include 
recommending that the General Assembly adopt human rights norms which are 
already legally-binding under international customary law.  
 
3.4.3 Compliance Powers 
The Council is given the power to undertake certain supervisory roles, such as 
monitoring state compliance with human rights. Sands & Klein (2001:330-331) note 
that states in breach of their obligations may face diplomatic or political pressure, 
including ―protest and censure by the organisation, the postponement or cancellation 
of visits and meetings, and the reduction of diplomatic representation. More far 
reaching, however, are … the suspension of rights relating the organisation‖. The 
Council may suspend member states under Paragraph 8. That power is a direct 
response to criticism that known abusers held Commission membership. As the 
example of the aforementioned suspension of Libya suggests, however, that tactic has 
thus far been used only to limited effect. The Council also has powers to deal with 
states that do not cooperate with the body‘s recommendations or monitoring. Such 
measures include recommending visits from special rapporteurs, appointing a 
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country-specific mandate holder, or calling on the GA or Security Council to look into 
the situation (e.g. Kälin, et al, 2006:18).  
 
3.4.4 Technical Powers  
Another Council function is information-sharing. Various actors, including states, UN 
bodies and staff, and NGOs, are involved. The Council is mandated to work within 
the wider UN system, and with civil society actors, to protect and promote human 
rights. The body has the power
97
 to share information with, and receive information 
from, those actors. Its implied powers extend to capacity-building, a recurrent theme 
throughout Resolution 60/251. The Council has powers, then, to assist with capacity-
building, despite those powers not being set out in the Resolution. The same can be 
said for other Council functions, including providing advisory services and technical 
assistance, and other roles, including being a forum for dialogue between various 
actors.  
 
 
3.5 Founding Principles 
The Council‘s founding principles impose legal requirements. They reflect the 
criticisms levelled at the Commission, and stem from interstate negotiations on the 
Council‘s creation. The Council‘s founding principles divide into two broad 
categories: principles that guide its work on human rights, and principles that guide its 
relationship to individual states. The principles concerning human rights work seek to 
ensure that the work is even-handed and non-selective. The principles aimed at the 
Council‘s relationship with states seek to ensure effective fulfilment of its mandate.  
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The principles include non-selectivity, universality, objectivity, cooperation, and 
dialogue. Repetition of these principles throughout the Resolution (e.g. paras. 2, 4, 
5(e), 12) underscores that they apply to all aspects of the body‘s mechanisms, 
proceedings and work (Kälin, et al, 2006:16).    
The founding principles are first set out in preambular paragraph 9, which 
stresses ―the importance of ensuring universality, objectivity and non-selectivity … 
and the elimination of double standards and politicization‖. Universality is integral to 
the UN human rights system. The UDHR first enshrined the notion of universal 
rights; that human rights apply across the world to all people. All states are required, 
in theory, to protect and promote all rights within their own and other countries‘ 
jurisdictions. The UN has adopted the universality approach despite some states, 
regional groups or political blocs viewing human rights from other theoretical 
perspectives (cf. Gerwith, 1982; Griffin, 2008:33).  
Despite emphasising universality, Resolution 60/251 is silent on the concept 
of even-handedness when universally applying human rights. Although some 
countries may be judged against each other‘s standards, this is not always the case 
because states often have different capabilities for implementing human rights. 
Sweden, for example, cannot be compared with Somalia.  
The second founding principle calls for objectivity within the Council‘s work. 
An objective approach requires the Council to adopt a neutral approach to human 
rights, particularly country-specific situations. It seeks to ensure that the body‘s work 
is guided by human rights rather than by states or groups‘ agendas.  
Bias and selectivity, as previously discussed, were two main Commission 
failings. The principle of non-selectivity seeks to address these flaws. Non-selectivity 
requires the Council to protect and promote human rights in an even-handed manner, 
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allocating proportionate time and resources dependant on an individual state‘s needs, 
without the Commission‘s culture of blame. Repeated focus on a state‘s human rights 
record, or the singling out of a state for constant resolutions, to the detriment of 
examining other similar or worse abusers, would violate this principle. Non-
selectivity requires the body to avoid both overt politicisation or politicisation through 
an ostensible ―success story‖ whereby the focus on one country masks the body 
altogether ignoring other known abusers.  The Council is required to eliminate 
politicisation and double-standards.  These principles reflect negotiating positions that 
the Council should move away from the Commission‘s confrontational ―shaming and 
blaming‖ which was widely viewed as ineffective. The HRC is expected to adopt a 
more constructive approach to human rights protection and promotion through 
cooperation and dialogue. Cooperation and dialogue arguably combat that culture, in 
theory providing a more effective way to protect and promote human rights. In 
practice, however, cooperation and dialogue have frequently provided states with an 
easy shield from scrutiny.    
State cooperation enables countries being discussed at the body to be involved 
with the Council‘s work. That principle acknowledges that human rights are a 
domestic concern and that working with individual states may provide an effective 
method for implementing human rights standards and norms. The Council‘s lack of 
binding powers requires, and indeed reflects the need for, the body to work with states 
in order to achieve its aims. Effective implementation of human rights requires a 
culture of cooperation as well as assistance for states which need, for example, 
capacity-building. Dialogue is key for this cooperative approach, reflected in its 
emphasis as a founding principle. Inter-state dialogue and the inclusion of non-state 
actors, provides human rights expertise and assistance as well as affording states an 
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opportunity to engage with the process of protecting and promoting human rights. 
Cooperative methods, while important in theory, provide the Council with little 
practical assistance with protecting or promoting human rights; instead they afford 
states an opportunity to avoid taking responsibility for non-compliance. 
The founding principles emphasise the Council‘s primary function to promote 
and protect all human rights across UN member states. Although they deal with many 
key criticisms of the Commission, the principles‘ central aim is to ensure the Council 
fulfils its mandate. Scannella and Splinter (2007:68-69) remain sceptical about the 
body‘s ability to adhere to these principles, despite the Resolution‘s assurances that 
politicisation would not dominate the Council. They argue that, as the Council 
remains a political body, the achievement of the founding principles in eliminating 
politicisation should not be judged until they are put into practice, or otherwise. 
Furthermore, until governments accept and apply these principles, nothing will 
change at the UN human rights body.  
Scanella and Splinter (2007:50-51) note that the founding principles ―are 
valuable reminders of how the promotion and protection of human rights should be 
approached in the United Nations‖. Assessing the Council‘s adherence to these 
principles poses certain difficulties. The principles are open-ended and somewhat 
ethereal, indicating that they are guidelines rather than precise requirements. Neither 
the body nor other actors have interpreted their meanings. No method has been 
created to determine whether the body has complied with these principles. I shall 
adopt a simple methodology to identify instances where striking non-adherence has 
occurred. Lack of universality results in a lack of even-handedness and 
proportionality when dealing with country-specific situations and thematic rights. 
Selectivity can be measured through disproportionate focus on a state for political 
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aims, or indeed shielding known abusers for similarly political motivations. Partiality 
impacts upon the body‘s work and proceedings when certain states or thematic rights 
are favoured over others.  
 
 
3.6 The Institution Building Package 
The Institution Building Package adds details to areas left broad or undefined in 
Resolution 60/251. The IBP was finalised at the Council‘s Fifth Session, after months 
of consultations, and was adopted on 18 June 2007. The Chairperson sought to 
achieve consensus on the IBP,
98
 but areas of disagreement remained even during the 
final negotiations. Schrijver (2007:818) comments that the final text was only agreed 
upon ―during the very final days and hours‖ of the Fifth Session. In contrast to 
Resolution 60/251, which broadly set out the Council‘s mandate functions, the IBP 
details the modalities of the Council‘s mechanisms and instruments, as well as the 
general agenda for future sessions. The IBP elaborates upon the founding principles,
99
 
detailing additional powers and functions, and gives guidelines for the Council‘s 
work, for example rules for the new UPR mechanism and details of the revised 
Complaints Procedure.  
 The IBP sets out the Council‘s permanent agenda to be followed at each 
regular session.
100
 The permanent agenda aims to ensure that the Council can 
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overcome its predecessor‘s failure to deal adequately with all human rights matters. 
Agenda Items 3 and 4 provide broad banners under which member states may raise 
any issues relating to protection or promotion of thematic human rights (Item 3) or 
country-specific human rights (Item 4). Agenda Item 3 allows states to raise 
protection and promotion issues pertaining to all human rights, and sets out broad 
categories - ―civil, political, economic, social and cultural right‖ - under which 
matters may be raised. Item 3 does, however, emphasise one individual right, ―the 
right to development‖. That right appears as a result of the Global South‘s concerns.  
 Alongside providing a broad basis for discussions, the agenda focuses Council 
attention on specific human rights areas which directly correlate to various aspects of 
Resolution 60/251. Item 10 reflects the body‘s duty to promote human rights through 
technical assistance and capacity-building. This item allows states time to raise 
concerns about, or enter into dialogues on, those aspects of the Council‘s work, and 
emphasises their importance for promoting human rights. Agenda Items 2, 5 and 8 
reflect the body‘s duties to interact with wider UN machinery and non-state actors. 
Item 6 solely focuses on the UPR.  
Two agenda items, however, directly contradict the Council‘s founding 
principles of non-selectivity and universality. One country-specific situation, as 
previously discussed, is singled out, under Agenda Item 7, to be discussed at every 
regular Council session. To focus permanent attention solely on the human rights 
situation in ―Palestine and other occupied Arab territories‖ is clearly selective, 
particularly given the persistence of other long-standing crisis regions or situations, 
many of which have claimed far greater numbers of victims. Moreover, one thematic 
right is also singled out and placed on the permanent agenda. Item 9 mandates the 
Council to discuss ―racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related forms of 
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intolerance‖ at every regular session. Both of these agenda items were proposed and 
supported by Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) members and their allies. 
That bloc‘s dominance at the Council enabled it to secure items clearly related to its 
political objectives despite the obvious violation of the body‘s founding principles.  
 The IBP includes additional powers. Paragraph 118,
101
 for example, 
encompasses ―recommendations, conclusions, summaries of discussions and 
President‘s Statement.‖ The text indicates that those powers have ―different legal 
implications [which] should supplement and not replace resolutions and decisions.‖ 
Paragraph 118 provides further mechanisms for fulfilling both aspects of the mandate. 
The IBP also provides greater detail of how the Council‘s mechanisms will work. 
Paragraph 128, for example, expands on special sessions, stating that they ―should 
allow participatory debate, be results-oriented and geared to achieving practical 
outcomes, the implementation of which can be monitored and reported on‖. Although 
primarily concerned with protecting rights, the IBP requires special sessions to focus 
on promoting rights through providing long-term goals to be implemented during and 
after the sessions. The IBP generally seeks to ensure that both the protection and 
promotion mandates are fulfilled across all of the Council‘s work. 
 
   
3.7 Summary 
General Assembly Resolution 60/251 sets out two distinct yet interwoven mandates –
protection and promotion of human rights. The Council is tasked with addressing 
short-term human rights situations where victims need to be protected from abuses. 
Various tools are available for the body to fulfil this mandate: convening special 
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sessions, making recommendations, passing decisions and resolutions, and instigating 
fact-finding and investigations. The Council is also required to promote longer-term 
human rights compliance through capacity-building, advisory services, fact-finding, 
dialogue with states and non-state actors, and providing technical and other 
assistance. The Council‘s mandate can only be understood in light of the background 
to the body‘s creation, particularly its predecessor‘s failure and the proposed reforms. 
Assessing the body will require greater focus on protection mandate, not least because 
the former is more contentious and harder to discharge. Protecting human rights is, in 
many respects, easier to assess over the Council‘s relatively short existence. The 
short-term results, or lack thereof, from the protection mandate can be more easily 
quantified than the longer-term promotion mandate.  
The constituent instrument sets out the powers and mechanisms by which the 
Council can discharge its mandate. Those powers are not legally binding, which 
reflects a general focus on cooperation, inclusiveness and dialogue between states, 
non-state actors and the body itself. The Commission‘s atmosphere had increasingly 
become one of naming, shaming and blaming states, a culture that the drafters of 
Resolution 60/251 clearly sought to avoid. The resolution emphasises inclusiveness 
through constant repetition of the need for cooperation and dialogue. However, the 
Council‘s lack of binding powers results in it relying on state cooperation for its 
mandate to be discharged through national implementation. That cooperation may 
occur through the body‘s own channels and relationships with countries, or through 
political pressure from other member and non-member states.  
The Commission‘s failure can be largely attributed to various forms of 
increasing politicisation during its final years. Politicisation occurred through, 
amongst others, regionalism, power struggles, and misuse of procedural mechanisms. 
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Although politicisation was widely identified as the Commission‘s main failing, the 
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights did say that such criticisms have 
been equivalent to ―fish criticising one another for being wet‖.102 Some radical reform 
proposals aimed to eliminate politicisation from the new human rights body. Most of 
them were not implemented, or were diluted, largely due to fears that radical reforms 
would fundamentally affect the Council‘s legitimacy. Instead the new body, with its 
particular focus on members states‘ accountability, aimed to eradicate politicisation as 
far as possible whilst retaining a geographically representative membership. The 
founding principles provide broad guidelines for eliminating politicisation, but are of 
little practical value. Observers, and some states, such as the US, expressed 
reservations about whether the theoretical hope of eliminating politicisation could be 
achieved in practice without radical reforms being implemented. Rahmani-Ocora 
(2006:16) asserts,―[a] fresh start may be just what the international human rights 
machinery needs; however, with the same players in entrenched positions, the old 
political game is likely to be repeated.‖ 
Lack of radical reform resulted in many similarities between the bodies, both 
in terms of their form and their mandates. The Council has barely a handful fewer 
members than the Commission, despite calls for a smaller, more streamlined body 
which would be less affected by politicisation and regionalism. Delegates at the 
Council remain governmental rather than being independent experts. These factors, 
combined with the adoption of ―soft‖ membership criteria, results in the Council 
resembling the Commission in terms of its members and their representatives. The 
Council‘s size and its inclusiveness regarding eligibility for membership are key for 
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granting the body legitimacy at the UN and amongst its member states. Negotiations 
on the new body underscored the central importance of that legitimacy.  
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PART 2: Criteria for Assessing the Council 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.120 
 
Chapter 4 – International Relations Theories 
 
 
4.0 Introduction 
No intergovernmental body can be assessed without reference to theories of 
international organisations. Five main theories will be explored here – realism, 
idealism, social constructivism, institutionalism, and Marxism - and then applied to 
the Council‘s mandate, roles and functions, work and proceedings.  Each of the five 
theories provides a ―map‖ of the international system, which Slaughter (2001:27) 
deems essential for approaching international relations from either a political or legal 
position. None of the theories is an exact fit. All have some merits as will be shown 
through application and analysis of the Council in relation to each theory. Weaknesses 
will be dealt with in turn in order to demonstrate that no single approach suffices 
when examining HRC proceedings.  
 Scholars of international law and of international relations maintained a 
distance from one another for many years, despite recognising each other‘s work. 
Simmons (2001:274-278) explores the reasons for this separation, identifying 
relatively few instances of collaboration between international law and international 
relations scholars. Henkin (1968:256-257) notes that compliance with international 
commitments is a fundamental component of international relations. Slaughter 
(2001:21) comments that international law cannot be separated from its political 
context. Whilst law plays a role in governing almost every area of international 
relations and international relations impacts upon the creation of and compliance with 
international law, scepticism about the overlapping roles has historically resulted in 
little scholarship combining these two fields (Simmons, 2001:271-279).  
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International law is used to understand the Council‘s mechanisms, whereas 
international relations theory assists with understanding the body‘s actual work, 
proceedings, and the manner in which it undertakes its mandate. Current scholars, 
such as Goldstein and Keohane, recognise the intrinsically bound nature of 
international law to politics. They argue that international law cannot be separated 
from international politics, as law is intrinsically bound to, and affected by, the 
machinery and interests of international politics (Goldstein, et al, 2000:387).  
Slaughter (2001:22) goes further, noting difficulty in determining whether 
international law is more than a mere manifestation of states‘ political will.  
  
4.1 Realism 
Realist writers on international relations can trace their origins to the 1930s (Archer, 
1983:75). Realist theory in relation to international organisations was a reaction to the 
failure of the League of Nations to prevent invasions, for example of Abyssinia and 
Manchuria, and the spread of fascism across Europe. Some realists challenged the 
relevance of international law to state behaviour (Osgood & Tucker, 1967:269-270), 
while others (Carr, 1939:vii) questioned the creation of the League of Nations for 
international governance while Germany was rearming and preparing for a second 
world war (Slaughter, 2001:22).  The Second World War followed by the Cold War 
gave credibility to the realist view that a lack of common authority over states results 
in international anarchy (Slaughter, 2001:33). Neo-realism developed from the early 
1980s. Although it adopts much of classical realism‘s premises it develops different 
conclusions (e.g. Mearsheimer, 1995:10-14). 
 International relations realists have traditionally proposed a state-centric view 
of the world, regarding international organisations as part of institutionalised 
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relationships that exist between states and their governments. Classical realist theory 
views states, unified and self-contained entities, as the decisive actors in international 
politics (e.g. Carr, 1964). States are continually seeking power (Smith, 1986:13), 
much as national political parties are always striving to have and retain power. The 
struggle for power is the focal point of all international relations (e.g. Morgenthau, 
1993). International organisations are used by powerful states to implement power-
politics and to pursue their own self-interest (e.g. Roberts & Kingsbury, 1993). 
International law and institutions only work if they reflect the most powerful states‘ 
interests (Slaughter, 2001:31).  
Disillusioned by the failure of the League of Nations, Carr argued that, to be 
successful, the international system must take into account the realities of existing 
power relationships between states. One of the main problems that he identified was 
discrimination in the international community between the different treatments 
afforded to cases regarding different countries (Carr, 1946:166). Carr illustrated that 
discrimination with reference to the different international reactions to the 1930s 
invasions of Greece (1940) and Abyssinia (1935). The international community, and 
in particular Britain and France, harbouring their own imperial ambitions, all but 
ignored the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, merely deeming it regrettable. Italy‘s 
invasion of Greece five years later resulted in support for the invaded country from 
both Britain and France, with Italy‘s actions being deemed unacceptable.  
Morgenthau‘s work constantly referred to three key elements of international 
relations: that states are the most important actors, that there is a clear distinction 
between national and international politics, and that international relations are 
predominantly about the struggle for power (Vasquez, 1979:211). As such, 
Morgenthau viewed international organisations simply as instruments used by states 
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in their search for power. Morgenthau (1993:497) described the UN as ―the new 
setting for the old techniques of diplomacy‖ explaining that even that international 
organisation was mainly a forum for intergovernmental discourse. The HRC, with 
various states and regional groups vying for power, is a good example of the use of an 
international organisation in this manner. Comparisons can be drawn between 
international organisations where power politics prevail, and, for example, the 
Universal Postal Union, where power struggles between states play no role (Weiss, 
2008:49).   
Realist theorists maintain that states‘ primary objective is asserting and 
ensuring their own interests. Where states exist within an anarchic world, they 
prioritise that primary objective during all interstate relations. International relations 
becomes a game whereby states seek sufficient power in order to be protected from 
other countries (Slaughter, 2001:32). Blocs of states, in the form of regional or like-
minded groups, are one way in which states can amass and maintain power and 
influence at international organisations. Weaker states allied with each other can, at 
times, exert more influence than powerful states on their own. One of the 
Commission‘s main failings was the power struggle between groups of states.  
 Morgenthau criticises those who define international organisations as anything 
other than political arenas. He includes in this analysis ―functional organisations‖, i.e.,  
those relating to practical and technical matters, for example the World Health 
Organisation, as opposed to more intergovernmental political arenas such as the 
General Assembly. Morgenthau (1960:528), sceptical of even the most ―functionalist‖ 
agencies as anything other than political arenas, commented that ultimately interstate 
conflicts overshadow any positive contributions made by international organisations 
to individual countries or the international community as a whole.  Steinberg (2002) 
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similarly argues that international law is nothing more than states furthering their 
national interests. Criticisms of the HRC being used for political agendas have been 
voiced by NGOs, the media and scholars from the outset. Debates and discussions 
focusing on a few states, systematically omitting scrutiny of some of the most 
egregious violators, undermine the body‘s credibility.  
A lack of action on situations involving grave violations, either through 
silence or blocking of meaningful action, has resulted in a body where political 
conflicts take precedence over fulfilment of its mandate. As a subsidiary body of the 
General Assembly, the HRC is not solely a ―functional‖ agency, although it does 
provide some practical and technical assistance for the protection and promotion of 
human rights. The Council‘s main role is to deal with human rights issues as opposed 
to undertaking low-level functional tasks. Despite such differences between 
subsidiary bodies and specialised agencies, Morgenthau‘s criticism applies to the 
HRC, as the body influences the work of specialised agencies whose work overlaps 
with human rights. Political conflicts that overshadow the body‘s work thus have a 
strong impact upon the contributions of the UN functional agencies in the field of 
human rights.   
 Realists view international organisations as ineffective mechanisms for 
effective regulation of state behaviour. Owing to democratic voting rules, groups of 
weaker states, whose domestic regimes are often undemocratic, can exert more 
influence at the Council than individually powerful countries. Downs, et al (1996) 
rather implausibly call for enforcement mechanisms to back up all international legal 
arrangements in order to combat such ineffectiveness, without which they argue that 
the arrangements are obsolete as governments will continue to act as they would have 
done in the absence of a legal commitment. Council decisions, being only hortatory, 
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that is, of an advisory or persuasive nature, remain political. Indeed, states can choose 
to ignore the Council‘s work. However, international organisations that pass binding 
rules effectively force weaker members to submit to the will of stronger ones 
(Goldstein, et al, 2000:391). The HRC cannot pass legally-binding resolutions, nor 
does it have its own enforcement mechanisms. Human rights issues can only be 
legally enforced through such bodies with legally-binding powers or enforcement 
mechanisms, such as the UN Security Council, which occurs very rarely. Moreover, 
decisions at such bodies to legally enforce human rights are made according to the 
political strength of individual members.  
The United States, under the Bush administration, for reasons examined in 
detail in Chapter 7, declined to stand for election for the HRC‘s first three years, from 
2006 - 2009. It did so knowing that the body was unable to impact on its sovereignty. 
At the HRC, powerful states often choose to take a back seat during proceedings. 
Certain powerful states and groups have been particularly notable for abstaining 
during controversial resolutions or for taking neutral stances in debates.
103
  
 
 
 
4.2 Idealism 
Former United States President Woodrow Wilson was a prominent example of 
idealism. The League of Nations was founded on the expectation that societies would 
always prefer peace, thus preventing individual states from going to war. Idealism 
regards actors as being directed by values and norms that are generally shared, if not 
universal. That notion has been a subject of controversy, particularly from a post-
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colonial perspective, which rejects the stance that all Western human rights norms are 
universal. States therefore behave in a manner guided by what is appropriate 
according to values rather than being driven by what consequences may be expected. 
Normative idealists therefore oppose realism, arguing that people, not states, are the 
central actors in international relations (Wilson, 1917/18). According to idealists, 
people are moral actors guided by ideals values and norms, and states act in 
accordance with those values. Realists, however, would argue that states do not 
necessarily represent societal values, especially within non-democratic countries 
where governments do not represent the people. Falk comments that the rapid rise of 
human rights ―to a position of prominence‖ nationally and internationally was both 
unprecedented and unexpected. Idealists explain the rapid rise as being due to 
increased emphasis on human rights within societies and societal groups. Falk 
(2008:8) further argues that ―[t]his rise cuts across the grain of both the structure of 
world order and the ‗realist‘ outlook of most political leaders acting on behalf of 
sovereign states‖.  
Idealism plays a different role in international human rights issues than in, for 
example, law of the sea or civil aviation. If human rights were not centred around 
what are or should be common ideals between states, then they might as well only be 
dealt with by national legal systems. The core of international human rights reflects 
idealist theories. Idealism is encompassed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, with the preamble describing all people as ―members of the human family‖.104 
Resolution 60/251, in a similar vein, is couched in idealist language. The preamble 
reiterates general aims of the UN such as  ―developing friendly relations among 
nations‖ (preamb. para.1) and ―promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
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and fundamental freedoms for all‖ (preamb. para.1). That language stresses the values 
that should guide states‘ actions. States are encouraged to ―respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, sex, 
language or religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status‖ (preamb. para.5). That passage illustrates an idealist vision 
which raises complex issues of universality and relativism that go beyond the scope of 
this assessment. Although idealism is not uncommon in international human rights 
documents, the preamble‘s repetition of idealist aims raises realist questions about 
feasible expectations.  
The Council‘s founding principles also use idealist language, for example 
underlining the need for universality; applying values and norms to all states. 
However, the principles arguably take a realist approach towards human rights by 
requiring cooperation, dialogue and inclusiveness. Those requirements recognise the 
reality that a state‘s involvement with the Council‘s work will more likely result in 
subsequent recommendations being implemented or assistance being accepted. 
Idealism assists with understanding the theory behind the HRC, but its 
practical application is of more limited use. Different societies may have competing 
values and norms, yet idealists hold that common ground can always be found. An 
international organisation stabilises the common ideals and values of its member 
states. A major problem with the HRC is that different states, and indeed regional 
groups, voice fundamentally different positions regarding human rights. Although the 
norms contained in the UDHR may once have represented shared values, such idealist 
hopes arguably are no longer realistic. Invocations of competing values obstruct 
Council efforts. That difficulty reflects the broader problem of universality of human 
rights and cultural relativism. Lack of action even in the face of grave violations, for 
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example in terms of women‘s rights in Islamic states, can be explained due to the 
competing values and norms articulated by member states.  
HRC proceedings demonstrate that where there are common norms and 
values, for example on the relatively non-contentious rights to adequate housing or 
sanitation, its effectiveness exceeds that of its work in contentious areas. The problem 
with normative idealism is that too high an expectation is placed on common ground 
prevailing. Insufficient attention is paid to problems arising where states argue that 
there are competing values, particularly as there are usually political, as opposed to 
sincere, motivations for such arguments. 
 
4.3 Social constructivism 
Social constructivism, whilst technically identified as a branch of idealism bridges the 
gap between realism and normative idealism, demonstrating that the divide between 
these two theories is based is more prevalent in theory rather than in practice. Indeed, 
Slaughter (2001:23) comments that in practice ―[i]t is unclear that the supposed divide 
between Realists and Idealists serves anything other than polemical purposes‖. She 
asserts that the dichotomy between the two theories is not ―a distinction worth 
dwelling on‖ (Slaughter 2001:24). Social constructivists adopt a position is not merely 
a ―compromise‖ between realism and idealism, but rather a distinct theory of state 
conduct which adopts elements of both approaches.  
Social constructivists stress that social actors behave in accordance both with 
selfish interests and in response to shared values and norms. International 
organisations emerge, according to Risse (2000:1-41), where the values they represent 
are widely shared by participating states.  Problems occur where societies stake out 
different positions on issues, hampering the success and effectiveness of the 
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organisation. According to idealists, human rights represent common interests among 
people, even if rights are perceived differently within different regions and cultures. 
Realists, however, argue that governments, particularly non-democratic ones, do not 
necessarily represent their peoples‘ interests in human rights.   
Universal membership of the UN is widely deemed to be represented at the 
HRC through membership being apportioned according to geographic boundaries,
105
 
resulting in a broad range of interests and strategies regarding the issues at hand.  
Problems arise where conflicts occur, for example the right to freedom of expression 
in conflict with defamation of religion.  The Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet 
Mohammad (e.g. Nathwani, 2008) resulted in ongoing debates regarding freedom of 
speech and defamation of religion, with various states continuously arguing that both 
issues be afforded the same level of protection. That controversy arose at the Council, 
which facilitated a number of debates and resolutions aimed at striking a balance that 
would to solve ―the problem‖.106 Western states underlined the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression whereas other states, predominantly OIC members, called for 
defamation of religion to be granted the same status. Haas (1992:1-35) comments that 
effective organisations are only likely where states hold a common position regarding 
how to solve ―the problem‖.  A lack of uniform opinion on ―solutions‖ to human 
rights ―problems‖ impeded the Commission‘s work, and continues to do so at the 
Council.  
Another facet of social constructivism is a focus on social groups that lobby 
for specific norms within their area of interest. Collectively, these groups are a 
mechanism for expressing shared or societal values. NGOs, regional groups, and other 
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social groups, use the mechanisms of international organisations to encourage states‘ 
behaviour to comply with the norms of those institutions. Various social groups use 
the HRC to encourage changes in states‘ behaviour, particularly focusing on national 
implementation of human rights norms. Moreover, the Council is mandated to provide 
a platform for such groups to raise concerns, share information and provide expertise.  
Reports on the right to food, housing and poverty, for example, have provided 
tools for states to implement changes with the help of social groups. International 
organisations promote their own norms which support the work of the social groups, 
leading to individual states changing their behaviour and interests. A primary aim of 
the HRC is to affect such change, and the innovative Universal Periodic Review 
mechanism was set up in order to achieve that purpose. The review aims to afford 
states an opportunity to provide advice and assistance for the country concerned in an 
environment of cooperation and support. 
Social constructivism provides a relevant theory for the HRC, because it 
encompasses idealist and realist positions whilst focusing on the fundamental interest 
that all states ought to have in human rights. The Council‘s use for providing 
technical assistance and advisory services underlines the social constructivist 
approach that organisations should enable changes in states‘ behaviour. However, 
social constructivists fail to address the problem of effectiveness, where competing 
positions on norms and values exist within an international organisation, as occurs at 
the Council.  
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4.4 Institutionalism 
Institutionalism, like social constructivism, offers a separate theory of state behaviour 
that includes some realist and idealist assumptions. Indeed, social constructivists use 
language which relies heavily on institutionalism. After the Second World War, 
international relations theorists moved away from a mainly state-centred approach. 
Increase in the numbers and importance of international organisations, coupled with 
growing influence of non-state actors, resulted in revised approaches to international 
relations. Institutionalists offer an alternative to realism by giving credence to 
international rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures (Krasner, 
1983:2).
 
Institutionalists argue that these mechanisms enable states to pursue common 
aims (Slaughter, 2001:35-36).  
Federalism is the oldest school of thought within institutionalism. Federalists 
view a common order being established through mass support within states for 
countries to join together whilst maintaining individual identities (e.g. Friedrich, 
1968). Federalists advocate the constructive transfer of sovereignty with the aim of 
integration and institutionalisation. A distinction must be drawn between federalism 
in the US, where states altogether abandoned sovereign powers, and that of the EU, 
where states retain sovereignty. The United Nations seeks neither to produce a ―world 
government‖ nor, as emphasised in the UN Charter,107 for its members to sacrifice 
sovereignty.  
Institutionalist ―functionalism‖ (as distinct from Morgenthau‘s usage of the 
term) rejects any such federalist unions as illusory, arguing that international 
organisations exist to enable states to overcome common problems or in the pursuit of 
common goals (e.g. Mitrany, 1966). Functions are delegated from states to the 
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organisations, increasing the importance of international organisations and decreasing 
the states‘ political roles. Functionalism focuses on economic rather than political 
integration, and provides an alternative to realism or federalism by aiming for 
transnational administrative networks.  
Institutionalism developed throughout the 1970s and 1980s, focusing on the 
emerging European Union as a model. ―Transactionalism‖ advocates integration 
through regional, continental and inter-continental organisations, as opposed to 
aiming for a world federation or the abandonment of states‘ sovereignty. 
Transactionalist theory emerged as a result of increasing numbers of security 
communities, such as NATO. Deutsch (1989:212) argued that increased transaction 
flow and communication between states would lead to greater integration and better 
understanding between people.  
The dominant institutionalist theories throughout the past two decades are 
―interdependence‖ and ―neo-institutionalism‖. Interdependence theorists challenge the 
realist emphasis on states as the primary entity in international relations. They stress 
the role of NGOs, multinational corporations, and other non-state actors. Neo-
institutionalists build on traditional institutionalist theories by incorporating aspects of 
the interdependence approach. I shall explore institutionalism‘s application to 
international organisations by focusing on those two branches of theory.  
Institutionalists argue that states‘ interests are neither mutually exclusive nor 
harmoniously in agreement. International relations results in outcomes that involve 
joint gains or losses for states on any given ―problem‖. A common interest between 
states, even where their political agendas may differ, is the avoidance of such joint 
losses or the acquisition of such joint gains. States are united by the pursuit of that 
which they cannot achieve on their own, and thus international organisations are more 
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than the sum of their parts. Even the most powerful states depend upon weaker ones, 
depending either on formal voting rules or on actual geo-political circumstances. 
Complex interdependence in a variety of areas will result in a state‘s goals varying 
according to the different matters under consideration.  Those factors do not, 
however, mean, as the realists maintain, that states pursue only their immediate self-
interest. International organisations allow a state to deal with each issue separately, 
thus affording a country an opportunity to pursue goals without constant reference to 
its overall power. Instead, a state‘s strength in relation to an individual ―problem‖ 
becomes more important than its overall strength.  
Lijnzaad (1995) explores the problems with applying the law of treaties as a 
framework for human rights. Models based so strongly on bargaining, and on 
individual gain for states, depart from the ideals behind human rights law, which 
fundamentally rejects the do ut des framework upon which many treaties have, 
traditionally, been based. Lijnzaad (1995:3-5) argues that human rights treaties deal 
with matters where compromise and bargaining should not exist owing to the 
fundamental nature of each right. ―Problems‖ with human rights are often solved 
through state reservations, which Lijnzaad insists are fundamentally at odds with the 
purpose of such treaties. Although reservations enable states to implement some 
human rights norms and allows them to engage with the wider human rights 
machinery, the use of bargaining and compromise undermines the system of human 
rights.  
Keohane (1989:11) sets out an institutionalist position which does 
acknowledge that states are primary actors.  Certainly, in the absence of institutions 
states pursue power despite their underlying interests not necessarily conflicting. That 
is precisely why institutions allow state cooperation.
 
 International organisations allow 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.134 
 
all states to pursue their goals in an area, rather than submitting to the will of strong 
states on every issue. Links from other issues, as well as the power distribution within 
a particular area, will affect the agenda. Weaker states have more power through 
collaboration and bargaining than in international organisations which only focus on a 
few issues. The more issues dealt with, the greater the opportunity for collaboration 
with like-minded states, whether on one or many matters, or for bargaining power 
across different areas.  
The interdependence approach (e.g. Keohane & Nye, 2001) developed in the 
US during the 1970s. It adopts aspects of transactionalism, placing emphasis on 
societal transactions between various entities. Rejecting realism, it regards the 
increase in controversial situations as resulting from ever-more complex 
interdependence between states owing to increasing globalisation and transnational 
interactions. Its exponents argue that the importance of international organisations 
increases in order to deal with those situations. Neo-institutionalism acknowledges 
this increasing interdependence, using it to build on traditional institutionalist theory.  
Keohane (1984) demonstrates the link between increasingly interdependent 
relationships of states and the creation and increased importance of international 
organisations. Smithers argues that an increasingly globalised world presents a range 
of interconnected problems, presenting international organisations with ever more 
complex problems (Smithers, 1979:13-14). One reason for the growth of human rights 
as an area of international concern is the emergence of an interdependent world.  
Globalisation, albeit only a factor in this growth, has impacted upon the awareness of 
human rights issues (e.g. McCorquodale & Fairbrother, 1999: 735-766; Monshipouri, 
2001: 370-401). Unlike idealism, which focuses on shared values regarding human 
rights, neo-institutionalism highlights the increase in states‘ common problems arising 
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from human rights abuses. Grave violations of human rights (expanded upon by Kälin 
and Kunzli, 2009:149) impact upon more states than those where such abuses occur, 
and repercussions of human rights situations occur in neighbouring countries and 
beyond. For example, grave violations of human rights result in refugees fleeing into 
neighbouring states. Human rights abuses impact upon state relations with known 
abusers, and violations do occur against persons with links to other countries. Human 
rights situations are not confined to the state where they occur, and transnational 
impact increases the global importance of this issue.  
Focus on human rights situations has grown due in part to the increasing 
ability to report on such situations, and the wider public‘s response has generally been 
to call for more action to be taken to prevent such violations. The HRC consists of 
member states proportionately representing the geographic make-up of the UN. 
Attitudes towards human rights generally, and especially individual rights, vary 
greatly across regions. During the Cold War there was increasing disparity between 
Western and non-Western notions of human rights ideals. Schoenbaum (2006:254) 
comments that one approach requires human rights to be subject to cultural and 
religious traditions. Kausikan (1993) examines the increasing impact of cultural 
sensitivities on human rights. The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights 
acknowledged ―[t]he significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind.‖108 An example 
of different attitudes towards human rights can be seen in various approaches towards 
women and human rights. 24 Muslim countries have made reservations to the 1979 
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Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
109
 on the basis of 
conflicting Sharia law regarding marriage and family (e.g. Hamid & Kulliyyah, 
2006). Moreover, various African states still allow female genital mutilation
110
 to take 
place under the guise of ―cultural identity‖ or ―religious practice‖ (e.g. Schoenbaum, 
2006: 254).
111
  
Government policies do not always reflect different cultural or societal 
attitudes towards human rights, although, as previously discussed, this is often used as 
a justification for states‘ non-compliance with human rights norms.112 According to 
Normand and Zaidi, there is a gap between values espoused and rights implemented 
due to a lack of adequate mechanisms for implementing human rights, as compared 
with, for example, international economic law. Human rights are ―both a source of 
universal values and an arena of ideological warfare.‖ (Normand & Zaidi, 2008:2)   
Interdependence theories use the notion of ―common interest‖ to explain 
international organisations. The preamble to Resolution 60/251 emphasises the need 
for a common interest in order to ensure that the Council overcomes the 
Commission‘s failure to uphold universally human rights norms and standards. The 
passage ―all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing‖ (preamb. para.3) reflects language used at the Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights (1993).However, the idealised common interest of 
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states in ensuring human rights compliance is complicated by different states having 
varying degrees of interest in upholding human rights. Realists would argue that states 
recognise self-interest above any common interest. Totalitarian or dictatorial states 
indeed have a particular interest in non-compliance with human rights in order to 
repress dissent (cf. Heinze, 2007).  
Within international human rights bodies, compromise agreements become 
increasingly important to fulfil their mandates. Compromise agreements at the HRC 
involve members or blocs bargaining over wording of resolutions, or indeed taking 
action on a human right situation. States seeking the common interest of human rights 
compliance are, problematically, forced to compromise on some aspects of human 
rights in order to achieve the broader aim of protecting or promoting other rights. 
Whilst the HRC itself cannot take action regarding human rights violations, its work 
is of great importance in the reporting of, and recommendations about, such 
situations.  
Neo-institutionalism regards international organisations as helpful in enabling 
states to cooperate successfully in pursuit of common interests. States holding 
common interests are able to raise such issues at the HRC through a collective voice,  
not only with each other, but with states who may join the alliance due to other 
common interests. Common interests in practice are not always the pursuit of human 
rights ideals. States may assert common positions that result in the majority being able 
to steamroll over the minority, even where it allows non-compliance with 
international human rights standards. Neo-institutionalists hold that the success of an 
international organisation requires alignment of common interests, or at least that 
interests are not mutually exclusive. Some common interests at the HRC, for example 
the right to safe drinking water, are less politically contentious than others.  The right 
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to freedom of expression is thought in some national contexts to conflict with 
defamation of religion, resulting in interests that are diametrically opposed (e.g. 
Parmar, 2009:353-375). Neo-institutionalism is perhaps too idealistic to apply to the 
HRC. At that body, discussions regarding safe drinking water will result in close 
cooperation between states to protect and promote that right for all people. 
Discussions regarding the freedom of expression, where the right conflicts with a 
value held by many member states, result in ineffective decision-making.  
Slaughter (2001:38) asserts that institutionalism requires states to hold 
common interests across the board. She insists that power politics, either between 
states or groups, will prevail unless states hold shared aims. Impact of common 
interests depends on the degree of commonality and the lack of opposing state self-
interests, which relies heavily on idealist theories. As with idealism, institutionalism is 
more applicable to bodies which deal with less controversial subjects. Proportionate 
geographic representation at the Council allows weaker states, particularly from the 
African Group and the OIC, to promote common goals, as can be seen from the 
HRC‘s agenda and work. Weaker states may have an impact upon the HRC, but, as 
realism reminds us, the incentive for any state, especially powerful ones, to defect 
from joint cooperation will always exist where it is in the state‘s interest to do so. 
Powerful but isolated states may be especially tempted to defect from the Council 
owing to the impact of regionalism at the body allowing weaker states to jointly 
pursue common goals. Refusal of the US to stand for election to the HRC has been 
argued to have occurred due to its reticence to have its own human right record 
scrutinised or to be subjected to regular attacks at sessions by other member states.
113
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Institutionalism applies to the HRC in terms of the collaboration of states to 
achieve political goals. However, emphasis on interdependence between states 
disregards the overall dominance of powerful states. Focus on weaker states‘ ability to 
pursue their own goals through bargaining power and collaboration fails to deal either 
with the issue of powerful states withdrawing from an international organisation, or 
with the impact of powerful states‘ general dominance over weaker countries.  
 
 
4.5 Marxist and post-Marxist Theories 
Marxism, as applied to international organisations, does not hold states or non-state 
actors as being of primary importance, although it recognises the need to 
acknowledge them as part of a ―stage‖ in world history. Although Marx lived in a 19th 
Century world dominated by nationalism, he saw divisions as being based on 
economic class rather than state borders. He argued that ―working men have no 
country.‖ (Marx & Engels, [1888] 2008:23) Marx saw the nation state, and 
particularly nationalism, as one of a number of mechanisms by which the proletariat 
were suppressed.  
State governments combining to reach global decisions would be anathema to 
Marx‘s theories. He envisaged solutions being found across national boundaries. 
Marx argued that true internationalism had no national interests because all 
distinctions between states must ultimately disappear, and the common interests of the 
proletariat would be pursued regardless of territory. Marx predicted that ―[t]he 
supremacy of the proletariat will cause [national differences] to vanish still faster.‖ 
(Marx & Engels, [1888] 2008:23)  Marx did not incorporate any concept of 
international organisations of states, as he expected the state to ―wither away‖ 
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(Engels, 1995:333) after successful socialist revolutionary activity. There was no 
place, in his model, for the pursuit of national (or regional) interests within an intra-
national framework. 
Subsequent Marxist treatment of international organisations was influenced by 
the post-revolutionary Soviet Union‘s approach, for example, its promotion of 
international labour organisations, while remaining isolationist in many areas of 
foreign policy. The First World War prompted Lenin‘s writings, which previously 
focused on Russian affairs, to deal with the problem of imperialism. Lenin considered 
Russia‘s place in the world amongst ―imperialist‖ states, and its duty to encourage the 
socialist revolution in other countries. Stalin (1933:8-9) wrote that ―Leninism is 
Marxism in the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution‖, implying that 
Lenin‘s revisions to Marxism occurred because of the evolution of European 
capitalism and colonialism.  
Soviet links with developing countries, prior to decolonisation, advanced after 
World War II and throughout the Cold War, with the Soviet Union‘s insistence on the 
right to national self-determination. International relations were to focus on the 
relationship between developed and developing nations, and the need for solidarity 
with states oppressed by imperialist nations (Meyer, 1957:270). Many post-colonial 
states continue to deploy post-Marxist discourses. Pashukanis, a Soviet legal scholar, 
accepted that international legal mechanisms, for example treaties and custom, 
provide the outline for international relationships. He advocated the requirement for 
socialist states to fill in the outline with socialist content (Pashukanis, 1980:168). 
Soviet policy later stressed the difference between relations with developing nations 
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and like-minded states, comparing them with a necessary, peaceful co-existence with 
capitalist countries despite ideological differences.
114
  
Co-existence with capitalist countries was reflected through the Soviet 
Union‘s membership of international organisations. Although socialist and capitalist 
ideals were fundamentally incompatible, mixed organisations (consisting of socialist, 
capitalist, developing and other nations) were viewed as part of this system of 
peaceful co-existence (Osakwe, 1972:35). Traditional Soviet thinking, applied to 
international organisations, focused on those bodies‘ founding instruments as 
determinative of their legal personality which, if present, conferred similar 
international legal standing to that of a sovereign state (Osakwe, 1972:30). Tunkin 
(1974:21-49), a post-Stalin Soviet scholar, emphasised the need for wide 
representation of all classes – or, in this instance, types of states – before an 
international organisation was to be generally recognised as having international legal 
personality. That view betokens the emerging link between Marxist and post-
colonialist theory during the period of decolonisation.     
Various more recent critiques have built on these ideas. Theories which have 
adopted a post-Marxist discourse include some schools of cultural relativism and 
Third World theories (Dembour, 2010:72-85), both of which seek to challenge 
imperialism and Western hegemony. According to post-Marxists, cultural relativism 
does have a ―good side‖ (Hatch, 1997:371), providing a counterbalance to the 
universalism promoted by Western states to advance their own objectives without 
reference to weaker states‘ norms, cultures or positions. Third World theorists 
challenge the use of international organisations by powerful states seeking to impose 
Western aims and to continue neo-colonial impositions and oppression (e.g. Said, 
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1978;  Bhabha, 1994; Anghie 2004; Doty, 1962; Franck, 1982). These two approaches 
have played a significant role in states‘ and groups‘ positions and agendas at the UN 
Human Rights Council.  
Other post-Marxist theories have also played a role at the Council. World 
systems theory emphasises capitalism‘s role in shaping a world order divided into 
powerful core states and weaker peripheral states (e.g. Wallerstein, 1974; Hobson, 
2000). That theory examines the fusion between state and class power, and the 
common interest between core and peripheral states, in maintaining an unequal and 
exploitative status quo. The neo-Gramscian approach argues that inequality stems 
from the ideologies of the powerful states, for example neo-liberalism (e.g. Gill, 
1992). International law, according to that theory, reflects the ideologies and interests 
of the global elite rather than acting as a neutral force in international politics. 
HRC membership is apportioned according to geographic boundaries, as 
opposed to political systems. Proportional geographic representation has ensured 
membership of states with a wide range of political systems. Marxist and post-Marxist 
theories have influenced the structure, proceedings and work of the Council. States 
from the global South, in particular decolonised states, alongside countries such as 
China, Venezuela and Cuba, have deployed post-Marxist discourses at the body. 
Moreover, weaker states have frequently acted across national borders in pursuit of 
common interests, utilising bloc tactics in order to assert collective power over 
typically more dominant states or groups.  
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4.6 Summary 
Failure of the League of Nations led to changing theories of international 
organisations during, and immediately after, the Second World War. Effectiveness of 
theories such as normative idealism, upon which the League of Nations had been 
built, and state-centric realism, had been undermined by the Second World War. 
Although the UN reflected emerging theories, incorporating institutionalism and 
social constructivism, amongst others, states were wary of ceding too much control 
over domestic affairs to the organisation.  
 Constituent documents, and indeed UN resolutions, decisions and other 
documents, tend to reflect idealist theory on international organisations. The preamble 
to such documents regularly repeat idealist aims set out in the UN Charter. Idealism is 
nevertheless counterbalanced by the realist approach states take towards the 
organisation and the proceedings within its bodies. The Council is not an exception to 
this juxtaposition between idealist theory and realist practice. However, when 
assessing the body from a legal perspective, the realities of international relations 
cannot supersede the legal documents upon which the body has been built.  
According to Klabbers (2002:30), theoretical idealists often assert that in 
practice they are realists. International lawyers perhaps do accept that, in practice, a 
realist approach ought to be taken towards international organisations. That 
acceptance is based, in no small part, on state behaviour, in particular the use of those 
bodies as political arenas as well as weaker states‘ use of regional groups and political 
blocs to influence work and proceedings. However, when taking a theoretical 
approach, international lawyers often follow, and seek to uphold, the idealist 
approach. International lawyers focus on the organisation‘s constituent document and 
other relevant legal instruments, expecting the body to adhere to those texts. Such an 
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approach is, essentially, idealism; expecting a body to fulfil the legal basis upon 
which it was created. At the UN, those documents often contain idealist aims, further 
emphasising that theoretical approach when undertaking legal assessments. The 
Council‘s constituent document and its Institution Building Package include many 
idealist aims and principles.  
The divide between realism and idealism provides too blunt an instrument for 
assessing the HRC. Institutionalism is useful for understanding the centrality of 
interstate collaboration at the Council. Bargaining and compromise are key working 
methods at the HRC, although that is problematic in terms of human rights. 
Institutionalism incorporates aspects of realism and idealism, but in so doing it fails 
adequately to address the weaknesses of either theory; institutionalists do not explain 
how isolated, powerful states can be encouraged to remain within a body, nor how to 
construct shared aims particularly where conflicting values already exists. Social 
constructivism provides the most useful method for understanding the Council both in 
theory and in practice. Social constructivists stress that human rights are a 
fundamental interest for all states, but accept that this position is not accepted by 
every country. Theorists therefore focus on how to change states‘ behaviour in order 
to ensure compliance with human rights norms. Affecting changes forms a significant 
part of the Council‘s mandate, work and proceedings, through promotion of human 
rights, technical assistance, advisory services, and support. Moreover, social 
constructivists recognise the importance of actors other than states, which is reflected 
in the Council‘s interactions with NGOs, social groups, human rights experts, and UN 
administrative staff.  
Social constructivism is the most appropriate theory for understanding the 
Council, whereas Marxism and post-Marxist discourses are useful for exploring state 
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and group behaviour at the body. The HRC is dominated by decolonised and 
developing states. Those countries typically adopt post-Marxist discourses on human 
rights. African states, in particular, emphasise a lack of national capabilities for 
human rights, often seeking the body‘s assistance with capacity-building, and drawing 
upon Third World Theories to underscore Western states‘ duties to support such 
efforts. Indeed, states have regularly referred to human rights as a ―neo-colonial tool 
of repression‖. Many states hide behind capacity-building in order to excuse non-
compliance, using post-Marxist discourses as a shield to avoid scrutiny. Similarly, 
cultural relativism, which draws upon some Marxist ideas, is frequently deployed to 
justify non-compliance. OIC members and African states are particularly prone to 
using that discourse despite it being fundamentally at odds with the concept of human 
rights. 
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Chapter 5 - Roles and Functions of International Organisations 
 
Resolution 60/251 requires the Council to fulfil certain roles and functions in order to 
protect and promote human rights. The body‘s roles and functions are intrinsically 
linked to, and dependant on the UN, wider human rights machinery, NGOs, states and 
non-state actors.  
 
5.1 Roles of International Organisations   
General theories on the relationship between international organisations and states 
may assist understanding of international organisations‘ roles (cf. Kennedy, 1987). 
International organisations are presented as playing various roles, of which three main 
theories will be examined: arenas, instruments and actors.   
Conor Cruise O‘Brien, one-time special representative to the UN Secretary-
General, described the UN as ―stages set for a continuous dramatisation of world 
history‖ (O‘Brien & Topolski, 1968:9).  This metaphorical view is perhaps better 
explained by Archer (1983:136): the UN is often seen as solely an ―arena‖ in which 
member states can advance their own viewpoints and suggestions in a public and open 
forum.  Member states, observers and NGOs use regular HRC sessions as an ―arena‖ 
to voice opinions and to set forth their agendas. State and non-state entities use HRC 
mechanisms to air their opinions. Informal meetings, the complaints procedure, and 
special sessions, are examples of such mechanisms. As an ―arena‖ the HRC is privy to 
vast amounts of information from states and specialised entities. This enables the 
Council to examine many human rights issues at each of its regular sessions. Despite 
the body‘s clear emphasis on its role as an ―arena‖, and the importance of this 
function for its work, the HRC aims to be more than merely a forum for discussion. 
The Council is able to act through, for example, undertaking fact-finding missions, 
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reporting on human rights issues, and passing decisions and resolutions.
115
 Powers for 
the body to be proactive in protecting and promoting human rights, even though those 
powers are non-binding, indicates that the Council was intended to be more than 
simply an ―arena‖ for interstate discussions.  
 ―Perhaps the most usual image of the role of international organisations is that 
of an instrument being used by its members for particular ends‖ (Archer, 1983:130). 
International organisations as instruments go beyond an ―arena‖ by doing more than 
staging debates. Instruments, as the regular use of the word indicates, are used to 
achieve results. A main hope at the HRC‘s inception was that it would actively protect 
and promote human rights issues. Nobel Laureate Karl Gunnar Myrdal
116
 (1955:4-5) 
stated that ―international organisations are nothing else than instruments for the 
policies of individual governments‖, implying that actions of an international 
organisation result directly from one or more member states‘ national policies. That 
assertion is supported by McCormick and Kihl‘s study of international organisations, 
which concluded that international organisations ―are used by nations primarily as 
selective instruments for gaining foreign policy objectives‖ (McCormick & Kihl, 
1979:502).  Despite political agendas dominating the Commission‘s final years and 
significantly contributing to its demise, the Council has failed to adequately address 
and overcome this problem.   
Claude (1971:13), re-stating the institutionalist position, explained that ―an 
international organisation is most clearly an actor when it is most distinctly an ‗it‘, an 
entity distinguishable from its member states.‖ One fundamental way to distinguish an 
organisation from its members is through an ability of the former to regulate the 
latter‘s behaviour. International organisations employ different methods of decision-
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making. For ―actor-capacity‖, resolutions, recommendations or orders must compel 
member states to behave differently than they would have otherwise done (Wolfers, 
1962:22).  
The fewer binding powers an international organisation holds, the more likely 
it will be used for political aims. Countries are reluctant to relinquish autonomy to 
international organisations holding legally-binding powers. Kahler (2000:663) asserts 
that the higher the degree of obligation under an agreement, the more credibility is 
given to a government commitment.  Similarly, he argues that where an agreement is 
strengthened by enforcement mechanisms and the ability to adjudicate on issues of 
non-compliance, the credibility of a government commitment is also increased 
(Kahler, 2000:663).   
 
 
5.2 Functions of International Organisations 
Three main functions are: inputs, outputs and the conversion process. International 
organisations can be understood as political systems that convert inputs into 
outputs.
117
 Demands and support from the organisation‘s environment are transformed 
into that institution‘s policies. Many of the demands and support for international 
organisations stem from its member states or expert bodies. The power position of a 
state, and its control over relevant resources, is of great importance. Power is 
manifested through specific control over resources in an area or through overall 
control of issue-transcending resources (Keohane & Nye, 2001:3-47).  States may use 
control of important resources in other issue areas to exert influence in areas where 
they lack relevant power. 
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5.2.1 Inputs 
The Council‘s inputs demonstrate that the body is fulfilling the requirements, under 
Resolution 60/251, that it operates within the UN human rights machinery and work 
with wider society and non-state actors. Input sources include a variety of actors 
which create ties between the Council and the wide human rights field. Three main 
input sources are specifically mentioned in Resolution 60/251. Input from all three 
forms part of the Council‘s legal mandate.     
Administrative Staff  Input sources include the administrative staff of an 
international organisation. Administrative staff can exert considerable influence on 
the input aspect of policy making. Creation of the HRC and the many reform 
proposals regarding its predecessor can be attributed to Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan‘s 2005 ―In Larger Freedom‖ report.118 Speeches of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights at HRC sessions demonstrate administrative staff‘s ability to influence 
the agenda. Issues are also raised by the Secretary-General, although his words are not 
always adhered to, often through calls for the Council to deal with particular thematic 
or country-specific issues. States have, at times, attempted to discredit information 
provided by administrative staff.
119
  
Special Procedures  Communities of experts are another main source of input 
at the HRC. Institutionalists such as Keohane regard expert advice as being of 
growing importance due to the increasingly complex problems being dealt with by 
organisations. UN bodies make frequent use of individual experts and committees of 
experts, selected according to the usual geographic criteria. Expertise is provided 
which may be lacking among administrative staff and member states. Effect on 
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policy-making is inevitable. Unanimity amongst experts, as is often the case at the 
HRC, lends greater credibility to the advice. However, states do ignore or attack 
experts‘ reports at the Council, particularly on politically-sensitive or contentious 
issues. Experts are frequently used to undertake HRC fact-finding missions, provide 
reports, or indeed are appointed as mandate holders regarding specific human rights 
issues.   
The Special Procedures system plays a role within every aspect of the 
Council‘s work. However, assessing the system itself goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
120
 A general understanding of special procedures will be necessary in order to 
assess the Council. Special Procedures were described, by former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, as ―the crown jewel of the [UN human rights] system‖.121 The 
system assisted human rights protection and promotion, primarily by investigating 
and reporting on human rights violations, and making recommendations. The 
Commission on Human Rights‘ Special Procedures system (e.g. Nifosi, 2005) was 
adopted by the Council under General Assembly Resolution 60/251 Paragraph 7. 
Special Procedures were established to assist the Commission‘s human rights 
monitoring and allow investigation of specific human rights situations within 
individual countries or of general, global human rights issues. Special Procedures 
mechanisms are universal, reflecting the UDHR‘s universality. Human rights 
protection and promotion thus applies across all UN member states, unlike at treaty 
bodies which only deal with states party to the relevant treaty.  
                                                 
120 On Special Procedures and the HRC see, for example, ‗Special Issue: The role of the special rapporteurs of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council in the development and promotion of international human rights norms‘, 
The International Journal of Human Rights, (Vol.15(2), 2011). 
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The legal basis for mandates derives directly from the Commission‘s powers 
to submit proposals, recommendations and reports concerning all questions of human 
rights.
122
 Special Procedures involve a range of activities, including fact-finding 
missions; meeting local authorities, NGOs, human rights defenders, and individuals; 
and visiting relevant facilities. Information gathered is used for reports and 
recommendations. Special Procedures mandate holders communicate with concerned 
governments about alleged violations, requesting responses and corrective actions. 
Clarification is sought on alleged violations, and governments encouraged to fulfil 
human rights duties. Special Procedures issue public statements on human rights 
situations to draw wider attention to violations. The main function for mandate 
holders is submitting annual reports to the Council, and sometimes to the General 
Assembly, and making recommendations. Mandate holders are almost always active 
participants in an interactive dialogue on their reports.  
Special Procedures impact on states‘ national jurisdiction through 
investigating country-specific or thematic human rights issues and issuing reports and 
recommendations on the findings. Fact-finding and other aspects of Special 
Procedures allows information sharing, which can damage states‘ national interests. 
Certain countries, in particular those from the South, sought to restrict Special 
Procedures at the new body. Those states were most affected by, or most fearful of, 
the system‘s impact on domestic jurisdiction.  
Special Procedures‘ functions are key for protecting and promoting human 
rights, and are utilised by the entire UN human rights machinery. Farer and Gaer 
(1993:287-288) argue that, at the Commission, mandate holders fulfilled their duties 
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to a high level, and gave ―recommendations that push beyond traditional thinking and 
practice at the UN.‖ It is therefore imperative that the system be maintained, not only 
for the new body but for the UN as a whole. However, although mandate holders 
provide useful information and encouraged protection and promotion of human rights, 
Special Procedures were criticised at the Commission for lacking practical impact. 
Hampson (2007:19) criticises the Commission‘s failure to devote sufficient time to 
consider Special Procedures‘ reports or for follow-up to such reports. She argues that 
failure to listen to or act upon expert advice was a main failing of the Commission. 
Farer and Gaer (1993:288) similarly comment on a lack of systematic follow-up to 
reports given by thematic mandate holders. They argue that reports were not 
discussed at the Commission in any systematic way, which limited their exposure and 
efficacy.  
 Resolution 60/251 requires the Council to ―maintain a system of special 
procedures, expert advice and a complaint procedure‖.123 The Council was not 
mandated to adopt the Commission‘s system in its entirety, but instead was given the 
ability to adapt and change aspects of Special Procedures so long as a system was 
maintained. Schrijver notes that, prior to the Council‘s creation tensions arose 
regarding modifying the system (Gutter, 2007:105). The compromise was to retain the 
system for the Council‘s first year, and undertake a review as to whether to keep, and 
where necessary rationalise or improve, individual mandates. Scannella and Splinter 
(2007:60) argued, prior to the review taking place, that the Council should strengthen 
rather than preserve the system. They advocated focusing on gaps in coverage and 
creating a comprehensive system. The review occurred throughout early sessions, 
culminating in the Institution Building Package‘s adoption. Part II of the text 
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establishes Special Procedures‘ modalities and mechanisms and the review process 
for individual mandates.  
The Special Procedures system operates independently of the Council, with 
much overlap but a concurrent system in play which allows mandate holders to retain 
independence of this, and indeed any UN, body. That independence is crucial for the 
Special Procedures system, but does raise questions regarding, for example, 
adherence to the Council‘s founding principles, fulfilment of its mandate, and the 
impact of politicisation, because the body must respect the independence of mandate 
holders and their decisions.   
Each mandate is allocated a mandate holder. Mandate holders occupy unique 
positions as independent experts with wide investigative and reporting powers. They 
are expected to be independent, are unpaid by the UN, and serve in a personal 
capacity for a maximum of six years.
124
 Farer and Gaer (1993:287-288) comment that 
mandate holders, by virtue of their expertise, ―have in general seemed insulated from 
the sort of political pressure that cripples effective and impartial inquiry.‖ Perhaps, as 
experts, such persons have been afforded sufficient respect by delegations to ensure 
they are not targeted for political aims. However, at times politicisation has occurred.  
Almost all mandate holders are human rights experts, either Special 
Rapporteurs of the Commission, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General
125
  
or Independent Experts.
126
 Despite little practical difference between these forms of 
mandate holders, Farer and Gaer (1993:284) comment that a hierarchy emerged at the 
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Commission with Special Rapporteurs being favoured over Special Representatives or 
Independent Experts. It was rarer for the Commission to appoint Working Groups as 
mandate holders, although this did sometimes occur. Working Groups are composed 
of five human rights experts, one from each of the geographic regions. That format is 
considered more suitable when a collegiate body is required, either to promote wider 
discussions or to render opinions on cases with participation of experts from different 
legal backgrounds. The working group model is also favoured by some because of 
representation from all five regional groups. Hampson (2007:19) notes the confusion 
between different forms of Special Procedures. Her opinion is that working groups 
should only be used where each individual‘s legal knowledge of his/her region is 
required in order for the mandate to be fulfilled, for example on arbitrary detention. 
 NGOs  Interest groups are another HRC input. NGOs have consultative 
status
127
 at the body and are a source of specialised quality input through formal and 
informal channels. International organisations need access to the information and 
expertise held by NGOs. One innovative reform to the UN human rights body enabled 
the HRC to be one of very few international organisations that allow NGO‘s to 
participate directly in the body‘s proceedings. These input sources directly implement 
Resolution 60/251 which mandates the body to provide a forum for information-
sharing and for dialogue between state and non-state actors. NGOs are also an input 
source for the Special Procedures system. NGOs provide specialised input through 
formal and informal channels. Scannella and Splinter (2007:57) comment NGO 
participation was widely accepted by states, and that they engaged with the substance 
of NGO concerns rather than the legitimacy of NGO involvement. Rudolf (2000:291) 
comments that Special Procedures provide an ―independent intermediary‖ between 
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NGOs and states. NGOs or other human rights activists may provide information to 
mandate holders which then forms part of the overall report and recommendations. 
Although NGOs are given the opportunity to participate in the Special Procedures 
system, their role during Council discussions on individual mandates is not afforded 
sufficient weight. NGOs are given the opportunity to speak after states during the 
interactive dialogue with mandate holders. However, the list of NGO speakers is often 
limited due to time constraints. State delegates leave the room or stand at the back of 
the chamber talking and using phones during NGO interventions. Such behaviour is 
not unusual at the Council, but occurs far more frequently during NGO, rather than 
country, statements. Observers at Council sessions, this author included, frequently 
witness such behaviour. Many observers, however, do not include descriptive details 
in their reports or scholarship, despite it being of critical importance for understanding 
the Council.   
 
5.2.2 Conversion Process 
The conversion process takes place in Council sessions and through informal 
meetings, working groups and negotiations. Special Procedures play a role in the 
conversion process through mandate holders presenting reports during Council 
sessions, followed by interactive dialogues with states, observers and NGOs. 
Discussions provide the opportunity for mandate holders to explain their findings, as 
well as for states to express any concerns. Conversion is intended to create suitable 
outcomes, usually in the form of resolutions or decisions.   
Conversion of inputs into outputs at the HRC occurs in two main ways. Inter-
governmental negotiations are a common mechanism for decisions to be taken within 
international organisations. Negotiations occur between the most powerful actors 
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representing divergent interests (Wilson & DiIulio, 1997).  Decisions require either a 
package deal or a compromise; an agreement on the lowest common denominator of 
all parties. Intergovernmental negotiations result in the most powerful states, groups 
or blocs controlling the decision-making. Informal meetings occur throughout regular 
HRC sessions, either between member states, involving entire regional groups, or 
with various states from like-minded groups in attendance. Draft resolutions and 
decisions are created through informal meetings, as well as internal decisions taken 
regarding states‘ approaches to agenda items.  
Majority voting, the other method of conversion most often used at the HRC, 
is decision-making characterised by formation of a majority through coalition 
building. Decisions represent the interests of the majority rather than of powerful 
states. International organisations become executors of shifting coalitions of member 
states. HRC membership is ever-changing, as states serve three-year terms with one 
third of the body changing annually. Coalitions are often formed within regional 
groups or through alliances between these groups, as will be discussed. Majority 
voting is easier for member states to accept where the decisions taken are legally non-
binding. Majority voting thus suffices at the HRC for most states regarding most 
issues. However, political sensitivities regarding the hortatory power of the Council‘s 
decisions and resolutions often results in a high level of informal and formal 
intergovernmental negotiation before the majority voting takes place.  
Resolution 60/251 does not expressly state the need for unanimity consensus 
in decision-making. At the Commission, where unanimity was required, each state 
effectively had a veto. However, it had been generally understood that consensus 
should be reached. The Chairperson usually seeks, and stresses the importance of, 
consensus but this has generally meant very little in practice. One key example was 
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the, somewhat controversial, lack of consensus on the IBP. Much of the body‘s work 
is arguably undermined by failure to reach unanimous decisions.  
The Council Chairperson seeks to ensure consensus, rather than calling for a 
vote, as this gives significant weight to the decision or resolution. Achieving 
consensus sends a strong message about the decision reached. It has been observed 
that consensus is often reached through the lowest common denominator (Weiss, 
2008: 53), both within and between groups. At the Fifth Session, Council Chairman 
de Alba, discussing negotiations on the Institutional Building Package, noted this 
issue but stressed the importance of achieving consensus:   
 
―[i]n the talks over the last few days, the biggest question I have been asked is 
whether I consider if we have been making a true contribution, or simply a 
lowest common denominator. I say no, and that real progress has been made.  
Although the text does need improvement, it does have a high degree of 
agreement; we have been working largely in consensus.‖128 
 
Despite the emphasis placed on reaching decisions by consensus, Scanella and 
Splinter (2007:68-69) comment that, at the Council‘s First Session, members of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference undermined attempts to ensure that all 
decisions were adopted by consensus. The OIC is the strongest bloc at the Council, 
with members and allies from across all of the regional groups. Rather than engaging 
with intergovernmental negotiations on its draft resolutions, the OIC and its allies 
often vote as a bloc at the Council in order to further the group‘s political agendas.   
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The majority of Council decisions are reached by consensus. Where consensus 
cannot be reached and a vote is called, member states often express disappointment. 
Votes tend only to be called where a decision or resolution is on a particularly 
sensitive subject matter, often on a country-specific situation or regarding a 
contentious human rights issue.
129
 At times, non-achievement of consensus angered 
state delegates who sought to underscore politically sensitive decisions or resolutions.  
 
 
5.2.3 Outputs 
International organisations create outputs in the form of, amongst others, policy 
programmes, operational activities and information activities. Most of the HRC‘s 
work takes one of those three forms. Policy programmes aim to direct states‘ 
behaviour by setting normative standards. General rules prescribe or proscribe certain 
behaviour in certain circumstances, acting as guidelines for states. Programme 
decisions impact directly on states‘ autonomy by providing norms and rules directing 
states‘ behaviour. States wish to dominate this type of decision-making process. 
Programme decisions affecting states‘ autonomy are unlikely to be allowed unless the 
states are directly involved in the process. Morgenthau notes that even when rules are 
violated they are not always enforced, and that even when enforcement takes place it 
is not always effective (Archer, 1983:79).  From a realist perspective, HRC policy 
programmes are merely political recommendations, due to a lack of enforcement 
mechanisms within that body. Although the Human Rights Council at times calls for 
other bodies to enforce its recommendations,
130
 such calls are generally not heeded.  
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Norms and rules of policy programmes generally require implementation, 
typically occurring through national governments. International organisations usually 
assist member states to implement norms and rules, as opposed to implementing them 
directly.
131
 This occurs at the HRC through assisting states to implement policy 
programmes at a national level. Monitoring of implementation by the international 
organisation is required. As previously discussed, Resolution 60/251 mandates the 
body to provide, amongst others, advisory services, technical assistance, and capacity-
building. Assistance with implementation of policy programmes, when they occur in 
practice, fulfils these aspects of the mandate. 
Fact-finding missions and reports given to the Council are examples of 
monitoring by this body. Fact-finding primarily occurs through the Special 
Procedures system, either through pre-existing mandate holders or through working 
groups set up by the Council to investigate specific human rights situations. Although 
the Special Procedures system operates independently of the Council, its role in fact-
finding is crucial for the Council to fulfil its mandate. Steiner et al (747) comment 
that the concept of fact-finding, that is of international monitoring of a situation to 
verify ―facts‖ given by a sovereign government, would have been inconceivable  ―not 
many years ago‖. However, today, fact-finding is a commonplace task which, when 
carried out fairly, is widely accepted by all parties (Steiner, et al, 2008:747). Fact-
finding enables the Council to identify where and when human rights protection and 
promotion is required, and to monitor implementation of previous outputs in that 
regard. 
 Reporting requirements are another method for monitoring human rights 
standards and implementation. Sands & Klein (2001: 316-317) note that many 
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international organisations have reporting requirements, with some expressly 
including them in the constituent instrument. The Council arguably included a 
reporting requirement through the mandate for the UPR to be carried out on all 
member states during their term of Council membership. Although reporting 
requirements in the human rights field have been criticised, not least due to the 
backlog and delays within many treaty bodies (e.g. Sands & Klein, 2001:317-318), 
the UPR is arguably a stringent requirement due to its review of all UN member states 
within a four year cycle, resulting in all states complying with the requirement on a 
regular, and indeed perhaps frequent, basis.  
Some international organisations may also adjudicate on issues of compliance, 
although the HRC does not hold this power. If a member state insists that it has 
implemented a programme but other states disagree, the international organisation 
may be asked to intervene to determine compliance. HRC discussions often centre on 
disputes regarding human rights whether between states and experts or between states 
themselves. Members, observers and NGOs will discuss reports on specific issues, 
and the Council may pass resolutions on the findings. Member states may raise issues 
of violations within other countries, which the HRC will debate and pass resolutions 
where required. Special sessions are convened to deal with urgent human rights 
situations. 
Compliance with HRC decisions will depend largely on political factors. 
Abbott, et al (2000:419) commented that the less legally-binding a resolution is the 
greater the influence of politics on compliance:  
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―On the whole [we have reached] the rejection of a rigid dichotomy between 
‗legalization‘132 and ‗world politics‘. Law and politics are intertwined at all 
levels of legalization. One result of this interrelationship… is the considerable 
difficulty in identifying the causal effects of legalization. Compliance with 
rules occurs for many reasons other than their legal status. Concerns about 
reciprocity, reputation, and damage to valuable state institutions, as well as 
other normative and material considerations, all play a role. Yet it is 
reasonable to assume that most of the time, legal and political considerations 
combine to influence behaviour.‖  
 
Information activities include collecting and publishing information relating to 
the international organisation‘s mission. Reports influence the organisation‘s own 
decision-makers, as well as states and other actors. Information activities are an 
important factor in the social construction of reality, and can influence political 
positions of actors within member states (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Experts‘ 
reports and fact-finding missions often gather information that is difficult to access. 
This may be disseminated through the HRC to a wide audience of states, NGOs and 
the public. The impact of human rights information activities cannot be 
underestimated. Very often the information is used further in a wide range of settings. 
Information-activities are particularly influential when transnational groups of experts 
make similar assessments to each other (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993:3-30).  
International organisations facilitate the exchange of information between member 
states, and also between member states and NGOs. Furthermore, allowing NGO 
participation at Council sessions results in information sharing from those 
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organisations with specialist knowledge that would not otherwise be available to the 
Council. 
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Chapter 6 - Politicisation of International Organisations 
 
6.1 The Concept of Politicisation 
Politicisation will always occur to some degree within international organisations, 
owing to the nature of interstate relations. Non-conflict within international 
organisations only occurs when member states have similar legal and social 
structures. One example is the Nordic Council, where states have similar legal 
systems and cooperation is more easily achieved than in other organisations. 
However, some divergence, and thus some degree of politicisation, still occurs. 
While politicisation affects all intergovernmental bodies, its impact must still 
be identified and analysed. Politicisation plays a key role in a body‘s work and 
proceedings, and ultimately the fulfilment its mandate. Acceptance that domestic 
agendas are always present is different to tolerating political conflicts subsuming a 
body. Problems arise where an organisation ceases to fulfil its mandate because of 
politicisation overshadowing, or preventing, work from being successfully 
undertaken.  
Whether politicisation occurs is often in the eye of the beholder. States with 
common political aims will not view those aims being furthered as politicisation, 
while countries with opposing interests will immediately cry foul in those 
circumstances. The United States, for example, criticised Arab states for politicising 
the ILO June Conference in 1991 when they accused Israel of labour injustices 
(Gibson, 1991:107), whereas the Arab states viewed their behaviour as a legitimate 
use of that body. The furthering of political aims is inevitable at any political body, 
and states may often differ as to whether ―politicisation‖ has occurred. Therefore, I 
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shall assess the Council by reference to forms of gross politicisation which render the 
body unfit for purpose. 
Lyons, et al (1977:83) examine politicisation‘s origins, explaining that, from 
the early 1950s, UN economic and social activities began to be viewed as non-
political. That ―myth‖ developed, with the US delegations in particular arguing that 
political issues should be confined to the General Assembly and Security Council, 
resulting in the expectation that UN specialised agencies should not be politicised 
(Lyons, et al, 1977:83-84).  Mitrany (1966) argues that specialised agencies should be 
given the authority to deal with transnational technical matters, leaving other 
international bodies to deal with more politically-sensitive areas. A lack of conflict 
within such agencies was expected to encourage more general intergovernmental 
cooperation.  
Mitrany (1976), in an institutionalist vein, envisaged a world where everyday 
functions are undertaken across regional, continental or universal frontiers, overseen 
by international organisations. The UN‘s specialised agencies do undertake 
cooperative tasks but problems remain. Archer (1983:85-86) notes that often 
unrelated political disputes affect all levels of international activities, usually with no 
positive impact on the activity involved. Politicisation at the HRC exemplifies this 
analysis.  
The view of specialised agencies as solely being technical fails to 
acknowledge politics‘ role in international affairs (Sands & Klein, 2001:79).  Sewell 
(1966:43-44) argues that functionalists, by disparaging the impact of politics and 
failing to discuss its role at international organisations, view the ―political‖ as being 
completely removed from the ―functional‖ aspect of such bodies. Functionalists 
hoped that international political agendas would be confined to certain organisations 
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whilst allowing specialised agencies to deal with functional - that is technical and 
practical - issues. Lyons, et al (1977:83) assert ―[e]ven if ‗depoliticization‘ were 
possible in an ‗objective‘ sense, it is … irrelevant to countries, especially those in the 
third world, for which these agencies are a major forum for mobilizing their combined 
forces to argue for systemic changes.‖  
Surprisingly, weaker states have thus far politicised the HRC more frequently 
than stronger states. Weaker states form alliances and use group tactics, such as bloc 
voting, to further common agendas. Some powerful states, including Japan, Brazil, 
Germany and India, rarely speak out during Council proceedings. Other powerful 
states, including the US, Canada and the UK, have more actively called for a more 
serious focus on grave violations. However, in view of the one-state one-vote 
structure, they lack the collective strength to overcome the politicisation that has 
dominated Council proceedings. Weaker states bring political aims and conflicts into 
the arena as a mechanism for voicing issues in a forum where more powerful states 
will be forced to listen, as will be explored throughout Part 3. 
―‗Politicization‘‖, according to Lyons, et al (1977:86), ―can be viewed as an 
organizational defect to be corrected, an indicator to be understood, or a bargaining 
tactic to be dealt with.‖ In a realist vein, many scholars argue that it is naïve to view 
politicisation as an organisational defect. They assert that international organisations 
cannot be divorced from the political agendas of their members. Humphrey (1984:25)
 
comments that human rights in particular cannot be divorced from politics, saying that 
―[I]n a sense nothing could be more political; and it would have been quite unreal had 
the great international debate on human rights not reflected the deep differences 
which divide nations and groups.‖ Recognition that political agendas will always exist 
at inter-state organisations results in an acceptance, or tolerance, of some degree of 
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politicisation as a natural consequence, rather than an organisational defect, of 
international organisations. Therefore, politicisation cannot readily be ―corrected‖.  
Politicisation as an indicator emphasises that the advancement of objectives 
within an international organisation reflects trends in the international system. 
Politicisation directly mirrors current political, military, economic or cultural conflicts 
between states, groups and blocs. Elimination of highly sensitive conflicts would not 
deal with the underlying reasons for politicisation of international organisations. 
International political tensions, rather than individual situations, would have to be 
resolved before politicisation could cease within an international organisation. 
Politicisation of the HRC is indicative of schisms within the international community 
that must be dealt with in order to eliminate, or at least to reduce, the manifestation of 
those inherent problems. Using politicisation as an indicator of international politics 
allows for some politicisation to occur within international organisations. A high 
degree of politicisation would nevertheless result the Council‘s credibility being 
undermined.  
Politicisation may also be used as a form of protest. HRC proceedings 
demonstrate that weaker states engage in politicisation of proceedings in order to 
ensure their protest is registered. Weaker states may also politicise a body in order to 
improve their bargaining power elsewhere. International organisations become arenas 
where sometimes unrelated or controversial, issues are raised in order for weaker 
states to have their policy aims heard by more powerful countries.  
 
 
 
6.2 Regionalism 
Politicisation can occur in many ways. The most important kind of politicisation, 
needing particular explanation, is regionalism. Regionalism is useful for 
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understanding HRC proceedings in relation to groups‘ power and influence (e.g. 
Smith, 2006) at that body. Geographic regional groups are not the only form of 
alliances at the UN. Social sciences define regions not just by geographic 
characteristics but also on economic, social and cultural grounds (Archer, 1983:44).  
Russett focussed on five aspects, which he identified as key to understanding 
alliances: social and cultural homogeneity, similar attitudes or external behaviour, 
political interdependence, economic interdependence and geographic proximity 
(Russett, 1967:2-7). Russett‘s study demonstrated that examining all five factors 
allowed a number of groups to emerge with almost the same boundaries for each 
criterion. None of these groups was in fact a subsystem of international law, and none 
had the same inclusions and exclusions for all of the criteria. However, Russett‘s 1967 
study highlighted four major areas with much in common under the five criteria. The 
groups consisted of a core number of states, with other peripheral ―hangers-on‖ 
dependant on the individual criterion being examined. The four main groups 
identified were: Eastern Europe,
133
 Latin America,
134
 Western community, and Asia 
(including some Arab and African states). The Middle East also emerged from the 
study as one cluster of less homogeneous, but still intrinsically linked, states. Despite 
the study being undertaken forty years prior to the Council‘s creation, many of those 
groups play a central role at the body.  
Various factors gave rise to the regional alliances at the UN, including Cold 
War politics, decolonisation, nuclear proliferation and issues of collective security, 
and perceptions of global interdependence (Nicol, 1979:100).  Political coalitions 
have, over time, become as influential as the geographically-linked groups (Nicol, 
1979:102).  Developing nations have formed subgroups, within or across regional 
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134 Although from the 1960s Cuba moved towards Eastern Europe group. 
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groups, asserting collective strength to pursue collective aims. Weiss (2008:50) 
comments that, ―the various roles on the international stage and in the global theater 
are played by actors from the two major troupes, North and South.‖  (Weiss, 2008:50-
51).  Quoting Black‘s view (2007:16) that ―axis descriptors – developing/developed, 
non-industrialized/industrialized, rich/poor – are crude and value-laden‖, Weiss 
(2008:50) argues that membership of the South/North has nothing to do with 
geographic location but is rather about economic, social and other similar factors.  
The UN‘s main political groups give strength to Weiss‘ argument. Political 
groups form alliances between either developed or developing states. Furthermore, 
developing states have formed stronger political alliances than developed nations, 
owing to their greater need for collective strength. The UN was designed by colonial 
powers and strong states. With increasing independence of former colonies, political 
alliances were needed for new states‘ interests to be collectively represented at the 
body. Strong alliances between developing countries allowed them to challenge the 
world economic order as set out by industrialised nations, (Nye, 1973:334-370) and to 
secure methods for trade, development, and economic growth. Initially, two groups 
were formed to represent developing nations‘ interests: the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77).  Those groups, although formed for economic 
motivations, also enabled developing states to use collective strength on political 
matters. 
The Non-Aligned Movement‘s name indicates that its membership was 
comprised of states not immediately involved in the Cold War - that is not aligned to 
either the US or the Soviet Union. Of course (e.g. Lundestad, 1999; Worsley, 1964), 
despite their claims, ―most nationalist movements and Third World regimes had 
diplomatic, economic, and military relations with one or both of the superpowers‖ 
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(Berger, 2004:13). Weiss (2008:51-52) comments that ―amateur lexicographers might 
have problems in finding a commonsensical dictionary entry for ‗non-aligned‘ that 
included such Soviet lackeys as Fidel Castro‘s Cuba and such American ones as 
Mobutu Sese Seko‘s Zaire.‖ NAM developed from the Asian-African Conference, a 
political gathering held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955.
135
 The conference was 
convened in part due to frustration by many newly independent countries unable to 
secure UN membership due to Cold War politics. The two then-superpowers refused 
to admit states seen as belonging to the other camp. Indeed no new members were 
admitted between 1950 and 1954 (Weiss, 2008:51). G-77 was named at its creation in 
1964, when 77 states
136
 jointly prepared for the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development. It worked in parallel with NAM, focusing on economic issues. Weiss 
(2008:49) comments that ―on many key areas of UN concern … the NAM and G-77 
remain the only way to organize international debates and negotiations between 
industrialized and developing states.‖  
The Organisation of the Islamic Conference was established in 1969 to unite 
Muslim countries after the 1967 War, in which Israel established control of Jerusalem. 
The OIC, with 57 member states, is the largest alliance of states within the UN.
137
 
Many of its members are influential within other groups or alliances. As such, the 
OIC has far-reaching political power. For example, in 2006, 17 of the 47 Council 
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136 There are currently 130 members.  
137 21 Sub-Saharan African, 12 Asian, 18 Middle Eastern and North African States, 3 Eastern European and 
Caucasian, 2 South American, and 1 Permanent Observer Mission.  See Organisation of the Islamic Conference, 
‗Permanent Missions of OIC Member States to the United Nations in New York‘,  
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member states were OIC members. Three OIC members, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and 
Azerbaijan, chaired the regional groups for Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe.    
Traditionally the OIC has agreed collective group positions that advance 
regional aims, in the interests of the governing regimes.  The ―Arab Spring‖ of 2011, 
beginning with the national uprising in Tunisia, may affect the OIC‘s future role. A 
main strength of that political bloc has been regional unity of political agendas. 
However, national discontent with individual regimes indicates that OIC states will 
need to engage more seriously in discussions on national issues, which may lead to 
less cohesion within the group on international political affairs. National governments 
may move away from their political allies within the OIC, with dictators and ruling 
elites making way for a range of different forms of governing powers, including 
perhaps military rule, secular governments, or Islamist movements. 
Western regionalism has played an important role at the UN. During the Cold 
War, Western states were united through affiliation to the US. NATO was the epitome 
of a Western political alliance in the period immediately following World War II. 
NATO was created
138
 as an alliance of like-minded, Western states who sought to 
defend its members‘ territories and also their common interests and values (e.g. 
Wenger, et al, 2007:3-4). That alliance was primarily founded to provide a defence 
and security outside of the UN system, one ―that would not be subject to Soviet 
interference (Kaplan, 2004:2). The Cold War also saw the emergence of what would 
become the European Union, which began in 1950 with economic and political ties 
through, for example, the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community.
139
 The 
EU‘s actions as a political bloc set a precedent for the rise of regionalism at 
international bodies (cf. Lombaerde & Schulz, 2009), including at the Commission.  
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The Treaty of Lisbon
140
 requires EU member states to seek and advance 
common foreign policies.
141
 Article 19(1) provides that EU members ―shall 
coordinate their action in international organisations and … shall uphold the common 
positions in such forums.‖ EU member states were, from 1993,142 required to speak 
with one voice on foreign policy matters, which occurs by negotiating and 
compromising to find common ground between member states. This requirement is 
particularly difficult regarding foreign policy as member states have different 
interests, allegiances, priorities, and preferences. Khaliq (2008:88) comments that the 
process is rarely straightforward. The common position‘s often fragile nature greatly 
affects EU states‘ ability to negotiate with other states or groups owing to the 
difficulties of renegotiating or deviating from the common position.   
Despite the Cold War‘s end, Weiss (2008:51) argues that groups and alliances 
are still obstructing the UN‘s work, with the North-South divide impeding a ―sensible 
regrouping of the majority of voices, which should change from issue to issue.‖ 
Regional alliances do allow a larger number of states‘ views to be represented through 
collective voices, as opposed to powerful states dominating Council proceedings. 
Abebe, a delegate to the Council from Ethiopia, argues that such subgroups are 
necessary because human rights discourse and practice are skewed towards Western 
experiences, resulting in developing states requiring subgroups to represent their 
views and allow participation in human rights bodies (Abebe, 2009:2). 
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141 Id., Title V, in particular Articles 11 – 20. 
142 The common position requirement was first adopted in European Union, ‗Treaty on European Union 
(Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht‘, 7 February 1992, Official Journal of the European Communities C 
325/5, entered into force 1 November 1993. 
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However, these alliances had a generally negative effect on the Council‘s 
proceedings.  Ultimately, such groups have served to undermine much of the body‘s 
work in its early years. UN alliances are represented at the Council despite many 
states from each group not holding membership at that body. Council alliances arise 
out of membership allotments and represent the interests of HRC members and non-
members from those general UN groups. States often hold membership of more than 
one regional or political alliance. For example, Egypt
143
 is a member of both the 
African Group and the OIC. Slovakia
144
 is a member of the Eastern European Group 
and the European Union. States holding membership of more than one group, 
especially those with large membership, may have more allies. Alliances between 
groups remain, as occurred at the Commission, which often results in what Schrijver 
(2007:812) identifies as ―the Rest against the West‖. 
The Council‘s composition contributes to its politicisation. Developing states 
have strong representation at the HRC. African and Asian states hold thirteen seats 
each, while Latin American and Caribbean states (GRULAC) hold eight seats. States 
forge alliances through groups, ensuring power as a collective despite being 
individually weak. The dominant group at the Council is comprised of developing or 
weaker nations as members, and it has a large number of allies from other political 
alliances such as the NAM and G-77. The North-South divide, expounded upon by 
Weiss (2008), is particularly apparent at the HRC owing to its large number of 
developing nations and the natural alliances formed between such states. The OIC 
exerts great power and influence over Council proceedings, ensuring that the political 
agendas of its members and allies remain at the fore within the HRC. Politicisation 
has been apparent through advancement of political objectives, groups shielding their 
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allies from Council scrutiny, and politically motivated attacks on certain states which 
have obstructed the HRC from taking action in other, needed, areas.  
Groups and alliances fundamentally structure Council discussions. Talks 
following expert reports, as well as general debates on agenda items, tend to begin 
with representatives of the main alliances stating a general position that is universal or 
predominant among its members. Those general positions are followed by 
pronouncements by individual state members, expressly or tacitly referring back to 
the broader positions of one or more of the allied blocs. That tactic allows weight to 
be added to groups‘ positions, through repetition of pronouncements on particular 
issues. The intensity of the repetition varies across the regional groups and political 
blocs. Western states tend only to make statements that introduce new information or 
take different positions than already mentioned by other countries during a discussion. 
By contrast, African states and OIC members most frequently simply repeat their 
groups‘ position rather than adding anything new to the discussion. Concerned 
countries, non-member states, and observers are afforded the opportunity to make 
statements where appropriate, which often follow the trend of repeating positions 
taken by their regional groups or political allies.   
 
 
6.3 Forms of Politicisation 
Three main forms of politicisation at the UN are: politicisation through ideological 
discourse, overt politicisation, and politicisation through an ostensible ―success 
story‖. Politicisation of human rights through ideological discourse occurred 
throughout the Cold War, for example in the tension between discussing civil and 
political rights and economic and social ones. Those discussions centred around 
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ideologies, which underscored the political divisions between the Socialist bloc and 
Western states.
145
 Politicisation through ideological discourse continues to exist at the 
HRC, with developing states emphasising promotion of human rights, capacity-
building, and technical assistance, in contrast with Western states primarily focusing 
on protecting victims and preventing gross and systemic violations. The tension 
between those groups demonstrates a deeper political and ideological divide on the 
role of human rights bodies and the responsibilities of individual states.  
Bosch (1998:42) insists that the two situations which have caused the most 
problems within the UN are the Israel-Palestine conflict and South African apartheid. 
That assertion relates to the manner in which Israel and apartheid South Africa have 
been dealt with at the UN, rather than comparing the actual situations. There are 
similarities between the violations in South Africa and those in Israel and the OPT. 
Such similarities may also be found in other countries where gross and systemic 
violations occur. Comparisons between Israel and South Africa (e.g. Badran, 2009; 
Bisharah, 2002; Davis, 1987; Laor, 2009; McGreal, 2006; Pappe, 2011) are 
controversial and frequently fail to acknowledge the many fundamental differences 
between those situations. Exploring the weaknesses within those comparisons goes 
beyond the scope of this work but nevertheless must be acknowledged (cf. 
Dershowitz, 2009; Lelyveld, 2007). Bosch (1998:42) nonetheless stresses the 
―negative influence‖ that both situations have had on the UN. In particular, they 
―polarized‖ the General Assembly, undermining its work and ―producing the most 
heated debates and the most drawn out procedural discussions, and were the object of 
repeated (and repetitive) resolutions.‖ Israel and South Africa respectively provide 
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perhaps the clearest examples of overt politicisation and politicisation through an 
ostensible success story at the UN. 
 
6.3.1 Overt Politicisation: Israel 
Overt politicisation occurs where groups or blocs of states seek to further a common 
political aim through the use of group tactics within a UN body or organ. Overt 
politicisation can only occur where a sufficient number of member states either hold a 
common aim or support allied states in the furtherance of their political aim. Where 
groups or blocs ally together to form a majority within a body, they are able to 
dominate proceedings and overtly politicise the body by voting en masse for political 
resolutions often unrelated to or going beyond the body‘s mandate.  
The GA, with universal membership where each state has equal rights and 
voting powers, provides a forum where overt politicisation occurs. By contrast, the 
Security Council has a small membership, including five permanent members holding 
veto rights, which allows for a very different form of politicisation whereby those 
states are able unilaterally to advance political objectives by blocking action. The 
HRC, although with limited membership, is an arena similar to the GA, whereby 
weaker states are afforded the same opportunity to exert influence as states that are 
economically, militarily or politically more powerful. Political agendas of groups or 
blocs gain more attention at bodies such as the HRC, where member states enjoy 
sovereign equality and geographic groups are proportionately represented. The 
Council is particularly vulnerable to overt politicisation in this regard due to the 
strength and dominance of the African Group and the OIC. As observed in Chapter 8, 
both rely heavily on tactics such as group voting, repetition of statements, and 
shielding allies.  
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Many UN bodies and organs have been politicised regarding Israel. The 
General Assembly, in particular, has been overtly politicised in its targeting and 
treatment of Israel. As will become apparent, that situation requires special attention, 
as it directly correlates to politicisation in the HRC.  A case in point is the passing of 
the 1975 GA Resolution 3379, entitled ―Zionism Is Racism‖146, and its later repeal in 
1991.
147
  Resolution 3379 reflected international politics and diplomatic relations at 
that time. Arab countries, supported and encouraged by the Soviet Union and its allies 
within the Socialist bloc, had gained significant strength and influence, which Bosch 
(1998:41-42) asserts was primarily due to ―the oil weapon‖. Many Arab states had 
participated in or supported the wars against Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973. They 
increasingly used the General Assembly to focus attention on the Palestinian cause.  
The Arab states sought to denounce Israeli treatment of the Palestinians, but instead 
―submitted a text that said something altogether different.‖ (Bosch, 1998:41)  
Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism, challenged the state of Israel as 
such. According to Jacoby (2007:87), it sought to ―to annul the UN resolutions which 
brought into being the creation of Israel‖.  
Resolution 3379 was passed in its grossly politicised form because of 
widespread support for the Arab states‘ aims.  To be sure, the Palestinians‘ 
predicament raised grave questions about human rights and about people‘s rights to 
self-determination.  Yet dictatorial regimes in both the Arab and Soviet blocs raised 
equally serious questions about whether human rights, or indeed any serious form of 
self-determination through political participation exercised directly by the people, 
existed in most of the states that supported the resolution.  Only decades later, first 
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with the fall of the Soviet bloc, then with the Arab Spring of 2011, would some sense 
of people asserting real rights of self-determination through open participation begin 
to emerge within the states that had so long opposed Israel.  Before those seismic 
shifts had occurred, global action against Israel served more to deflect attention from 
such states‘ own human rights abuses than to manifest any serious concern for the 
rights of Palestinians.  Indeed, with the advent of democracy, most Eastern European 
states reversed their earlier positions, voting in 1991 to repeal resolution 3379.
148
 
Whilst many Western states might have supported more candid criticism of Israel 
within the context of broader, even-handed scrutiny of human rights throughout the 
whole of the Middle East, the obstinate singling out of Israel, which would recur in a 
host of institutional contexts well into the 21
st
 century, became symptomatic of the 
sheer manipulation of human rights for power-political ends. 
Bosch (1998:41) notes that, by 1975, a large part of the international 
community had grown impatient with Israel. The USSR supported the Arab states for 
various reasons. Israel had once been viewed as a potentially socialist state, but was 
increasingly allied with the US. Decolonised states lent their support, perhaps due to 
alliances with the USSR, or perhaps on anti-imperialist grounds, particularly striking 
in view of the Soviet Union‘s own domination of many subordinated national 
minorities (cf. Heinze, 2007).  The draft resolution was proposed by Cuba, Libya and 
Somalia, on behalf of the non-aligned states. Virtually the entire Soviet bloc 
supported the resolution, alongside all Arab states and most African countries. 139 of 
the UN‘s then 145 Member States took part in the vote: 71 in favour, 35 against and 
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33 abstentions.
149
 The resolution was supported by almost half of the UN 
membership, and by more than two-thirds of those ―present and voting‖.   
 The 1991 repeal of Resolution 3379 further demonstrates its originally 
political motives.  Although international opinion on Israel‘s treatment of Palestinians 
had not changed fundamentally in 1991, there was widespread agreement that 
Resolution 3379 had been aimed not at the occupation, but merely at delegitimising 
the State of Israel. International relations changed from the mid-1980s, with the 
eventual dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War politics that had 
dominated the UN. Dominance of political blocs such as the Socialist bloc, NAM and 
G-77, receded during the nineties, enabling regional groups and political blocs to 
advance more of their own interests rather than participating in the ideological 
warfare between the US and the USSR. The shifting international climate enabled 
other blocs to gain power, albeit not to the same extent that had previously occurred. 
That climate enabled the US, particularly under the administration of President 
George Bush, Sr., to garner support for repealing the resolution (cf. Gilman, 199:74-
79).  
 The international climate in 1991 resulted in only 25 states, out of the UN‘s 
then 166 members, voting against repealing Resolution 3379.
150
 All of those countries 
were either OIC members, or were closely allied with that bloc. Of the 71 countries 
that had supported the resolution in 1975, 13 absented themselves in 1991, five 
abstained, two had merged with other states, 29 did a complete about-face, and only 
22 opposed its repeal (the other 3 opponents of the repeal not having been member 
states when Resolution 3379 was passed).  
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The Council has demonstrated, from the outset, some members‘ eagerness to 
continue the excessive focus on Israel. Throughout the Council‘s early sessions, 
various states, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and indeed the Secretary-
General, called on the Council to devote attention and resources to grave situations 
other than the Occupied Palestinian Territories. These calls were a response to the 
Council‘s repeated focus on Israel to the detriment of other serious situations in, for 
example, the DPRK (North Korea), the DRC (Congo), Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka, 
and Zimbabwe, amongst others. Observers, and indeed states themselves, drew 
comparisons between the Commission and the Council‘s treatment of Israel (cf. 
Hampson, 2007; Scanella & Splinter, 2007).  
Despite warnings about selectivity, bias, double standards, and loss of 
credibility, from the outset Council discussions were dominated by states seeking to 
vilify Israel and to retain focus on that region. A large number of OIC states were able 
to express, and use their votes to achieve, collective positions. The OIC sought to 
retain focus on the OPT as part of national and regional foreign policies. OIC agendas 
included political, religious, cultural and regional ties with the Palestinians and with 
affected neighbouring states. OIC states also used the situation to divert attention 
away from other gross and systemic violations within the Middle East or within 
influential OIC Council members such as Pakistan, Algeria, and Egypt.  
A further political motivation, particularly for states allied with but not 
members of the OIC, was Israel‘s ties with the US. Israel is seen as the US foothold in 
the Middle East. Realists and institutionalists would argue, for different reasons, that 
this relationship encouraged anti-US states, such as Cuba, China, Venezuela, and 
Russia, to use the situation in the OPT to attack US hegemony and interference. From 
a realist perspective, this group of states allied themselves with the OIC to attack a 
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more powerful country through attacking its allies. Institutionalists might counter that 
instead this is an example of a group of states seeking to further a common interest, 
with the interest here being the OPT.  
Israel is also viewed by some as a remnant of colonialism, particularly in 
terms of its treatment of the Palestinians. Neo-Marxists or Third World theorists 
perhaps view Israel as a remnant of colonialism because it occupies Palestinian lands 
and is widely seen to have racist and discriminatory practices towards the indigenous 
people. Developing states identified with the Palestinian cause, seeking to use the 
Council to eliminate similar violations as had been perpetrated in colonial countries. 
Scannella and Splinter (2007:61) argue that bias, selectivity and politicisation 
have ―been most evident in the Council's handling of situations involving Israel‖. The 
situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories is one of gross and 
systemic human rights violations. The Council‘s attention ought to be drawn to that 
situation, and indeed Israeli violations in Lebanon and the Occupied Syrian Golan. 
However, the Council‘s excessive focus on Israel, which frequently results in other 
gross and systemic situations being ignored altogether, occurs owing to the gross 
politicisation of the Council. Indeed, politicisation of the body‘s mechanisms and 
proceedings are often exemplified by the Council‘s treatment of Israel. The Council, 
as will be explored in Part 3, has excessively focused on Israel during related and 
unrelated discussions, during Special Sessions, and through reports by various 
thematic mandate holders.  
To illustrate the overt and excessive politicisation of the HRC regarding Israel, 
I shall briefly explore Council discussions about the country-specific mandate on 
Israel and the OPT. The Council, having adopted its predecessor‘s Special Procedures 
system, utilises both thematic and country-specific mandates. States critical of country 
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resolutions at the Commission remained committed to that position at the Council. 
Those states tended to be decolonised states, members of NAM, and OIC members. 
Despite vehemently opposing country-specific mandates in general, the states and 
groups which called for their end constantly gave the caveat that the mandate on the 
OPT must be retained. Justification for that position was the constantly repeated 
argument that the OPT mandate dealt with foreign occupation, rendering it thematic 
rather than country-specific.
151
 Conversely, Israel was the sole country-specific 
mandate not to be supported by Western and other developing nations, despite their 
general support for country-specific mandates. 
Steiner et al (2008:814) note that the Council does not examine human rights 
violations in Israel, but rather violations committed by Israel in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. That supports the argument that the OPT is a thematic 
mandate. However, thematic mandates do not solely focus on one country, which 
clearly the OPT mandate does. For the OPT mandate to be thematic, it should 
arguably encompass other issues of foreign occupation in, for example, Northern 
Cyprus and Tibet. States arguing that the OPT is a thematic mandate were silent on 
other issues of foreign occupation within any other region. That silence suggests the 
argument was based on political, rather than technical, motives. Ultimately, country-
specific mandates were not abolished. However, states‘ tactics resulted in Israel being 
singled out in every discussion on country-specific mandates, thus keeping the 
spotlight on Israel to the detriment of other country-specific situations.   
                                                 
151 These calls were led, notably, by China on behalf of the Like-Minded Group, who provided the initial caveat 
that the OPT mandate could not be regarded as country-specific because it dealt with the thematic issue of foreign 
occupation (oral statement of the Chinese delegate, 2nd Session, 3 October 2006). China‘s comments about the 
thematic issue of foreign occupation is interesting given its position regarding its occupation of Tibet and its 
frequent use of the ―no-action motion‖ to block Commission discussions and action on Tibet. The ―no-action‖ 
motion was used from 1992-1996 to block all draft resolutions that mentioned Tibet.  
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The Commission‘s loss of credibility has been attributed to a number of 
factors, a main one being the body‘s treatment of Israel. One significant manifestation 
of these problems was the placing of Israel on the Commission‘s permanent 
agenda.
152
 Israel, a democratic state, does commit violations against Palestinians and 
Israeli Arabs. Israel does also allow protection and promotion of human rights 
through granting wide access to human rights organisations and NGOs, providing 
legal recourse for human right violations through domestic and international courts 
and tribunals, and through its formal commitment to international human rights law 
obligations. Yet, of all the human rights situations across the globe, including those 
states under despotic rulers and those which provide almost no access to the outside 
world to ascertain severity of the situation,
153
 the only country-specific mandate to be 
placed on the Council‘s permanent agenda is Israel and the OPT.154 Moreover, while 
all other country-specific mandates exist for one year and must be renewed annually, 
the mandate on Israel and the OPT is open-ended and will last until the end of the 
occupation.  
 
6.3.2 Ostensible “Success Story”: South Africa 
The UN‘s approach to apartheid in South Africa is perhaps the clearest example of 
politicisation through an ostensible ―success story‖. Politicisation through an 
ostensible ―success story‖ occurs where failures are masked behind a success story 
that is used to deflect attention away from inaction elsewhere. UN action alongside 
                                                 
152 The Commission established a mandate valid until the end of the occupation, see CHR Res 1993/2, ‗Question 
of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine‘, 19 February 1993, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/1993/2 
153 For example, Myanmar (Burma), or DPRK (North Korea). 
154 ‗Institution Building of the United Nations Human Rights Council‘, 18 June 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/5/1, 
Chapter IIV Part C, Item 7 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.183 
 
diplomatic and political pressure was indeed key to South Africa ending its policy of 
apartheid in the 1990s. The UN was able to focus on South Africa because both the 
Western and Soviet blocs agreed, or tacitly accepted, that action be taken on that 
situation. Western states, many of whom were former imperial powers, tended to take 
a backseat during discussions on South Africa. Soviet states, by contrast, were more 
actively involved in pushing for action to be taken against that state (cf. Birmingham, 
1995: 51-61; Shultz, 1988:115-147). That position reflects the USSR‘s anti-
imperialist stance and support for decolonisation across Africa (cf. Birmingham, 
1995: 9, 28-39).  
Developing states, as a result of the Western and Soviet attitudes to South 
Africa, did not have to choose sides between the US and the USSR. This allowed 
them to promote their own national and regional political objectives. Many 
decolonised states sought to highlight ongoing imperialist practices which flagrantly 
violated human rights in a similar vein to recent historical abuses, using South Africa 
―to channel emotional anti-Western feelings into lasting political gains‖ (Moskowitz, 
1980:49). Moskowitz (1980:49) points out that ―the vast majority of those who called 
for freedom, human rights and racial equality in South Africa hardly conceded them 
to their own peoples.‖ He argues that many abuser states denounced South Africa in 
order to deflect attention away from their own human rights records (Moskowitz, 
1980:49).  
The UN‘s ability to deal with abuses in South Africa indicates that such action 
did not contravene the political aims of either the Western or Soviet bloc. That was 
not the case for many other human rights situations. The UN was unable to take action 
on other egregious violations owing to a lack of agreement by one or both groups 
owing to political objectives that often were unrelated to human rights. The Western 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.184 
 
and Soviet blocs frequently shielded allied states from scrutiny, even where violations 
were gross and systemic (Matas, 1994:211). Indeed, many other grave violations 
occurring elsewhere at that time resulted from similar policies adopted by other states 
to discriminate against indigenous populations.  
China has occupied Tibet in 1949, since which China has committed egregious 
violations in that territory (cf. McCorquodale & Orosz, 1994; Lal, 2008:131-135; Asia 
Watch, 1988). Discrimination and abuses in Tibet have been described as ―apartheid‖ 
policies (e.g. Dalai Lama, 1995:161; Mullik, 1971:603). Chitkara (1996:110) goes 
further, insisting that ―even the worst form of apartheid enforced in South Africa pales 
into insignificance when compared to the atrocities which the Chinese have 
committed and are continuing to commit in Tibet.‖ China, owing to its powerful 
position at the UN, its leadership of political alliances between developing states, and 
its links to the USSR, was able effectively to ensure little scrutiny of those abuses. 
Similarly, the USSR was shielded from scrutiny of its discriminatory human rights 
abuses despite, as Heinze (2007:22) notes, the Soviet Union having ―crushed vast 
numbers of minority and ethnic groups‖. Heinze (2007:23) names the ―Chechens, 
Ingush, Balkars, Baltic peoples, Roma, Jews, Muslims, Romanian ethnic Hungarians, 
Tibetans or Uighurs‖ as just a few of the groups that were repressed by the Soviet 
Union‘s policies. The USSR‘s strength at the UN, owing more broadly to Cold War 
politics, enabled it to avoid scrutiny of almost all such human rights situation. The US 
also committed discriminatory human rights violations against its indigenous 
population, which the General Assembly altogether failed to address during the time 
that focus was on South Africa. It is clear from these examples that international 
relations and political objectives dictated which apartheid-type situations were and 
were not discussed. The UN‘s ―success‖ in taking action on South Africa resulted 
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from a lack of overt politicisation from the US and USSR, which both masked a 
common underlying aim of deflecting attention away from other gross and systemic 
violations, and underlined the many instances where politicisation directed the 
organisation‘s work.  
 The General Assembly produced more resolutions on apartheid than any other 
single item between 1952 (when it first appeared on the GA agenda) and 1994 (when 
the policy was ended). Apartheid in South Africa provided a unifying issue on which 
developing countries spoke with one voice in much the same way as decolonisation 
and self-determination had done previously. The sheer number of decolonised and 
developing states seeking action against South Africa, and the many Soviet and 
Western states who supported them, ensured ample backing for any tabled 
resolutions. That support resulted in a disproportionate number of resolutions on 
South Africa as compared with other similar, gross and systemic violations. Other 
situations attracted little attention or, more often, were ignored altogether.  
Between 1946 and 1992 the GA adopted by recorded vote 234 resolutions on 
apartheid, 111 on Namibia, and 224 on other issues regarding Southern Africa. Those 
569 resolutions totalled approximately one fifth of the total recorded votes. On 
average, the General Assembly passed between five and ten resolutions annually on 
apartheid policies. Some sessions, saw almost double that number of resolutions 
focusing specifically on South Africa.
155
 Mertus (2009:40) notes that each year 
approximately 20 percent of GA resolutions relate to human rights, which underlines 
the disproportionate attention given to Southern Africa. By contrast, during that time 
the General Assembly passed five resolutions regarding gross and systemic violations 
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by China against indigenous peoples: three on Tibet
156
 and two on Burma.
157
 
Similarly, only four resolutions were passed regarding grave abuses committed by the 
USSR: one general resolution
158
 and three concerning violations in Hungary.
159
 
Moreover, violations against Native Americans were ignored altogether, as were 
similar practices and policies against the Aborigines in Australia, the Maoris in New 
Zealand, and other such situations.  
From 1965, states regularly challenged South Africa‘s credentials at the 
General Assembly. Verification of a delegation‘s credentials was aimed at resolving 
situations where competing governments within a state sent different delegations to 
the GA and each one claimed to represent that country (Amerasinghe, 2005:130). The 
challenge to South Africa‘s credentials instead sought to delegitimise that state‘s 
delegation, leaving the country without any representation at the GA, a clearly 
political act. The challenge raised objections to the credentials of South Africa‘s 
delegation at the GA on the basis that they were sent by a non-representative and 
illegitimate government (cf. Moskowitz, 1980:65-68). States, particularly decolonised 
ones, insisted that the exclusively-white government represented less than 20 percent 
of the population, and therefore could not be viewed as legitimate.  
                                                 
156 GA Res 1353, ‗Question of Tibet‘, 21 October 1959, 14th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/1353 (XIV); GA Res 1723, 
‗Question of Tibet‘, 20 December 1961, 16th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/1723 (XVI); GA Res 2079, ‗Question of 
Tibet‘, 18 December 1965, 20th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/2079 (XX)  
157 GA Res 717, ‗Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the 
Republic of China‘, 8 December 1953, 8th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/717 (VIII); GA Res 815, ‗Complaint by the 
Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China‘, 29 October 1954, 
9th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/815 (IX) 
158 GA Res 285, ‗Violation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of fundamental human rights, traditional 
diplomatic practices and other principles of the Charter‘, 25 April 1949, 4th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/285 (III). 
159 GA Res 1312, ‗The situation in Hungary‘, 12 December 1958, 13th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/1312 (XIII); GA 
Res 1454, ‗Question of Hungary‘, 9 December 1959, 14th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/1454 (XIV); GA Res 1741, 
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 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.187 
 
Resolution 2636 A (XXV) 1970 approved the Credentials Committee‘s Report 
―except as regards the credentials of the representatives of South Africa‖. That 
rejection was repeated in 1971, 1972 and 1973. Up until that point, a successful 
challenge to a state‘s credentials had political rather than practical consequences. That 
changed in 1974 the Assembly voted to interpret this annual rejection as a repudiation 
of South Africa‘s participation at the GA, which effectively expelled that country 
from the Assembly. Resolution 3207 (XXIX) 30 September 1974 called on the 
Security Council to review the relationship between SA and the UN. The GA had 
been urged to expel SA
160
 in accordance with Article 6 of the Charter which permits 
expulsion ―upon the recommendation of the Security Council.‖ France, the UK and 
the US used their veto powers at the Security Council. As a result of the triple veto, 
―the General Assembly intensified its condemnation of South Africa‖ and focused 
excessive and repetitive criticism of those three Western states during discussions on 
South Africa (Bosch, 1993:45). 
The UN‘s focus on South Africa was ―successful‖; South Africa eventually 
withdrew from Namibia, ended the apartheid policy, and ceased to be a pariah state. 
Success in the campaign against South Africa‘s racist and discriminatory policies 
provided an opportunity for decolonised states to engage with UN bodies and to 
interact with other, more established, blocs. In particular, it provided a bridge 
connecting decolonised countries and the Soviet bloc. Beyond the success story and, 
indeed, the opportunity for weaker and newer states to use a collective voice, South 
Africa also afforded protection for other abuser states by deflecting attention away 
from ongoing gross and systemic violations elsewhere. A clear parallel can be drawn 
between oppression of non-Russian, indigenous peoples within the USSR (cf. Heinze, 
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2007), and the apartheid policy which oppressed the non-white peoples in South 
Africa. The USSR, however, received scant attention for those practices, with 
millions of victims being ignored, whereas South Africa was focused upon throughout 
the UN.  
 
 
 
 
6.4 Politicisation of UN Bodies 
UN organs and bodies have been politicised, to varying degrees, from the 
organisation‘s outset. The UN‘s first decade saw the United States and the Soviet 
Union use the organisation to achieve their diplomatic and foreign policy aims 
(Archer, 1983:181). Cold War politics resulted in both the US and the USSR, and 
their respective allies, politicising UN bodies. Cold War political agendas were 
introduced into specialised agencies throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  
 The US opposed Communist China joining the ILO, and withheld 
contributions following the appointment of a Soviet assistant-director-general in 1970. 
The World Bank has always had an American president, with one exception,
161
 and a 
voting system reflecting US financial importance, leading to criticisms of it being 
politicised and a pawn of US policy.  Some might question whether such stances can 
merely be dismissed as ―political‖, since the Cold War involved questions of 
fundamental principle—questions about the very nature of rights, law and citizenship 
in any society.  For example, those who fervently believed in liberal democracy, in 
opposition to totalitarianism, would not call their opposition to Soviet or Chinese 
influence merely ―playing politics‖.  They saw it as a defence of core human values.  
Meanwhile, others criticised liberal democracies for preaching human rights whilst 
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pursuing neo-imperial or neo-colonial practices.  Whilst it lies beyond the scope of 
this study to rehearse the rights and wrongs of Cold War politics, the fact remains that 
such polarisation constantly shaped international diplomacy, on the broadest range of 
issues.   
 In 1974 the US withheld payments to UNESCO until anti-Israel resolutions 
were changed. In particular, on 7 November 1974, UNESCO voted ―to withhold 
assistance from Israel in the fields of education, science and culture because of 
Israel‘s persistent alteration of the historic features of Jerusalem.‖162 US pressure 
resulted in alterations to that resolution. Another political resolution, on 20 November 
1974, denied Israel membership of the European group, leaving it the only state not 
assigned a regional group.
163
 This amounted to a de facto expulsion of Israel from 
UNESCO (Abdulqawi, 2007:380-381) and, owing to Western pressure, was reversed 
in 1976. The US withdrew from UNESCO in 1984, in protest at its anti-western bias, 
rejoining only in 2003 (cf. McDermott, 2000:97-98). The US asserted that UNESCO 
was being used to discuss political matters, including peace and security, which fell 
outside its mandate, and which should have been left to appropriate organs, such as 
the GA and SC. The American response to UNESCO‘s politicisation made use of its 
powerful position, financially and politically. Withdrawal from UN agencies as an 
―ultimate sanction‖ as a US multilateral policy developed in the 1970s (Preston, et al, 
1989:137), and continues to be used as a method for that state to demonstrate its 
displeasure with a body‘s work. Indeed, as I shall explore in Chapter 7, the US pulled 
out of the Council within two years of the body‘s creation.  
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Vol.1), pp.59-60 
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The Soviet Union also used the UN for political aims. Parsons (1993:113) 
notes that the USSR used the UN to ally non-aligned states to the Soviet bloc by 
supporting their causes, particularly decolonisation, in order to globally isolate the US 
and Europe. The USSR did not support self-determination for all peoples, particularly 
those nations living within the USSR. It did, however, adopt an anti-imperialist 
discourse regarding decolonisation in order to support peoples fighting against 
Western imperialism and to ally those emerging states with the Soviet bloc.  
Decolonisation led to UN membership expanding, making the superpowers 
less able to dominate proceedings. That change was notable within the General 
Assembly, and in agencies comprising proportionate geographic representation. 
Emergence of developing nations shifted the balance of power from the 1960s 
onwards (Ziring, et al, 1994:99).  Lyons, et al, (1977:81-82) recognised this shift in 
the 1970s, commenting that developing nations began to dominate UN bodies through 
collective voting, which was used to further common objectives.  
Weiss argues that developing nations protect each other through regional and 
political alliances. Weiss (2008:61) cites South African support for Mugabe‘s regime 
in Zimbabwe as a ―contemporary example of misplaced Southern solidarity‖. 
Mugabe‘s regime commits gross and systemic human rights violations, including 
widespread arbitrary detention and torture of prisoners; curtailment of the right to 
freedom of association and assembly; attacks on human rights defenders; and 
violations of  rights to food, sanitation, adequate housing and safe drinking water (cf. 
Amnesty International, 2008:333-336).  However, despite US and EU targeted 
sanctions and political pressure, Mugabe‘s retention of power, particularly after the 
2008 elections, demonstrates the strength of support from regional and political allies 
within the UN and the African Union. Mugabe, building on that support, has 
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constantly attacked the West, particularly the UK, for imperialism and hegemony. 
Weiss (2008:62) argues that Southern support for Mugabe exists ―presumably to 
maintain solidarity with one of the storied examples of anti-colonial and anti-imperial 
struggle.‖  
Politicisation can be found throughout the UN. Acknowledging that 
politicisation will occur is, however, markedly different to accepting politicisation 
overshadowing a body‘s work and the ultimate fulfilment of its mandate. The General 
Assembly, which has universal membership and is tasked with considering political 
matters, is regularly politicised by states, groups and blocs seeking to further political 
objectives. Much of the politicisation has been attributed to international political 
situations such as the Cold War, unity of decolonised states, the emergence of the 
European Union, or the more recent increase in strength of the Islamic bloc. 
Politicisation at the GA can be measured by examining statements made, resolutions 
tabled or, perhaps most pertinently, voting records (cf.. Bosch, 1998:117-162).  
Although some technical bodies are politicised to a far lesser extent than 
political bodies, none are completely divorced from members‘ political agendas. Even 
bodies responsible for non-political matters are affected by state and regional 
considerations. The International Whaling Commission arguably should not be 
politicised owing to it being a single-issue body focused highly on one very subject, 
unlike the UN Charter-based human rights body which has a broad jurisdiction owing 
to everything invariably being connected to human rights. Prima facie, the IWC is so 
specific that it might be expected to solely be a technical body that keep any politics 
under control. Yet this ostensibly manageable body is steeped in politics. The IWC 
has been identified as a ―dysfunctional organ‖ (Fitzmaurice, 2010:255) which 
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―requires normalising‖.164  The IWC has 88 state parties, the majority of which are not 
whaling nations, and yet are able to influence the Commission‘s policy (Fitzmaurice, 
2010:254-255), even where that policy undermines the body‘s fulfilment of its 
mandate.
165
 Modern whaling has been driven by economic factors as much as cultural 
ones (cf. Epstein, 2008:27-53), resulting in divergent factors, including economic 
considerations, rights of indigenous people, and state sovereignty.   
The Human Rights Council is distinct from other UN bodies, regardless of 
their levels of politicisation in two main ways. The Council‘s composition as a body 
of limited membership with proportionate geographic representation allows for a 
range of political objectives to be advanced by various government delegates, regional 
groups and political blocs. Moreover, as the Council‘s work is so inherently political, 
owing to the breadth of universal human rights, a greater degree of politicisation must 
be expected than at many other bodies.  
 
 
 
6.5 Politicisation of Human Rights Bodies 
Politicisation at the Commission occurred in three distinct ways during three separate 
phases. At the Commission‘s outset, the body was used by Western states seeking to 
advance human rights whilst simultaneously retaining colonial practices. With 
increasing UN membership due to decolonisation, politicisation of the Commission 
increasingly mirrored Cold War politics. Following the dissolution of the USSR and 
the Socialist bloc, with which many decolonised states were allied, the Commission 
                                                 
164 International Whaling Commission Res 2006-1, ‗St Kitts and Nevis Declaration‘, 18 June 2006, UN Doc. 
IWC/58/16/Res/2006-1  
165 Id. 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.193 
 
became politicised through disproportionate focus on a few, politically isolated states 
- Israel, as we have seen, standing out as a conspicuous example - whilst shielding 
grave abusers.  
The kind of politicisation that occurred during the Commission‘s final years is 
found in much international human rights activity. Failure to treat states in an even-
handed manner is a main way in which the field of human rights becomes politicised. 
Alongside human rights bodies, such politicisation can occur within, for example, 
NGOs (cf. Heinze, 2008) and the media (cf. Heinze & Freedman, 2010; Heinze, 
2011). Heinze (2008:8) notes that the concept of even-handedness has not adequately 
been explored. He provides a three-part test to identify lack of even-handedness 
(Heinze, 2008). Under the third prong of his test, selection of human rights violators 
becomes illegitimate when motivated by a ―political, social or cultural conflict‖ 
unrelated to the content of the human rights at issue (Heinze, 2008:31). The ongoing, 
overwhelmingly disproportionate focus on a state such as Israel, in both the 
Commission and the Council, often as a pretext for sidelining violations claiming far 
greater numbers of victims than the Israel-Palestine conflict has done (as I shall 
further examine in Chapter 8), raises serious questions about the Council‘s adherence 
to its mandate.  Even-handedness does not require equal attention to be devoted to all 
states, but rather that the level of condemnation should be ―roughly proportionate to 
actual levels of abuse‖. (Heinze & Freedman, 2010:498).  
Politicisation of human rights bodies, particularly the phenomenon of 
excessive politicisation, arguably results from human rights and politics‘ interlinked 
nature. Gearty (2006:60-98) criticises what he terms the false dichotomy between 
these fields in which politics becomes subordinate to law. Instead, he deems it crucial 
to view human rights as part of, rather than superior to, politics. That claim does, 
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however, contradict the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and subsequent 
human rights instruments. The UN sought to prioritise human rights as separate and 
superior to politics, giving them a higher-order status to competing political interests. 
It is that superiority which dictates that those rights be upheld universally. Gearty‘s 
assertion focuses on the everyday practice, rather than the fundamental significance, 
of human rights. Human rights compliance frequently relies on politics and, 
conversely, violations are often able to occur because of political factors. Tyagi 
(2011:6) recalls that the legal formulations of human rights are themselves products of 
political, and politicised, processes. Even after such processes, regional or political 
groupings often take different, sometimes competing, stances on human rights, based 
on cultural norms and political agendas. Politics plays an integral role in human rights 
with the two fields not easily divorced from one another. 
The UN treaty-based human rights committees are frequently held out as 
examples of bodies where politicisation is sufficiently minimised so as to allow focus 
to remain solely on the task at hand - an important achievement, since those bodies 
handle many of the same controversial matters as the Charter-based bodies. That 
discrepancy can be explained by those bodies‘ mandates to monitor implementation 
of treaties in contracting state parties, which allows relatively little contention as 
compared with the Council‘s broad mandate.  
It is widely accepted that politicisation of human rights bodies will more likely 
occur where those bodies consist of government delegates rather than independent 
experts. McGoldrick (1994:45) notes that ―the proof, of course, lies in the practice‖. 
The Human Rights Committee, for example, consists of independent experts and it is 
their independence from governmental or institutional influences that ―at least gives it 
the potential to be effective‖ (McGoldrick, 1994:44). Independent experts at the 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.195 
 
Committee are not required to have personal independence from their governments, 
and members include former ambassadors, government ministers, and members of 
parliament (McGoldrick, 1994:44). These experts‘ involvement at the highest level of 
politics ensures delegates have the expertise to engage with the political aspects of 
international human rights. The success of that body lies, predominantly, in the 
delegates‘ independence from their state governments (McGoldrick, 1994:44-45). 
Another reason for the committees avoiding politicisation is the concerted efforts 
made by those independent experts to proceed on the basis of consensus in order to 
avoid confrontation and politicisation (e.g. van Boeven & Coomans, 2000:72). The 
committees have sought to create environments of dialogue and to avoid ―relating 
closely to the [UN‘s] political control bodies and policy organs‖ (van Boeven & 
Coomans, 2000:72).  
The Human Rights Committee is, informally, regarded as ―primus inter pares‖ 
(Tyagi, 2011:792). There are, however, other UN human rights committees which, 
despite efforts to avoid confrontation, have somewhat greater degrees of 
politicisation. When many states make reservations to a treaty, for example the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
166
 it indicates that 
countries are likely to have differing political objectives viz those human rights.  The 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is highly politicised 
and is, arguably, as complex and difficult as the Human Rights Council (cf. 
Goonesekera, 2010:189-192). CEDAW has mainly experienced problems in relation 
to OIC states which have sought to maintain discriminatory practices against women 
(cf. Shivdas & Coleman, 2010), requiring the body to manoeuvre between state 
parties‘ conflicting interests in order to achieve the necessary balance. The HRC 
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similarly experiences problems with states claiming ―cultural sensitivities‖ as the 
basis for non-compliance with human rights norms. OIC members, in particular, have 
politicised the Council in this manner. The difficulties and complexities at CEDAW, 
as at the Council, require the body to take a ―soft‖ approach towards compliance that 
primarily focuses on diplomatic pressure and ongoing discussions.  
Despite the similarities between CEDAW and the HRC, when assessing the 
Council, however, I shall focus on the Human Rights Committee as a comparator 
because the Committee provides a model of best, indeed ―exemplary‖, practice 
(Tyagi, 2011:311). Tyagi (2011:311) claims that the Human Rights Committee has, 
on the whole, avoided the ―East-West‖ and ―North-South‖ divides. The Committee, 
with relatively less politicisation than other bodies, provides a benchmark against 
which the Council may be assessed. However, its nature as a body consisting of 
independent experts is fundamentally different to the Council which consists of state 
representatives. Despite the lack of scholarship assessing the practical impact of 
various types of delegates, it is clear that this difference is fundamental. Using the 
Committee as a benchmark for assessing the Council‘s politicisation will, therefore, 
require constant reference to this intrinsic difference and its impact on the Council‘s 
work and proceedings.   
Regional human rights institutions are another type of body where 
politicisation may be minimised or at least do not  fundamentally undermine the 
bodies‘ work. Politicisation is minimised at the European Court of Human Rights due 
to that body being unable to select the cases it hears, despite a constantly increasing 
workload. The doctrine of margin of appreciation which is crucial in relation to issues 
of morality is, arguably, one main reason for the high level of compliance with the 
Court‘s rulings. The UN system also uses similar kinds of proportionality criteria 
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(Steiner et al, 2008:964-965) where political tensions may exist between various 
states. One area where national political agendas do come into play is the selection of 
judges to sit at the Court. The selection process was criticised by, amongst others, 
Interrights which noted the possibilities for governmental interference with judicial 
candidates and sitting judges (Limbach, 2003:9). Such interference resulted in greater 
potential for politicisation of the Court. Despite that weakness, the ECtHR has been 
held out as a model of best practice for an intergovernmental human rights institution. 
Gibson (1991:107), recognising the success of European institutions, argues that 
regional functionalism occurs as a result of the common politics and goals of those 
states which ―is not necessarily transferable either to other regions or to states on a 
universal scale‖.  
The Human Rights Committee and the ECtHR are both concerned with a 
limited number of rights as well as particular groups of states. The Committee was 
created to supervise the compliance of state parties to the ICCPR with their 
obligations under that treaty.
167
 The European Court supervises EU members states‘ 
compliance with obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. State 
parties to these conventions agreed to be supervised by those bodies.
168
 As a result of 
states placing themselves under these regimes, and due to the limited nature of the 
rights governed by those bodies, states are less able to use the body as a forum for 
changing the interpretation or application of the rights themselves. Other bodies, such 
as CEDAW, are used to advance cultural norms or political agendas regarding that 
convention‘s rights through states‘ use of reservations to that treaty. The Council, 
which is concerned with rights of universal application rather than conventions, is 
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frequently politicised by states seeking to advance cultural or political aims through 
changing the interpretation or application of the rights.  
The Council is a universal body consisting of members from across all UN 
regional and political groups. As such, many political views on human rights are 
represented. Moreover, being comprised of government delegates, the very nature of 
the body‘s membership is political. Political appointees have little concept of 
―functionalism‖ because their responsibility and accountability is to their national 
governments rather than to the UN (Gibson, 1991:107). Oberleitner (2007:47) 
remarks that it is unsurprising and somewhat inevitable that an intergovernmental 
body comprised of state representatives acts along political lines. Assessment of the 
new body, therefore, will focus on instances of gross politicisation and the extent to 
which they have undermined the Council. 
Despite the problems caused by politicisation, human rights bodies remain key 
for protecting and promoting rights. As will be explored, human rights bodies 
undertake crucial roles and functions, including fact-finding, information-sharing, and 
reporting on human rights situations. Although politicisation can undermine the work 
of such bodies, many victims of human rights violations would be in a far worse 
position were those bodies to cease to exist. Assessment of the Council will, 
necessarily, examine the extent to which politicisation is undermining the body‘s 
fulfilment of its mandate. Criticisms of the Council in this regard will not negate the 
body‘s positive achievements, but rather seek to identify areas for improvement.   
I shall explore the impact of politicisation in undermining the Council‘s ability 
to pursue and achieve its mandate. There are no set criteria for identifying 
politicisation. The use of group tactics to advance political agendas and the impact of 
regional and political aims on the Council‘s work and proceedings are key to 
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assessing the body. Moreover, the Council must be examined in light of states‘ use of 
politicisation to direct the body‘s work and proceedings, to introduce unrelated issues 
into discussions, and to either shield states from scrutiny or to ensure disproportionate 
focus on states for political motives.  
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PART 3: Assessment of the Council  
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Chapter 7 - The United States and the Human Rights Council  
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
―The worst fear of any of us is that we fail to navigate an effective way 
between the Scylla of being seen as a cat‘s paw of the sole superpower, and 
the Charybdis of being seen as so unhelpful to the sole superpower that they 
disregard the value of the United Nations‖ (Tharoor,169 2001)  
 
Using the relationship between the US and the Council as a case study, I shall 
examine the body‘s fulfilment of its protection mandate and adherence to its 
underlying principles, assessing to what extent it has overcome the Commission‘s 
failings. The relationship between the US and the Council provides a broad canvas 
from which to draw regarding problems such as politicisation, even-handedness, 
selectivity and bias across the Council‘s work and proceedings. The US, despite not 
gaining membership of the Council until 2009,
170
 played an active role in the body‘s 
proceedings from the outset. Exploring US involvement with, and its opinions on, the 
body will enable assessment of the Council‘s early years. The body‘s treatment of the 
US highlights many of the criticisms already levelled at the body during the Council‘s 
formative years. Similarly, US positions towards the Council highlight a variety of 
issues with the HRC‘s proceedings and work. 
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Despite countries including China, India, and Brazil becoming increasingly 
more powerful, the US has maintained significant influence in many spheres of the 
UN system. Resentments towards that country are manifested through regular power 
struggles against the US from other states. States use international organisations to 
voice criticisms of American actions. Furthermore, US unilateralism and 
exceptionalism has affected its relations with international organisations. The US 
attempted to exert its strength and influence over the Council before, during and after 
the body‘s creation. Failure to impose its will on the Council at its creation resulted in 
the US relationship with the new body being problematic from the outset. 
US election to the Human Rights Council in 2009 displayed a shift in foreign 
policy under President Barack Obama.  The Obama administration‘s decision to 
engage with the Council by seeking membership, for the first time since the Council‘s 
creation, reversed the approach taken under George W. Bush.  During General 
Assembly discussions aimed at establishing the Council, the Bush administration had 
objected to key provisions.  The US had argued that the proposed Council would fail 
to overcome the shortcomings of its predecessor, the Human Rights Commission.
171
  
When the Council was established in 2006, the US did not stand for election to one of 
the body‘s 47 seats,172 registering its protest about failure to adopt more radical 
reforms. It instead opted for permanent observer status, which entitles a state to 
participate in all sessions.  In 2008, the US withdrew its mission, disenchanted with 
the tone and progress of Council proceedings.  The withdrawal was a pivotal moment 
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in US policy towards the UN. Analysis of events leading up to the 2008 withdrawal 
will shed light on the overall performance of the Council since its creation.  
Two broad factors are relevant to the US withdrawal. Although US policy at 
that time had done much to inflame international relations, countries used proceedings 
to attack America on issues related and unrelated to agenda items. Perhaps more 
importantly for the relationship between the US and the HRC, the Council‘s Special 
Procedures mandate holders
173
 did focus, sometimes unwarranted, attention on the 
US, often to the neglect of far more serious human rights situations elsewhere in the 
world. For example, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Philip Alston, visited the US in 2008, despite having visited that country 
a decade earlier, and despite not having visited other countries which committed at 
least as grave abuses of this right including, for example, Kenya, Bangladesh, or 
Iraq.
174
 As mandate holders have independence to determine which states to visit, 
such selectivity cannot be directly attributed to the Council. I shall, however, explore 
the argument that mandate holders do give disproportionate or unnecessary attention 
to the US at the Council and, indeed, other UN bodies. Use of Council time to discuss 
and take action on such reports results in less time and fewer resources to devote to 
fulfilling its mandate by protecting human rights within other states or regions. 
Selectivity did occur from member states and the Council itself. Treatment of 
the US by Council staff, members, and participants during the body‘s proceedings 
show the trend for politicisation, not least through the form of double standards, 
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inherent throughout the Council. Selectivity was often a manifestation of power 
struggles against the US. As such, it is an indicator of international trends and the 
international political atmosphere at that time. Selectivity directed towards the US 
was used by states as a mechanism for promotion of national policies, as well as a 
method used by weaker countries to gain bargaining power. National political agendas 
and conflicts, according to realist theories, will always dictate state behaviour at UN 
bodies. The Council has proved to be no exception. Treatment of the US demonstrates 
member states‘ disregard for the Council‘s underlying principles of non-selectivity 
and impartiality. Attacks on the United States have so far been stronger and more 
constant than against any other country except Israel. States‘ positions regarding the 
US demonstrate some of the main politicisation issues at the Council from the outset.  
 
 
7.1 US Exceptionalism and Unilateralism 
 
In order to explore the relationship between the US and the Human Rights Council, 
that state‘s general approach to international organisations and international human 
rights must be examined.  After the end of the Cold War, the US emerged as the main, 
if not sole, superpower. Therefore, having spent decades leading Western states, it 
viewed itself as having greater responsibilities for world order than any other country. 
The US approach of unilateralism and exceptionalism continued, arguably increasing 
as a result of the change in global politics. 
Schoenbaum (2006:251) argues that, despite its early involvement, the United 
States no longer plays a leading role in the protection and promotion of human rights. 
He insists that by the time of the Council‘s creation the US had ―largely abandoned 
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the field to others … and retreated into exceptionalism and unilateralism.‖ 
(Schoenbaum, 2006:251) 
 
He comments that the US role since the end of the Cold 
War has been at best that of a passive bystander and has at worst undermined the 
international human rights system. The US long advocated human rights, to a greater 
extent than other powerful states, yet has sought to defend its own sovereignty and 
power by failing to proportionately implement the human rights standards which it 
advocates that other states must adopt. Schoenbaum‘s observations illustrate the 
changing relationship between the US and UN human rights machinery, particularly 
leading up to its non-election to the Commission in 2001 and its decision not to stand 
for election to the Council in 2006. Much of this change can be attributed to the 
general US approach to international organisations. 
 US exceptionalism and unilateralism can be seen particularly clearly in its 
approach to international treaties (e.g. Henkin, 1995). Despite being the first country 
to ratify the UN Charter (Weiss, 2008:130), within the UN‘s first decade the US 
demonstrated its unilateralist position. In 1953 the Eisenhower Administration 
announced a new policy towards UN human rights: ―while we shall not withhold our 
counsel from those who seek to draft a treaty or covenant on human rights‖,175 the US 
would not ratify any human rights treaty (Alston, 2006:208), largely to appease 
southern conservatives who feared that international human rights would be used to 
promote racial equality, amongst others (Ignatieff, 2005:19). The US only ratified its 
first UN human rights treaty,  the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, in 1992. It ratified the only other UN human rights treaty to which it is a party, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in 1994. 
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Schoenbaum (2006:271) notes that the US reservation that both treaties be non-self-
executing results in them having no impact on US domestic law. The Human Rights 
Committee has criticised the US for its: 
 
―failure to take fully into consideration its obligation under the Covenant not 
only to respect, but also to ensure the rights prescribed by the Covenant; 
and . . . its restrictive approach to some substantive provisions of the 
Covenant, which is not in conformity with the interpretation made by the 
Committee before and after the State party‘s ratification of the Covenant.‖176 
 
 The US approach towards other international bodies can be used to understand 
its relationship with the Human Rights Council. A recent example is the US position 
on the International Criminal Court. Initially, the US favoured the ICC as it 
represented that state‘s values regarding law, justice and human rights (McGoldrick, 
2004:400). McGoldrick (2006:442) comments that US eventual opposition to the ICC 
was political rather than ideological (cf. Sands, 2003:76-77), as the US was concerned 
about the potential impact on its military personnel (e.g. Patten, 2004). Such 
opposition placed it ―in the company of ‗despotic‘ states such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, 
North Korea and Sudan.‖ (McGoldrick, 2004:442)  One of the key problems with the 
American approach to international organisations is that the state is often placed 
alongside countries that the US itself regularly condemns. US positions towards 
international organisations are at least partly based on the belief that such bodies take 
an anti-American and anti-Israeli stance (McGoldrick, 2004:442). McGoldrick argues, 
somewhat sympathetically, that the US doubts the legitimacy of such organisations, 
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especially where there are such credibility issues regarding membership as had 
occurred at the Commission. The US approach towards the Council reflects its 
general stance, owing to membership of that body constantly including known human 
rights abusers, as well as many totalitarian and other non-democratic regimes. US 
preference to share a platform with other democratic states rather than totalitarian 
ones is, according to Khaliq (2008:75), understandable. However, the US position has 
often resulted in it choosing not to enter an arena where it disapproves of other actors.  
Former-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger commented that the US 
position towards international organisations and institutions is based on strategic 
interests as to how they will affect the ―many Americans engaged in global 
responsibilities.‖ (Kissinger, 2002)   This approach underscores a main idea behind 
American exceptionalism, that the US has a special position due to its global 
responsibilities and that it ought to be treated differently because it takes a different 
role to all other states (McGoldrick, 2004:443).  
McGoldrick (2004:443) argues that the high level of US involvement in 
international affairs, particularly through its military, is used by some ―to explain 
American exceptionalism, non-compliance with international agreements, non-
ratification of signed treaties, rights narcissism, and its distinctive rights culture.‖ 
Byrnes and Charleworth (2002) disapprovingly argue that the US, due to its military 
strength, believes it has the right to act unilaterally in order to defend the world order. 
 
 
7.2 The US Vote against Establishment of the Council 
News that the US had withdrawn its observer mission was first reported in Human 
Rights Tribune in June 2008, between the Seventh and Eighth Sessions (Doole, 2008).  
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That move effectively ended US involvement with the Council, ceasing its input into 
the body‘s discussions and activities.  Confirmation came through the US 
announcement at its daily State Department briefing that it would only participate in 
Council discussions where ―absolutely necessary.‖ (Doole, 2008)  The Bush 
administration pursued no further involvement since the Seventh Session, which 
ended in 2008. Withdrawal, from a realist perspective, was a demonstration of US 
power within the wider UN sphere. Unable to exert sufficient influence at the Council 
to avoid what the US deemed as unfair levels of scrutiny, it instead withdrew 
altogether, knowing the impact that this would have on the new body. Arguably, 
however, from an idealist perspective US withdrawal displayed its frustration with the 
Council‘s failure to fulfil its mandate adequately and frequent selectivity, bias and 
inaction on human rights situations. As with the Commission in 2001, when the US 
failed to secure re-election, US withdrawal was viewed as a blow to the Council‘s 
credibility. Disengagement of the most powerful and influential state challenged the 
Council‘s legitimacy and highlighted some major issues very early in its existence.  
The Obama administration announced its decision to stand for election to the 
Council early in Obama‘s Presidency.177  In order to secure the US membership, New 
Zealand withdrew its candidacy, thus allowing the US to gain an unopposed seat in 
the Western European and Other States‘ group (e.g. Havel, 2008), removing the 
possibility of it failing to gain re-election as had occurred once before near the end of 
the Commission.   
 Those are only recent chapters of a turbulent history. In the original 
discussions the United States had focused on membership issues in objections to the 
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draft resolution establishing the Council. The Secretary-General at that time, Kofi 
Annan, had proposed that the Council be elected by a two-thirds majority of the 
General Assembly.
178
  The US pushed for additional criteria in order to ensure that 
―gross and systemic‖ violators could not be elected.179  Annan had deemed the 
Commission‘s lack of credibility to be crucial to its demise,180 along with the number 
and prominence of members with poor human rights records.
181
 Worried that the 
Council‘s membership would, like the Commission, include states with different 
positions on human rights, the US sought to advance its own national ideals by 
pushing for liberal democratic membership criteria that reflected its own positions on 
human rights issues. Despite some states‘ support for these aspirations, the final 
resolution simply required human rights records to be taken into account during 
elections.
182
  The US Ambassador, John Bolton, insisted that the resolution should go 
further in excluding countries with the worst human rights records from gaining 
membership. The lack of assurance of a credible membership would, he argued, result 
in the Council being no better than the Commission.  The test would be whether 
countries such as ―Cuba, the Sudan, Zimbabwe, Iran, Belarus and Burma‖ acquired 
membership.
183
 Those states, with different forms of non-democratic regimes, were 
each, for different reasons, ones which the US held national political reasons for 
seeking to exclude from the Council and, more generally, criticise within the 
international sphere.  
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Unsurprisingly, Bolton‘s views won little sympathy from member states he 
had previously criticised. In 1994, Bolton had claimed, ―There is no such thing as the 
United Nations. There is only the international community, which can only be led by 
the only remaining superpower, which is the United States‖ (Watson, 2005).184  He 
famously declared, ―If the UN Secretariat building in New York lost ten storeys, it 
wouldn‘t make a bit of difference‖ (Watson, 2005). Bolton‘s has regularly criticised 
the UN‘s existence, even criticising President Clinton for engaging with the 
organisation rather than pursuing unilateralist policies (cf. Bolton, 1997). Bolton‘s 
opinions, even those views which are valid are, therefore, frequently rejected by 
diplomats and administrative staff at the UN. Bolton‘s opinions on Council 
membership carried little weight among the countries increasingly suspicious of the 
Bush administration, in view of such high-profile US foreign policy failures, such as 
Guantanamo Bay, invading Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. Although Bolton made 
serious points about the Council, his standing at the UN, and the standing of the Bush 
administration generally, guaranteed that his opinions would garner little support. 
Bolton‘s backing for the invasion of Iraq further undermined his ability to steer the 
UN on human rights.  The Council‘s proceedings were politicised even before the 
body‘s official creation. Valid criticisms and proposals were ignored during the 
Council‘s creation, largely owing to the international political atmosphere against the 
US.  
Struggles for influence, both by and against the US, at times overshadowed 
states‘ legitimate efforts to protect and promote human rights. It is frequently difficult 
to distinguish between real claims to protect and promote human rights and instances 
where such claims sought instead to advance underlying power struggles. In those 
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instances where a state‘s position in fact undermined rather than advanced interests of 
human rights, gross politicisation is clearly apparent. Less clear, however, are the 
statements which do genuinely advance human rights interests but simultaneously 
further a state‘s political aims which are in direct conflict with other states or groups.  
Many of Bolton‘s assertions were, indeed, right. Yet it is apparent that the US 
positions sought to promote liberal, democratic approaches to human rights to the 
exclusion of other ideological discourses. Although the US did seek to promote its 
own political aims, proceedings were politicised by the outright rejection of its 
suggestions for motives other than in the interests of human rights.   
Bolton advised the General Assembly never to ―settle for good enough, for a 
compromise‖ in the promotion and protection of human rights.185  GA Resolution 
60/251 nevertheless passed with 170 states in favour, 4 against,
186
 and 3 
abstentions.
187
 The vote was called by the US, to the chagrin of those who had hoped 
that the text would pass unanimously (a vote is only called for when there are 
countries that oppose the draft resolution in question).  Before the vote, Cuba accused 
the US of taking a ―punitive and sanctioning‖ approach. Accusing the US of power 
politics, the Cubans alleged that America and its allies had exerted ―strong pressure 
and resorted to their traditional blackmail‖ in pursuing its preferred outcome.188 That 
statement altogether ignored that the US had committed to, and indeed did, finance 
the Council irrespective of it voting against the body‘s creation. Had the US sought to 
use underhand tactics to undermine the new body, it could simply have refused to 
provide financial support which would have seriously hampered efforts to create the 
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Council. The US vote against the Council‘s creation arguably registered its 
displeasure about the new body‘s form rather than seeking to undermine its existence.  
Cuba‘s allegations, even at this early stage, demonstrate the power struggles already 
occurring around the HRC, with long-standing foes using the discussions as an 
opportunity to vilify the US, attacking it under the guise of human rights while, 
somewhat transparently, pursing unrelated political objectives. That Cuba‘s position 
was a sheer attack is evidenced by its silence towards the abstainers which included 
two of its key allies, Iran and Venezuela, despite the abstentions also negating the 
Assembly recording a unanimous vote.  
After the vote, Bolton reminded the General Assembly that the US had 
counted, historically, among the strongest voices for the global protection and 
promotion of human rights, since the founding of the UN. That claim underscored 
America‘s failure to acknowledge its own politicisation of human rights bodies and its 
one-dimensional approach to human rights. He pointed out that the UN ―can, and 
should, do more. We had an historic opportunity to create a primary human rights 
organ in the United Nations, poised to help those most in need.‖189 Although 
expressing disappointment, he nevertheless went on to pledge US assistance in 
strengthening the Council. The US declined to stand for membership, leaving its 
status formally peripheral, in comparison to its earlier, full-fledged membership of the 
Commission. By not fully engaging with the new body, the US emphasised its 
reservations about the Council from the outset. Perhaps, noting the strength of feeling 
against the US, it chose not to stand rather than to face the indignity of not being 
elected as had occurred at the Commission in 2001.  
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Nevertheless, the American delegation energetically participated in Council 
sessions and activities as a permanent observer until the end of the Seventh Session. 
The Council‘s rules regarding observer states and bodies retained those of the 
Commission.
190
 Observer status entitled the US to be present at all Council sessions, 
and to participate in all discussions. The US vigorously exercised that prerogative, 
exerting its influence on Council proceedings, as we shall now see from the many and 
varied discussions in which it participated. 
 
 
7.3 US Views on the Council‟s Activities 
US views on Council activities scarcely changed during the seven sessions in which it 
participated. Its initial fears that the Council would be biased and opaque, continuing 
the politicisation prevalent at the Commission, were repeated in its comments on 
working methods. The Council‘s inaction on grave human rights situations was a 
source of US consternation, echoing its initial fears that the Council would not go far 
enough in discharging its mandate.. 
 The US expressed strong opinions about the Council‘s working methods, and 
further frustration in its appeals for more constructive methods. From the outset, the 
US stressed the need for dialogue, as opposed to confrontation, and the importance of 
involving NGOs, national observers, and all other stakeholders.
191
 The US 
emphasised the Council‘s underlying, idealist principles, including ―the need to have 
clarity and transparency‖, and arguing that the Council ―must follow clear and 
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predictable guidelines‖.192 The US seemed particularly concerned that the Council 
should avoid the Commission‘s earlier opacity, by preferring open, formal procedures 
over closed, informal and unreported meetings. While the US may be criticised for its 
own secrecy on the Security Council, a feature shared by permanent members, such 
insistence on transparency at the Council is not necessarily hypocritical, as security 
issues often require different approaches than human rights. The protection and 
promotion of human rights are rarely placed at risk by transparent procedures, 
particularly outside declared states of emergency.
193
 Unfortunately, thus far, those 
calls have gone unheeded at the Council.  Major decisions are still being taken within 
closed, informal, unreported meetings. The Council does hold open, informal 
meetings which, whilst not available via webcast, are open to observers. However, 
throughout Council sessions there are constant closed informal meetings held by 
regional groups or other alliances, as well as intergovernmental negotiations behind 
closed doors. Most of the work on draft resolutions takes places in these meetings, as 
do negotiations regarding votes and voting tactics. That method of work shrouds the 
Council in secrecy for observers, the secretariat, non-member states, and states not 
affiliated with the powerful groups.    
The US repeated the need for transparency in discussions on Universal 
Periodic Review. The US emphasised that UPR success would ―lie in its openness‖.194 
The Americans stressed that UPR, and other working methods, should not supplant 
                                                 
192 Id. 
193 For example, ICCPR states ―In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures 
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and 
do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.‖ Supra 
n.4 
194 American delegate, 2nd Session, 2 October 2006, during debate on UPR with the Working Group facilitator, 
Moroccan Ambassador, Mohammed Loulichki. 
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certain established procedures.  For example, they stressed that the Council should be 
able to continue to consider country-specific situations on its own initiative and at any 
time.
195
 The US also recalled its earlier fears about politicisation, reminding the 
Council, for example, that there should be ―no double standards‖196 when using UPR.  
 The theme of impartiality and non-politicisation in the Council‘s working 
methods continued in the US comments about country-specific mandates. Whilst the 
US advocated the continuation of such mandates as a strong tool for keeping ―the 
spotlight on human rights abuse‖,197 it expressed reservations about the singling out of 
Israel and the Occupied Territories by the Council under the guise of these 
mandates.
198
 The US asserted that such focus ―makes the system politicised and non-
universal‖199 and advocated that the Occupied Palestinian Territories‘ mandate ―be 
subject to modification in the normal procedure‖.200  
The US repeated its general positions on Council working methods during 
both formal and informal debates. It regularly used discussions on working methods 
to air concerns about the Council‘s effectiveness, reminding the body of the need for 
―independent, impartial experts in order to maintain credibility‖.201  It also insistently 
reminded the Council of the need to implement its resolutions.
202
  American delegates 
repeatedly recalled the need to improve human rights mechanisms at the UN, 
                                                 
195 American delegate, 3rd Session, 4 December 2006, in response to UPR Working Group Facilitator, Ambassador 
Loulichki. 
196 American delegate, supra n.194  
197 American delegate, 4th Session, 23 March 2007, during discussion on country-specific mandates. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 American delegate, 3rd Session, 5 December 2006, in response to the Review of Mandates Facilitator Czech 
Ambassador Tomas Husak.  
202 American delegate, 3rd Session, 7 December 2006, informal session with the Experts Advice Facilitator, 
Jordanian Ambassador Burayzat.  
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reminding the Council of the Secretary-General‘s report,203 especially the strong 
criticisms contained therein, that had acted as a catalyst for the body‘s creation.   
 Despite the US insistence at the Council‘s formation that it would not become 
a member of the body, it sought to play an active role in shaping it from the outset. 
Realists would reason that the US was keen to advance its own national policies on 
human rights, seeking to implement liberal, democratic norms, despite its lack of 
official involvement with the body. The US has frequently sought to ensure that the 
Western approach to human rights remains at the fore at international bodies. Others 
might argue that the US sought to protect and promote all forms of human rights for 
their own sake even though it disagreed with many aspects of the new body. 
Regardless of its motives, the US constantly insisted that the Council adhere to its 
own idealistic founding principles. 
The Council‘s primary objective of protecting and promoting human rights 
was frequently repeated by the US during both general discussions and those 
regarding specific activities. The US also criticised the Council‘s inaction on specific 
situations. It singled out serious and ongoing violations in DPRK,
204
 Myanmar,
205
 
Sudan
206
 and Zimbabwe
207
 as requiring immediate attention and action. It urged the 
Council to act on a number of occasions, mentioning the ongoing atrocities, and 
urging immediate action.  Emphasis on gross and systemic violations in these states, 
rather than in those countries with which the US had other ties, mirrors behaviour at 
                                                 
203 Supra n.1 
204 See, for example, American delegate, 4th Session, 23 March 2007, in response to SR on DPRK, Vitit 
Muntarbhorn.  
205 See, for example, American delegate, 4th Session, 15 March 2007, during interactive dialogue with UNHCHR, 
Louise Arbour.  
206 See, for example, American delegate, 2nd Session, 18 September 2006, during interactive dialogue with 
UNHCHR, Louise Arbour.  
207 American delegate, supra n.205. 
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the Commission for which it was criticised. Although the US raised valid issues 
regarding those countries, its silence about countries such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan, 
states with which it had important security ties, demonstrated the US again advancing 
its national policies with the UN human rights body. Despite widely participating in 
Council discussions, the US maintained a somewhat conspicuous silence when both 
of those countries were raised at the body. Although mere silence does not amount to 
obstructionism, the US arguably applied double-standards in terms of its allies.  
The US stressed its support for, amongst others, the Special Session on 
Darfur,
208
 extra resources for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the ground in these aforementioned regions,
209
 and the continuation of reports and 
recommendations from mandate holders.
210
 The US again condemned politicisation of 
the Council, criticising the incessant focus on Israel as compared with states 
committing equal or worse levels of abuse.
211
 The lack of even-handedness regarding 
Israel, with grossly disproportionate scrutiny of that state diverting time and resources 
away from other abusers, was a source of constant US frustration. The Council, as 
with the Commission, increasingly targeted Israel at the expense of other gross and 
systemic situations.  
 
7.4 US Objections to the Council‟s Work 
Throughout the first seven sessions, the US voiced strong objections to the work 
undertaken by the Council, as expressed both in (a) country-specific and (b) thematic 
                                                 
208 American delegate, 3rd Session, 29 November 2006, during interactive dialogue with UNHCHR, Louise 
Arbour. 
209 American delegate, supra n.206  
210 American delegate, 5th Session, 11 June 2006, in response to SR on Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 
Leando Despouy. 
211 American delegate, 7th Session, 27 March 2008, during the informal meeting.   
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debates.  Whereas country-specific debates focus on many rights within one state, 
thematic debates examine one right across several states.  US objections can be 
viewed from different perspectives, again including idealist advancement of human 
rights standards or motivated by national policies such as promoting liberal, 
democratic human rights principles to the exclusion of other categories of human 
rights.  
 
Country-specific debates.  The US commented on a number of the country-specific 
situations brought to the Council‘s attention during its first two years. The situations 
discussed were either ongoing or dire, requiring country-specific mandate holders to 
report on them. The raising of specific situations depended on considerations such as 
the gravity of the crisis as well as political motives of Council members. The impact 
of regional ties was particularly strong. Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
members, for political reasons, ensured that the Council‘s attention remained on Israel 
whilst the body ignored situations in, for example, Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia, and 
that action on Darfur was blocked. Regionalism in this context resulted in the Council 
not focusing solely on the gravest situations, but also on those countries that fell foul 
of prominent groups of member states.  
During the first seven sessions, Israel was brought to the Council‘s attention 
through reports on various aspects of the human rights situations pertaining to the 
Occupied Territories, the conflict between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, and the situation following the Lebanese war in the summer of 2006. 
Notably, the US did not defend Israeli violations; it did, however, note abuses 
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committed on the Palestinian
212
 and Lebanese
213
 sides.  The US approach emphasised 
the need for balance and impartiality, a position not taken by any country other than 
Canada.
214
 During discussions on Israel, the US highlighted the human rights abuses 
on both sides, and called for the Council to act to ensure that all sides cease 
violations.
215
 The US statements in these discussions were strongly contrary to 
popular and media representations of US ―blind‖ or one-sided support for Israel. The 
US reminded the Council of the underlying principles that established the body,
216
 
stating that ―the unbalanced focus on Israel‖217 was inconsistent with them,  
 
―The Council must be more balanced . . . . The Human Rights Council can 
express concern about Israel‘s human rights violations, but it should be 
equally concerned with Palestinian terrorism and other human rights violations 
in the world.‖218 
 
                                                 
212 For example, ―Palestinian rocket attacks must stop, and terrorist attacks that target civilians must stop‖, 
American delegate, 7th Session, 6 March 2008, in response to the UNHCHR report on resolutions concerning the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. 
213 For example, the American delegate condemned the Hezbollah attack on Israel and the kidnapping of two 
Israeli soldiers which directly preceded the war, 2nd Session, 4 October 2006, in response to UN Doc. A/HRC/2/7 
(2006). 
214 Canada is the only member of the Human Rights Council to have voted against every resolution critical of 
Israel, where a vote was called.  
215 ―Israel must dismantle those settlements built since March 2001, and the Palestinians must prevent terrorist 
activities.  We … call on parties to fulfil their obligations …. We call on Israel to take into account the 
humanitarian impact … [of the] wall and avoid action that could prejudice issues that should be determined by 
negotiations.  We urge everyone not to consider this situation as a one-sided context‖, American delegate, 2nd 
Session, 29 September 2006, in response to SR on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, John Dugard.  
216  ―… the work of the Council shall be guided by the principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-
selectivity, constructive international dialogue and cooperation …‖, supra n.6 
217 American delegate, supra n.215  
218 Id.  
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At the same session, the US spoke of ―the human suffering on both sides‖ during the 
Israel-Lebanon war in 2006.  In another intervention, the US called for ―Israel to take 
into account the humanitarian impact‖ of the security wall.219  
The US regularly repeated its commitment to a two-state solution.
220
 That, 
seemingly even-handed statement, contrasted with US unequivocal support for Israel 
under the Bush administration, particularly within the General Assembly and through 
the use of its veto at the Security Council. Within the HRC, where the US had far less 
power or influence than at other organs, the US sought to play the role of mediator 
between Israel and its OIC-led detractors. Unsurprisingly, other states were frequently 
distrustful of US efforts in this regard. 
American delegates attempted to steer Council discussions towards addressing 
solutions, contrary to the frequent criticism levelled against Israel through decisions, 
resolutions,
221
 and the calling of Special Sessions (Israel was the subject of four of the 
seven Special Sessions convened during the Council‘s first two years). At the Sixth 
Session,
222
 the US again urged that ―addressing the Israel-Palestine conflict requires a 
balanced and forward-looking approach‖, insisting that ―the Arab states should stop 
the incitement of hatred in the media and should cease their refusal to recognize the 
existence of Israel.‖223 The Arab press arguably is predominantly a tool of national 
governments, promoting national and regional interests as exemplified by the quantity 
and quality of its reporting on Israel (cf. Fandy, 2008). Indeed, Rugh (2004:7) argues 
                                                 
219 American delegate, 2nd Session, 26 September 2006, in response to SR on OPT, John Dugard. 
220 See, for example, American delegate: 2nd Session, 26 September 2006; 4th Session, 20 September 2007; 7th 
Session, 6 March 2008. 
221 19 resolutions critical of Israel were passed between 2006 and 2008.   
222 6th Session, 10-28 September 2006, resumed 10-14 December 2006. 
223 American delegate, 6th Session, 20 September 2007, during discussions pursuant to HRC resolutions requiring 
UNHCHR to report to the HRC on the implementation of Res 1/1 adopted by HRC at 1st special session 
dispatching a SR to Israel.  
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that Arab governments use the conflict with Israel, or the need to confront Israeli 
policies, as justification for their influence over the media. Arab media provides 
continuous coverage of Israel as a news story (Sakr, 2007:126). As occurs as the 
Council, vilification of, and constant focus on, Israel enables Arab countries to avoid 
national scrutiny of their own human rights violations, as well as providing a central 
unifying policy behind for all regional media outlets (cf. Rugh, 2004).  
The US repeatedly berated the Council‘s anti-Israel bias, but such concerns 
were largely dismissed due to the close relationship between these two countries. 
Rubenberg (1986:330) claims that unconditional U.S. support for Israel ―goes beyond 
any traditional relationship between states in the international system‖. 
Unsurprisingly, that relationship affects perception of US comments about Israel, 
even when those positions are valid. Frum & Perle (2003:181) suggest that 
unconditional US support for Israel is always in the US national interest. Although 
this is a questionable thesis, many states agree with that opinion, thus further 
undermining comments made by the US on the Council‘s treatment of Israel. The 
only state that generally supported the US position was Canada.  Other Western and 
democratic states, with the occasional exception of Australia and Japan, perhaps 
fearing the same impact of regional alliances as dominated Commission proceedings, 
took neutral positions during most of these discussions. The EU regularly abstained 
during votes and made neutral comments during discussions regarding Israel. The 
EU‘s reluctance to take sides could be due to that bloc‘s need to internally negotiate a 
collective position, and the varied stances of its members on the Israel-Palestine 
situation. The EU and its dominant state members also tended to seek a mediating 
role. The EU‘s neutrality is, however, more likely to have resulted from the power 
and influence held by the large bloc of OIC member states sitting at the Council. The 
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size and geographical diversity of its membership gave the OIC significant weight in 
the Council, and that influence was often deployed to ostracise those countries that 
disagreed with the OIC‘s collective stance. The EU‘s recognition of the OIC‘s 
influence at the Council can be contrasted with wider perceptions, particularly within 
the media, that the US is always dominant at the UN. The UN is often, falsely, 
assumed to replicate the Security Council‘s power structure, with scant understanding 
of the composition of various organs and bodies. The repercussions for a state taking 
a stand against the OIC can be seen in the reaction of that bloc, its allies, and the 
African Group.
224
 That deterrent undoubtedly played a role in the weakening of the 
Council‘s resolutions and decisions. 
The US, as the most powerful state and due to its already poor relations with 
many OIC members and allies in the aftermath of the Iraq war, had less to lose by 
criticising the Council‘s targeting of Israel. It was able to push for more balanced and 
less selective discussions without fear of reprisals at the body from regional groups, 
due both to its strength as well as its position as an observer rather than Council 
member.  
Sudan is of particular interest throughout the period of the Bush 
administration. The US in general, and particularly under the Bush administration, has 
repeatedly spoken out against the genocide in Darfur, and was often alone in calling 
for, and taking, constant action to improve the situation (e.g. Bohm, 2006). The Bush 
administration, as with many of its recent predecessors, was influenced by the 
Congressional Black Caucus which was founded in 1971 to represent black 
Congressmen. The caucus has had significant influence on domestic and foreign 
affairs, although little scholarship exists on the caucus‘ impact on foreign policy (cf. 
                                                 
224 See Chapter 8, Section 8.3.4 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.223 
 
Copson, 2003). Eager (2007:273) claims that the caucus, alongside other US actors, 
promotes and influences legislation salient to Africa. Of all African and Caribbean 
states, Sudan features as the one which found most common ground between the Bush 
administration and the Congressional Black Caucus owing, in no small part, to 
widespread bipartisan condemnation of the worsening situation in Darfur during 
Bush‘s presidential terms (Eager, 207:282). Sudan was frequently discussed, and 
indeed the subject of legislation, throughout Bush‘s presidency. The US behaved in a 
similar manner at the Council, despite the seeming indifference of many members 
towards the escalating crisis. Constant raising of human rights abuses in Sudan could 
be seen as promoting human rights for their own sake. However, US national political 
focus on Sudan indicates that promoting the situation in Sudan to the Council over 
other similarly gross and systemic violations was due, at least in part, to domestic 
concerns.  
Although the US, amongst others, constantly brought Sudan to the Council‘s 
attention, the body took no meaningful action on the situation in Darfur. Reports on 
Sudan were presented by the Special Rapporteur and the Group of Experts, as well as 
by the High Commissioner and others. These reports provided the basis for Council 
discussions on Sudan. Throughout the discussions, the US maintained its strong 
condemnation of the escalating humanitarian crisis, calling for steps to be taken to 
ensure a resolution to the conflict. At the Second Session the US asked the Special 
Rapporteur on Sudan
225
 to provide further information on human rights violations 
occurring in Sudan
226
 due to the gravity of the situation. As the situation escalated, the 
                                                 
225 Sima Samar, UN-appointed SR on Sudan. 
226 American delegate, 2nd Session, 27 September 2006, in response to SR on Sudan, Sima Samar. 
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US insisted that ―the council cannot ignore the ongoing crisis in Sudan‖,227 repeating 
―that in the Darfur region there are gross violations of human rights‖.228 
The US maintained that the reports given to the Council left ―no further doubt 
that action is demanded‖.229 Throughout these Sessions, the US charged that the 
―Council has yet to adequately address the human rights violations in Sudan‖,230 
repeating that it ―remain[ed] very concerned‖ and was ―call[ing] on the government to 
end its destructive behaviour‖.231 The US spoke about possible methods, including 
sanctions, to encourage a resolution of the conflict.
232
 American delegates asked why 
the Council was so slow to take action. Having secured sanctions against Sudan in the 
Security Council, the US encouraged the Council and member states to take decisive 
action. The Americans encouraged the Council to act swiftly rather than spend 
months or years awaiting reports from mandate holders and fact-finding missions, or 
passing somewhat neutral resolutions calling for change without condemning the 
parties responsible for atrocities. However, other Council members stressed the need 
to follow the Council‘s procedures in decision-making regarding this, and other, 
human rights situations. The US desire to ―rip up the rule book‖ and take swift, 
decisive action where necessary in crisis situations such as Darfur, lacked credibility, 
they declared, due to the US having taken similar steps before the invasion of Iraq and 
the subsequent international condemnation of that action. However, the delaying 
tactics of other states, under the guise of following legitimate procedures, increasingly 
                                                 
227 American delegate, 6th Session, 14 December 2007, discussion on renewal of mandate on Sudan. 
228 American delegate, 7th Session, 17 March 2007, in response to SR on Sudan, Sima Samar. 
229 American delegate, 4th Session, 16 March 2007, in response to Jody Williams, Mission to Sudan. 
230 American delegate, 5th Session, 13 June 2007, in response to SR on Sudan, Sima Samar. 
231 American delegate, supra n.228  
232 American delegate, supra n.230  
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lacked credibility in much the same way as the US desire to ignore those procedures 
altogether.  
The US was concerned not only with the impact of regionalism through OIC 
tactics of blocking action on humanitarian crises occurring within OIC member states 
such as Sudan, but also with the Council‘s disregard for other situations across the 
world. Various factors affected the Council‘s inaction regarding such states, notably 
the lack of will to interfere with repressive regimes that afforded little access to the 
international community, or the lack of interest in those states that afforded no 
political gains for individual members of the Council. For example, the US also 
expressed concern about Myanmar throughout discussions on what it termed ―one of 
the most repressive regimes‖.233 The US highlighted the ―lack of inclusive and 
genuine dialogue with all stakeholders‖234 as being a fundamental obstacle to the 
protection of human rights through national reconciliation. Despite the lack of access 
to, or information from, Myanmar, the US set out the ongoing human rights 
violations, including the large numbers of refugees,
235
 detention of political 
prisoners,
236
 police brutality,
237
 and restrictions on the activities of NGOs and other 
such parties.
238
 The crux of the US position on Myanmar was to ―urge this Council, 
the international community, and Myanmar to protect those Burmese persons whose 
                                                 
233 American delegate, 4th Session, 23 March 2007, in response to SR on Myanmar, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.   
234 American delegate, 2nd Session, 27 September 2006, in response to SR on Myanmar, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. 
235 ―… hundreds of thousands of refugees …―, American delegate, 2nd Session, Id. 
236 ―How can we support the release of political prisoners?‖, American delegate, 2nd Session, Id.; ―Pro-democracy 
advocates continue to be arrested‖, American delegate, 7th Session, 13 March 2007, in response to SR on 
Myanmar, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.   
237 ―The excessive force against civilians during peaceful demonstration led to the numerous killings, detention, 
and injuries.‖, American delegate, 6th Session, 12 December 2007, in response to SR on Myanmar, Paulo Sergio 
Pinheiro. 
238 ―The Red Cross has had to halt its activities …‖, American delegate, 4th Session, supra n.233  
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rights are being violated‖.239 In order for this to occur, ―continued international 
attention [requiring] sustained commitment‖240 was called for in order to ensure the 
cooperation of the government in the implementation of Human Rights Council 
recommendations. The US condemnation of the regime was echoed by other western 
states, and was repeated throughout all sessions. However, the situation was of little 
interest domestically for many of the Council members, as opposed to, for example, 
the situation in Israel. Therefore, the Council failed to discharge its mandate to protect 
human rights. As had occurred at the Commission, Council attention was given to the 
Israel-Palestine conflict at the expense of the victims in Myanmar.   
The US raised other similar country-specific situations such as Belarus,
241
 
Burundi,
242
 Cambodia,
243
 Cuba,
244
 Liberia,
245
 North Korea
246
 and Somalia,
247
 amongst 
others. The US focus on these repressive regimes and their ongoing human rights 
abuses followed the same pattern regardless of the countries involved. It condemned 
regimes for not cooperating with the Council or other UN bodies, it called for 
increased international action to ensure protection and promotion of human rights, and 
                                                 
239 American delegate, 7th Session, 13 March 2007, in response to SR on Myanmar, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. 
240 American delegate, 7th Session, 17 March 2007, in response to SR on Myanmar, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. 
241 See, for example, American delegate, 2nd Session, 27 September 2006, in response to SR on Belarus, Adrian 
Severin. 
242 See, for example, American delegate, 2nd Session, 27 September 2006, in response to SR on Burundi, Akich 
Okola; American delegate, 4th Session, 23 March 2007, in response to SR Burundi, Akich Okola. 
243 See, for example, American delegate, 2nd Session, 26 September 2006, in response to SR on Cambodia, Yash 
Ghai; American delegate, 7th Session, 19 March 2007, discussions on renewal of mandate on Cambodia. 
244 See, for example, American delegate, 2nd Session, 26 September 2006, in response to SR on Cuba, Christine 
Chanet; American delegate, 5th Session, 12 June 2007, in response to SR on Cuba, Christine Chanet.   
245 See, for example,  2nd Session, 29 September 2006, in response to SR on Liberia, Charlotte Abaka; American 
delegate, 4th Session, 23 March 2007, in response to SR on Liberia, Charlotte Abaka. 
246 See, for example, American delegate, 2nd Session, 27 September 2006, in response to SR on DPRK, Vitit 
Muntarbhorn; American delegate, 4th Session, 23 March 2007, in response to SR on DPRK, Vitit Muntarbhorn; 
American delegate, 7th Session, 13 March 2007, in response to SR on DPRK, Vitit Muntarbhorn. 
247 See, for example, American delegate, 2nd Session, 26 September 2006, in response to SR on Somalia, Ghanim 
Alnajjar; American delegate, 5th Session, 12 June 2007, in response to SR on Somalia, Ghanim Alnajjar. 
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commended and supported the efforts of UN mandate holders in these regions. Unlike 
the OIC, whose political objectives drove its responses to human rights abuses, the 
US consistently denounced humanitarian situations even within closely allied states 
such as Israel or Pakistan, albeit that its criticism of those countries‘ governments was 
somewhat muted.  
The belief that international aid and intervention could most appropriately 
assist such areas was emphasised by US calls for such action to be taken. The US 
demanded action and expressed frustration that the Council was dragging its heels 
when dealing with crisis situations. The US initial fears that the Council would 
become biased and politicised can be seen to have been realised in respect of the 
focus on certain human rights situations and the body‘s inaction on others. Although 
some may assert that the US used the Council to further its own national aims, any 
politicisation on its part was overshadowed by the gross politicisation from OIC and 
African states. Politicisation had already come to dominate the fledgling body, with 
regional groups able to steer discussions towards or away from their choice of 
situations. The frustration that this caused was evident from the American 
interventions during all of the seven sessions in which it participated before its 
withdrawal.  
 
Thematic debates The US frequently reiterated the importance of international 
support in order for Council mandates to be fulfilled, usually those promoting liberal 
human rights standards that reflected US national positions. It singled out topics such 
as protection of women and children from violence and trafficking, freedoms of 
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religion and expression,
248
 and the protection of human rights defenders, as being of 
particular concern. For example, the position that ―violence against women is 
indefensible‖249 was repeated in the context of abuses against women and children, 
including the trafficking of people in both groups as well as sex-tourism.
250
 The US 
identified Sudan and Myanmar as the two countries where it believed these groups 
were particularly vulnerable, arguing that such ―human rights abuses [were being] 
used to terrorise people‖251 due to government involvement in human rights 
violations.  
The US discussed the need to promote freedom of religion,
252
 calling for all 
countries to ―ensure that freedom of religion is respected for all religions … [and] the 
freedom to not affiliate with any religion at all, or to change religion must also be 
respected‖,253 due to the central importance of this right for people across the 
world.
254
 When discussing freedom of expression, the US stressed that ―the right is a 
cornerstone in the protection of human rights‖,255 arguing that ongoing support of ―the 
mandate is urgently needed‖.256 The strength of the US support for these two 
freedoms was not solely based on its traditional domestic regard for these rights,
257
 
but also on the juxtaposition between freedoms of religion and expression and the 
                                                 
248 ―There is often and overlap between freedom of religion and freedom of expression‖, American delegate, 2nd 
Session, 22 September 2006, in response to SR on Freedom of Religion, Asma Jahangir. 
249 American delegate, 4th Session, 21 March 2007, in response to SR on Violence Against Women, Yakin Ertuk. 
250 See, for example, American delegate, 2nd Session, 25 September 2006, in response to SR on the sale of children 
and child pornography, Juan Miguel Petit; American delegate, 2nd Session, 20 September 2006, in response to SR 
on Violence Against Women, Yakin Ertuk. 
251 American delegate, supra n.249 
252 American delegate, 2nd Session, 21 September 2006, in response to SR on Freedom of Religion, Asma Jahangir, 
and Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Ambeyi Ligabo. 
253 American delegate, supra n.248  
254 Id. 
255 American delegate, 7th Session, 14 March 2008, in response to SR on Freedom of Expression, Ambeyi Ligabo 
256 Id. 
257 The Constitution of the United States, Amendment 1. 
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OIC demand that defamation of religion be afforded equal protection. The US 
interventions on certain rights and freedoms showed its desire to promote those 
typically Western values that underpinned the UDHR, thus ensuring that they 
remained prevalent within the human rights system.  That showdown of cultural 
values echoed the old US-Soviet controversies that once politicised the Commission 
and other human rights work at the UN. Despite hopes that the Council would protect 
and promote all human rights, differences couched in language of cultural sensitivities 
reflected similar problems at the Commission.  
 The Council was strongly reminded of the absolute imperative of protecting 
human rights defenders during discussions of various reports given by the Secretary-
General‘s Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders.258 The US noted that 
―some governments feel restricted by [human rights defenders] and attempt to restrict 
them‖,259 and criticised this ―obviously political‖ motivation.260 The US was disturbed 
by the violations perpetrated against many of these people, particularly the 
harassment, detention, and attacks on human rights defenders.
261
 It called for the 
Council to join it in ―standing with courageous defenders‖ and to ―call into account 
those governments that seek to undermine their liberties‖.262 The US wished to ensure 
that ―individuals and groups … be able to fight for human rights‖263 and asked for 
support in this regard. The support that the US expressed for human rights defenders 
could also have been a way of criticising those regimes that do not allow open and 
easy access to such people. Many of those states that attacked the US at the Council 
                                                 
258 Hina Jilani. 
259 American delegate, 2nd Session, 22 September 2006, in response to SR on Human Rights Defenders, Hina 
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could be accused of repressive laws and actions against human rights defenders, 
especially members of the OIC. The strenuous positions taken by the US in related 
discussions reflected its deteriorating relations with such countries.   
 Throughout the Council sessions, the US spoke out against regimes 
committing the worst human rights abuses. General debates were used to flag the 
atrocities in specific states such as Zimbabwe,
264
 China
265
 and Uzbekistan.
266
 The US 
noted violations of specific rights, as well as the general culture of violations 
prevalent within these countries. The US also used general discussions to encourage 
the Council to focus on implementation of human rights, and on providing ―relevant 
and practical advice‖ without politicisation.267 This tied in with its initial fears that the 
Council would be selective and bias in terms of which rights it chose to protect and 
promote. The realisation of these fears was apparent in the vociferousness of US 
interventions and calls for the body to discharge its mandate. The body‘s failure to 
listen to the US positions was arguably a main reason for its temporary 
disengagement from the body.  
 
 
7.5 The US human rights record  
Towards the end of the Commission, the body increasingly shielded its members from 
scrutiny. As already discussed, a number of states became members in order to avoid 
scrutiny, allowing abuses to continue within their own borders.
268
 The Council 
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adopted a number of safeguards to combat its predecessor‘s reputation, particularly in 
relation to member states‘ human rights commitments and scrutiny of their records.  
In contrast to the view that the US under George W. Bush‘s administration decided 
not to stand for election because of dissatisfaction, some have argued that it feared its 
own record would be scrutinised more harshly as a member than as an observer 
(Harris, 2006).  The desire to deflect attention from its human rights record may be 
traced to the repeated criticisms, often heard at the UN, of the Bush administration‘s 
anti-terrorism tactics after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre.  Another 
view, however, is that the US decision not to stand for election resulted from its fear 
of an embarrassing defeat similar to the one suffered in its 2001 bid for re-election. 
That view is supported by the US reform proposal, rejected by the majority of states, 
under which the permanent members of the Security Council would also be 
―permanent members‖ of the Council. Had that proposal been adopted, the US would 
have been guaranteed a seat, thus avoiding the need for election. The US would have 
been granted a powerful position of being able to assert influence at the Council 
without fear of reprisals during elections. Power would have allowed the US to pursue 
its human rights objectives, regardless of its reasons for particular stances or 
positions. 
 
 
The US Domestic Human Rights Record The US domestic human rights record was 
raised at the Council by various mandate holders, which led to the question of 
whether the US was being unfairly singled out. The US concern that it was being 
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treated disproportionately more harshly than other states was reflected in its responses 
to being the only Western state repeatedly raised in reports to the Council.  The US 
reaction must be examined not only with respect to the possibly disproportionate 
focus on it, but also with respect to legitimate concerns about US domestic human 
rights.   
Various methods were used to ensure that the Council focused on the US. 
Mandate holders, in particular, were able to ensure that discussions took place 
examining US violations. Mandates are established and defined by the resolution 
creating them, but the mandate holders work independently of any UN body. Mandate 
holders receive information on human rights abuses, and they determine based on 
that, and other information, which countries to visit and report on, and which 
countries to include in their annual reports. States, at the request of a mandate holder, 
determine whether to extend an invitation for a country visit. Many states do extend 
standing invitations, which allow visits. Each mandate holder may visit two countries 
each year.  As independent experts, thematic mandate holders determine which states 
to visit. The Council has little control over which states will be visited, beyond 
providing mandate holders with visit requests or information on human rights 
violations. 
The Council heard, and subsequently discussed, issues relating to domestic US 
human rights from mandate holders who included the US in annual reports or who 
undertook a country visit to the US. Such mandates included contemporary forms of 
racism
269
 and extreme poverty. The latter mandate, on extreme poverty, provides a 
useful example of the way in which the US domestic human rights record was 
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examined. The US officially welcomed visits and recommendations by mandate 
holders. In response, however, it questioned what was being done to improve far 
worse situations in other countries.  Whilst this stance can be argued to have missed 
the point of the reports, the US position was legitimate. The inclusion of the US in 
these reports resulted in other states not being discussed at the Council, despite there 
being ongoing, dire situations across the world. This was not an issue that went 
unnoticed by other states at the Council, for example, during discussions on extreme 
poverty. Despite Arjun Sengupta, the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, saying 
that ―most of the problems I saw in the United States need to go a long way before 
there is a solution‖,270 a number of developing countries expressed disappointment 
that the US had been the sole focus of the report. Mali questioned why the Special 
Rapporteur visited ―one of the richest countries in the world‖ rather than ―a poor 
country‖, stating that ―the living conditions in Africa cannot be the same as in the 
US‖.271 Statements made by developing countries underscored the power given to 
mandate holders to determine which states to visit, and the sometimes arbitrary 
results. Sengupta‘s decision to visit the US highlighted the potential for politicisation 
or abuse of the process by which country-visits are chosen.  
Mandate holders are given the freedom and independence to determine which 
country visits to undertake. Some guidance, however, is provided by the mandate 
itself. The resolution establishing the mandate on extreme poverty stressed the need to 
promote human rights for people living in such circumstances.
272
 Sengupta did 
recognise this need,
273
 and indeed provided some individual examples of the link 
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between poverty and denial of rights.
274
 However, his report focused almost 
exclusively on the poverty itself rather than any general trends or links between 
extreme poverty and other human rights violations such as discrimination against 
women, modern forms of slavery, or denial of sanitation, safe drinking water or 
adequate housing. Sengupta‘s decision to spend time and resources on scrutinising the 
US human rights record at the expense of other states impacted most upon those 
countries which expressly requested to utilise mandate holders‘ expertise to improve 
the rights within their own, or neighbouring, territory.  
Although mandate holders used their reports to provide neutral and facilitative 
advice to almost all states concerned, the manner in which the US was dealt with was 
somewhat different. For example, despite the mandate holder being required to ―make 
recommendations and, as appropriate, proposals in the sphere of technical 
assistance‖,275 the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty‘s report on the US at the 
Second Session did not include any constructive recommendations that could be 
applied to the US or to other countries. Instead, the Special Rapporteur‘s conclusions 
repeatedly emphasised the US position as ―the wealthiest country in the world‖ before 
noting various problems and criticising various practices without providing 
alternatives or solutions.
276
 Sengupta failed to fulfil a key element of his mandate,
277
  
and, as a result, a number of states, including Brazil, Cameroon, Philippines, and 
Senegal, asked the Special Rapporteur for concrete proposals, or a list of best 
practices, for states dealing with extreme poverty. That report and subsequent 
discussion can be contrasted with the useful and facilitative country report on Ecuador 
given by the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty at the Eleventh Session, 
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Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona.
278
 That report gave strong guidance and advice, in 
particular on the ―cash transfer programme‖ and the relationship between social 
spending, human rights and extreme poverty, which was useful for many other 
countries, especially states within the same region as Ecuador. Contrasting Sengupta 
and Carmona‘s reports raises questions about the competence of individual mandate 
holders, which the Council has no power in terms of selection. This is a key concern 
in terms of the Council‘s relationship with the Special Procedures system which, 
necessarily, must remain wholly independent of any UN body.  
It is interesting to note that Sengupta no longer held the mandate for Extreme 
Poverty at the Eleventh Session. However, he did give an annual report at the Fifth 
Session
279
 which can be contrasted, in terms of its utility and applicability, with his 
earlier country report on the US. Although an annual report is aimed at providing 
guidance and advice for many states and regions, the contrast between this and the US 
country report is stark enough to demonstrate the politicisation of that mandate in 
relation to the US country visit. The annual report dedicated separate chapters 
outlining neutral and constructive proposals for dealing with extreme poverty across 
Africa, Asia and even, to some extents, the European Union. The manner in which the 
US was dealt with in terms of extreme poverty was clearly politically motivated rather 
than being a constructive exercise in facilitating human rights.   
The inclusion of the US as the sole Western state, and sometimes even the sole 
country, in reports on various topics indicated that it was being disproportionately 
singled out. Its inclusion in reports alongside grave abusers indicated selectivity by 
mandate holders. One might suspect that mandate holders assumed that they could 
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ensure support for their reports and recommendations by singling out and criticising 
the US. This was apparent from the response to the Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty from countries such as China, Cuba, Ecuador, Indonesia, Morocco, and Saudi 
Arabia. All of these countries, as well as other states who had tense relations with the 
US, congratulated the Special Rapporteur for focusing on the US, although their 
reasons for doing so were not always apparent.   
 Some mandate holders argued that the US was widely reported on in order to 
uphold the principles of impartiality and non-bias, thus ensuring that all states be 
subjected to scrutiny rather than focusing solely on poor or developing nations.
280
 For 
example, Sengupta expressed this position by saying,  
 
―The reason that I chose the United States is not because I do not think that 
developing countries have no problems. I wanted to point out that it is not a 
problem of per capita income, but a problem of society, so I chose the richest 
country in the world. I wanted to focus on basic problems of people in US 
with the intention to show that human rights are a basic issue of empowerment 
and dignity, which is not accepted by all the countries‖.281  
 
Despite that and other similar explanations, it is clear that the US was being used as 
an example in reports on such human rights issues where, arguably, to better fulfil the 
Council‘s mandate, time should have been spent discussing and dealing with grave 
situations in other countries. The failure of many member states to question, and 
indeed the decision by some to laud, the mandate holder for choosing to visit the US 
suggests that political agendas, rather than the body‘s mandate, were at the fore.  
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The US was prepared to accept some of the sharper focus that its standing in 
the world entailed. However, as will be shown, it is clear from the US response to 
mandate holders on human rights issues relating to counter-terrorism that it viewed 
the attention on these issues as grossly disproportionate and lacking in even-
handedness. The US regarded states and mandate holders focusing on its human rights 
record as seeking to exert influence and gain power. However, despite that 
disproportionate attention, there were instances where, as will be explored, focus on 
the US was required to fulfil the Council‘s protection mandate.   
Mandate holders discussed the US in relation to issues of counter-terrorism, 
torture, enforced disappearances and rights of detainees. The debates primarily 
focused on Guantanamo Bay and the US tactics employed in the ―war on terror‖. 
Despite its support for many Council mandates, one notable exception that the US 
disagreed with was the Special Rapporteur on Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin.
282
 Scheinin was mandated to 
―gather, request, receive and exchange information and communications from and 
with all relevant sources, including Governments, the individuals concerned, their 
families, their representatives and their organizations . . . on alleged violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism‖.283 The mandate 
holder was required to make recommendations,
284
 identify and promote best 
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practices,
285
 and to work with other relevant mandate holders and UN bodies
286
 to 
ensure the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism.   
At the Second Session, Scheinin signalled his intention to look at various state 
and institutional trends in this area, in order to set out best practices regarding issues 
such as racial profiling, secret detentions and extraordinary renditions. Despite having 
omitted specific mention of the US in his report, Scheinin was nonetheless criticised 
by that country. The US questioned ―whether certain areas of the Special 
Rapporteur‘s work are sufficiently necessary and effective‖.287  The US, which 
regularly queried the mandate‘s necessity, has frequently asserted that counter-
terrorism is exclusively a matter of domestic concern. At the Second Session, 
Scheinin accused unspecified countries of abusing the notion of terrorism, although he 
clearly alluded to the US and its allies in the ―war on terror‖.288 He spoke of a ―trend 
of states to stigmatise movements and ethnic groups they simply do not like and fight 
against terrorism while not defining the term ‗terrorism‘‖.289 That, and similar, 
comments were arguably understood to be aimed at states including the US and UK, 
as well as countries such as Russia. The US rejected Scheinin‘s calls for research 
aimed at developing a single definition of terrorism, stressing that there had already 
been ―thousands‖ of such debates, and questioning the utility of such an exercise.290 
While the UN had discussed this issue on a number of recent occasions, this 
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intervention missed the point of the mandate itself. The Special Rapporteur was 
concerned with defining terrorism in order to combat human rights violations as 
opposed to the ongoing debates as to whether terrorism should be defined as an act of 
war. The US obtuseness in this regard was arguably motivated by its sensitivity to 
having any of its anti-terrorism tactics scrutinised by the mandate holder or indeed the 
Council. This hostility arguably resulted from the US insistence that counter-terrorism 
solely fell within national jurisdiction and therefore should not be defined by an 
international body.  
The Special Rapporteur not only discussed the US in his reports
291
 but also 
undertook a country visit to that state during the Council‘s first year which was 
reported on at the Sixth Session. The mission‘s report repeatedly identified the US 
role as a world leader and its subsequent responsibility to protect and promote human 
rights while being at the fore of countering terrorism.
292
 That position reflects a more 
general approach that the US should be held to higher standards than other states. 
While an even-handed approach requires factors such as wealth, national human 
rights institutions, and capacity to be taken into account, ―world leadership‖ is not one 
of those criteria. However, mandate holders and, indeed, states, did use this factor as a 
justification for holding the US to proportionately greater scrutiny than any other 
country. 
Scheinin expressed grave concerns regarding detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
and other prisoners suspected of terrorism, as well as interrogation techniques, 
extraordinary renditions, and degrading treatment by the CIA. The US was 
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―disappointed by the report‖ due to its ―unfair and oversimplified criticisms‖293. For 
example, the report alleged that detainees were denied the right to a fair trial
294
 and 
criticising various administrative processes.  The US criticised the Special 
Rapporteur‘s the lack of acknowledgement of the complexity of the situation, 
especially with regard to his rejection of the status of detainees as ―unlawful enemy 
combatants‖.295 The US argued that the classification of the detainees was 
fundamental in terms of the rights they were afforded under international law. The 
Special Rapporteur‘s insistence that the detainees be treated as prisoners of war or as 
criminal suspects failed to address arguments raised by the US that a war was in fact 
occurring. The US alleged that selectivity and politicisation was apparent not only in 
what was reported, but also that the report was prefaced with remarks such as, ―the 
USA is a world leader, and has a responsibility to ensure respect for human rights and 
international humanitarian law‖.296 The US objected to its world position being used 
to justify disproportionate scrutiny when other states were committing similar, and 
worse, abuses, for example Russia‘s ongoing violations against Chechen separatists.  
Scheinin‘s mandate required him to investigate US human rights abuses while 
countering terrorism and, indeed, he explained throughout the reports and oral 
statements why he held that state to higher standards. He primarily focused on 
America‘s duty, as a world leader and powerful state, to set an example for other 
countries. Although these reasons do raise serious concerns about the criteria for 
proportionate scrutiny, other mandate holders have been less convincing, or even 
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silent, as to any reasons for excessively focusing on the US. The aforementioned 
stance that the US should be held to a higher standard than less-developed countries 
was explicitly or implicitly repeated in the reports of other mandate holders regarding 
issues relating to the ―war on terror‖. The position was especially apparent in reports 
where the US was the sole Western state raised alongside countries known to commit 
grave and systematic abuses. Whilst such remarks could be argued to be non-
controversial in terms of the standards that other Western nations were held to by 
mandate holders, the repeated focus on the US alone (aside from Israel), despite other 
countries such as the UK being accused of similar abuses, indicated a lack of even-
handedness in the way that the US was treated at the Council. The US desire not to 
have its human rights record scrutinised was arguably a factor in its response to 
various mandate holders‘ reports but, as will be demonstrated, the selectivity and bias 
apparent through disproportionate attention devoted to the US gave weight to its 
reaction.  
 The mandate on Enforced Disappearances also, perhaps dubiously, focused on 
the US.  The Working Group on Enforced Disappearances
297
 was the Commission‘s 
first thematic mandate, and was created as a result of Argentina‘s resistance to having 
a country-specific mandate to deal with the human rights violations occurring as a 
result of enforced disappearances within that state. Throughout the history of that 
thematic mandate, the focus has largely been on Central and South America
298
 and no 
country visits have been undertaken to Western states.  
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The report at the Second Session on enforced disappearances
299
 discussed 
countries such as Guinea, Burundi, and Colombia, before identifying the US as being 
one of the four main countries of concern regarding its ―anti-terrorist activities 
[which] are used as an excuse for not applying international obligations‖.300 
Extraordinary rendition is essentially an issue of torture. The inclusion of 
extraordinary rendition within the report on ―enforced disappearances‖ seemed 
somewhat tenuous as that mandate has always focused on national political 
disappearances rather than transnational renditions, torture or terrorism. The Human 
Rights Committee, in contrast, criticised the US practice of secret detention,
301
 but in 
no way linked this to an issue of enforced disappearances. The Working Group‘s 
report was discussed during the Council‘s first year when it simultaneously was 
reviewing all Special Procedures mandates. Inclusion of the US in this report was 
arguably a ploy to attract attention and support for the mandate from US detractors at 
the Council. US inclusion in that report was perhaps selective and bias for what 
appears to be political reasons.  
The Working Group gave constructive and neutral advice to countries that had 
been visited, including Sri Lanka and Colombia, but solely criticised the US rather 
than providing any other comments. Although that discrepancy alone does not 
necessarily imply selectivity, it does demonstrate that, once again, the US was treated 
differently to other states. During the subsequent discussion, a number of countries 
requested further advice, such as a list of best practices, from the Working Groups on 
issues as disparate as enforced disappearances of political opponents or hostage-
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taking by non-state actors.
302
 Other than the US response, no other states discussed 
extraordinary rendition during the debate, arguably due to its anomalous and unrelated 
inclusion within this report. The US expressed respect for its international obligations. 
It recognised ―that the international community has not always agreed with US 
position‖ but that, with respect to extraordinary rendition ―to bring suspects to other 
countries is not inherently unlawful‖.303 However, its comments during subsequent 
discussions on domestic human rights issues, at this and other sessions, indicated a 
waning patience with being singled out for criticism, whilst known abusers and 
critical situations were seemingly ignored by mandate holders and the Council itself.  
Mandate holders continued to identify the US alongside states known as 
human rights abusers during general reports on issues pertaining to the treatment of 
detainees. The US response not only disagreed with assertions made in some 
reports,
304
 but further accused some of misrepresenting facts.
305
 Further struggles 
occurred between the US and the Council-appointed mandate holders. For example, 
the US criticised the independent experts that made up the Working Group on the 
Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay
306
 for not accepting its open invitation to 
visit Guantanamo Bay which subsequently led to their report being based on ―second 
and third hand information‖.307 The five mandate holders determined that they could 
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better discharge their functions regarding human rights violations and Guantanamo 
Bay through submitting a single joint report rather than five separate ones.
308
 
However, it was the joint venture that, ultimately, resulted in none of the mandate 
holders visiting that facility. 
The mandate holders had originally accepted the US invitation for only three 
of the five experts to visit Guantanamo Bay as well as other terms set out by the 
US.
309
 Ultimately, a crucial reason that the Working Group decided to refuse the 
invitation was due to the US indicating that they would not be granted private 
interviews with detainees. The US issued a letter on 28 October 2005 inviting three of 
the five mandate holders to visit Guantanamo Bay. However, the US stipulated that 
the mandate holders would not be able to conduct private interviews with detainees, 
citing national security reasons. In their response, dated 31 October 2005, the mandate 
holders accepted the invitation, stating that the visit would take place on 6 December 
2005. However, the mandate holders asserted that excluding private interviews with 
contravened the ability to undertake a fact-finding mission, and impeded an objective 
and fair assessment Guantánamo Bay. The US failed to overturn that exclusion, and 
therefore, on 18 November 2005, the mandate holders canceled the visit.‖310 
In particular, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, refused to 
accept the invitation to Guantanamo without assurances that he would be allowed to 
talk to detainees in private. That position reflects the mandate holder‘s approach to 
country visits, and indeed was consistent with his later cancellation of a visit to Russia 
for the same reason,
311
 and his agreement to visit China only after the authorities 
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accepted this condition. The US expectation, framed in exceptionalist terms, that it be 
afforded different treatment than other states by the mandate holder demonstrated its 
continued exceptionalism regarding domestic human rights matters.  
The Working Group‘s report detailed and explained the problems set out 
above. However, the Working Group‘s oral statement to the Council asserted that a 
main reason why they had declined the invitation to visit Guantanamo Bay was the 
extension of it to only part of the group, as well as refusal to grant unhindered access 
to detainees, and a lack of standard terms for the visit.
312
 These oral assertions were 
inconsistent with the written report which acknowledged the Working Group‘s initial 
acceptance of that invitation despite the restrictions set out by the US.
313
 Indeed, the 
oral statement was more critical of the US than the written report had been, including 
by discussing issues that had not previously been raised. The Working Group‘s 
inconsistency indicates that the mandate holders were influenced, to some extent, by 
the political atmosphere within the body where many states adopted, or were allied 
with those who had, an anti-US position.  
The Working Group orally stated that they regretted that there was ―no point‖ 
in visiting Guantanamo Bay
314
 despite recognising, throughout the written report, the 
limitations that this placed on the information gathered and recommendations made. 
The US response, both orally and in a letter annexed to the report,
315
 highlighted the 
flawed nature of the report owing to the failure to visit Guantanamo Bay and the 
―flawed‖ premise that the US was not engaged in an international war. It set out the 
―need to work together to move forward‖ and its ―regret [regarding] the approach 
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taken [by the Working Group] that they did not accept our invitation‖316 but failed to 
accept any of the recommendations given by the Working Group.  
US intransigence towards mandate holders‘ recommendations was 
undoubtedly influenced by statements made by known human rights abusers during 
subsequent discussions on mandate holders‘ reports. During the discussion on the 
Working Group on the Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the US argued that 
accusations in the report of US breaches of international law and violations of human 
rights were unfounded and incorrect. These comments were followed by members 
such as China, Cuba, and Venezuela, as well as observers such as Iran and North 
Korea, supporting the assertions made in the report as well as criticising the US. The 
US was distressed by what it deemed as known abusers of human rights taking 
strident positions regarding the US treatment of detainees, despite the lack of first 
hand evidence available in the report. The US ignored the fact that a wealth of 
information on abuses in, for example, Guantanamo Bay and Abu Graib, had been 
published by NGOs, the media, and other human rights actors. While Council 
members should, perhaps, have confined discussions to the report and its findings, the 
reality was that US abuses while countering terrorism was a highly contentious 
political issue on which many states had strong opinions. The US was held to higher 
standards than other states by other countries not only due to its global position, but 
also as a result of its ongoing human rights discourse on the one handand its 
simultaneous violations during its ―war on terror‖ on the other hand. However, the 
disproportionate reaction from other states, and the constant attack of the US in some 
countries‘ statements, reflected the general politicisation of the Council. Iran, for 
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example, accused the US of lying to the Council,
317
 while Venezuela asserted that the 
US was committing ―flagrant violations of human rights‖.318 
These positions were not echoed by Western states, most of whom were more 
concerned with asking questions of the Special Rapporteurs rather than making 
sweeping criticisms of the US. However, even Western States known as allies of the 
US joined in the discussions on these issues as there were clearly human rights 
violations that fell under the Council‘s protection mandate. Finland (on behalf of the 
EU) took the neutral approach that whilst they were ―committed to the fight against 
terrorism, human rights law has to be respected‖.319 Switzerland criticised renditions 
of detainees to countries where torture was not prohibited. It questioned the US 
employment of such tactics.
320
 Many Western states, particularly Western European 
ones, were highly critical, outside of the Council, of US abuses in the ―war on terror‖. 
The US approach that those violations were legitimate as part of an ongoing ―war‖ 
demonstrated its exceptionalism and unilateralism. US attempts to justify those 
violations struck at the heart of the universal rights enshrined at the UN. The US did 
not respond directly to Western interventions or questions on these issues, instead 
preferring to deal solely with comments by countries such as Iran and Venezuela 
which, by attacking rather than questioning the US, were easier to deal with.  
The US belief that it should not be held to disproportionately higher scrutiny 
arguably ignored the fact that the Council encouraged each state to strive constantly to 
improve its own human rights record. Therefore, countries such as Sweden were 
necessarily held to higher standards than, for example, Somalia, because each state 
was judged with reference to its available resources and abilities and not against a 
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common standard. This reflects a general UN approach, such as for example in 
Article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
321
 
The US world position and long-term stance on human rights resulted in it being 
expected, by other states and the body itself, to attain the highest possible standards of 
human rights. Arguably, owing to the negative effect of US violations on the 
fundamental notions of human rights, abuses by that country were regarded by other 
states as at least as serious as many violations in countries with limited capacity for 
human rights protection, authoritarian rulers or bad governance.    
Although this concept does not appear too controversial, the US was the sole 
Western state to constantly condemn the scrutiny necessitated by such a process.  The 
apparent US hypocrisy on human rights did, perhaps, contribute to its complaints and 
reluctance to discuss its domestic human rights record. Moreover, those complaints 
gave strength to those who argued that the US feared examination of its own record. 
However, the Council and its members placed the US under far more scrutiny than 
any other Western state aside from Israel, thus legitimising its complaints about 
selectivity and bias at the body. While US violations did require the body‘s attention 
under its mandate, the disproportionate scrutiny not only contravened the founding 
principles, but also resulted in other, often graver, abuses not being dealt with.  
 
The US International Human Rights Record The Council was frequently used by 
states wishing to attack the US regardless of whether a relevant discussion was 
occurring. Certain countries, such as Iran, had well-known political motivations.  The 
fact that such comments were allowed, without other states objecting nor the 
Chairperson intervening, despite their nature or their irrelevance to proceedings, was a 
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significant cause of the US withdrawal from the Council. Whilst these attacks may be 
partially explained by incidents occurring around the time they were made, the 
vehemence and regularity of interventions made by a range of states must have 
contributed to the US decision to withdraw. 
Unsurprisingly, given the long-standing poor relationship between those 
states, Cuba most often used the Council to criticise the US. Cuba‘s comments rarely 
related to topics under discussion at the body, and these assertions were supported 
only by Cuba‘s allies or states maintaining equally strained relations with the US.  
During a discussion on torture, for example, Cuba alleged, without drawing any link 
to issues of torture, and without evidence, that the CIA was training and developing 
terrorist groups to attack Latin American countries, and that it was involved in plots to 
kill the Cuban head of state.
322
 Venezuela, also out of context and without evidence, 
expressed similar allegations against the US, stressing that ―we denounce those that 
protect and foster terrorism, specifically our neighbour to the north - America‖.323 
These countries both have a history of bad relations with the US, and this was by no 
means the first time either country had attacked the US within UN bodies. Both 
countries have socialist governments with directly opposing political and economic 
views to the US. Targeting the US at the Council gave Cuba and Venezuela the 
opportunity to indirectly attack that state‘s political system. 
Again offering no evidence, Cuba accused the US of ―coordinating diplomatic 
campaigns… in the Human Rights Council‖, alleging that NGOs with accreditation to 
the body were under American control.
324
 Cuba further attacked the US through 
allegations that it was undermining the Council. For example, saying ―to those who 
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attack, namely the US, the Council, they must show humility. Those who make the 
Council fail will be criticised by history‖.325 Cuba‘s remarks during non-US related 
discussions included, for example, calling it the ―main sponsor of the brutal regime of 
[Israeli] occupation‖326 It also used similar tactics to allege that the UK was an 
American puppet, saying that its remarks on Cuba were ―prepared by Washington‖.327 
While such remarks were, presumably, afforded little weight by other countries at the 
Council, the constant repetition and vociferous nature of these comments made them 
difficult for anyone, the US included, to ignore.   
Syria supported Cuba‘s attacks on a number of occasions, and alleged that the 
country-specific mandate on Cuba was politically motivated due to the US position 
towards Cuba.
328
 Again, the alliance between these two countries in this regard is akin 
to the old adage that ―my enemy‘s enemy is my friend‖, itself a form of ―virtual‖ 
regionalism. Cuba accused the US of ongoing human rights violations against it, 
stating that ―the policy of hostility maintained by the USA has used coercive 
measures as a fundamental tool and has had a serious impact on Cuba. Humanitarian 
damage has occurred especially in areas of public health and education‖.329 DPRK 
(North Korea) also attacked the US during Council discussions.  It alleged that the US 
sought to ―destroy‖ its ―socialist system‖ through ―hostile policies‖ and ―conspiracies 
with the EU and Japan‖.330 DPRK accused the US of human rights abuses, asserting 
that ―it is a well-known fact that the US is the worst human rights violator in the 
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world‖,331 asking that a Special Rapporteur be ―placed in the US‖.332 The Palestinian 
delegate made similar comments, asserting that the US itself was a grave abuser of 
human rights, dubiously echoing Churchill, in exclaiming, ―Americans will always 
only do the right thing after they have exhausted all other alternatives‖.333 
Just as interesting were the approaches taken by allies of, or countries with a 
more neutral position towards, the US. The positions taken towards the US by such 
countries, especially those bordering on attacks or those which failed to apply the 
founding principles to discussions on the US, must have played a part in its decision 
to quit the Council. The US may have become used to being one of the few dissenting 
voices during Council debates, often joined only by Canada and at times Australia and 
New Zealand, while other Western states equivocated. However, being left isolated or 
even attacked by its allies, especially regarding such issues that they failed to criticise 
other known abusers about, could have been the final straw for the US in terms of its 
engagement at that time with the Council. 
The EU abstained from many votes on controversial issues, and often 
maintained a neutral position during related Council discussions. The EU‘s collective 
stance was arguably motivated by fear of upsetting dominant regional groups that 
targeted the US. However, its stance could also be viewed as resulting from fear of 
upsetting the US, or indeed those EU members which supported US actions, despite 
the critical opinions of the human rights abuses. Although the EU did, at times, 
criticise the US on topics where it may have been expected to ally itself with, or at 
least refrain from attacking, the US, it used non-confrontational tactics to do so. The 
EU‘s prevailing attitude towards the mandate ―Protection of Human Rights Whilst 
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Countering Terrorism‖ was critical of US tactics, such as extraordinary rendition and 
detention without trial. The EU did not attack the US per se, but rather used 
discussions with Special Rapporteurs, or other related debates, to highlight its 
concerns in this regard. The EU‘s collective stance during such debates at the Council 
was rather ironic considering the role of some of its members, including the UK, in 
the counter-terrorism tactics being discussed.  
The EU‘s interventions were typically placid, which neutralised its obvious 
disagreement with certain US practices.  For example, the EU emphasised that ―the 
US should refrain from bringing [detainees] to other countries‖, before suggesting that 
international tribunals be used in order to ensure such detainees‘ rights.334  The 
collective position negotiated amongst EU members would have taken into account 
opinions of all member states. There were EU members who supported the US tactics, 
or indeed engaged with them. Other states were, however, highly critical of violations 
that eroded the core of Western notions and aims of human rights. Some EU states 
were, therefore, restrained in their criticisms of the US during Council sessions due to 
the need to maintain the bloc‘s collective position. 
Switzerland was critical of the US, especially in terms of its ―war on terror‖, 
but followed the EU in the manner of its criticisms rather than attacking the US, as 
Cuba and others chose to do.
335
 Switzerland‘s comments were less reserved than those 
of EU countries, and it often asked posed pointed questions to mandate holders and 
experts that made clear its position towards the US international human rights record.  
Russia and China may both have a history of difficult relations with the US, 
but their interactions at the Council have remained friendlier than at other UN bodies. 
Whilst China was conspicuous in its failure to criticise the US, possibly due to its fear 
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of having its own human rights record scrutinised, Russia did, at times, condemn the 
US during discussions of certain issues. On one such occasion, Russia accused a US 
delegate of ―arrogance . . . in the way he talked about human rights situations‖, 
alleging that ―the US ignore the United Nations human rights mechanisms, and even 
stops financing them‖.336 The Russian attack on this occasion, which included 
references to Guantanamo Bay and extraordinary rendition despite that state‘s own 
poor record on torture, enforced disappearances and the like, suggested political 
motivations not least due to Russia‘s desire to maintain favourable relations with OIC 
members.  
In many ways, the Western states‘ criticisms or failures to insist on even-
handed treatment of the US probably impacted more upon the US decision to remove 
itself from the Council than other countries‘ comments. The US must have become 
used to venomous and vociferous attacks at UN bodies from countries such as Cuba 
and Iran. However, despite the belief by many within the US of an international 
culture of anti-Americanism extending even to Europe (McGoldrick, 2004:444), 
criticism from its allies, or at least those states it has good relations with, must have 
stung the US considerably. Moreover, those states noticeably failed to call for 
proportionate treatment of the US during Council discussions. Whether these 
positions struck a raw nerve in terms of its own human rights record, or whether the 
US was merely reacting to selectivity and bias against it, such interventions 
presumably played a large role in its decision to withdraw from the body.  
In order to understand why these comments may have encouraged the US to 
disengage from the Council due to alienation rather than fear of scrutiny, the 
regularity and nature of these attacks must be examined. One example of a 
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particularly venomous attack on the US occurred at the Fourth Session in response to 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights‘ report. Iran, during its right to reply, 
launched into the following diatribe,  
 
―Iran wants to draw the Council‘s attention to the most phenomenal irony of 
our era. The United States has been condemned as the most notorious violator 
of human rights by peoples of the world.  The occupation and unilateral 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was an unlawful and illegitimate invasion and has not 
only led to the violation and killing of innocent people. The United States is 
not referring to the very bitter cases of the rape of innocent women . . . . The 
American action had led to violations of the right to life, killings, it has caused 
misery and destruction . . . referring to raping Iraqi girls and killing of their 
family. The invasion is an arrogant adventure . . . the United Nations is now 
not as credible any more . . . . The barbaric treatment of prisoners in 
Guantanamo, which is by human rights criteria perfectly beyond 
description . . . in Prisons in Iraq the United States resorts to the same 
approach, although it has failed. The situation in Iraq shocks the world. It has 
not tried to remedy the victims . . . the operation transferring prisoners to force 
them to confess under pressure and torture has the most ridiculous justification 
as a ‗war on terror‘.‖337 
 
That excerpt, alongside the fact that it was not controversial at the Council for such 
comments to be made, emphasise the anti-US sentiment that had become 
commonplace during the Council‘s first two years. The strength of feeling against the 
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US may have reflected the general mood at the UN, but only served to isolate and 
ostracise it at the HRC.  
  
 
 
 
 
7.6 US Election to the Council 
US withdrawal underscored its frustration with the Council‘s repetition of its 
predecessor‘s selectivity, bias and politicisation. The election of President Obama 
inspired hope that the change in the US administration would bring a new attitude to 
the Council.  Eric Sottas, Director of the International Organisation against Torture, 
argued that the withdrawal was actually a political gesture. He said that  
 
―[the US] has always clearly shown its opposition to the Council. This is a 
slightly more public way of putting pressure on it in order to raise the stakes. 
[…] [I]t reminds me of the time when the Nixon administration, which backed 
Pinochet in Chile, chastised the UN for criticising the Chilean dictator. But 
when Carter was elected in 1977, the American government took the floor at 
the Human Rights Commission to ask forgiveness. After a presidency like that 
of Bush, you can expect some important changes in US policy on human 
rights‖ (Doole, 2008).  
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This opinion was reinforced by the US election to the Council in May 2009, which the 
State Department spoke of as being ―in keeping with the Obama Administration‘s 
‗new era of engagement‘ with other nations‖.338 
After the Presidential elections, a bipartisan group of over 30 senior foreign 
policy figures called for President-elect Barack Obama to strengthen relations with 
the United Nations,
339
 specifically urging Washington to re-engage and indeed to 
become a member of the Human Rights Council. One article reported on this 
statement:  
 
―The statement urges Washington to join the Geneva-based HRC, an agency 
that has been singled out for scorn by Bolton and other hawks in and outside 
the Bush administration, since it replaced the U.N. Human Rights Commission 
in 2006 due to the presence there of governments accused of serious human 
rights abuses. Like its western allies, the statement said Washington should 
‗work to influence [the HRC] from within.‘  
‗The HRC has drawn a tremendous amount of fire, and the fact that you‘ve got 
all these people coming together and saying that the best way to effect change 
in the institution is to have a seat at the table is very powerful,‘ said PSA 
director Matthew Rojansky, who helped draft the statement.‖ (Lobe, 2008)  
 
Another article stated that although ―the Bush administration has distanced itself from 
the U.N. Human Rights Council . . . the experts suggested the United States should 
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now actively seek a seat on the ―faltering‖ council and work to influence the body 
from within‖ (Pleming, 2008). During the Presidential campaign, Obama‘s views 
were mixed,  
 
―With new leadership in Washington committed to human rights standards in 
deed as well as in word, the United States will again have the moral authority 
to lead the world on human rights issues. The United States should seek to 
reform the UN Human Rights Council and help set it right. If the Council is to 
be made effective and credible, governments must make it such. We need our 
voice to be heard loud and clear to shine a light on the world‘s most repressive 
regimes, end the unfair obsession with Israel, and improve human rights 
policies around the globe.‖340 
 
However, the President has also criticised the Council, not least for passing ―eight 
resolutions condemning Israel, a democracy with higher standards of human rights 
than its accusers‖ (Rovenger, 2008). He further asserted that the body ―only with 
difficulty adopted resolutions pressing Sudan and Myanmar . . .  [and] has dropped 
investigations into Belarus and Cuba for political reasons, and its method of reporting 
on human rights allows the Council‘s members to shield themselves from scrutiny‖ 
(Rovenger, 2008).  Appointment of Hilary Clinton as Secretary of State demonstrated 
the new administration‘s desire for re-engagement with the Council. Some 
commentators pointed to Clinton‘s support for the UN, usually reserving her 
criticisms for individual member states, saying that she made clear her disapproval of 
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the ―Bush administration‘s policy of ‗standing aside and not fully engaging‘‖ (Avery, 
2008) with the Council. Clinton has expressed strong opinions regarding the US 
standing for election to the Council, saying, 
 
―Human rights are an essential element of American global foreign policy 
 . . . . With others, we will engage in the work of improving the UN human 
rights system to advance the vision of the UN Declaration of Human Rights.  
The United States helped to found the United Nations and retains a vital stake 
in advancing that organization‘s genuine commitment to the human rights 
values that we share with other member nations.  We believe every nation 
must live by and help shape global rules that ensure people enjoy the right to 
live freely and participate fully in their societies.‖341 
 
US unilateralism under the George W. Bush administration was of such a level 
that observers find it difficult to imagine any way but up for the US relationship with 
the UN (Weiss, 2008:129). Indeed, such a shift is deemed necessary by some for the 
UN‘s success (Weiss, 2008:131). However, despite the change in administration and 
thus the change in policy towards the Human Rights Council, the US decision to work 
towards such change from the inside did not negate its positions regarding the 
Council‘s flaws and weaknesses. The impact of its withdrawal on the Council‘s 
credibility was significant, and parallels can and will be drawn with the demise of the 
body‘s predecessor. US disengagement only served to strengthen the arguments of the 
body‘s critics that the Council failed to adequately fulfil its mandate and to overcome 
the politicisation and selectivity that had plagued the Commission.  
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7.7 Summary 
The US never fully supported the creation of the Human Rights Council. It argued 
that neither the body‘s form nor Resolution 60/251 were sufficiently radical to 
effectively protect and promote human rights. Despite not standing for membership, 
the US participated in the first seven sessions as a permanent observer, expressing 
views on almost all issues raised during discussions and debates. The US arguably 
played as important a role as member states in the shaping of the new body. Its 
opinions and interventions were often more extensive than many Council members, 
although the US did not have the power to vote at the body.  
The US relationship with the Council demonstrates that, from the outset, 
problems arose in relation to the body‘s fulfilment of its mandate and adherence to its 
founding principles. Those problems did not only occur in relation to the Council‘s 
treatment of the US, but were also highlighted and emphasised by that state in relation 
to the body‘s general work and proceedings. Exploring US involvement with, and 
disengagement from, the Council has enabled a more general assessment of the 
Council‘s formative years, particularly whether, and to what extent, the Council 
fulfilled its mandate, adhered to its founding principles, and overcome the 
politicisation that beset its predecessor. I shall explore the conclusions that have been 
drawn under three broad assessment criteria. 
 
7.7.1 Mandate   
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.260 
 
GA Resolution 60/251 mandates the Council, under Paragraph 3, to ―address 
situations of human rights violations‖. The US itself, and its own human rights record, 
became the focus of various Council discussions and of individual states‘ comments 
during debates. The US cannot boast a flawless human rights record. During the two 
years of the Council‘s existence before its withdrawal, the US committed serious 
abuses both domestically and internationally. For example, the Human Rights 
Committee
342
 highlighted the following categories of serious human rights abuses by 
the US during 2006: renditions and secret detentions,
343
 torture and other abuses
344
 
particularly at Guantanamo Bay,
345
 widespread and systematic racial 
discrimination,
346
 torture and ill-treatment in jails and police custody,
347
 ill-treatment 
of female prisoners,
348
 and the disproportionate use of the death penalty on ethnic 
minorities and low-income groups.
349
 These, and other, issues of serious concern were 
justifiably looked into by national and international human rights institutions, as well 
as NGOs.
350
  The US accepted such attention, despite the scrutiny and criticisms that 
it entailed.  The Council sought to discharge its mandate through attempts to protect 
victims of various US human rights violations. In terms of violations committed 
during the ―war on terror‖, the Council justifiably sought to protect victims from US 
abuses.  
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The body fulfilled its roles and functions while seeking to discharge its 
protection mandate; for example enabling information-sharing, providing a forum for 
dialogue, and working with non-state actors. Paragraph 3 requires the Council to 
provide recommendations on situations requiring protection.  Despite discussing some 
recommendations within these debates, the Council did not provide formal 
recommendations on US violations. Kälin et al noted that recommendations should 
include advice, assistance, or encouragement, rather than simply condemning 
violations.
351
 However, discussions on the US reflected the Commission‘s culture of 
naming, shaming and blaming, rather than seeking to provide constructive advice, 
support or dialogue.  
Discussions on protecting victims from US violations heard various 
allegations and comments from a range of states, groups and blocs. Comments made 
by countries with poor relations with the US had less impact than criticisms from 
Western states and other US allies despite the latter groups‘ comments being more 
constructive and less vociferous. The Western states‘ interventions condemning the 
US mainly focused on human rights violations occurring during the ―war on terror‖. 
The US failed to respond adequately to allegations and questions regarding 
extraordinary renditions, torture, arbitrary detention, and other tactics used in 
countering terrorism. The US frequently reacted defensively to any founded criticism 
of its human rights record, rarely addressing the concerns raised. However, the US 
position arguably resulted from it being regularly condemned by the body with little 
constructive guidance. 
The protection mandate was misused in two crucial ways. Firstly, a number of 
states used the guise of protecting human rights to attack the US, making unfounded 
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allegations of the commission of domestic and international human rights violations. I 
shall explore this further in relation to the body‘s adherence to its founding principles 
and the impact of politicisation on the Council. Secondly, disproportionate focus on 
protecting victims of US violations resulted in the body failing to fulfil its mandate to 
address other, graver situations. The Council‘s mandate to protect human rights 
requires, necessarily, a degree of proportionality and even-handedness in order to 
ensure that sufficient time and resources are devoted to the range of human rights 
abuses occurring across the world at any one time. Criticism of the US was justified 
by that state‘s human rights violations and the body‘s express mandate to protect 
human rights through discussions and actions aimed at ceasing ongoing abuses. 
However, the Council did go beyond its protection mandate by disproportionately 
scrutinising the US human rights record to the exclusion of other, graver, situations.  
Arguably, the US would have tolerated mildly disproportionate emphasis on 
its human rights record had the Council proceeded more strongly on other grave 
situations such as Darfur, Burma or Zimbabwe. Instead, the Council spent little time 
discussing situations such as these. The Council‘s failure to talk about, let alone take 
action against, repressive regimes that systematically violated human rights, such as 
Libya or Saudi Arabia, only emphasised the disproportionate focus on the US. The 
US withdrawal arguably was cemented when it seemed that the disproportionate focus 
on its human rights record, under the guise of human rights protection, would 
continue indefinitely.  
 
7.7.2 Founding Principles   
The US repeatedly called for adherence to the Council‘s founding principles, 
particularly of non-selectivity, impartiality and lack of bias. Those principles were 
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emphasised through Resolution 60/251, underscoring the central importance of such 
aims for the body to successfully fulfil it mandate and overcome its predecessor‘s 
failings. The US stressed the importance of these principles during all discussions, 
including debates about Council working methods, country-specific human rights 
situations, and individual rights and responsibilities. Its fears that the body would 
repeat the Commission‘s mistakes were reflected in its efforts to steer the Council 
away from such pitfalls.  
US displeasure with the Council for scrutinising its human rights record was 
particularly apparent within discussions on thematic issues where the US had few 
problems. As an intergovernmental body consisting of member states representing all 
regions and most political systems, none other than the most orthodox functionalists 
could expect the Council to be wholly apolitical. However, that the founding 
principles had been all but ignored from the outset underscored the US position that 
the new body and its constituent document did not go far enough to ensure a more 
effective body than the Commission that it replaced. 
The US was not only highly critical of the Council‘s selective and partial 
treatment of its human rights record, also constantly raised the issue of the body‘s 
non-adherence to its founding principles in its treatment of Israel. Indeed, the 
Council‘s selectivity and bias were stronger in relation to Israel than any other state 
including the US. As already discussed, a main criticism of the Commission had been 
the amount of time and resources that were spent on Israel and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories to the detriment of other grave human rights situations. The US 
swiftly noted that throughout the Council‘s formative years, the body‘s discussions, 
mechanisms and work were being used for those same biased ends. Despite regular 
statements and assertions to that effect, the body ignored US calls for the founding 
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principles to be adhered to in relation to Israel, and certain states flagrantly violated 
these principles throughout all aspects of the body‘s work and proceedings.  
Had the Council fulfilled early expectations and followed its own idealistic 
principles, the US would not have faced the predicament that led to its withdrawal. 
The US might have tolerated closer scrutiny of its human rights record had the 
Council been even-handed in its approach towards other states and their national 
records, as this would have gone some way to fulfilling the body‘s stated aims.  
 
 
 
7.7.3 Politicisation   
The US relationship with the Council highlights the problems of politicisation that 
beset the body from its creation. Pursuit of national agendas by states began during 
discussions creating the Council. Indeed the US pursued its own objectives in trying 
to ensure that the Council was composed of liberal democracies, reflecting its own 
position on human rights issues. US attempts to wield power over the Council‘s 
creation was a typically realist attempt of that powerful state to promote its own 
national policies by seeking to exert influence over weaker countries during 
negotiations. Mirroring similar behaviour at other UN bodies in the 1970s, when the 
US realised its policies were not fully being advanced, it chose not to stand for 
election to the Council. 
Many Council members had anti-West, and in particular anti-US, national 
policies. As domestic politics play a large role in setting the agenda, proceedings 
would naturally feature disproportionate attention focused on the US and its allies. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the common interest between many Council members 
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was the desire to challenge US supremacy. That can be shown through the combined 
will of many different states with whom the US had poor relations, for example Cuba 
and Venezuela joining forces with Syria, Iran and DPRK, resulting in targeting of the 
US. Those common agendas served to create a politicised atmosphere within the 
Council which, perhaps, affected the work of the independent mandate holders. 
The Council‘s targeting of the US, whilst couched in human rights language, 
can be viewed as an indicator of international relations at that time. Archer (1983:85-
86) comments that even functionalist bodies are riddled with political disputes that 
often have little, if anything, to do with their work. Council membership included a 
large number of countries particularly concerned with US foreign policy, especially in 
regard to the ―war on terror‖, and ongoing situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many 
Council members belonged to the OIC, a group of Islamic countries which held a 
particular interest in the ongoing tensions between America and many parts of the 
Middle East. The significant politicisation of the Council in these, and other, regards 
played a considerable role in the US decision to withdraw.  
Power politics dominated Council discussions on the US, with weaker states 
seeking to exert influence over the US through alliances with other members and 
regional groups. Long-standing US enemies such as Cuba allied themselves with 
newly powerful blocs, such as the OIC, which held their own cross to bear against 
America. Regionalism played a large role with groups of states exerting collective 
strength that exceeded the sum of its parts in the ongoing power struggles at the 
Council. Typical US allies, especially EU states, often abstained from contentious 
proceedings and votes, either because of displeasure about US violations or due to 
fear of reprisals from the powerful groups. Those abstentions enabled the Council to 
continue its lack of even-handedness regarding the US. The Council‘s proceedings 
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and work over its early years demonstrates the primary importance of interstate power 
struggles. 
Alliances between states pursuing national agendas were a cause of the 
politicisation that plagued the Commission during its final years. Most of these states 
were non-democratic countries with poor national human rights records. US 
displeasure with the Council‘s membership rules displayed fears that, with 
membership open to such countries, the body would become as politicised as its 
predecessor. Indeed, many such states were elected to the new body. During 
formative years the Council proved to be biased and selective, with members blocking 
meaningful debate about grave situations due to regional alliances, as well as failing 
to adequately deal with many of the issues brought to its attention. Furthermore, there 
were human rights situations that not only dominated the Council‘s discussions but 
were focused on to the detriment of worse abuses elsewhere.  
Schoenbaum (2006:283) argues that US human rights violations are held to 
higher scrutiny than worse abuses in other states because of US power, wealth and 
influence, and because the US sets standards for other nations. Whilst it is, at times, 
necessary to scrutinise some countries more than others, especially where a crisis or 
ongoing human rights situation occurs, the disproportionate focus given by the 
Council to certain states such as the US was due to political rather than humanitarian 
motivations. Moreover, whilst it may be acceptable to hold different nations to 
different standards in view of their respective levels of available resources, the 
Council again used political motivations as the basis for deciding those standards.  
Double standards, apparent at the Council from the outset, served to reiterate the 
position that the UN ―singles out Western and pro-Western states for obloquy, while 
winking at far worse excesses committed by socialist and Third World nations.‖ 
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(Franck, 1984:811)  Unlike bodies such as the Human Rights Committee or 
organisations such as Amnesty International, the Council‘s credibility as an impartial 
body was severely lacking. 
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Chapter 8 – The Council‟s Inaction on Darfur 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter explores the impact of politicisation in the Council within an ongoing, 
country-specific situation. In particular, it examines problems arising as a result of 
regionalism. Regionalism occurs at the UN where a group of interdependent states 
form a subgroup within that universal organisation (Kaiser, 1968:86). Allied countries 
use group tactics in the pursuit of common agendas, to protect individual members, or 
to further national policies of individual states. The Commission was criticised for 
regional groups blocking action on gross and systemic human rights violations. 
Regionalism at the Commission resulted in various problems that significantly 
contributed to its demise. The Commission‘s failure to take action against states such 
as Zimbabwe and Libya, or its weakened stance against known abusers such as China, 
were at the heart of criticisms levelled at that body (e.g. Rahmani-Ocora, 2006:15-20; 
Wheeler, 1999:75-76; Harris, 2006).   
Specific reforms were proposed directly aiming to combat regionalism at the 
Council. One example was Kofi Annan‘s recommendation that there be 18 Council 
members as opposed to the Commission‘s 53.352 That proposal would have resulted in 
no regional groups having sufficient members at the Council to be able to affect 
proceedings through group tactics. Kälin and Jimenez (2003:6-7) assert that such a 
proposal, had it been implemented, would have enabled the Council to work more 
efficiently. Despite various reform proposals aimed at combating regionalism, few 
were taken up at the Council‘s creation, leaving the body open to regional tactics 
similar to those that had dominated the Commission.  
                                                 
352 Supra n.1 para.183 
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The human rights situation in Darfur has been brought to the attention of the 
Council at each of its regular sessions. By 2009, the conflict in Darfur, which began in 
2003, had displaced up to 3 million people and caused up to 300,000 people to die 
from the combined effects of war, famine and disease. Sudan is only party to five
353
 
of the ten core human rights treaties whose implementation is monitored by UN 
treaty-bodies.
354
 Three of those five treaty-based committees which had jurisdiction to 
do so, reported on Sudan during the conflict: the Committee for the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination,
355
 the Human Rights Committee
356
 and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child.
357
  Reference to the Committee reports will be compared with the 
Council‘s discussions. This will provide a benchmark for assessing the HRC as well 
as, more broadly, for exploring the relationship between the Council and other UN 
human rights bodies.  
The three Committees that reported on Sudan are each concerned with a limited 
set of rights, although the Committees tend to construe their mandates broadly. As 
such, I shall also refer to Amnesty International‘s reports which provide coverage of a 
broader range of human rights that the Committees. Amnesty International reports on 
a wide range of human rights concerns across the world, aiming at an even-handed 
and proportionate approach (cf. Heinze & Freedman, 2010:497-498). As with the 
Committees at the UN, Amnesty International provides perhaps the most accurate, 
unified human rights sources from within the NGO community. Amnesty 
                                                 
353 CCPR; CESCR; CERD; CRC; and CED. 
354 CCPR; CESCR; CERD; CEDAW; CAT; SPT; CRC; CMW; CRPD; and CED. 
355 CERD, ‗Situation in Darfur: Sudan‘. 18 August 2004, UN Doc. CERD/C/65/Dec.1.  
356 UN Human Rights Committee, ‗Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: The Sudan‘, 29 
August 2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3 
357 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child ‗Concluding Observations, Sudan‘, 21 June 2007, UN Doc. 
CRC/C/OPSC/SDN/CO/1 
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International‘s report from the year of the Council‘s creation will be used to give an 
overview of the human rights situation in Darfur in 2006. 
 
―A Darfur Peace Agreement negotiated in Abuja, Nigeria, was signed in May 
by the government and one faction of the opposition armed groups in Darfur, 
but conflict, displacement and killings increased. The government failed to 
disarm the armed militias known as the Janjawid, who continued to attack 
civilians in Darfur and launched cross-border raids into Chad. Hundreds of 
civilians were killed in Darfur and Chad, and some 300,000 more were 
displaced during the year, many of them repeatedly. Displaced people in Darfur 
and Darfuri refugees in Chad were unable to return to their villages because of 
the lack of security. In August government forces launched a major offensive in 
North Darfur and Jebel Marra, which was accompanied by Janjawid raids on 
villages and continued at the end of 2006. The air force frequently bombed 
civilians. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was unable to stop 
killings, rapes and displacement of civilians or looting. Government security 
services arbitrarily detained suspected opponents incommunicado and for 
prolonged periods. Torture was widespread and in some areas, including Darfur, 
systematic. Human rights defenders and foreign humanitarian organizations 
were harassed. Freedom of expression was curtailed. The authorities forcibly 
evicted displaced people in poor areas of Khartoum and people in the Hamdab 
area where a dam was being built. Armed opposition groups also carried out 
human rights abuses.‖ (Amnesty International, 2007:242-243) 
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Those, and other grave, violations continued throughout the Council‘s formative 
years. Sudan‘s government claimed to cooperate with international organisations and 
peacekeeping efforts, however UN bodies, independent experts, and NGOs constantly 
documented the government‘s collusion, and indeed active participation, in gross and 
systemic human rights violations within Darfur. 
 In 2005 the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed Sima Samar
358
 as 
Special Rapporteur on Sudan.
359
  Samar has reported on the situation to the Council 
since its creation.  Despite her efforts, and those of individual states during various 
debates, no progress has been made. NGOs with a broad range of mandates – 
including such politically diverse groups as Human Rights Watch (2008), Nord-Sud 
XXI,
360
 and UN Watch
361
 - documented the gross and systemic violations perpetrated 
by all parties to the conflict.  The Council regularly discussed Darfur and did pass 
resolutions which called, albeit weakly, for action from the Sudanese government, 
other parties to the conflict, the African Union, and UN organs. Qualified experts 
insisted that the Council‘s resolutions and recommendations be implemented, and yet 
action rarely materialised.  Despite calling on other actors to protect and promote 
human rights, the Council itself failed to take steps to fulfil its own mandate. The 
Council only provided broad, general recommendations, owing in no small part to the 
African Group and OIC insistence that Sudan‘s government not be singled out for 
scrutiny or criticism. Moreover, the body frequently did not follow-up on the 
                                                 
358 Dr Sima Samar (Afghanistan) is a medical doctor, former Deputy President and Minister for Women's Affairs 
under Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan‘s interim government, and currently serves as Chairperson of the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission.  
359 UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/82 (2005). This mandate was subsequently extended by the Council, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/6/34 (2007). 
360 Nord-Sud XXI, ‗Darfur‘, http://nordsud21.ch/Darfour.htm (last visited 2 August 2011). 
361 UN Watch, ‗UN Watch Action on Darfur‘, http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.2607541/ 
k.5D6E/UN_Watch_Action_on_Darfur/apps/nl/newsletter3.asp  (last visited 2 August 2011). 
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implementation of its recommendations, and the facts on the ground showed little 
improvement.  
 The Council‘s inaction on Darfur exemplifies the impact of regionalism. Sudan 
had many allies at the Council owing to its membership of both the African Group 
and the OIC. As such, Sudan was largely shielded from scrutiny or was protected by 
its allies from criticism about the situation in Darfur. The Council‘s inaction similarly 
resulted from regional alliances dominating proceedings whenever that situation was 
raised (e.g. Scannella & Splinter, 2007:61-62).  
 
 
8.1 Background Positions within the Political and Regional Alliances 
Regionalism occurs where states form alliances based on common characteristics. 
Russett (1967:2) identifies geographic proximity, social homogeneity, and political or 
economic interdependence, as being some of the main characteristics of regional 
alliances. The UN, as a universal organisation, is divided into various subgroups 
based on regional alliances. Some states belong to more than one alliance, where they 
share characteristics with more than one group. Harris (2006) comments that the 
Commission‘s main regional groups reflected Cold War divisions between Western 
states pushing for liberal democratic rights, and Communist countries alongside 
developing nations, which promoted collective and social rights. Many developing 
states allied themselves with Communist positions, adopting a post-Marxist discourse 
on the use of human rights as a neo-colonial tool of oppression. They claimed that 
former-colonial countries sought to undermine developing states through demands for 
human rights implementation despite those countries lacking national capabilities for 
such compliance. That discourse insists that ex-colonial states have a duty to assist 
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decolonised countries with capacity-building. Weiss (2008:49) argues that the main 
division is now between the North and South, terms he uses to differentiate between 
developing and developed nations. 
At the Human Rights Council, regional groups have dominated discussions on 
specific situations such as the situation in Darfur.  The alliances are used, either 
expressly or tacitly, to coerce states from other regional groups into action or silence, 
undermining the Council‘s ability to intervene. Power politics enters the arena 
through use of collective strength to determine whether the Council takes action 
regarding a human rights situation. 
The alliances‘ members followed different patterns during discussions on 
Sudan. Individual states from the OIC, Arab Group and African Group tended to 
make statements, even where they all-but echoed that made by the Group‘s chair. Use 
of large numbers of similar statements emphasised both the strength as well as the 
political aims of those groups. The other main regional groups – the Asian Group, the 
Western European and Others Group, the Eastern European Group, and GRULAC - 
tended to allow their elected chair to speak on their behalf in discussions on Darfur 
unless there was something specific which the individual member wished to add. 
Therefore, many discussions lacked balance due to the large number of repetitive 
statements by members of the African Group and the OIC compared with other states 
and their alliances. There is no substantive gain to be made from such tactics beyond 
using the allocated Council time for that agenda item, thus preventing potential 
negative statements from countries not allied to those groups. This tactic could be 
blocked by creating a procedural rule preventing states from making pronouncements 
that substantially repeat points made by the regional group representative. Such 
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reform would allow the Council to spend more time on different discussions, whilst 
also preventing collective weight being exerted through repetition. 
  
8.1.1 The African Group as a Regional Group 
Sudan is a member of the African Group, satisfying all five of Russett‘s criteria for 
group membership. Although not a member of the Human Rights Council, Sudan was 
protected by its African Group allies. Representatives of the Group, followed by 
representatives of individual African states, generally supported the Sudanese 
government. They insisted that Sudan was doing everything possible to curb 
violations and to bring perpetrators to justice.  
The Group‘s repeated declarations of solidarity with Sudan was accompanied 
by calls for international assistance. Their refusal to ascribe any state responsibility to 
Sudan hindered the Council‘s ability to take action. Those positions mirrored China‘s 
position in 1997 that ex-colonial, Western states were duty-bound to assist promotion 
of human rights in developing nations rather than criticise violations.  
Not only did the African Group as a whole stand up for Sudan, but the vast 
majority of its individual members took similar positions during discussions and 
votes, even to the point of promoting obviously untenable positions. In March 2007, 
for example, during a discussion about the Council-mandated Mission to Sudan, 
which the government had blocked from entering the country, the Tunisian delegate 
stated, ―Sudan continues to express its readiness to cooperate with Council.‖362  
The African Group‘s reticence about allowing action against one of its members 
could have been simply shielding an allied state from Council action. However, there 
are realist arguments as to why Sudan was protected by the Group and its members. 
                                                 
362 Oral intervention of Tunisian delegate, 4th Session, 16 March 2007.   
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Many African Group members had poor human rights records. Blocking action 
against Sudan would represent a common interest of group members in ensuring that 
similar action was not taken regarding their own human rights situations. That theory 
is supported by the behaviour of African states with stronger democratic regimes, 
such as Botswana
363
 and Zambia,
364
 which often contradicted the group position and 
supported proposed action on Darfur. Other than those states directly harmed by the 
conflict,
365
 the only instances of African states breaking regional alliances were 
countries with more democratic regimes, although such instances were rare and 
unpredictable.  
 
8.1.2 The OIC as an Alliance 
Sudan, in addition to being an African Group member, also holds membership of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Sharing geographic proximity, religious ties, 
as well as others of Russett‘s criteria, that state was afforded protection by the most 
powerful group at the Council. The OIC is the largest alliance of states within the UN.  
                                                 
363 According to the Human Rights Committee, for example, ―The Committee notes with satisfaction the strong 
democratic culture of the State party as well as the establishing of universal basic education, and its considerable 
achievements in addressing the challenges posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.‖ ‗Concluding observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Botswana‘, 24 April 2008, UN Doc. CCPR/C/BWA/CO/1; According to the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, ―Botswana has a generally good human rights record, consistent with its reputation for 
democratic and constitutional governance.‖, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‗Country Profile: Botswana‘, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/botswana/  (last visited 2 August 
2011). 
364 According to the Human Rights Committee, for example, ―The Committee welcomes the establishment . . . of 
the Zambian Human Rights Commission, with the mandate to promote and protect human rights‖ ‗Concluding 
observations of the Human Rights Committee: Zambia‘, 23 July 2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ZMB/CO/3/CRP.1; 
According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ―Human rights are improving in Zambia. Although never 
particularly bad by regional standards, there were repressive policies associated with UNIP‘s one-party rule, and in 
response to alleged attempts to overthrow both UNIP and MMD governments. President Mwanawasa has notably 
commuted the death sentences given to the 1997 coup plotters and indicated his opposition to judicial execution.‖, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‗Country Profile: Zambia‘, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-
profiles/sub-saharan-africa/zambia (last visited 2 August 2011). 
365 Chadian delegate, 4th Special Session, 13 December 2006. 
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It calls itself ―the collective voice of the Muslim world‖.  All of its members are 
developing states or those from the global South. In 2006, 17 Council states were OIC 
members. Three of them, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan, respectively, chaired 
the regional groups for Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Schrijver (2007) had 
identified it as one of the newer groups holding considerable power at the 
Commission.  From the outset, the OIC was the dominant group at the Council. 
OIC members almost invariably aligned themselves with the African Group‘s 
opinion on Sudan. Abebe (2009:32-33), a delegate from Ethiopia, commented that the 
African Group and the OIC formed a ―natural alliance‖ based on agreement on 
several major Council issues. Both groups were comprised of developing states, many  
from the South, and institutionalists might point to their various common interests as a 
leading factor for that alliance.  
Peggy Hicks, Global Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch commented, 
―The OIC‘s mantra has been that the council should work cooperatively with abusive 
governments rather than condemn them. Since states tend to fear the airing of their 
own dirty laundry, many have bought into this argument.‖ (Hicks, 2006)  The OIC‘s 
shielding of an allied state, alongside group members‘ desire to protect their own 
actions from scrutiny, bears a marked resemblance to the reasons for the African 
Group‘s position. The OIC‘s dominance allowed it to employ stronger tactics than the 
African Group in protecting Sudan. When Sudan was brought to the Council‘s 
attention, the OIC, like the African Group, emphasised its collective position by using 
large numbers of similar statements by individual states.  
The impact of this alliance was especially apparent in the juxtaposition between 
Asian states belonging to the OIC, which therefore gave regular statements supporting 
Sudan, and other members of the Asian Group which did not often support nor 
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criticise the regime.  Apparent lack of interest from other Asian states could have 
been due to fear of reprisals at the Council from OIC or African Group members as 
opposed to mere disregard for the ongoing situation in Darfur.  
Members of the OIC often blocked, or significantly weakened, action from 
being taken on Sudan. The OIC frequently used discussions on Darfur to raise 
unrelated issues, thus diverting time and focus away from the region. Raising 
unrelated issues also allowed the OIC to further its own agenda, especially where it 
diverted attention away from the human rights situation in Darfur by shining a 
spotlight on abuses in, for example, Israel or the US.   
 
8.1.3 The EU as a Regional Group  
The EU contains states which were once individually major world powers, reflected 
in Britain and France holding permanent Security Council seats. As a group, the EU is 
recognised as a serious force across all interest areas. However, Weiss (2008:128) 
observes that the EU has failed adequately to address various military, political and 
economic issues. Perhaps such a reticence is motivated by the EU and its members‘ 
relationships with the US, whose power in some areas the EU would be challenging. 
Others have argued that the reconfiguration of global power, particularly in relation to 
the rise of China, India and Brazil primarily at the expense of Western states, is the 
reason for EU passivity at the Council (e.g. Abebe, 2009:21).   
As Sudan has no regional ties with the EU, that group‘s positions on the 
situation in Darfur ought to have been objective. However, political factors at times 
inhibited the EU in making statements regarding Darfur. The EU generally avoided 
strong criticism of Sudan, reflecting its overall approach to Council proceedings. The 
EU did seek to ensure cooperation of Sudan and of the African Group by seeking to 
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negotiate agreements with that group on how to best protect and promote human 
rights in Darfur. Those negotiations resulted in the creation of a Group of Experts 
with an innovative mandate which, explored, was somewhat short-lived despite some 
successes on the ground. Whether the EU‘s moderate stance on Sudan was 
attributable to a desire for cooperation, or internal politics within that bloc, or even 
due to fears of reprisals from Sudan‘s allies, the EU was notable for its effective 
abstention from much of the discussion on Darfur. The EU, perhaps noting post-
colonialist discourses on human rights, undoubtedly took a more benign and neutral 
approach to human rights abuses in decolonised states than it did towards violations 
elsewhere.  
Positions taken by the EU as a regional group are, supposedly, guided by 
ethical policies (Khaliq, 2008:54-57). However, Khaliq notes inconsistencies in EU 
member states‘ relationships with non-democracies,366 giving examples of friendly 
relations with Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan, and others, but not with Zimbabwe or 
Myanmar. The EU therefore uses a lack of democracy as a selective, ideological 
weapon rather than as a decisive factor for determining foreign policies (Khaliq, 
2008:71). This is of particular importance because grave human rights situations often 
occur within non-democratic states. 
The EU seeks to find common ground between member states, requiring 
negotiation and compromise. This requirement is especially difficult regarding foreign 
policy as member states have different interests, allegiances, priorities, and 
preferences. Khaliq (2008:88) comments that the process by which members adopt a 
common position is rarely straightforward. At the Council, often the EU‘s group 
statement is shown to be a compromise between members, as states subsequently 
                                                 
366 On EU practice see, more generally, Youngs (2001). 
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make individual statements taking positions to one side or the other of the common 
position. The EU position, being the lowest common denominator, does not reflect the 
nuanced positions taken by individual members. EU members regularly make 
statements complementing the common position, particularly during political 
discussions at bodies such as the General Assembly (cf. Bosch, 1998:136).  
An agreed position does carry significant weight, not only because it is made 
on behalf of all members, but also because the group contains ―heavyweight foreign 
policy players‖ (Khaliq, 2008:89), such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Khaliq (2008:270) argues that the collective weight of the EU is more than a sum of 
its members. However, the EU has taken a passive role at the Council despite its 
collective influence, partly due to the internal difficulties in adopting a common 
position and the inability of members to deviate from that position within the Council 
or to negotiate and compromise with other groups or blocs. EU passivity on 
contentious issues such as Sudan reflects a trend by states and regional groups not 
wanting to damage relations with OIC members due to that group‘s collective weight. 
 
8.1.4 Other Groups and Alliances  
Latin American and Caribbean (GRULAC) states did voice the need to deal with the 
crisis in Sudan, but in ways that were neither internally nor mutually consistent. 
During different debates, an individual state which had previously expressed support 
for Sudan may subsequently be found to be silent, or even to have criticised the 
regime. The GRULAC states also lacked uniformity in the positions taken within any 
given debate. There were some regional exceptions, which always supported Sudan, 
notably Cuba. The alliance between Cuba and the OIC is demonstrated by Cuba 
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frequently supporting OIC positions. The OIC‘s approach towards the West, and in 
particular the US, made it a natural group for Cuba to ally itself with.   
 The Asian Group did not take a collective stance, reflecting that Group‘s 
general trend on issues not directly affecting regional agendas. Many Asian states 
have conflicting alliances to each other, with some allied to the West and other 
members of the OIC, NAM or the Like-Minded Group.  
The only countries consistently condemning Sudan and the atrocities taking 
place in Darfur were those belonging to the Western Group, albeit with the EU taking 
a more moderate approach than states such as Canada and Australia. There were a few 
states which were undeterred by the OIC‘s tactics. Canada, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and Switzerland,
367
 among others, were notable for both their 
condemnation of the situation in Darfur and their calls for action.  Members of the 
Asian Group and GRULAC, and at times the EU, often remained silent or even 
deferred to the OIC‘s position in discussions, wishing to appear neutral rather than 
offend the OIC.  Hicks, perhaps unduly idealistic about the repercussions of states‘ 
positions in the Council, strongly criticised the docility of such states towards the 
OIC, saying that these countries, 
 
― . . . need to know that if they side with the Pakistans [sic] and 
Algerias [sic] [respectively chairs of the OIC and African Group at 
this time] of the Council to block efforts to address situations like 
Darfur, their conduct in Geneva will be made known, and they will 
pay a price both back home and in their international reputation.‖ 
(Hicks, 2006) 
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States appeared somewhat more concerned with the power and influence of OIC 
states within the Council, and their ability to use proceedings to raise political agendas 
attacking other states, than with any national or international repercussions for their 
positions on the situation in Darfur.  
 
 
8.2 Council Sessions‟ Dealings on Darfur   
The early sessions on Darfur demonstrate a trend for inaction that continued 
throughout the Council‘s work. The discussions focused less on Darfur from the 
Eighth Session onwards, with only the Ninth
368
 and Eleventh
369
 sessions passing 
resolutions or decisions on the situation. Politicisation of early proceedings on Darfur 
contributed to the situation receiving less attention, alongside increasing pressures on 
the Council to deal with other situations.   
A number of resolutions and decisions were passed on Darfur, many including 
recommendations to improve the situation. The African Group and the OIC ensured 
that these contained weaker language than the Western states would have preferred. 
The weakened language prevailed as states threatened to vote against strongly-worded 
drafts. Such tactics affected, and at times altogether negated, the impact of these 
resolutions and decisions on the ground. This point was repeatedly made by 
individual states as well as the Special Rapporteur on Sudan when calling for 
recommendations to be implemented. A number of factors contributed to the lack of 
change in Darfur, not least the Sudanese government‘s unwillingness to allow UN 
forces to operate within Darfur, a matter in which the African Group and OIC 
                                                 
368 HRC Res 9/17, ‗Situation of human rights in the Sudan‘, 18 September 2008, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/9/17 
369 HRC Res 11/10, ‗Situation of human rights in the Sudan‘, 18 June 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/11/10 
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colluded by blocking Council efforts to encourage or coerce the government to do so. 
A main motive for blocking these efforts lay, at least to some degree, in African 
countries‘ fears that such methods could be deployed in dealing with human rights 
abuses in other states.  
 An important aspect of proceedings on Darfur is the process of fact-finding 
employed by the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures mandate holders are 
tasked with carrying out fact-finding on the Council‘s behalf. For Darfur, the Council 
appointed individual expert Sima Samar to establish the facts regarding violations. 
The Special Rapporteur, in conjunction with the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, was tasked with compiling reports, and delivered them to the Council 
during its sessions. Various missions were also been sent by the Council to Sudan to 
ascertain the human rights situation in Darfur and to report their findings.  
A main problem in fact-finding is where a country refuses entry to Council-
appointed experts, as has occurred in, amongst others, Israel, Myanmar, and Sudan. 
Another common problem, which frequently arose during discussions on Darfur, is 
how to determine the facts when a state disputes the reports delivered to the Council. 
This method was employed not only by Sudan, but also by that state‘s allies in the 
African Group and the OIC. One solution would be to create an assumption that 
where a state refuses entry to a fact-finding mission without valid reason then that 
mission‘s report will be given greater weight than the concerned state‘s assertions. 
This would encourage cooperation with mandate holders and stop states from 
circumventing Council investigations.  
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8.2.1 The Second Session 
The Second Session
370
 opened with the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
371
 and the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour both drawing attention to 
Darfur.  Both speakers emphasised the grave violations occurring within that region. 
Arbour spoke about the further deterioration of the humanitarian situation despite the 
Darfur Peace Agreement.
372
 She noted Sudan‘s refusal to allow UN peacekeeping 
troops into the region, and the insufficient mechanisms for dealing with violations.
373
  
The inclusion of Darfur in these speeches set the tone for the session, with a number 
of mandate holders‘ reports raising concerns about the region. Walter Kälin, the 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons, expressed ―grave concerns‖, especially with regard to the internally 
displaced persons hoping to return to Darfur.
374
  Yakin Ertuk, the Special Rapporteur 
                                                 
370 2nd Session, 18 September-6 October 2006 (first part), 27-29 November 2006 (resumed) 
371 ―You [the Council] were rightly concerned with the situation in the Middle East, I feel confident that you will 
draw the same attention to other situations. At this time, I feel I must draw your attention on issue on Darfur‖ Kofi 
Annan UN Secretary-General, 2nd Session, 18 September 2006.  
372 Negotiated in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2006 and signed by the government and one faction of the opposition 
armed groups. Amnesty International (2007:243-244) reported, ―A Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in 
May by the government and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Minni Minawi. Other armed 
opposition groups, including the SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement, refused to sign. Most displaced 
people opposed the agreement, which was felt to lack guarantees for safe return and compensation. In 
demonstrations which turned into riots in many camps for the displaced, there were deaths, including of police 
officers, and numerous arrests. Some individuals and groups later signed the peace agreement. Under the DPA‘s 
terms, Minni Minawi was appointed Senior Assistant to the President.‖  
373 ―In light of the continued failure or willingness [of the Sudanese government] to hold perpetrators to account, 
states must give support to the International Criminal Court and remind Sudan that its cooperation is not optional, 
it is a Chapter 7 decision of the Security Council.‖ UNHCHR, Louise Arbour, 2nd Session, 18 September 2006. 
374 Oral intervention of SR on Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kälin, 2nd Session, 19 September 2006.  These 
concerns are reflected by Amnesty International (2007:245), which reported, ―On 16 August, without prior 
warning, bulldozers began to demolish homes in Dar al-Salam, an IDP settlement 43km south of Khartoum 
housing some 12,000 internally displaced persons. Many had fled droughts and famine in Darfur in the 1980s. 
Armed police and Special Forces used violence and tear gas against residents, and carried out arrests. Four people 
died, including a child, and many were injured.‖  
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on Violence Against Women spoke of a lack of improvement
375
 since the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005.
376
 Jean Ziegler, the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, spoke about the ―millions of displaced people [in 
Western Sudan and Darfur who were] seriously and constantly undernourished‖.377 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Special Rapporteur on Children in Armed Conflict 
expressed concern about violations of children‘s rights, especially with regard to non-
state actors, closely associated with the state, who recruit children.
378
 These mandate 
holders‘ focus on Sudan, and their depth of information-sharing, shows the breadth of 
the crisis.  
Due to the gravity of the situation, the Council heard a report from Sima Samar.  
Her report covered three missions to Sudan that had been conducted during 2005 and 
2006. Despite the Interim National Constitution
379
 and the CPA creating a framework 
for human rights, Samar observed, ―the government has failed in its responsibility to 
protect its civilians.‖380 According to Samar, rape and sexual violence were 
continuing in Darfur, and ―the authorities have often failed to bring the perpetrators to 
justice.‖381 Her recommendations included investigation of violations, government 
cooperation with the International Criminal Court, protection of civilians by the 
                                                 
375 Oral intervention of Yakin Ertuk, 2nd Session, 20 September 2006.  This can be evidenced in Amnesty 
International (2007:244) reporting, for example, ―Janjawid accompanying the armed forces offensive in North 
Darfur in September captured five girls and women aged between 13 and 23 in the village of Tarmakera, south of 
Kulkul. They were reportedly raped and severely beaten before being released the following day.‖  
376 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 between the government and the Sudan People‘s Liberation Army.   
377 Oral intervention of Jean Ziegler, 2nd Session, 22 September 2006.  
378 Oral intervention of Radhika Coomaraswamy, 29 September 2006. 
379 A transitional legal framework entered into in July 2005, after the CPA ended decades of conflict between 
Khartoum and Southern Sudan. The Interim National Constitution changed the legal and governance system in 
Sudan, as well as providing a comprehensive Bill of Rights. 
380 Oral intervention of Sima Samar, 2nd Session, 27 September 2006. 
381 Id. 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.285 
 
African Union mission, and for the international community to support human rights 
facilities and inclusive dialogue. 
 
8.2.1.1 Sudan 
Sudan always exercised its right of reply at the Council. The state representative put 
forward the government‘s position, mostly a propaganda exercise. He argued, for 
example, ―The policy of the Sudanese government is to offer unlimited cooperation 
with institutions of the international community and with human rights 
institutions.‖382 The comments also included Sudan asking for assistance, for 
example, ―We need support, especially financial support, from the international 
community. We would require 200 billion dollars to settle the problem in Darfur.‖383 
Sudan‘s statement seemingly perverted the otherwise legitimate link between 
resources and human rights by insisting that financial assistance was required for the 
violations to cease.  
The Sudanese delegate questioned the legitimacy of mandate holders‘ reports, 
stating ―the Special Rapporteur said that regarding Sudan you relied on reliable 
information. What kind of information is that? Why does the [Sudanese] government 
not have this information?‖384  Sudan further questioned the motives of the 
international focus on Darfur; 
 
―In Sudan there are many investigators from human rights 
institutions, especially in Darfur . . . . There are many reports on this 
                                                 
382 Sudanese delegate, 2nd Session, 27 September 2006, in response to Samar, Special Rapporteur on Sudan 
383 Sudanese delegate, 2nd Session, 18 September 2006, in response to UNHCHR, Louise Arbour  
384 Sudanese delegate, 2nd Session, 20 September 2006, in response to Ertuk, Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women. 
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within the UN framework . . . .  I leave it to you to understand the 
real motivation of some states to continuously put pressure on 
Sudan . . . .  This is just making the situation more difficult for the 
victims.‖385 
 
It also reminded the Council of its founding principles and the need for impartiality, 
saying ―the Human Rights Council should have no politicisation . . . selectivity . . . or 
double standards.‖386 Taken at face value, Sudan‘s comments appear in line with the 
idealist language underpinning the Council‘s creation. Similar comments were 
repeated throughout the sessions, with calls for non-politicisation being used as a 
defence against the Council‘s attempts to protect and promote human rights in Darfur. 
However, Sudan‘s objections were unsubstantiated, and it failed to identify unrelated 
political agendas regarding the international focus on Darfur. Rather, the focus on that 
region resulted from the widespread and systematic human rights violations including 
rapes, killings, violence and displacement of civilians.  
The situation in Darfur arguably constituted one of the gravest human rights 
situations
387
 during the Council‘s formative years, thus necessitating more attention 
and resources than other situations in, for example, Myanmar, Israel, or Sri Lanka.
388
 
Indeed, the situation has been identified by many as a genocide (Sanders, 2009). In 
                                                 
385 Sudanese delegate, supra n.382 
386 Id. 
387 In 2005, the Security Council-appointed Commission of Inquiry on Darfur emphasised that its conclusion that 
genocide was not occurring in the region ―should not be taken in any way as detracting from the gravity of the 
crimes perpetrated in that region. International offences such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that 
have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.‖, ‗Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General‘, 25 January 2005, Part II, p.4, 
available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf   
388 All of which also received Council attention through various mechanisms, including agenda items, resolutions, 
fact-finding missions and special sessions. 
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July 2010, the International Criminal Court issued a second arrest warrant for Sudan‘s 
President, Omar Al-Bashir, adding genocide to its original list of charges for crimes 
allegedly committed in Darfur.
389
 Sudan‘s claims of selectivity and politicisation were 
arguably nothing more than that state‘s attempt to deflect attention from its gross and 
systemic violations.   
 
8.2.1.2 The African Group 
Algeria (speaking on behalf of the African Group) pointed out that Samar‘s report had 
been written six months before the Peace Agreement of June 2006, since which time 
improvements had occurred, a point which it felt Samar had unfairly overlooked. 
However, Algeria‘s assertion that the Sudanese government was dealing with, rather 
than contributing to, the human rights situation contradicted the Amnesty 
International Annual Reports 2006 at that time, that merely a month prior to this 
Council session, government-backed attacks had occurred in the region.
390
 Algeria 
nevertheless insisted that Council action should be limited to material and institutional 
support: ―The international community at large, and donor countries in particular, 
[must] provide financial and technical assistance to Sudan.‖391  
Those positions were typical of the African Group‘s support for Sudan through 
undermining the Council‘s information-sharing function and calling for Sudan to 
receive solely material and technical assistance. The African Group adopted a post-
Marxist approach, reflecting post-colonialist theories which argue that developing 
                                                 
389 International Criminal Court Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, in the case of The 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), 12 July 2010, ICC-02/05-01/09  
390 ―In August government forces launched a major offensive in North Darfur and Jebel Marra, which was 
accompanied by Janjawid raids on villages.‖ Amnesty International (2007:242). 
391 Algerian delegate, supra n.382 
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states should not be criticised for human right abuses by ex-colonial countries, but 
rather assisted in creating mechanisms to protect and promote human rights. This 
allows states to avoid scrutiny and criticism even where there are gross and systemic 
violations..  
 
8.2.1.3 The OIC 
Pakistan (OIC) expressly associated itself with the African Group‘s statement on 27 
September 2006, reiterating that the groundwork had been built for the 
implementation of human rights in Darfur as well as ―commend[ing] the Sudanese 
government for its efforts . . . and for its international cooperation.‖392 The OIC called 
on the international community to assist the Sudanese government, stating that 
―justice and human rights should be absolute priorities . . . . We have to support 
this . . . to strengthen the Sudanese government . . . and provide moral support and 
technical assistance.‖393  The OIC‘s support for the Sudanese government‘s efforts394 
can be contrasted with Amnesty International‘s reports of government offensives at 
this time.
395
 That group, with its various cultural, regional and religious ties to Sudan, 
advanced national agendas, including self-protection of members with similar dubious 
records, through its support of Sudan.  
 
                                                 
392 Pakistani delegate, supra n.382 
393 Id. 
394 ―The Government does its part to achieve reconciliation…It is a nightmare to disarm people in Darfur because 
there are so many small arms…. Sudan also cooperates with the Security Council… All parties must come to the 
negotiation table like the Special Rapporteur suggests‖, Pakistani delegate, supra n.382 
395 ―After a massive troop build-up in Darfur in August, the government launched an offensive against areas 
controlled by those groups in North Darfur and Jebel Marra. Government aircraft indiscriminately or directly 
bombed civilians.‖ Amnesty International (2007:244). 
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8.2.1.4 The EU 
The EU‘s position was markedly different to the African Group and OIC, especially 
in how it viewed the Sudanese government‘s role in the conflict. For example, in 
response to the High Commissioner, the EU said that it was ―alarmed by the new 
fighting in Darfur, especially the systematic bombings of villages. It is the 
responsibility of the government to protect its own citizens and to hold perpetrators 
accountable . . . . Do not forget the lessons learned in Rwanda.‖396 
A similar position was repeated when Finland (EU) expressed ―strong support 
for Ms Sima Samar‘s mandate‖ and asked for her opinion on the best way to protect 
civilians. Finland noted Samar‘s warning that further deterioration would be likely if 
steps were not taken. Finland claimed that Samar‘s ―fears have become reality.‖ The 
EU, using idealist and social constructivist arguments, emphasised that ―the Human 
Rights Council cannot remain silent about the killings and violations in Darfur.‖397 
 
8.2.1.5 Canada 
Whilst Canada acknowledged the government‘s efforts, it spoke at greater length of 
the increase in violence and the need for international intervention, for example, 
 
―we are deeply concerned about the situation in Sudan…some two 
million people have been displaced . . . .We welcome the efforts of 
the UN, the EU and the government of Sudan . . . . Despite the Peace 
Agreement, there is more and more violence, also towards aid 
workers. We call on all parties to immediately cease violence 
                                                 
396 Finnish delegate supra n.383  
397 Finnish delegate, supra n.382 
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towards civilians and aid workers and to enable the UN mission in 
Darfur.‖398  
 
Canada questioned the most effective ways for assistance to be provided to the 
civilians in Darfur, for example asking whether the High Commissioner thought that 
―monitoring the situation [in Darfur] makes a difference?‖ as well as questioning 
whether ―there is anything the Council can do to assist you in this regard?‖399  
Canada voiced concerns about protection of women in the region, saying 
“Canada sees that there is an increase in violence, despite of the peace agreement . . . . 
Internally displaced women are particularly vulnerable . . . . Sudanese police failed to 
act with due diligence.‖ Canada asked Samar ―how can the OHCHR and international 
community assist Sudan to protect women?‖400 
  
8.2.1.6 Other States 
Whilst many states spoke about Sudan, one country‘s comments on the situation were 
unique. China spoke of the challenges presented by poverty which, in its opinion, 
significantly contributed to the human rights situation within Sudan
401
 before praising 
the government‘s ―efforts to protect and promote human rights‖.  
Towards the end of the session, the President postponed all proposed resolutions 
and decisions due to delay caused by informal consultations. It is interesting to note 
that whilst members of GRULAC had remained somewhat passive during the 
                                                 
398 Joint statement on behalf of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, supra n.382 
399 Canadian delegate, supra n.383 
400 Canadian delegate, supra n.382 
401 ―Sudan is…struggling with poverty and diseases. The Council should take into account the special difficulties 
which the government of Sudan faces.‖ Chinese delegate, supra n.382 
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discussions on Sudan, several of these same states criticised the Council for not taking 
any substantive decisions, especially in relation to Darfur. Those countries were 
disappointed at the Council‘s failure to fulfil its mandate by protecting and promoting 
human rights in Darfur. For example, Uruguay pointed out that ―any gap on 
substantive issues is a lack of protection for victims‖.402  
8.2.1.7 Decision on Darfur  
The Second Session produced a Decision on Darfur
403
 which called on all parties to 
sign and adhere to the Darfur Peace Agreement
404
 and to cease violations of 
international humanitarian law.
405
 It reminded the international community of its 
obligations, calling on states to honour their promises of assistance. The decision 
repeatedly stressed the need for ―all parties‖ to uphold general human rights 
obligations, mentioning women, children and internally displaced persons
406
 but 
without reference to specific violations or obligations. The body missed an 
opportunity to protect and promote human rights. This text can be compared with the 
Human Rights Committee‘s report on Sudan,407 which highlighted specific rights that 
were violated and indicated how the government should ensure compliance with its 
obligations regarding those rights.  
After weeks of delay due to informal consultations
408
 the draft Decision
409
 was 
presented by Algeria (African Group).
410
 The EU, unhappy with what it perceived to 
                                                 
402 Uruguay delegate, 2nd Session, 6 October 2006, general discussion on other issues, initiatives, and decisions.  
403 Human Rights Council Decision 2/115, ‗Darfur‘, 28 November 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/DEC/2/115 
404 Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Abuja. 
405 Supra n.403, para.2. 
406 Supra n.403, para.2 
407 Supra n.356 
408 Despite ongoing escalation of violence in Darfur at this time, as reported by Amnesty International (2007:244), 
for example, ―November at least 50 civilians were killed, including 21 children under 10, when Janjawid attacked 
eight villages and an IDP camp in Jebel Moon in West Darfur. AMIS forces arrived the day after the attack.‖  
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be too weak a draft, proposed revisions in a separate Draft.
411
 One difference was 
whether ―the‖ or ―a‖ should precede ―report‖ in the text of the Decision, which would 
determine whether to require a specific follow-up report. The African Group deemed 
this ―extremely sensitive‖, saying ―one of the reasons why the Commission was not 
successful was because of the naming and shaming [of states]‖,412 reflecting the 
language of criticisms levelled at country-specific discussions at the Council‘s 
predecessor. In order to strengthen its position in weakening the text, the African 
Group argued that this issue directly related to the founding principle of non-
selectivity. The African Group strenuously disagreed with the EU‘s position that the 
―situation of Darfur really requires special reporting‘‖.413  
That difference of opinion on a seemingly technical matter actually struck at the 
heart of the issue of how the Council would attempt to avoid the pitfalls of its 
predecessor; that is, the issue of whether country-specific focus could – or even 
should - occur in certain circumstances. Whilst it was agreed that the Council should 
generally avoid politicisation and selectivity, the question was whether this should 
apply during a humanitarian crisis such as the one in Darfur. Use of founding 
principles to divert attention away from human rights violations demonstrated a 
disregard for these new, founding principles. 
The EU also raised substantive issues, especially in relation to impunity. It 
argued that nothing would change through monitoring, and the text needed to include 
places of detention for perpetrators. Canada voiced support for the proposed 
amendments, stating that, whilst Algeria‘s efforts were appreciated, they ―fail[ed] to 
                                                                                                                                            
409 Human Rights Council Draft Decision 2/L.44, ‗Darfur‘, 28 November 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/L.44 
410 Algerian delegate, 2nd Session, 28 November 2006 
411 ‗Amendment to decision L.44 entitled ―Darfur‖‗, 28 November 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/L.48 
412 Algerian delegate, supra n.410  
413 Finnish delegate, supra n.410 
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address essential issues‖. There was support for Canada‘s position that ―people in 
Darfur should not wait for another six months until the Council meets again.‖414 
However, the African Group did not share the concern that the situation in Darfur was 
deteriorating, instead talking about recent positive developments in the region.  
The EU expressed ―deep disappointment‖415 at the defeat of its proposed 
amendments, as the draft resolution was said to not adequately address the 
deteriorating situation. The UK expanded on this statement, saying ―it is hard to 
imagine a situation where it would be more appropriate for the Council to act‖. 
Despite hopes that the Council would take action where the Commission had failed to 
do so, inaction had prevailed through regionalism. 
 
8.2.2 The Third Session  
The Third Session
416
 opened with the High Commissioner‘s overview of missions. 
This overview spoke of the crisis in Darfur, noting that it had ―spilled over‖417 into 
Chad and Central African Republic,
418
 and that attacks on villages, killings, 
displacement and rape had continued,
419
 with up to two million people now displaced, 
alongside other ―horrific levels of violations‖.420 OHCHR also documented attacks by 
                                                 
414 Canadian delegate, Id. 
415 Finnish delegate, Id. 
416 29 November - 8 December 2006. 
417 Oral intervention of UNHCHR, Louise Arbour, 3rd Session, 29 November 2006.  
418 An escalation reported by Amnesty International (2007:244), ―Attacks across the border resumed in October, in 
which some 500 civilians were unlawfully killed, many more were raped, thousands were driven from their homes, 
and villages were destroyed‖  
419 For example, Amnesty International (2007:244) reported, ―In November at least 50 civilians were killed, 
including 21 children under 10, when Janjawid attacked eight villages and an IDP camp in Jebel Moon in West 
Darfur. AMIS forces arrived the day after the attack. The Governor of West Darfur promised an inquiry but no 
findings had been made public by the end of 2006.‖ 
420 ―The Chief Prosecutor said [at this time] that the office had documented killings and massacres and there is a 
lot of information indicating deaths, destruction of food stocks and livestock which has deprived citizens of their 
means of survival.‖ Louise Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights, 3rd Session, 29 November 2006. 
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government-sponsored militia. The High Commissioner reported that up to four 
million people were in need of aid, urging the international community to ensure 
cessation of human rights violations.  
The session heard calls for a Special Session to be convened on Darfur, 
primarily from Western and GRULAC States.
421
 It was later announced
422
 that the 
Special Session on Darfur would occur immediately after the Third Session. 
Discussions focused on the need for the Special Session and the way it would be 
conducted.    
8.2.2.1 Sudan 
Sudan‘s response to the High Commissioner‘s report followed similar patterns to its 
comments in the previous session. It dismissed the Council‘s information-sharing 
function, alleging that there was an ―intentional campaign to offer false information 
on the situation‖,423 and that the ―Resolution of the Council was based on false 
information‖.424 Sudan further emphasised this by saying ―there are repeated attempts 
to spread false information in regard to rape . . . it was said that dozens of cases took 
place . . . we proved that rumours spread by some NGOs are not true‖.425 Having 
made such accusations, Sudan invited ―the High Commissioner and the OHCHR to 
come to Darfur to see what the situation looks like.‖426 
Sudan again asserted that focus on Darfur was caused by politicisation and 
selectivity. During discussions regarding a Special Session on Darfur, Sudan alleged 
that it was being singled out and treated unfairly, for example saying ―there are 
                                                 
421 Including; the Netherlands, Ecuador, Poland, Australia, Chile, Sweden, and Norway, 29 November 2006. 
422 Oral statement of HRC President, Luis Alfonso de Alba (Mexico), 3rd Session, 30 November 2006. 
423 Sudanese delegate, 3rd Session, 29 November 2006, in response to UNHCHR, Louise Arbour. 
424 Id. 
425 Id. 
426 Id. 
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violations in many parts of the world . . . the question of Darfur is different to other 
situations, because it is highly and heavily politicised . . . we were not able to change 
this.‖427  
Sudan‘s attempts to present a positive image included assuring the Council that 
the ―[peace] agreement has led to very positive developments‖,428 and asserting that 
―those responsible [for attacks] are those who have not signed the peace 
agreement‖.429 Sudan again showed its ties with the African Union, saying,  
 
―The African Union has stated, and it is the most credible, that the 
security situation has improved . . . [there have been] improved 
levels of nutrition . . . internally displaced persons have better access 
to water than others in Darfur . . . [there has been] improvement in 
the rates of child deaths . . . [and has been] tribal reconciliation.‖430  
 
This information, again, contradicted independent NGO reports from this time.
431
 
 
8.2.2.2 The African Group 
Following the High Commissioner‘s speech, the sole focus of the African Group‘s 
statement was to complain that five paragraphs of her report had been dedicated to 
Darfur as compared with one paragraph on the crisis caused by the invasion in Iraq. 
                                                 
427 Sudanese delegate, 3rd Session, 1 December 2006, general discussion on ‗other issues‘. 
428 Id. 
429 Sudanese delegate, supra n.423  
430 Id. 
431 For example, Amnesty International (2007:244) reported that ―The Gereida region was insecure throughout 
2006, with scores of villages destroyed in attacks by Janjawid or other armed groups. Some 80,000 people fled the 
camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Gereida after fighting between forces of the SLA Minawi faction 
and the Justice and Equality Movement in October.‖  
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Echoing the Sudanese position, the African group accused the High Commissioner of 
bias and selectivity.
432
 Moreover, the group blamed the worsening of the Sudanese 
crisis on the ―politicisation‖ of the situation. Algeria (African Group) asserted that the 
Sudanese government was co-operating with the ICC, and that security was 
improving in the region; developments which Algeria said were yet to be recognised 
by the Council or the OHCHR - which the African Group alleged was unfair
433
 and 
biased against the government.
434
 
The African Group and its members mostly remained silent during the calls for 
a Special Session on Darfur. However, Algeria did strongly oppose Canada‘s 
proposals regarding the Special Session, alleging that strict procedural rules would 
hinder the Council in terms of addressing substantive issues in a flexible manner. It 
went on to state, ―The Council must make sure that we do replicate the model of the 
three previous sessions  . . . [to] avoid the impression that there is selectivity, 
politicization and a particular desire to attack a particular State that is a member of the 
African Group.‖435 
8.2.2.3 The OIC 
The OIC and its individual members also remained silent during both the discussion 
of the High Commissioner‘s report and the calls for a Special Session. This was at 
                                                 
432 In fact, the High Commissioner said in her response that the reason for doing so was due to the situation in Iraq 
having been the subject of 8 reports between 2004-2006. This was a direct result of the Human Rights Office 
within the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq being established in 2004. For reports see, United Nations Human 
Rights: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‗UNAMI Human Rights Reports‘, in Countries: Iraq, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/UNAMIHRReports.aspx (last visited 2 August 2011). 
433 ―The meeting on the 12th of November welcomed information that the security situation in Sudan is 
improving… encouraged by outcome of high level consultation on the 16th of November…‖, Algerian delegate 
supra n.423   
434 ―The alleged links between the government and the militias referred to by the High Commissioner have yet to 
be documented in an objective way‖, Algerian delegate supra n.423 
435 Algerian delegate, Organisational Meeting, 7 December 2006. 
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least partially due to the High Commissioner‘s speech mentioning the situation in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, which subsequently became the focus of almost all 
OIC members‘ statements, perhaps as a specific diversionary tactic.436  
 
8.2.2.4 The EU 
Finland (EU) condemned the situation in Darfur, calling on the Council to convene a 
Special Session and to take action. It declared, 
 
―Acts of violence against vulnerable groups in Darfur, especially 
against children, must stop. Ethnically targeted violence against 
women and children, especially against internally displaced persons, 
must stop . . . put an end to impunity . . . [the Council must] exercise 
responsibility to adequately address the situation in Darfur.‖437 
 
The EU did not explicitly criticise the Sudanese government, although some of its 
members did do so in their individual statements.
438
 
8.2.2.5 Canada 
Canada argued that setting procedural rules would enable the Special Session to be as 
effective as possible. It suggested that four working days should pass between the end 
of the Third Session and the beginning of the Special Session, thus ensuring adequate 
preparation time for all delegations. Canada asked the OHCHR to provide background 
                                                 
436 See, for example, delegates of Pakistan, Morocco, Bahrain, Bangladesh, and Tunisia, supra n.423 
437 Finnish delegate, supra n.427  
438 For example, ―[e]ven if all parties are guilty of serious breaches of international law, responsibility lies with the 
government‖, Swedish delegate, supra n.423  
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information on Darfur from a variety of different UN sources. After these proposals 
were opposed by a number of states,
439
 Canada explained that the aim was not to 
restrict nor set limits and that its suggestions would merely be guidelines in terms of 
ground rules. Canada again expressed the idealist hope that the Council‘s work be 
directed towards making changes on the ground, and that it should not become a 
political chamber.  
8.2.2.6 Other States 
During the discussions on 29 November the Council was urged by a number of states 
not to focus all of its attention on one region alone. Australia reiterated that ―there are 
more situations than just the Middle East that have to be addressed [by the 
Council]‖.440 The UK called for equal attention to be paid to the crisis in Darfur as the 
Council had already given to the Middle East. Chile also called on the Council to ―not 
forget that human rights are universal‖.441 These comments reflect the growing 
disappointment that the Council was already mirroring its predecessor in devoting 
disproportionate time and resources to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
at the expense of other grave situations such as Darfur. 
8.2.2.7 No Decisions or Resolutions on Darfur 
The Third Session‘s lack of decisions or resolutions on Darfur was a result of the 
announcement that a Special Session on Darfur would immediately follow the 
session. Member states, aware that an arena would be immediately provided for 
                                                 
439 See discussion regarding convening a Special Session on Darfur, including: Algeria‘s objections, 3rd Session, 
30 November 2006; Cuba opposed Canada‘s proposal, arguing that the session was of such urgency that it could 
not wait for another 4 working days to pass, 3rd Session 30 November 2006; The Philippines said that the 9 
proposed procedural points were excessive, 3rd Session, 30 November 2006; Brazil concurred, saying that such a 
―heavy instrument‖ was unnecessary, 3rd Session, 30 November 2006.  
440 Australian delegate, supra n.423  
441 Chilean delegate, 3rd Session, supra n.423 
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discussions, decisions and resolutions on Darfur, had no reason to raise the situation 
during the regular session.     
 
 
8.2.3 Special Session on Darfur 
The Special Session on Darfur
442
 took place over two days. It opened with a video 
address by the Secretary-General
443
 and a speech by the High Commissioner,
444
 Both 
deplored the conditions in Darfur and called on the Council to send a clear message to 
the victims that change would occur. Representatives of a number of agencies
445
 
delivered statements, including Jan Egeland - the Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator - who accused the 
government of Sudan of ―allowing more freedom to those committing atrocities than 
those there to protect.‖446 Several elements of UNICEF‘s intervention directly 
contradicted claims made by Sudan at the Session, especially with regard to 
malnutrition, food insecurity, and violence against women and children.
447
 
NGO contributions followed similar patterns to the regional alliances.
448
 Human 
Rights Watch spoke about the failures of the government of Sudan, accusing it of 
arming the militias and denying the factual records.  Amnesty International (2005) 
read representative testimony sent from an individual in Darfur. Nord Sud XXI
449
 
                                                 
442 4th Special Session on the Human Rights Situation in Darfur, 12 - 13 December 2006 
443 Secretary-General Kofi Anan, Address to the Human Rights Council, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
444 UNHCHR Louise Arbour, Address to the Human Rights Council, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
445 See, for example, UNHCR statement, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
446 Written statement of Jan Egeland, read by OCHA representative, 4tFh Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
447 UNICEF statement, 4th Special Session, December 12 2006. 
448 NGO statements occurred on 13 December 2006. 
449 Nord Sud XXI is an NGO which ―strives to support the work of the United Nations in the fields of human 
rights and development by providing a voice for concerns of individuals in the southern hemisphere‖ and is 
strongly anti-war. Its founders include Mr. Ahmed Ben Bella, the first President of Algeria, Mr. Nelson Mandela, 
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brought a Darfuri as their speaker, and criticised the OIC for denying the facts of 
Sudan‘s participation in the ongoing violations. The Lutheran World Federation450 
made neutral comments and did not criticise Sudan, whilst the Union des Juristes 
Arabes
451
 and Tupaj Amaru
452
 moved the focus away from Darfur and onto Israel,
453
 
which bore obvious similarities to tactics used by the OIC.
454
    
 
8.2.3.1 Sudan 
Sudan‘s comments455 were divided into three categories: its efforts to curb human 
rights violations and calls for assistance to continue to do so, the inaccuracy of 
reporting on Darfur, and the alleged bias and politicisation against the government. 
Sudan cited numerous statistics, many of which it claimed had been documented by 
the African Union, as proof that the conflict in Darfur was ―tribal struggles‖ that the 
                                                                                                                                            
the first President of South Africa after apartheid, and Mr. Ramsey Clark, a former US Attorney General and 
leading human rights lawyer. See, generally, Nord-Sud XXI, ‗Darfur‘, http://nordsud21.ch/Darfour.htm (last 
visited 2 August 2011). 
450 The Lutheran World Federation provides relief and education in developing countries. See, The Lutheran 
World Federation, http://www.lutheranworld.org/ (last visited 2 August 2011). 
451 ―The Union of Arab Jurists, founded in 1975, is an international organization that aims to bring together 
associations of practicing lawyers and other members of the legal community in the Arab world to promote the 
rule of law.‖ See, Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.arab-ipu.org/english/ (last visited 2 August 2011). 
452 Tupaj Amaru is an NGO which advocates for the rights of indigenous populations of the Americas known for 
its anti-West stance. It had its consultative status suspended for a year in 2004 when at the ―fifty-ninth session of 
the Commission on Human Rights in 2003, two representatives of the organization had rushed towards [USA‘s] 
delegation carrying a large cylindrical object, had unfurled a banner and had chanted anti-American slogans.‖ See, 
Tupaj Amaru, http://www.pusinsuyu.com/english/html/tupaj_amaru_english.html (last visited 2 August 2011). 
Tupaj Amaru said that the solution to the crisis in Darfur required the political will of the government of Iran – 
which gives some indication of their desire to echo Iran‘s focus on Israel at this session - and that Western powers 
were solely responsible for the conflict in Darfur. 
453 Union des Juristes Arabes suggested that international interests in Darfur were due to oil, minerals and colonial 
intentions, and said that the West didn‘t really want democracy because ―it responded to democracy in Palestine 
with a siege against the Palestinian people.‖  
454 See Section 8.4.2 
455 All comments made by the Sudanese delegate, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
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―government is aware of and settling through agreements‖. It asserted that it was 
actively working to protect its citizens, and that rebel groups which had not signed the 
Darfur Peace Agreement were committing atrocities such as recruiting children, 
raping women and committing mass killings.  
Sudan repeatedly alleged that information presented to the Council, and also 
apparent in the Western media, was inaccurate. Sudan accused Western states of 
attempting ―to undermine the dignity and sovereignty of weak states.‖  It questioned 
the motives of some states who had called for the Special Session, alleging that this 
was a tactic to divert attention away from atrocities being committed by the West in 
Iraq and elsewhere.
456
 Sudan highlighted its regional alliances, emphasising that ―we 
have chosen to belong to the African community, the Arab community, and the 
Islamic community‖, underscoring its power and strength at the Council through 
regionalism. The speaker expressed the differences it saw between Western and other 
states, saying ―we distinguish between genuine concerns for human rights, and 
ideological and political drives pushed by countries and organisations that control 
power, wealth and media.‖ 
Alongside alleging that the West and the media were partial and unfair, Sudan 
accused the High Commissioner of being ―clearly biased‖, citing her focus on Sudan 
at the Third Session as evidence, before saying ―the High Commissioner has adopted 
an unprofessional position . . . [she] is partial to opinions of certain countries.‖ 
Sudan‘s position towards the High Commissioner reflected some states‘ treatment of 
the secretariat and Council-appointed experts where the information provided is 
unpalatable to, or disputed by, the country concerned. Sudan‘s accusations of bias and 
                                                 
456 ―[the West] seeks to divert attention from cities air-bombarded where every morning more than 400 people die.  
Also attempts to divert attention from agony of people under occupation, detainees under secret detention, here in 
Europe, without anyone doing anything about it.‖ Sudanese delegate, supra n.455  
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selectivity were not supported with evidence, but rather used in an attempt to 
undermine the High Commissioner‘s credibility and thus the report delivered to the 
Council. 
 
8.2.3.2 The African Group 
Algeria (African Group) supported Sudan‘s assertions. It criticised the Western media 
for trying to ―undermine the sovereignty of an African government‖,457 later 
emphasising this position by stating, ―We are gathered to make an objective diagnosis 
for an appropriate road map.  We must be driven by facts obtained on the ground, not 
simply by media-driven interpretations as a heavy-handed response aimed at naming 
and shaming an African government.‖ 
Algeria also insisted that the Special Session was being used for political 
purposes, including diverting attention away from Iraq, for example saying, ―human 
rights protection was more needed in Africa than any other continent during the slave 
trade . . . .Today, [the human rights situation in Africa] pales in comparison with Iraq 
[where there are] hundreds of thousands of deaths‖. Mentioning Iraq not only diverted 
attention away from Sudan, its regional ally, but also advanced the national agendas 
of those African states, including Algeria, with ties to Iraq through OIC membership. 
The African Union alleged that facts had been misrepresented to the Council, 
saying, 
 
―[there have been] far-reaching propaganda campaigns where human 
rights situations are politicised . . . .  Thus, one major first-world 
                                                 
457 All comments made by the Algerian delegate, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
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NGO calls this an ‗apocalyptic conflict where an Arab government 
with its militia attacks non-Arab tribes‘ . . . . [However] the 
Chairman of Commission of the African Union says that the 
situation is ‗improving slightly in some parts while deteriorating in 
others‘.‖ 
 
Algeria queried the fact-finding process, questioning whether reports were valid. Such 
tactics mirrored Sudan‘s position towards the High Commissioner, seeking to 
undermine the credibility of the fact-finding process. Algeria spoke of the need to 
―find out first-hand what the facts really are‖ in order for innovative solutions rather 
than ―just maintaining the status quo‖, something which the African Group stressed 
was ―not an option‖. 
 
8.2.3.3 The OIC 
Pakistan (OIC) again commended the Sudanese government for its cooperation, its 
efforts and the information provided, even asserting that ―no government has been 
more forthcoming than Sudan‖.458 It said that other parties to the conflict bore 
responsibility for the violence and atrocities, and called for further funds and 
assistance in the region. The OIC called for the outcomes of the session to ―not be 
one-sided‖ against the Sudanese government. 
The OIC again shifted the focus from Darfur and onto the Middle East. Pakistan 
criticised Kofi Annan, alleging that his call for the Council to address problems 
outside of the Middle East was a ―tit for tat‖ approach. Pakistan enquired why the 
Secretary-General had not spoken at the previous Special Sessions, at one point 
                                                 
458 All comments made by the Pakistani delegate, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.304 
 
asking ―were the situations in Gaza or Lebanon not worthy of a message from the 
Secretary-General?‖ 
 
8.2.3.4 The EU 
The EU repeated some points which had already been presented to the Council, 
emphasising the importance of the factual information that had been delivered. It 
spoke of a ―grave crisis‖, of which the ―magnitude is profoundly shocking‖, before 
citing numbers including ―more than 200,000 dead‖ and ―Two million who have left 
their homes‖.459 Finland (EU) called on the Council to act by saying ―an assessment 
mission should be sent to Darfur…including the Special Rapporteur . . . the mission 
should build on OHCHR experience, and recommendations should be given to Sudan 
on how to implement proposals‖.  
The EU did not explicitly criticise Sudan, but did express the need for the 
Sudanese government to take action to change the situation in Darfur. It emphasised 
that ―the cooperation of the government of Sudan is essential . . . . We call on Sudan 
to cooperate with follow-up mechanisms . . . . We appeal to all of you to cooperate 
[on behalf of] the people of Darfur‖. 
 
8.2.3.5 Canada 
Canada reminded the HRC why the Special Session had been convened, noting that 
―it is high time that the Council act in accordance with its mandate‖ of promoting and 
protecting human rights.
460
 It said of the international community‘s duties, 
 
                                                 
459 All comments made by the Finnish delegate, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
460 Canadian delegate, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
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―we are here to signal that we haven‘t forgotten the people of 
Darfur . . . to show that the international community is ready to 
act . . . the international community must do all that it can to provide 
protection . . . the international community must do the monitoring, 
provide technical assistance for human rights education.‖     
 
When speaking about solutions, Canada expressed ―support [for] the decision for an 
independent human rights assessment mission with suitable expertise to provide 
recommendations on practical short-term actions to improve the situation.‖ Canada 
further said that ―[we are here] to remind the government of Sudan that it has primary 
responsibility to protect this region‖, before calling on ―all parties to implement 
recommendations . . . and resolutions.‖ 
 
8.2.3.6 Other States 
Zambia, once again, took a different position to the African Group, speaking out 
forcefully against ―burying our heads in the ground‖.461 It accused other African 
governments of previously taking an ostrich approach to the atrocities in Rwanda and 
of again doing so regarding Darfur.  Zambia criticised other African states for being 
quick to call for UN action outside of Africa, but being much slower to respond to 
problems occurring within their continent. On the other hand, despite its democratic 
tendencies, South Africa‘s statement neither criticised Sudan nor departed from the 
African Group‘s sentiments, reflecting a similar stance taken by that state towards 
fellow African Group members such as, for example, Zimbabwe.  
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The Netherlands notably spoke strongly, repeatedly blaming the Sudanese 
government for the violations as well as accusing it of lying to the Council.
462
 Some 
GRULAC
463
 states spoke strongly in support of the High Commissioner, especially 
after many of the OIC countries had strongly criticised her, and Armenia commented 
that doubting UN sources‘ credibility was akin to ―questioning the integrity of the 
UN‖.464 
 
8.2.3.7 Decision on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur 
The Council adopted, by consensus, a Decision which created a High Level Mission 
to Sudan.
465
  This decision neither condemned Sudan nor used the word ―violation‖, 
making it weaker than the Western states would have liked. The emphasis was on 
promoting rather than protecting human rights, with references made to advisory 
services and technical assistance.
466
 Even in terms of the promotion mandate, the 
Council failed adequately to discharge its duties, with the Decision‘s text and 
language remaining general and neutral. Again, in contrast with the Human Rights 
Committee‘s approach,467 the Council failed to set out which specific human rights 
need protecting and failed to provide recommendations for how the Sudanese 
government should comply with its obligations. The Decision allowed for the five 
members of the Mission to Sudan to be selected by the President, although it specified 
that the SR on Sudan would also participate in the mission.  
                                                 
462 Dutch delegate, supra n.460  
463 See, for example, Uruguayan and Argentine delegates, Id. 
464 Armenian delegate, Id. 
465 ‗Situation of human rights in Darfur‘, 13 December 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-4/101 
466 Id., para.5 
467 Supra n.356 
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Algeria spoke before the vote, and 19 other Council members
468
 spoke 
afterwards, all lauding the Council for its cooperation, compromise, and congenial 
approach, with some making it clear that they saw the consensus as proving the 
legitimacy of the Council.
469
 The UK reiterated its hope that the Council use this 
constructive spirit to move its focus away from being solely on the Middle East, and 
the President invited Council members to ―maintain this spirit when we deal with 
other situations.‖  Cuba said that one of the best things about the decision was that it 
left aside ―inflammatory language‖ and the desire to impose ―unnecessary 
condemnation‖, despite the fact that Cuba does not possess an unblemished record in 
this regard.  
 
   
8.2.4 The Fourth Session 
Despite institution building being the primary focus of the Fourth Session,
470
 Darfur 
was extensively discussed during the High Level Segment
471
 and was raised critically 
as an example of non-implementation of Council decisions.
472
 Darfur was also spoken 
about in response to reports by the Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Internally Displaced Persons (Walter Kälin)
473
 and the Council-appointed Special 
                                                 
468 7 OIC countries, 5 EU countries, 4 GRULAC (including Cuba), and India, Russia, China, and Zambia. 
469 Including India, China, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. 
470 12-30 March 2007. 
471 The IBP mandates a High Level Segment to take place annually during the main session of the Council, supra 
n.173, para. 116. A High Level Segment is a discussion where state dignitaries or government representatives of 
ministerial or higher rank address the Council. For an example of High Level Segment modalities see 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/modalitieshls2june.doc  
472 See, Lithuanian delegate, 4th Session, 14 March 2008, High Level Segment. 
473 See, Canadian delegate, 4th Session, 21 March 2007, in response to SR on Internally Displaced Persons, Walter 
Kälin.  
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Rapporteur on Violence against Women
474
 (Yakin Ertuk), as well as in the High 
Commissioner‘s report475 which noted increased levels of violence. States, NGOs, and 
agencies called for increased international presence, stressing the necessity of such 
action in order for civilians to be best protected. 
Similar themes were apparent in the report of the Mission to Sudan which spoke 
of the ―pattern of counter insurgency by the government and the Janjawid militia‖,476 
and described grave and systematic human rights abuses. The report noted that ―the 
region is a stranger to the rule of law‖ and that as the ―conflict continues, abuse feeds 
on abuse‖.477 It strongly condemned violations, calling on the international 
community to ―take urgent action to ensure effective protection [of civilians]‖.478 Its 
recommendations included; the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, independent 
monitoring of the situation, and international prosecution of Sudanese war criminals – 
none of which had previously been implemented effectively. 
 
8.2.4.1 Sudan 
Sudan repeated its pattern of comments in responding to the issues raised at this 
session. It again spoke of its willingness to protect human rights and its efforts to do 
so, for example saying ―we showed unprecedented cooperation and flexibility, and 
believed that would be sufficient to help the international community help us to 
achieve peace.‖479 These comments were made despite the fact that it had denied 
                                                 
474 See, Maltese delegate, 4th Session, 22 March 2007, in response to SR on Violence Against Women, Yakin 
Ertuk. 
475 UNHCHR Louise Arbour, supra n.472  
476 Oral intervention of Mission to Sudan‘s representative, Jody Williams, 4th Session, 16 March 2007. 
477 Id. 
478 Id. 
479 Sudanese delegate, Id. 
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entry to Bertrand Ramcharan.
480
 As a result, the entire Mission could not enter 
Darfur.
481
 Sudan protested innocence over that incident, alleging that it merely denied 
a visa to one member of the mission. Sudan‘s objection to the inclusion of one 
member, resulted in the denial of entry and the resulting fallout at the Council. 
Sudan again condemned the Council‘s ―politicisation‖ of the situation, urging 
the Council not to repeat the ―politically-motivated naming and shaming‖ of its 
predecessor,
482
 and claiming that the Council had been created ―to move away from 
selectivity and double standards [yet] today we witness a conspiracy against Sudan for 
political objectives‖.483 Sudan again challenged the impartiality of UN employees, 
and questioned the mission‘s neutrality.484 It queried the impartiality of the OHCHR, 
doubting the validity of the recommendation for an international presence in the 
region.
485
 Sudan condemned the Mission‘s ―faulty report‖486, alleging that various 
findings were exaggerated or false.
487
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
480 See, supra n.476  
481 HRC Res 4/8, Follow-up to decision S-4/101 of 13 December 2006 adopted by the Human Rights Council at its 
fourth special session entitled ―Situation of human rights in Darfur‖‗, 30 March 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/4/8, 
para.1  
482 Sudanese delegate, 4th Session, 13 March 2007, High Level Segment. 
483 Sudanese delegate, 4th Session, 16 March 2007, in response to Williams, representative of Mission to Sudan  
484 ―[Sudan has] reservations towards the head of the [fact-finding] mission. That person was from a country 
known for having a hostile position regarding Sudan. The subsequent behaviour of the mission‘s head confirmed 
that our fears were correct…‖ Sudanese delegate, supra n.482  
485 ‗Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and follow up to the World Conference for Human 
Rights‘, 2 March 2007, A/HRC/4/49, page 11, para. 42. 
486 Sudanese delegate, supra n.483  
487 Id. 
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8.2.4.2 The African Group 
The African Group refused to accept the legitimacy of the mission because it had not 
entered Sudan, and because its report was written whilst the mission was in 
neighbouring countries. The group failed to criticise Sudan for denying entry to the 
mission, or to acknowledge the reason why the report had been compiled outside of 
that state. Instead it asserted ―the assessment is incomplete and the needs of Sudan 
were never fulfilled.‖488 
Despite expressing concerns about ―the gravity of the situation‖, Algeria said 
that there had been ―progress in the situation of human rights in Darfur‖. The African 
Group reiterated its support for the government, saying ―we welcome the commitment 
of Sudan‘s government to cooperate with international support . . . [and] continuing to 
permit humanitarian support for people in Darfur.‖489   
8.2.4.3 The OIC 
Pakistan agreed with the African Group‘s positions, saying that the OIC was ―unable 
to comment on the substance of the report‖ of the mission due to it not having entered 
Sudan in order to fulfil its mandate.
490
 It further commented that ―the concept of the 
responsibility to protect was not reflected‖ by the mission, and that its report ―has 
multiple political and security dimensions that go beyond its mandate.‖ The OIC 
supported Sudan, saying, 
 
―The government was asked to continue and intensify its 
cooperation…the Council must build on that . . . there should be no 
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selectivity and targeting…the interests of the Sudanese people are 
not served by a list of recommendations. The situation can only be 
improved by the government of Sudan and the assistance of the 
international community.‖491  
 
8.2.4.4 The EU 
The EU criticised Sudan for denying entry to the mission. It reminded the Council 
that the Special Session had been held ―because of the extreme seriousness of the 
human rights situation in Darfur‖492 and that ―the government of Sudan welcomed the 
decisions‖ made at that session. The EU said that this made it even more regrettable 
that ―the government did not extend that cooperation to the mission‖.  
Germany (EU) commented that ―the legitimacy of the mission is not in 
question, because it fulfilled its mandate and provided a good report‖. The report‘s 
findings were emphasised, including that government troops were committing 
violations in Darfur. It used the report to call for further action to be taken by the 
government, the Council and the international community to cease the ongoing human 
rights violations.  
 
8.2.4.5 Canada 
Canada voiced support for the mission and its report, and expressed concerns about 
the Sudanese government, for example saying ―Canada had welcomed the 
commitment by the government to cooperate . . . but regrets that the mission was not 
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allowed into Sudan‖.493 Having expressed concerns about the ongoing violations, 
Canada stated that ―the international community must act when a country is unwilling 
or unable to do so‖.494 
 
8.2.4.6 Other States 
Like Zambia, Botswana was a notable exception to the general African silence 
regarding Sudan at the High Level Segment, telling the Council of their peacekeeping 
contribution, and expressing concern about the ―suffering of internally displaced 
persons and refugees‖ in the region.495 Ghana also broke regional alliances, this time 
during the discussion on the Mission to Sudan, saying ―the situation in Sudan needs 
urgent attention . . . concerning the promotion and protection of human rights. The 
report by Jody Williams underlies the need for urgent action‖.496   
Ireland,
497
 an observer at the Council, expressed grave concerns regarding the 
situation, saying that the mission‘s findings were a ―badge of shame for the 
international community‖ and ―urge[d] the Council to act consensually to adopt the 
conclusions of the mission‖. Ireland was careful to point out that it had ―no strategic 
interest in Sudan‖ nor ―motive to stand up for Darfur‖ other than the desire to 
―promote human rights‖. This was a direct reference to an earlier accusation that the 
Western interest in this region was motivated by oil.
498
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8.2.4.7 Resolution on the Follow-Up to Decision S-4/101 
At the Fourth Session a resolution
499
 was adopted, by consensus, following-up the 
Special Session‘s Decision. The resolution was the first Council text on Darfur which 
documented violations of specific human rights
500
 and provided recommendations and 
a mechanism aimed at protecting human rights.
501
 Alongside calling on all parties to 
uphold human rights,
502
 the resolution further, for the first time, identified the 
Sudanese government‘s obligations to protect human rights.503 It was written and co-
sponsored by the EU and the African Group. This joint initiative between the African 
Group and EU resulted from the two groups working together closely in order to 
ensure the cooperation of African states with the Council‘s action on Darfur. 
Germany (EU) said that its adoption showed that ―the Human Rights Council does not 
close its eyes to the suffering of the people of Darfur.‖ It further said that ―this 
[resolution] is not about political games, diplomatic manoeuvres [but is] solely about 
the realisation of human rights.‖504  
As a result of the mission not visiting Darfur, the Council established a Group 
of Experts on Darfur. The Group of Experts was the first group created by either the 
Council or its predecessor with the purpose of following-up recommendations made 
by human rights bodies. It was innovative for a UN human rights body to implement a 
follow-up process as previously each new resolution sent out, for example, 
commissions of enquiries which required the fact-finders or experts to begin new 
                                                 
499 HRC Res 4/8, ‗Resolution on the Follow-Up to Decision S-4/101 of 13 December 2006 adopted by the Human 
Rights Council at its Fourth Special Session entitled the Human Rights Situation in Darfur‘, 30 March 2007, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/4/8  
500 Id., para.3 
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enquiries even when a territory had been visited the previous year. By creating a 
mission to follow-up recommendations, the Council intended for the Group to focus 
on implementation rather than on making new recommendations.  
The joint initiative to establish the Group of Experts focused on cooperation, 
not only of Sudan but also of that state‘s regional allies in the African Group. 
Cooperation is a founding principle at the Council, underscoring its importance for 
effective promotion and protection of human rights within a state‘s domestic 
jurisdiction. Negotiations and compromise between the EU and the African Group 
sought to ensure that Council action on Sudan would be more palatable to that state 
and therefore facilitate the body better fulfilling its mandate with regard to Darfur. 
However, that compromise required the body to weaken action it might otherwise 
have taken in order to retain the cooperation of Sudan and its allies. This initiative 
failed to achieve many positive results in terms of Sudan‘s implementation of the 
Group‘s recommendations although, arguably, some work was done which may not 
have been achieved without the atmosphere of cooperation and dialogue engendered 
within this joint initiative.  
Despite their close cooperation, the EU and the African Group took somewhat 
different positions during Council discussions on the Resolution. The EU sought to 
avoid the appearance of politicisation, and to encourage the Council to take action on 
violations. The African Group took a different approach to the EU, stressing the 
importance of unanimity in decision-making. Despite these comments, the African 
Group had devoted considerable effort to blocking meaningful discussions, let alone 
action, on Darfur. 
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8.2.5 The Fifth Session 
Darfur was raised at the Fifth Session
505
 by Jean Ziegler, the Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food
506
 and Arjun Sengupta, the Independent Expert on Extreme 
Poverty.
507
 Sima Samar, the Special Rapporteur on Sudan
508
 presented a report and 
made a number of recommendations. Darfur was also mentioned during the report on 
the situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in terms of the 
universality of human rights, with the head of the mission
509
 saying ―it is important 
that this Council has sought to investigate the situation in Darfur‖.   
 
8.2.5.1 Sudan 
Sudan denounced Ziegler‘s report, asserting that there were factual inaccuracies, and 
alleging that humanitarian food aid was being blocked by those parties to the conflict 
who had not signed the Peace Agreement.
510
 Sudan also blamed militia groups, 
especially the Janjawid, for causing the problems set out in the session. It denied 
government responsibility for the social exclusion and the impeding of Darfuris‘ 
ability ―to enjoy the essential freedoms in life‖.511 Sudan again asked for international 
support, for example saying ―the government of Sudan asks this Council to call on the 
United Nations . . . to provide us with aid‖.512 
Sudan reiterated their ―commitment to cooperate with the Council and the 
Group of Experts‖, emphasising their alleged efforts to improve the situation in the 
                                                 
505 11-18 June 2007. 
506 Oral intervention of SR on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, 5th Session, 11 June 2007. 
507 Oral intervention of SR on Extreme Poverty, Arjun Sengupta, Id. 
508 Oral intervention of Sima Samar, SR on Sudan, 5th Session, 13 June 2007.  
509 Oral intervention of Mission to OPT representative, Desmond Tutu, 5th Session, Id. 
510 Sudanese delegate, 5th Session, 11 June 2007, in response to SR on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler.  
511 Supra n.507  
512 Sudanese delegate, Id. 
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region before again requesting assistance in doing so, expressing that ―the United 
Nations and the international community must render support to Sudan for an action 
plan to deal with Darfur‖.513 
 
8.2.5.2 The African Group 
Algeria repeated its support for the Sudanese government, for example by saying ―the 
dialogue between Sudan and the Group of Experts was open and frank‖.514 The 
African Group supported the recommendations made by the Group of Experts, and 
expressed that, thus far, it had been successful,  
 
―We particularly [welcome] the consultation that went on between 
the Group of Experts and the regional groups . . . . This Group made 
a selection of various recommendations that fall within responsibility 
of this council . . . . They also established a timeframe in terms of 
short and long term action . . . . The African group has been involved 
in addressing Darfur at the level of the Council . . . . I am confident 
that we will achieve yet another consensus in terms of this very 
delicate issue . . . . What is important is the consensus on the 
ground.‖515 
 
                                                 
513 Sudanese delegate, 5th Session, 13 June 2007, in response to Samar, SR on Sudan. 
514 Algerian delegate, Id. 
515 Id.  
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Furthermore, in picking up on comments by Desmond Tutu, the African Group said, 
―today I have the pleasure of knowing that we have moved forward in Darfur…I just 
pray and hope that the progress we are making continues‖.516 
 
8.2.5.3 The OIC 
Pakistan also had a positive view of the Group of Experts and Sudan‘s cooperation 
with it, saying, 
 
―The work in this area shows how cooperation leads to results . . . . 
The government of Sudan has worked well with the UN to 
implement the existing resolutions . . . . We support the 
recommendation that the experts continue their work for another 
fixed period of time . . . . We appreciate having a focal point to 
coordinate assistance to Sudan.‖517 
 
8.2.5.4 The EU 
Germany (EU) questioned the usefulness of the report, saying; that the members of 
the Council ―all know of the problems in Darfur‖, and that rather than giving new 
recommendations the Council should be trying to ensure that existing ones are 
implemented. The EU‘s position was that ―it is essential that we actually change the 
situation on the ground . . . because as we consider the report, the violence goes 
on‖.518 Germany‘s response to the discussion on the right to food519 condemned the 
                                                 
516 Id.  
517 Pakistani delegate, Id. 
518 German delegate, 5th Session, 13 June 2007, in response to Samar, SR on Sudan. 
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Sudanese government for its role, and criticised the lack of access to food in Darfur as 
well as the use of food and water as a political tool in the region.
520
 
 
8.2.5.5 Canada 
Canada expressed a more positive view of Samar‘s report than that of the EU, saying; 
 
―We welcome the report . . . . We believe after this report that the 
government of Sudan can now show its commitment to human 
rights . . . . We welcome the dialogue that has taken place between 
Sudan and the international community, and we note that all parties, 
including rebel groups and regional neighbours, should be 
involved.‖521  
 
However, Canada did speak of the ongoing violations in Darfur and the need to deal 
with this situation, saying that ―since March 2007, there has been tremendous sexual 
violence in Darfur . . . . Humanitarian assistance is compromised by all parties to the 
conflict . . . . We call on all parties to bring the violence to an immediate halt‖.522 
Whilst noting some improvements, Canada reiterated its usual position that the 
international community ―needs to do better to help the people of Darfur . . . . We can 
start by implementing these recommendations‖.523  
 
                                                                                                                                            
519 Ziegler, supra n.506 
520 German delegate, supra n.510  
521 Canadian delegate, supra n.513  
522 Id.  
523 Id.  
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8.2.5.6 Other States 
Most countries used the discussions to reiterate their previous positions on the 
situation, but there were a few statements of particular interest. Central African 
Republic, a neighbour of Sudan affected by the conflict, broke regional trends in 
condemning the situation, 
 
―Darfur, after the two world wars, is the worst humanitarian disaster 
the world has witnessed. It is a shame for all mankind. Failing to 
have dealt with Darfur has encouraged the abuse of human rights 
around the world. We must stop this catastrophe and protect the 
fundamental rights that the people of Sudan are entitled to.‖524 
 
The United States called for sanctions to be imposed against Sudan
525
 in order to 
encourage the government to fulfil its international obligations and cooperate fully.  
China again expressed the opinion that poverty was the fundamental problem in 
Darfur, saying that the economic and social issues which contributed to the situation 
had to be addressed.
526
 Syria brought up the politicisation of the conflict, declaring 
that,  
―[alongside] other countries, we are concerned with the politicisation 
of the situation in Darfur with external parties exploiting the 
                                                 
524 Central African Republic delegate, supra n.513 
525 ―This Council has yet to adequately address the human rights violations in Sudan. The targeting of women and 
children remain a grave concern…The US has imposed sanctions on Sudan to bring about a peaceful resolution to 
this conflict. We wish to end the suffering of millions of Sudanese….. At the Security Council the US is working 
on a resolution to widen sanctions against Sudan. We call on Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed, demonstrate 
commitment to peace, cease aerial bombardments, stop obstructions and allow peacekeepers and humanitarian 
workers access to internally displaced persons‘ camps.‖ American delegate, supra n.513 
526 ―The fundamental problem is poverty…we must address the economic and social issues that contribute [to the 
conflict]‖, Chinese delegate, supra n.513 
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situation to achieve their own objectives, particularly in oil. There 
will be no improvement until there is an end to external 
interference.‖527 
 
8.2.5.7 Resolution on the Group of Experts 
Having seen relatively little improvement in Darfur as a result of the work of the 
Group of Experts,
528
 at the Fifth Session the EU and the African Group jointly 
tabled
529
 a draft resolution following up Resolution 4/8 on Darfur.
530
 They proposed a 
six-month extension of the mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Sudan and the 
Group of Experts. Despite the extension being passed, the Group of Experts‘ work 
was not finished, nor their recommendations implemented, by the end of the year,
531
 
and, as will be explored, the Council chose not to extend their mandate at the 
following session.
532
  
 
 
 
                                                 
527 Syrian delegate, supra n.513 
528 For example, ―In March the Council convened a group of experts to pursue previous recommendations made by 
UN human rights bodies on Darfur. The Sudanese government-appointed Human Rights Advisory Council 
responded to these recommendations but according to the report presented to the Council in November, few of the 
recommendations were implemented.‖ Amnesty International (2008:280)  
529 Consideration of all Resolutions and Decisions were postponed at this Session, see ‗Postponement of 
consideration of all pending draft resolutions and decisions, and of the draft report‘, 18 June 2007, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/DEC/5/102. 
530 ‗Follow-up to Resolution 4/8 of 30 March 2007 adopted by the Human Rights Council at its fourth session 
entitled ―Follow-up to decisions S-4/101 of 13 December 2006 adopted by the Human Rights Council at its fourth 
special session entitled ‗Situation of Human Rights in Darfur‘‘, 15 June 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/5/L.6. 
531 ―In December the Council urged Sudan to implement all outstanding recommendations identified by the group 
of experts on Darfur‖, supra n.528, p.281 
532 Human Rights Council Resolution 6/35, ‗Resolution on the Human Rights Council Group of Experts on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Darfur‘, 14 December 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/35. 
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8.2.6 The Sixth Session 
Having postponed its follow-up at the Fifth Session, the Council heard an update from 
the Group of Experts
533
 during the Sixth Session.
534
 The government of Sudan was 
urged to co-operate with the group and to implement its recommendations, and the 
situation in Darfur was, again, raised a number of times during general debates. The 
first day of the resumed Sixth Session
535
 coincided with the 60
th
 anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The report of the High Commissioner
536
 
spoke of ―grave violations‖ in Sudan since September, saying that ―more needs to be 
done by the government in Khartoum and the international community to ensure 
protection for civilians‖, and that the ―rule of law needs to be strengthened, especially 
in Darfur where lawlessness abounds‖.537 
At the resumed Sixth Session, the Chair of the Group of Experts
538
 presented its 
final report.
539
 The group stressed Sudan‘s ―primary duty to respect human rights and 
to comply with international obligations‖, and expressed continuing concerns about 
lack of governmental action. The Sudanese government‘s ―cooperative behaviour‖ in 
certain regards was noted, but Samar then stated,  
                                                 
533  Oral intervention of the Group of Experts representative, Walter Kälin, 6th Session, 24 September 2007 
534 10-28 September 2007 
535 10-14 December 2007 
536 Oral intervention of UNHCHR, Louise Arbour, 6th Session, 11 December 2007 
537 Id. 
538 Oral intervention of Chair of Group of Experts, Sima Samar, 6th Session, 11 December 2007. 
539 ‗Final report on the situation of human rights in Darfur prepared by the United Nations Experts Group on 
Darfur, presided by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan and composed by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary on arbitrary executions, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights 
defenders, the Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights internally displaced persons, the Special 
Rapporteur on the question of torture and the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences‘, 28 November 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/6/19. 
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―In terms of substance, not much impact has occurred [since the 
Group of Experts was set up] . . . . A lot of the recommendations 
made could have been implemented in a few months with minimal 
cost [but this has not occurred] . . . . The Group remains concerned 
that efforts have not led to improvement of the human rights 
situation in Darfur.‖540  
 
8.2.6.1 Sudan 
In a statement on Human Rights Day, Sudan described the situation in Darfur as ―a 
difficult period in Sudan‘s history.‖ 541 It reiterated its commitment to improving the 
situation, assuring the Council that ―no efforts have been spared by Sudan to ensure 
human rights in the country‖.542 
Sudan continued to take this position during the session, stating its firm 
commitment to the implementation of resolutions and trying to convince the Council 
that it had recently undertaken activities complying with the recommendations. 
Sudan‘s response to the High Commissioner asserted that the regime ―respects all 
conventions of human rights‖ and that the government ―promotes human rights 
protection [in Darfur]‖.543 Sudan responded to Samar‘s report in a similar manner, 
again trying to assure the Council of its ―cooperation with the Human Rights Council, 
Special Rapporteur and Group of Experts [which] has given the fledgling Council the 
                                                 
540 Oral intervention of Sima Samar, supra n.538  
541 Sudanese delegate, 6th Session, 10 December 2007, general discussion on ‗Human Rights Day‘. 
542 Sudanese delegate, 6th Session, 11 December 2007, in response to Chair of Group of Experts, Sima Samar. 
543 Sudanese delegate, 6th Session, 11 December 2007, in response to UNHCHR, Louise Arbour. 
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chance of credibility.‖544 These comments were made despite reports of worsening 
conditions and ongoing violations at this time.
545
 
Sudan repeated its typical positions, again calling on the Council to ensure that 
it did not have ―double standards or selectivity when it comes to protecting vulnerable 
groups and promoting human rights‖.546 Sudan also repeated its request for assistance. 
Whilst arguing that ―the situation in Darfur is improving‖, Sudan claimed that ―many 
factors exert influence on the situation‖ and asked the international community ―to 
help us try to find solutions‖.547 
8.2.6.2 The African Group 
The African Group spoke about ―positive developments and improvements‖ in Darfur 
and attributed them to ―the strong will of the government of Sudan to improve the 
situation‖.548 Egypt commended ―the high level of cooperation shown by the 
government of Sudan‖.549 At the resumed Session, Egypt repeated this position, 
saying,  
 
―We had hoped that the High Commissioner would acknowledge the 
efforts of the Sudanese government to improve the situation on the 
ground, as noted by the Expert Group on Darfur. The Sudanese 
                                                 
544 Sudanese delegate, supra n.542  
545 For example, ―As a result of attacks, particularly by government and paramilitary groups, some 280,000 people 
were displaced bringing the number of displaced in Darfur to more than 2,387,000.‖ Supra n.528, p.281 
546 Sudanese delegate supra n.542 
547 Id. 
548 Egyptian delegate, 6th Session, 24 September 2007, in response to Group of Experts representative, Walter 
Kälin. 
549 Id.  
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authorities have taken tangible steps to improve the situation on the 
ground.‖550 
 
Egypt asserted that the international community ―has failed to truly assist‖ Sudan and 
the Darfur region, a position which ignored the Sudanese government‘s resistance to 
various initiatives and recommendations. Egypt also asserted that the ―international 
community and agencies must assist Sudan‖.551 These requests were reiterated, with 
the African Group saying, ―[w]e call on the OHCHR to continue to provide technical 
support . . . and we call on the international community to help provide the resources 
needed to improve the situation‖.552 
8.2.6.3 The OIC 
The OIC expressly aligned itself with the African Group‘s statements on Sudan. It did 
not comment extensively on Sudan, expressing the wish to avoid mentioning specific 
countries during general discussions because of the need to then ―talk about all the 
issues‖.553 The sole position which the OIC expressed regarding Sudan was to state its 
ongoing support for the government. Pakistan focused its comments on the 
international assistance necessary to enable the government to further deal with the 
situation in Darfur, for example saying that ―the Sudanese government‘s efforts need 
concrete support from the international community‖.554 
 
 
                                                 
550 Egyptian delegate, supra n.543  
551 Egyptian delegate, supra n.548  
552 Egyptian delegate, supra n.543 
553 Pakistani delegate, supra n.543 
554 Pakistani delegate, supra n.542  
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.325 
 
8.2.6.4 The EU 
In response to the Group of Experts, the EU welcomed the ―great cooperation of the 
government of Sudan‖. However, unlike the African Group, the EU expressed 
concerns about the continuing situation of human rights in Sudan, saying ―we urge 
Sudan to demonstrate its willingness to fight violations of human rights in Darfur and 
to combat impunity‖.555 Similarly, after the High Commissioner‘s report, Portugal 
(EU) voiced ―grave concern over human rights abuses in Darfur‖ before calling for an 
―end to impunity‖ and for perpetrators to be brought to justice.556  This 
acknowledgement of the government‘s efforts alongside condemnation of the 
situation and calls for further changes was repeated after the Group of Experts‘ report 
in December. In this statement, Portugal again urged the Sudanese government to end 
the human rights violations in Darfur and to fulfil its international obligations.
557
 
8.2.6.5 Canada 
Canada again took a stronger position than the EU, voicing. its ―ongoing concern‖ 
about the violence and documenting various violations.
558
 Canada that it was 
―appalled‖ at the appointment of Ahmad Mohammed Harun as co-chairman of a 
national committee charged with addressing human rights violations in Darfur.
559
 The 
Council was informed that Harun had been formally charged with crimes by the 
                                                 
555 Portuguese delegate, supra n.548 
556 Portuguese delegate, supra n.543 
557 Portuguese delegate, 6th Session, 13 December 2007, in response to Samar, Special Rapporteur on Sudan. 
558 Canadian delegate, supra n.548 
559 See, for example, Trial, ‗Ahmad Mohammed Harun, in Trial Watch, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-
watch/profile/db/legal-procedures/ahmad-mohammed_harun_621.html (last visited 2 August 2011). 
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International Criminal Court
560
 and that his appointment ―casts doubt‖ on the 
government of Sudan‘s commitment to improve the human rights situation in Darfur.  
In December, Canada stressed that improvements on the ground would only 
occur if the Group of Expert‘s recommendations were implemented. It criticised the 
government for saying much and doing little, saying ―we are concerned that the 
failure to implement many of the recommendations shows that there is rhetoric, but 
little concrete action‖.561 
 
8.2.6.6 Other States 
The US, an observer state denounced the poor human rights records in a number of 
countries including Sudan, and questioned the relevancy of a body which ignores 
ongoing human rights abuses.
562
 Zambia again broke regional alliances, urging the 
Sudanese government to cooperate with the Council and the international community 
in order to ―improve the human rights situation on the ground‖. In expressing its 
concerns, Zambia said that ―attacks still continue, which is of great concern because 
the people of Darfur should be able to have their lives return to normal, and to close 
the chapter on this issue‖.563 
Algeria retained its regional alliances despite no longer chairing the African 
Group. Having congratulated Sudan for its ―excellent cooperation‖, it expressed deep 
alarm at the ―exaggerated disinformation‖ on Darfur, saying that the situation 
                                                 
560 Warrant for the Arrest of Ahmad Harun, in the case of The Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun, 27 April 
2007, ICC-02/05-01/07 
561 Canadian delegate, supra n.542 
562 ―This council is becoming less and less relevant … because it continues to ignore the oppressing situations in 
many countries‖, American delegate, supra n.548 
563 Zambian delegate, Id. 
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received disproportionate coverage in the media.
564
 Algeria then used an African 
Group and OIC tactic, shifting the focus away from Sudan by asserting that the 
Council should instead be discussing the situations in Iraq and Palestine.
565
 That 
rhetoric on Darfur is an exact mirror-image of that given by OIC states regarding 
Israel.  
 
8.2.6.7 Resolutions on the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur  
The review of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Sudan occurred at the 
resumed Sixth Session.
566
 The African Group argued that, bearing in mind that Sudan 
would be subject to Universal Periodic Review,
567
 the mandate should be 
eliminated.
568
 Sudan said that ―there is a politicisation that led to the dismantling of 
the Commission which has started once again to infiltrate the work of this Council‖. It 
called on the SR ―to reflect very carefully on the information provided by the 
Sudanese authorities‖.569  
The EU expressed its ―strong support of the mandate and the excellent work of 
the Special Rapporteur‖, and it asserted that ―the Special Rapporteur can play a very 
important role on combating impunity, but it is the responsibility of Sudan to respect 
and ensure human rights‖.570 The EU hoped that ―the renewal of the mandate will be 
                                                 
564 Algerian delegate, Id. 
565 The Council passed 9 resolutions on Israel as compared with 3 non-condemnatory resolutions on Sudan during 
its first year. 
566 13 December 2007. 
567 Universal Periodic Review applies to all UN member states. 
568 This position was supported by states such as Cuba and Russia, which said that the SR on Sudan would only be 
effective if it was adopted with the consent of the Sudanese authorities, supra n.572 
569 Sudanese delegate, supra n.557  
570 Portuguese delegate, supra n.557 
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adopted by consensus‖,571 a position supported by other Western States.572 The 
Resolution on the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in the Sudan
573
 was passed by consensus. The resolution focused on capacity-
building and technical assistance,
574
 emphasising the founding principles of 
cooperation and dialogue,
575
 but again failed to mention any specific rights or 
violations.   
The Council passed a resolution which acknowledged the Group of Experts‘ 
work, which had reported on human rights abuses in Darfur, but effectively abolished 
its mandate by omitting any reference to its future work.
576
  The Resolution welcomed 
the Group‘s report and called on the government of Sudan to take action against 
―serious violations of human rights‖.577 The strong language in this resolution and the 
documenting of specific grave violations was markedly different from the Council‘s 
previous texts, and appeared closer to that of the Human Rights Committee. Perhaps 
due to the expertise of its members, or due to the cooperation of the EU and the 
African Group, the Group was viewed as stronger and more influential than the 
Special Rapporteur, which was arguably a main reason for its abolition by states 
seeking to shield the Sudanese government. The Resolution abolishing the Group of 
Experts was adopted by consensus, having been co-sponsored by Egypt on behalf of 
the African Group, and Portugal on behalf of the European Union.  
                                                 
571 Id.  
572 For example, the US said that ―the Council cannot ignore the on going crisis in Sudan…[We] fully support the 
renewal of the mandate and resist all efforts to weaken it‖, American delegate, 6th Session, 14 December 2007.  
573 HRC Res 6/34, ‗Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan‘, 14 
December 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/34  
574 Id., para.3 
575 Id., para.5 
576 HRC Res 6/35, ‗Human Rights Council Group of Experts on the situation of human rights in Darfur‘, 14 
December 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/35,  
577 Id., para.5 
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8.2.7 The Seventh Session 
At the beginning of the Seventh Session,
578
 during the High Level Segment,  a 
number of Western states
579
 raised the situation in Darfur. The High Commissioner 
noted the escalating violence in West Darfur during her presentation of the OHCHR 
Annual Report.
580
 Western States again spoke about Darfur during the general debate 
on Agenda Item 4.
581
 The report of the Special Rapporteur on Sudan condemned the 
―culture of impunity‖ in Sudan, and voiced concerns about the ―persistent violence, 
military force, and the government‘s failure to protect citizens‖ in Darfur.582  
 
8.2.7.1 Sudan 
Sudan again followed its pattern of assuring the Council that the government would 
―continue to cooperate with the Group of Experts and the Special Rapporteur on 
Sudan‖.583 It spoke of improvements to the situation in Darfur and initiatives taken by 
the government. Sudan‘s response to the High Commissioner‘s report was to assert 
that the situation in West Darfur was under control, saying that the government had 
―already put forward the peaceful solution in its right, appropriate way‖.584 Sudan 
repeated another of its usual positions in alleging that there were factual inaccuracies 
                                                 
578 3-28 March 2008. 
579 Including oral interventions of: Switzerland‘s Micheline Calmy-Ray, Luxembourg‘s Vice Prime Minister Jen 
Asselborn, and France‘s State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Human Rights Rama Yade, all: 6th Session, 3 
March 2008, High Level Segment. 
580 Oral intervention of UNHCHR, Louise Arbour, 7th Session, 7 March 2008.  
581 Including delegates of: the Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland, and Australia, all; 7th Session, 14 March 2008, 
general debate on Agenda Item 4. 
582 Oral intervention of SR on Sudan, Sima Samar 7th Session, 17 March 2008. 
583 Sudanese Minister of Justice, 7th Session, 3 March 2008, High Level Segment. 
584 Sudanese delegate, 7th Session, 7 March 2008, response to the UNHCHR, Louise Arbour. 
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in the Special Rapporteur on Sudan‘s report, saying ―we believe that the facts of the 
report are not represented by the facts [on the ground]‖.585  
During the High Level Segment, Sudan attempted to shift the focus from its 
own crisis onto the situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
declaring that,  
 
―the entire world is watching with sadness the massacres in the 
OPT . . . we strongly condemn Israeli aggressions. We call on the 
Human Rights Council to protect the innocent civilians and children 
and women who are being killed on a daily basis and in cold 
blood.‖586 
 
Sudan was demonstrating their allegiance with the OIC and the Arab Group, diverting 
attention from the crisis on its own soil.  
 
8.2.7.2 The African Group 
The African Group reiterated its ―appreciation‖ for the Sudanese government‘s efforts 
and cooperation, citing the Special Rapporteur‘s activities across the country as 
evidence of ―Sudan‘s willingness to comply with the United Nations‖. Its speech 
focused on the ―cooperative spirit that has gone on in regards to Sudan‖, expressing 
the hope that this would continue.
587
 
 
                                                 
585 Sudanese delegate, 7th Session, 17 March 2008, response to SR on Sudan. Sima Samar. 
586 Sudanese Minister of Justice, supra n.583  
587 Egyptian delegate, supra n.585  
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8.2.7.3 The OIC 
Pakistan expressed similar sentiments to the African Group, saying; ―the Special 
Rapporteur acknowledged the progress of the Sudanese government . . . they are 
noteworthy and must be encouraged . . . . We appreciate the consistent efforts of the 
Sudanese government‖.588  The OIC also called for further assistance to the region, 
saying ―the government requires international support without political 
qualifications‖, a position reiterated in its later calls for ―support without political 
criteria‖. 
8.2.7.4 The EU 
During the general debate on Agenda Item 3, the EU deplored the ―many instances of 
discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people in Sudan‖589 as 
well as condemning the renewal of violence in West Darfur. Concerns were also 
raised after the Special Rapporteur on Sudan‘s report, with Slovenia asking what 
could be done to ensure access to humanitarian aid, to bring perpetrators to justice, to 
halt the violence against women, and to protect journalists. The EU criticised the 
Sudanese government for failing to adequately address these issues.
590
 
8.2.7.5 Canada 
Canada said relatively little in relation to Sudan at this session. Its primary focus was 
to question the Special Rapporteur on Sudan about the best ways to change the 
situation on the ground in Darfur. In particular, Canada asked ―how can we [the 
Council] assist the Special Rapporteur to carry out the recommendations in your 
report?‖  
                                                 
588 Pakistani delegate, Id. 
589 Slovenian delegate, 7th Session, 13 March 2007, general debate on Agenda Item 3. 
590 Slovenian delegate, supra n.585  
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8.2.7.6 Other States 
Cuba repeated its previous opinion that ―all of these scourges were caused by 
colonialism‖,591 although it neither expanded upon nor explained this position. Other 
individual states and observer missions commending the Sudanese government at this 
Session included; Palestine, Algeria, Pakistan (OIC), Saudi Arabia, Cuba, China, 
Russia, and Zimbabwe. The UK voiced the strongest condemnation of Sudan, saying 
―the situation has not fundamentally changed, including the indiscriminate killing on 
both sides.  The Special Rapporteur‘s reports remain the same from one year to the 
next and we call on the Sudanese government to address this issue‖.592 
 
8.2.7.7 Resolution on Human Rights in Sudan 
At the Seventh Session a Resolution on Sudan
593
 was submitted by the African Group 
and co-sponsored by the UK. The EU joined the consensus, and expressed its belief 
that the Resolution highlighted the deep concern of the Council. Canada deplored the 
fact that, again, the resolution fell short and ―fails to reflect the recent deterioration of 
the situation‖.594 The Council, once more, failed to adequately discharge its mandate, 
Although the resolution did identify some categories of violations and did call for the 
Sudanese government to comply with its human rights obligations, the text again 
sought to shield the government and to identify other actors as abusers.  
                                                 
591 Cuban delegate, Id. 
592 UK delegate, Id. 
593 HRC Res 7/16, ‗Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan‘, 27 March 2008, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/16 
594 Canadian delegate, 7th Session, 27 March 2008.  
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Canada recalled recent reports showing grave violations, and regretted that this 
resolution was not more ―robust‖. Although Canada joined the consensus, it believed 
that the people of Sudan deserved better. Again, the weakening of the resolution can 
be explained by the need to pass it, let alone gain consensus in doing so. The result 
was, once again, a resolution lacking weight in language and substance. 
 
 
8.3 Patterns and Impact of Regional Alliances  
As has been demonstrated, regional alliances played a large role in shaping Council 
discussions and actions on the situation in Darfur. Regular discussions on the situation 
in Darfur displayed differing positions taken by regional groups, often depending on 
their own agendas. The pattern that emerged was that the Council was split between 
two sets of groups and states; those who expressed the opinion that the Sudanese 
government was cooperating fully and required further international assistance, and 
those who believed that the government was not doing all that it could and who called 
on it to comply with its international obligations and improve the situation. The 
former often resorted to accusing the Council, its mandate holders, or even member 
states, of politicisation in order to block intervening action. The term ―politicisation‖ 
had become a rallying cry against action proposed by Western states. It was used to 
accuse Western states and mandate holders of falsifying information. However, the 
reports from UN bodies and NGOs often independently verified the information being 
called into question (cf. Amnesty International, 2007; Amnesty International, 2008).  
Accusations of falsification aimed to undermine the information activities of the 
Council regarding the situation in Darfur. Information activities are a main function of 
the body, and attempts to de-legitimise that function resulted from political agendas of 
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certain states, particularly Sudan‘s regional allies. Politicisation can be seen on the 
part of those who were bandying around that same accusation against others. Parallels 
can be drawn with America‘s accusations of politicisation at UNESCO in the 1970s.  
Advancement of states‘ national agendas, including protecting Sudan from 
Council scrutiny in order to protect themselves from similar scrutiny in the future, 
demonstrated realist tendencies already prevalent at the new body. National policies 
combined with regional alliances allowed these agendas to dominate proceedings and 
to greatly impact upon the Council‘s ability to fulfil its mandate.  
 
 
8.3.1 The African Group 
African Group members almost always shielded Sudan. Many African states also had 
dubious human rights records, and were advancing national agendas by seeking to 
ensure that the Council was unable to take strong action against Sudan that might be 
replicated in the future against other African regimes. In order to shield Sudan from 
Council action, the African Group employed various tactics during Council 
discussions and votes on resolutions. The Group used its collective weight to ensure 
that discussions were steered away from the specific violations, and ensured that 
resolutions were as weakly worded as possible. 
The African Group constantly sought to undermine information-sharing 
activities regarding Sudan. It frequently expressed the opinion that the Sudanese 
government was doing all that it could to ensure resolution of the crisis, and that other 
parties to the conflict were to blame for the situation. For example, at the Third 
Session, Algeria said ―the alleged links between the government and militias referred 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.335 
 
to by the High Commissioner have yet to be documented in an objective way.‖595 
However, not only had documentation compiled by OHCHR been presented to the 
Council by the High Commissioner at the beginning of the Session,
596
 but it was also 
verified by independent information from NGOs.
597
  
Individual members of the African Group reiterated that collective position 
during discussions, even where their opinions contradicted independent evidence. For 
example, Egypt, a member of both the African Group and the OIC, said ―we 
commend Sudan for her cooperation and efforts to disarm militias, despite practical 
challenges‖598 However, Amnesty International (2007:244) contradicted these 
statements, reporting that ―a government promise to disarm the Janjawid was broken, 
as it had been after numerous previous agreements, and none of the agreed 
commissions was operating by the end of 2006, including the Compensation 
Commission.‖   
The African states which did, at times, break regional alliances in discussing 
Darfur, were those known to be more benign or democratic than their neighbours.
599
 
The more democratic African regimes were more likely to deviate from the African 
Group‘s position due to less fear of Council scrutiny of their own human rights 
records. For example, at the Special Session on Darfur, Zambia said ―despite the 
peace agreement, there is a lack of political will of the government of Sudan to protect 
civilians . . . . The government must care for the welfare of all people regardless of 
                                                 
595 Algerian delegate, 3rd Session, 29 November 2006.  
596 Id. 
597 See, for example, ―In August government forces launched a major offensive in North Darfur and Jebel Marra, 
which was accompanied by Janjawid [sic] raids on villages and continued at the end of 2006.‖, Amnesty 
International (2007:242)  
598 Egyptian delegate, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
599 On Botswana see supra n.363. On Zambia see supra n.364  
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racial or religious background.‖600 This sentiment was not often expressed by African 
states, and was buried in the vast amount of statements of support for the Sudanese 
government from this region.  
 
8.3.2 The OIC 
The OIC frequently aligned itself with the African Group‘s statements on Sudan. It 
also employed the tactic of using large numbers of states giving similar comments 
during discussions in order to emphasise the collective position. At the Second 
Session, individual states from the OIC expressing confidence in the Sudanese 
government‘s ability and willingness to improve the situation in Darfur included; 
Bahrain (Chair of the Arab Group), Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Malaysia, Senegal, 
Azerbaijan and Bangladesh. The use of large numbers of States making broadly 
similar comments in order to emphasise a collective opinion was a tactic which 
continued to be employed at subsequent sessions. The OIC sought to protect Sudan, a 
member of the group, from scrutiny, often by advancing members‘ common national 
agendas of keeping the spotlight on human rights abuses committed by non-allied 
countries. The OIC sought to protect Sudan through constantly shifting attention onto 
other human rights situations, particularly in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories.  
OIC members include many countries with foreign policy aims to de-legitimise 
Israel. Its members politicised the Council by raising issues regarding Israel during 
discussions on Sudan.  At the Special Session on Darfur,
601
 for example, the 
discussion became sidelined by members of the OIC, including the representative of 
Palestine, who accused Kofi Annan of being partial to the developed world and the 
                                                 
600 Zambian delegate, 4th Special Session, 12 December 2006. 
601 4th Special Session, 12-13 December 2006. 
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High Commissioner of ignoring the occupation of Palestine.  Iran later spoke at length 
about the ―60-year Holocaust in Palestine‖ and accused the Council of ignoring the 
conflict in this region. The attempt to divert attention away from Sudan, where Arab 
militia
602
 were being accused of atrocities, and to shift the focus onto Israel, must be 
viewed in context of the fact that not only had a special session already taken place 
about Israel a month earlier
603
 but that there had also been as a Special Session on 
Israel four months prior to that.
604
  Therefore, the shifting of focus by OIC members 
onto Israel during a Special Session convened on Darfur showed that the undercurrent 
of selectivity was still apparent within the main UN human rights body.
605
 This was 
something picked up by other states, for example the UK said that ―when [the 
Council] focuses on the Israel and Palestine situation without focusing on other 
issues, some will wonder what this Council is doing‖.606  
 
8.3.3 Other Regional Groups  
The EU consistently took a fairly neutral approach, unusually for that Group owing to 
its ―ethical foreign policy‖ (e.g. Khaliq, 2008) normally guiding its approach to such 
situations. The EU commended Sudan‘s efforts and cooperation and it called for 
further assistance to support the government‘s efforts, whilst also condemning the 
human rights situation in Darfur and calling for action in this region. For example, 
after the Group of Experts‘ report at the resumed 6th Session, it said,  
 
                                                 
602 Most notably the Janjaweed militia. 
603 3rd Special Session (regarding Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories), 15 November 2006. 
604 2nd Special Session (regarding the war between Israel and Lebanon), 11 August 2006. 
605 Despite the founding principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, amongst others.  
606 UK delegate, 2nd Session, 28 November 2006. 
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―The report gives us some encouragement regarding potential positive results of 
this exercise. It also demonstrates clearly that much still has to be done. We 
welcome the open and constructive dialogue which has been taking place. 
However, little, or no, tangible impact has been reported of the few 
recommendations that have been implemented . . . . Lots of recommendations 
have not been implemented . . . . Some displaced persons have returned, but 
more have been displaced during this time . . . violence has increased . . . the 
Sudanese government is responsible for protecting its people, and they have not 
done so . . . . We must all help to stop these human rights violations.‖607  
 
Moss (2006) has commented that even ―democratic countries are often reluctant to 
join in condemnation of other countries when doing so could harm the many other 
interests and ties – economic, political, security, regional, cultural, or religious – they 
have with those countries.‖ EU states‘ neutrality on the situation in Darfur reflected 
its reticence about endangering its overall relationship with Sudan‘s allies.  
GRULAC members took neither consistent nor uniform positions regarding 
Sudan and the situation in Darfur. Whilst individual states did, at times, call for action 
or condemn the government, none did so regularly over the two-year period. Many 
states remained silent during discussions. Cuba consistently aligned itself with the 
OIC and African Group‘s position, commending the Sudanese government for its 
efforts and cooperation. This position contradicted comments of other GRULAC 
members during the same discussions. 
Canada, whose statements were often joined by Australia and New Zealand, 
took a stronger approach than the EU or GRULAC members, consistently 
                                                 
607 Portuguese delegate, 6th Session, December 11 2007. 
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condemning the Sudanese government for its role in the situation, and calling for 
action to be taken and recommendations to be implemented. Canada often questioned 
mandate holders as to how assistance could best be provided to help the civilians in 
Darfur. It spoke out against the weakening of resolutions and decisions, and was 
consistent in its calls for the Council to take a proactive approach. Canada‘s positions 
did not escape the OIC‘s attention, as shall be explored below.  
 
8.3.4 An Example of the Impact of Regional Alliances 
The repercussions for a state taking a stand against the OIC can be seen in its 
subsequent treatment by the OIC and the African Group. This deterrent undoubtedly 
played a role in the weakening of the Council‘s resolutions and decisions. The 
resolution passed at the Second Session was weaker in its wording than Western 
states and others had urged.  The EU‘s proposals to strengthen the language, including 
the use of the words ―grave concern‖, were overwhelmingly defeated by the OIC and 
African Group. To understand why the weakened text was adopted, it must be 
examined within the context of an incident occurring during the resumed session. 
Canada had been the sole opposing vote against the OIC‘s resolutions on Israel,608 
with many Western states choosing to abstain. Ignoring the reasons given for 
Canada‘s ―no‖ votes,609 the OIC showed its displeasure by using its collective weight 
                                                 
608 HRC Res 2/3, ‗Human Rights in the Occupied Syrian Golan‘, 9 January 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/2/3; HRC 
Res 2/4, ‗Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and in the Occupied 
Syrian Golan‘, 9 January 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/2/4 
609 Which included the fact that the resolutions were biased and only addressed the human rights violations of 
Israel, which contradicted the Council‘s principles of non-selectivity, universality and equality.   
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to pass a last-minute motion postponing three non-controversial Canadian Draft 
Resolutions.
610
   
The OIC‘s flexing of its collective muscle, alongside that of their usual 
supporters
611
, sent a clear message to the Council. Power politics undoubtedly made 
an impact upon other members of the Council that witnessed this tactic. Morgenthau 
(1960:39) argued that all politics, including international affairs, can be categorised as 
one of three types: ―A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, 
or to demonstrate power‖. OIC members‘ behaviour at the Council clearly sought to 
achieve all three objectives. The OIC aimed to retain power by discouraging other 
states from challenging its power. It aimed to increase power through deterring other 
states from taking contradictory stances as Canada had done. It further demonstrated 
power through displaying its collective strength. Therefore, when it came to the 
language of the Resolution on Darfur, the Western states stood little chance of being 
able to convince other countries to stand against the OIC and African Group. 
 
 
8.4 Summary   
The human rights situation in Darfur was ongoing and grave, requiring the Council‘s 
attention from the body‘s outset. Unlike other situations, for example in Zimbabwe, 
the Council did focus attention on the gross and systemic abuses in Darfur. The body 
sought to discharge its protection, and indeed promotion, mandate through pre-
                                                 
610 One of which – HRC Res 2/5, ‗Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights‘, 28 
November 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/2/5 - was later negotiated to be presented the following day, and passed by 
consensus. The other two - HRC Draft Decision 2/L.44, ‗Darfur‘, 28 November 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/L.44 
and HRC Draft Decision 2/L.44, ‗Impunity‘, 28 November 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/L.38 - were presented at a 
different Council Session. 
611 Including Cuba, China and Russia. 
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existing and innovative mechanisms. The Council focused on the founding principles 
of cooperation, inclusiveness and dialogue with Sudan and its regional allies in the 
African Group. Despite the time and resources devoted to Darfur, there was little 
improvement on the ground. This chapter has presented a case study which 
demonstrates, through detailed analysis of Council sessions, that politicisation 
through regionalism prevented the body from adequately fulfilling its mandate. 
Political agendas, particularly protecting an ally and deflecting attention away from 
abuses within other allied states, resulted in weakened action on Darfur and less 
pressure on Sudan to fulfil its human rights obligations and implement 
recommendations.  
 
8.4.1 Mandate   
The Council utilised a number of tools and undertook various functions in attempting 
to fulfil its mandate. The body enabled fact-finding missions, information-sharing, 
dialogue between state and non-state actors, and support, advice, and capacity-
building for Sudan‘s government. All of these sought to protect victims of abuses 
within Darfur. The body further utilised its mechanisms, including convening a 
Special Session on Darfur, and sought to use its powers, including decisions and 
resolutions, to place pressure on the Sudanese government to comply with its human 
rights obligations. Alongside the UN-appointed Special Rapporteur on Sudan, the 
Council upheld a joint initiative between the EU and the African Group creating a 
Group of Experts on that region. The Group of Experts was an innovative mechanism 
aimed at discharging the Council‘s protection mandate and adhering to the principles 
of cooperation, inclusiveness and constructive dialogue. The Group‘s short existence, 
however, proved insufficient for its work to have a serious impact on the ground. 
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The body‘s attempts to discharge its mandate were repeatedly thwarted. Weak 
resolutions and decisions, particularly when compared with reports from such bodies 
as the Human Rights Committee or indeed with Council resolutions on states such as 
Israel, resulted in little political or other pressure on the Sudanese government. 
Arguably emboldened by the Council‘s weak attempts to fulfil its mandate, the 
government often ignored the body‘s work. For example, Sudan was expected to 
formally accept at least some of the recommendations made by the Group of Experts, 
but this did not occur in practice. In its final report, the Group of Experts concluded 
that  
 
―while certain recommendations have been partially implemented, it is not in a 
position to report that a clear impact on the ground has been identified. 
Regarding other recommendations, first steps towards implementation have 
been taken in some cases, whereas in others, recommendations remain to be 
implemented. The group of experts regrets that certain short term 
recommendations were not addressed by the Government at all or, in other 
cases, information provided was unrelated to them.‖612 
 
The Council did achieve some successes under its protection mandate, and 
indeed the Group of Experts did provide Sudan with important proposals and 
recommendations. One example where the Council effectively protected human rights 
was by improving the reporting requirements and procedures for rape victims. Those 
successes were, however, offset by continuing, and sometimes worsening, human 
right abuses. Hafner-Burton (2008) argues that naming and shaming of states for 
                                                 
612 ‗Interim report on the situation of human rights in Darfur prepared by the group of experts mandated by the 
Human Rights Council in its resolution 4/8‘, 22 September 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/6/7, p.3. 
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human rights violations results in some improvements regarding the abuses in the 
spotlight, but a worsening of other human rights abuses within that country. This 
analysis is supported when examining Sudan‘s human rights record in Darfur during 
the Council‘s early sessions. 
The failure of the Group of Experts to encourage ―concrete improvements on 
the ground in Darfur‖ 613 is representative of a more general problem with the 
Council‘s attempts to secure the cooperation of Sudan despite that state‘s clear 
disregard for the body‘s work. Attempts to ensure cooperation impacted upon the 
Council‘s work, for example by weakening both the language of decisions on the 
situation in Darfur and the pressure on Sudan to cease human rights violations. The 
Council‘s desire for inclusiveness did not achieve results on the ground because the 
Sudanese government failed to implement recommendations to which it had agreed 
and disregarded much of the body‘s work on Darfur. Sudan was supported in this 
stance by its allies, particularly within the OIC and the African Group.  
The promotion aspect of the Council‘s mandate was manipulated by states as a 
method for shifting focus away from the Sudanese government. The Council was 
constantly asked to focus on capacity-building and technical assistance despite the 
crisis situation requiring focus on the need for immediate protection of victims. These 
invocations were repeatedly made by states seeking to protect Sudan. Calls for further 
assistance for Sudan was a theme apparent within all discussions of Darfur, and one 
which masked the attempts by regional groups to block intervention. Furthermore, 
these calls for assistance often came from members of those alliances which were 
weakening attempts to intervene in Darfur. These statements often used a post-
                                                 
613 Id. 
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colonialist discourse, seeking to shift attention away from the Sudanese government 
by blaming the international community for the escalating and continuing crisis.  
 
8.4.2 Founding Principles   
The Council‘s attempts to discharge its mandate in relation to Darfur were constantly 
undermined by states seeking to protect Sudan for subjective and partial motives. The 
Council, therefore, saw its efforts to adhere to its founding principles of objectivity 
and impartiality thwarted by states, groups and blocs which sought to achieve their 
own aims.  
The Council did attempt to secure cooperation, inclusiveness and dialogue, all 
of which are founding principles. Cooperation was stressed in decisions and 
resolutions. However, emphasis on that principle was often used as an excuse to 
weaken the texts. Despite some states and groups, particularly the EU, seeking to 
ensure cooperation, a main obstacle was the Sudanese government‘s refusal to 
cooperate with the body (e.g. Schrijver, 2007). Sudan‘s constant downplaying – or, at 
times, outright denial - of its role in the atrocities being committed in Darfur was 
consistently strengthened by the comments and actions of the African Group, the OIC 
and other allied states such as Cuba and China.  
 
8.4.3 Politicisation   
A main tactic deployed by regional groups was collective voting to block action being 
taken against Sudan. Mirroring the same issue at the Commission, most of the states 
using these tactics at the Council themselves had somewhat dubious human rights 
records. Blocking action against Sudan furthered these states‘ national objectives by 
creating obstacles to similar Council scrutiny of their own records. 
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Another tactic was the OIC‘s use of its dominance at the Council to promote its 
policies on Sudan. The tactic of ostracising countries which vocalised their 
disagreement with the OIC‘s collective stance was employed to intimidate other non-
OIC states and to ensure that they did not speak out against the alliance‘s stance. 
States were given a clear message that disagreement with the OIC would result in 
repercussions beyond those particular discussions or issues. Reticence about 
disrupting relations with that influential group arguably went beyond repercussions at 
the Council. Fears of damaging economic, security, political, and other ties, resulted 
in a number of states, especially EU members, taking neutral positions on Darfur to 
avoid conflict with that group.  
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Chapter 9 - Innovative mechanisms 
 
Assessment of the Council requires an examination of the two new mechanisms. 
Universal Periodic Review was aimed at supporting Council efforts to universally 
promote human rights. Special Sessions were designed to enable protection of human 
rights within grave and crisis situations.  
 
 
9.1 Universal Periodic Review 
Universal Periodic Review, through its universality, directly deals with criticisms of 
selectivity and politicisation at the Council‘s predecessor (Callejon, 2008:334). 
Sweeney and Saito (2009:203) comment that the UPR is the one completely 
innovative mechanism that distinguishes the new body from the Commission. 
However, while the UPR has been mooted, and widely accepted, as an innovative 
mechanism (Callejon, 2008:334), Alston (2006:207) draws a historical parallel 
between the UPR and a 1950 proposal for a periodic review. Although this 
comparison has been criticised (cf. Abebe, 2009:5),
614
 I shall use it as a starting point 
for exploring the UPR‘s background. 
In 1950, France proposed a system to examine states‘ adherence to their 
human rights commitments. Yugoslavia raised the issue of capacity-building during 
these discussions, insisting that assistance be given to states lacking the national 
resources to implement human rights standards.
615
 That issue is still raised in relation 
                                                 
614 Arguing that there are few similarities between the two mechanisms. 
615 ‗Yugoslavia: Amendments to the Draft Resolution on Annual Reports (E/CN.4/L.266) Submitted by the United 
States of America‘, UN Doc E/CN.4/L.305/Rev.1 (1953) in ‗Report of the Ninth Session of the Commission on 
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 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.347 
 
to human rights and the expectations placed on weaker, particularly developing, 
states. Cold War tensions initially blocked the proposal, with Western and Latin 
American states
616
 fearing that ―democratic states‖ would be the sole countries to 
submit reports (Alston, 2006:208). In 1953, however, the US, seeking to deflect 
criticism from its pronouncement that it would not ratify human rights treaties,
617
 built 
on France‘s proposal, suggesting annual voluntary state reports on particular human 
rights issues (Alston, 2006:208-209). The US proposal particularly focused on fact-
finding, information-sharing, and the role of administrative staff and states in 
providing peer-led practical advice and guidance on implementing human rights 
standards (Alston, 2006:209).  
Neither proposal bore fruit until 1956. Even then, Alston (2006:211) 
comments, they were watered down in an effort to achieve compromise, resulting in a 
number of failings of the reporting system. These failings are key to understanding the 
UPR and the potential problems that it faces. State reports to the Commission 
regularly downplayed or ignored issues of compliance. The potential for such abuse 
stems from allowing states, rather than independent experts, to submit reports on their 
human right situations. Another main flaw was that rather than allowing the 
Secretary-General to analyse state reports, he was only mandated to summarise them. 
Alston (2006:212) comments that this undermined the reporting system‘s 
effectiveness. A third issue relevant for the UPR was that recommendations were 
qualified by the requirement that they be ―general and objective‖, thus limiting the 
ability of the mechanism to deal with specific human rights issues or situations 
(Alston 2006:212). 
                                                 
616 ‗Report of the Sixth Session of the Commission on Human Rights‘, 19 May 1950, UN Doc. E/1681, p.8. 
617 See Chapter 7, Section 7.1  
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 The Commission‘s reporting procedure lasted for 25 years, but made little 
impact on the protection and promotion of human rights. Alston (2006:213) 
comments that the procedure‘s ―achievements could readily be measured in terms of 
trees destroyed‖.  Its main success was to give the impression that governments were 
cooperating with the Commission. One of the UPR‘s main tasks will be to ensure that 
it does more than merely giving the appearance of human rights protection.  
Alston (2006:214) summarises four main lessons that the Council can learn 
from the Commission‘s review system: transparency and fairness; strong and reliable 
information; concise, focused recommendations tailored to individual situations; and 
tangible outcomes. This section examines the UPR, state positions taken during its 
creation, and its early sessions, in order to assess whether it has learned lessons from 
the previous review system and, indeed, has achieved its objectives.  
 
9.1.1 Background 
Adoption of a ―peer review‖ was first proposed by the then-Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan in April 2005
618
 during the Commission‘s final Session. The concept was 
introduced as part of Annan‘s proposal to replace the Commission (Schrijver, 
2007:814). The mechanism was intended to implement universal and indivisible 
human rights.
619
 The review was expected to assist the UN human rights machinery to 
overcome the Commission‘s politicisation and selectivity.620  
Alston (2006:207) notes the proposal‘s main attractions: universality; 
avoidance of the politicisation that had undermined the Commission; and provision of 
practical human rights support and advice. Peer review was expected to overcome 
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619 Secretary-General Report Addendeum (2005), supra n.76, para.6. 
620 Id. 
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selectivity by assessing every state‘s fulfilment of human rights obligations.621 Annan 
proposed that each country be reviewed periodically
622
 to ensure regular and universal 
application. The mechanism would thus avoid selectivity and politicisation as it would 
not single out known human rights abusers for scrutiny (Gaer, 2007:111). Rather than 
eliminating country scrutiny altogether, the review would place the burden of scrutiny 
on ―peers‖ – other member states (Gaer, 2007:110). Moreover, as it aimed to prevent 
any country from avoiding human rights scrutiny, the proposal was seen as the 
embodiment of a genuinely reformed human rights body (Gaer, 2007:110).  
Alston (2006:207) comments that ―peer review‖ has no meaning other than 
involvement of other states, despite the term‘s frequent use within international 
organisations. Annan did not expand upon the ―peer‖ element of his proposal, and the 
term ―peer review‖ was absent from Resolution 60/251 (Gaer, 2007:112) which 
instead required the Council to ―undertake a universal periodic review‖.623 Change 
from ―peer‖ to ―periodic‖ appears to have had little impact on the mechanism which, 
as shall be explored, undertakes a periodic and peer review of all states. It does, 
however allow other stakeholders to participate alongside states in the review 
(Callejon, 2008:334), although that participation is limited. Change in language 
perhaps reflects concerns regarding the phrase‘s lack of definition, or counters any 
potential state arguments about who constitutes a ―peer‖.  
Idealism featured prominently in Annan‘s proposals. Gaer (2007:113) 
comments that Annan, supported by Louise Arbour, had ―a grand vision‖ in which 
various UN mechanisms would be utilised to implement UN human rights norms and 
standards. However, little discussion occurred on the review‘s modalities, nor how it 
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622 Id., paras. 6 & 7. 
623 Supra n.6, para.5(e). 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.350 
 
would achieve the stated aims (Sweeney & Saito, 2009:204). Idealist language and 
hopes were expressed with little regard to the practicality, nor even the possibility, of 
implementation. Indeed, Annan failed to discuss whether or how the Universal 
Periodic Review, itself an intergovernmental mechanism, might avoid the same 
politicisation that it sought to help the UN human rights body to overcome (Sweeney 
& Saito, 2009:204). Perhaps, in the throes of idealistic vision, Annan did not consider 
the very possibility that UPR was always going to be placed under pressure as an 
inter-governmental mechanism mandated to conduct itself without politicisation. 
In keeping with Annan‘s idealist aims, the General Assembly‘s first 
pronouncement on the new mechanism
624
 stated that the ―Council shall have the 
ability to periodically review the fulfilment of all human rights obligations of all 
Member States‖.625 The August draft similarly called for periodic review of all human 
rights obligations of all states.
626
 However, the September draft downgraded the 
review from fulfilment of human rights obligations to compliance with such 
obligations (Gaer, 2007:111). Observers have noted the fundamental difference 
between ―fulfilment‖ and ―compliance‖ (e.g. Gaer, 2007:111), arguing that the former 
requires states to take proactive steps to ensure individuals‘ rights.627 These early 
                                                 
624 Draft released by the General Assembly President, dated 3 June 2005. 
625 GA Report, ‗Draft Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of 
September 2005 submitted by the President of the General Assembly‘, 8 June 2005, UN Doc. A/59/HLPM/CRP.1,  
para.88; See UN Press Release, ‗Assembly President Previews Possible Outcome of Summit on UN Reform‘, 3 
June 2005, available at: www.un.org/news. 
626 GA Report, ‗Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of 
September 2005 submitted by the President of the General Assembly, 10 August 2005, UN Doc. 
A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2, para.139. 
627 For more on this see, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 16, ‗The 
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (Article 3)‘, 11 August 
2005, UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4; Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 31, ‗The Nature of the General 
Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant‘, 26 May 2004, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, 
para.192. 
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changes mirror the Commission‘s review procedure, whereby key elements for 
protecting and promoting human rights were undermined or downplayed in order to 
maintain state support for the fledgling proposal.  
All states saw UPR as a mechanism that would deal with the UN human rights 
machinery‘s credibility issues after the Commission‘s demise. As a universal 
procedure it was expected that no states, not even powerful or well-connected 
countries, would be able to avoid scrutiny (Gaer, 2007:110). However, the North-
South divide demonstrated different motivations for wanting the UPR and different 
expectations for the mechanism‘s outcomes. Steiner, et al (2008:806) comment that 
the UPR was heralded by developing countries, particularly the Like Minded Group, 
as they had opposed the Commission‘s selective focus on grave violations within a 
few states. UPR offered a universal mechanism that would focus on a range of human 
rights abuses, not just gross and systemic situations. Western Governments and NGOs 
also welcomed UPR as an opportunity to hold regular, in-depth reviews on all states‘ 
human rights records (Steiner et al, 2008:806). Alston (2006:206) comments that in 
practice, there will be divergence between North and South expectations. Western 
states will seek probing reviews resulting in critical country-specific 
recommendations. Developing states will seek a general, open-ended, non-
condemnatory process. Alston (2006:206), writing before the UPR‘s first cycle, 
argued that the mechanism will ultimately be shaped by states not aligned with the 
North or South, such as Latin American countries and those African states not 
members of the OIC. That assertion was correct to a certain extent, as will be 
demonstrated through examining the debates on the UPR‘s creation and modalities, as 
well as its early sessions. 
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9.1.2 UPR Creation 
Canada circulated two non-papers
628
 on Peer Review during 2005 (Gaer, 2007:113). 
The first offered two approaches for the review - the Comprehensive Approach and 
the Interactive Dialogue.
629
 Gaer (2007:114) explains that the Comprehensive 
Approach
630
 comprised compiling a comprehensive state report, giving 
recommendations, a formal interactive dialogue, and publication of conclusions. The 
Interactive Dialogue proposed a three-hour discussion of a state‘s pre-published 
statement on its national human rights situation, with extra information made 
available by the OHCHR,
631
 with a published summary to which the concerned states 
could respond within six months (Gaer, 2007:114). The latter was a simpler but less 
rigorous approach (Gaer, 2007:114).  
Canada‘s second non-paper combined the two approaches. OHCHR would 
compile all available information on the reviewed state to which that state would 
respond. A committee ―of experts appointed by the [12] ‗peer states‘‖ would hold an 
interactive dialogue, with a state presentation, questions and comments, and state 
response. A summary would be published to which the state could respond. All 
documents would then be submitted to the Council (Gaer, 2007:115). 
Canada‘s proposals clearly guided and shaped the UPR, as I shall demonstrate 
when examining the mechanism‘s modalities. Although not explicitly stated by 
Canada, that country hoped that UPR would enable the UN human rights body to 
                                                 
628 Non-papers are authoritative but unofficial documents used to present ideas about and test state reactions to 
policies. 
629 Id.  p.114 
630 based on OECD, ILO, and World Trade Organisation peer review mechanisms, as well as the African Peer 
Review Mechanism. 
631 Such as treaty body reports, information from other procedures, and statements from interested parties. 
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move away from politicisation and towards cooperation (Gaer, 2007:115). Canada, a 
Western and developed state, aligned itself with a typically South position that 
naming, shaming and blaming states achieves less than encouraging a cooperative 
culture of practical assistance. Canada does have a strong reputation at the UN for its 
peacekeeping initiatives, and is seen as a benign Western nation by many developing 
countries and groups. Therefore, Canada‘s taking up the South‘s mantle in this regard 
is not wholly surprising. Canada has nevertheless found itself ostracised at the 
Council by some developing groups owing to its position on Israel.
632
 Canada‘s 
general position against naming, shaming and blaming, and its interest in avoiding 
politicisation particularly regarding country-specific issues, was mirrored in its 
proposals for the UPR.  
 The UPR‘s general outline was established by GA Resolution 60/251. 
However, the modalities were left to the Council, with only guiding principles and 
concepts set out in paragraph 5(e), which says that the Council shall: 
 
―Undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable 
information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations and 
commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal 
treatment with respect to all States; the review shall be a cooperative 
mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the 
country concerned and with consideration given to its capacity-building needs; 
such a mechanism shall complement and not duplicate the work of treaty 
bodies; the Council shall develop the modalities and necessary time allocation 
                                                 
632 See Chapter 8, Section 8.3.4 
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for the universal periodic review mechanism within one year after the holding 
of its first session‖633 
 
Alston (2006:207) comments that Resolution 60/251 ―faithfully reflects‖ Annan‘s 
vision. However, as with Annan‘s original proposal, the Resolution sets out nothing 
more than the mechanism‘s general skeleton. Annan‘s Explanatory Note on the 
Council‘s creation634 added a similarly vague and broad statement; that the UPR 
should give ―an evaluation of fulfilment of all human rights for all persons.‖635 The 
language used reflects idealist language found in other UN documents. Ghanea 
(2006:703) comments that such idealist language is ―worrisome‖, particularly as 
requiring cooperation will reduce the Council‘s ability to deal with the gravest 
situations where an abuser state is unlikely to cooperate with the Council.  
Rather than dealing with the UPR‘s specifics, Resolution 60/251 directed the 
Council on certain fundamental criteria that it should fulfil: it should be based on 
objective and reliable information; it must review state fulfilment of human rights 
obligations and commitments; the review must ensure universality of coverage and 
equal treatment of all states, with consideration given to a state‘s capacity-building 
needs; it shall be a cooperative mechanism; and it involves an interactive dialogue 
with the state‘s full involvement.636   
Interpreting this idealist language, and ensuring practical implementation of 
these requirements, presented various issues, including: the information to be used; 
                                                 
633 Supra n.6,  para.5(e). 
634 Supra n.76, para.6. 
635 Id. 
636 Although the UPR‘s relationship with treaty body mechanisms shall not be explored in this thesis, it must be 
noted that Resolution 60/251 went beyond earlier stipulations that the mechanism not interfere with the system of 
reporting to treaty bodies, instead directing that the procedure ―shall complement and not duplicate the work of the 
treaty bodies‖.  
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involvement of the state; how to ensure universal coverage and equal treatment; 
UPR‘s interactions with Council plenary sessions; and the formal reports to be 
submitted.
 
North-South tensions existed from the outset, with developing nations and 
groups taking very different positions to Western and other developed countries. One 
example was the debate on whether non-ratified treaty obligations should form part of 
the review. Reviewing a state‘s universal coverage of human rights obligations was 
innovative, and can be contrasted with treaty body reviews which only deal with 
states‘ obligations under ratified treaties (Gaer, 2007:125). Treaty ratifications vary 
greatly.
637
 Gaer (2007:125) comments, for example, that many Asian states are not 
parties to the Convention Against Torture. Unsurprisingly, states arguing that the 
UPR should not examine obligations under non-ratified treaties were invariably 
themselves, or allied with states, not party to such treaties. Algeria (African Group) 
said that ―[n]o State can be held accountable for obligations pertaining to a treaty that 
they have not ratified‖.638 Singapore argued that the resolution ―clearly precludes 
judging States against treaties and conventions that they have not ratified, since they 
are neither obligated to fulfil them nor have made a commitment to do so…. Instead, 
the review should examine broader obligations under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as well as commitments made by individual States, such as the 
voluntary pledges made while seeking membership in the [Council].‖639  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
637 For example, 192 states are party to the CRC, 141 to CAT and only 34 to the CMW. 
638 Algeria, Oral Statement (on behalf of the African Group), 21 July 2006. 
639 Singapore, Oral Statement, 21 July 2006. 
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9.1.3 Finalising the UPR 
One of the Council‘s initial tasks was to establish the UPR‘s modalities. An open-
ended working group,
640
 comprised of state delegates rather than independent experts, 
was established to create the mechanism‘s modalities. Morocco‘s Ambassador 
Mohammed Loulichki was appointed as facilitator. It held numerous meetings and 
consultations, including a one-day conference in Switzerland, during which Canada‘s 
proposals were examined at length and presentations given on similar review 
processes (Scannella & Splinter, 2007: 63-64). The modalities were drafted over three 
sessions in 2006-2007, and were observed to have been ―the least contentious 
component of the institution-building phase.‖ (Sweeney & Saito, 2009:205)  
Abebe (2009:3), an Ethiopian delegate to the Council, comments that 
institution-building was heavily dominated by political agendas, with only ―a minimal 
professional and expert input.‖ Creating the UPR mechanism followed similar 
patterns to, but to a lesser extent than, other institution-building tasks, perhaps owing 
to the central importance of ensuring the mechanism‘s success. Key areas of 
divergence included concern about the roles of NGOs and independent experts, the 
sources of information to be used, and the composition of the Working Group 
facilitating the review.
641
 It was determined that the UPR would be an evolving 
mechanism, with its modalities reviewed at the end of the first four-year cycle 
(Callejon, 2008:337).  
                                                 
640 Human Rights Council Decision 1/103, ‗The Universal Periodic Review‘, 30 June 2006, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/DEC/1/103  
641 For critical summaries, see ISHR‘s ‗Overview reports of the Working Group sessions‘ and ‗Daily Highlights of 
the final session of the Working Group‘, available at: 
http://www.ishr.ch/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=248&Itemid=444) 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.357 
 
The facilitator‘s final non-paper642 was reproduced in the IBP to enshrine the 
UPR‘s modalities. Sweeney and Saito (2009:205) argue that consensus on this 
document was easily achieved as the mechanism‘s success was recognised as key for 
the Council‘s success (Sweeney & Saito, 2009:205). The need for consensus was 
particularly important to give credibility to this new mechanism. Without such 
consensus the UPR would have been weakened both in practice and in the eyes of the 
UN and observers. 
 
 
9.1.3.1 How It Works 
UPR is not based on a treaty or legal instrument; its legal foundations are Resolution 
60/251 and the IBP. As Resolution 60/251 simply set out the UPR‘s general 
principles and objectives, the IBP must be examined to understand how the 
mechanism works. Part I of the IBP identifies the roles, functions, principles and 
objectives of the review. It then sets out the modalities, including: periodicity and 
order of the review, process and modalities of the review, documents to be used, and 
the review‘s outcome and follow-up. Each UPR Working Group session reviews 16 
States. Three reviews take place per year, thus covering 48 States, with all states 
reviewed during the four year cycle.  
The first stage involves gathering and collating information on the reviewed 
state‘s human rights situation. State cooperation is an essential component of the 
process. Many states viewed UPR as a cooperative rather than confrontational 
mechanism, as is reflected in the IBP‘s emphasis on cooperation (Callejon, 2008:335). 
It has been generally accepted that states are obligated to participate in the process, 
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and as such there are no provisions for how to deal with a state that does not engage 
with the mechanism (Abebe 2009:7). However, it has been argued that requiring a 
―cooperative mechanism‖ may cause problems (Gaer, 2007:137) as much of the 
UPR‘s success, or otherwise, depends on the nature and quality of the documents used 
to conduct the review (Callejon, 2008:336). State cooperation is key to the collation 
of such material. Gaer (2007:137) argues that the UPR‘s ambiguity on state 
cooperation, and the conflicting visions of the Council‘s general role in protecting and 
promoting human rights, casts doubt on whether such issues will be adequately 
resolved to allow the UPR to achieve its objectives. 
 States‘ national reports are limited to twenty pages. The General Guidelines643 
require a brief description of a state‘s human rights situations, the challenges it faces 
and the assistance it requires. Abebe (Abebe 2009:10) comments that requiring states 
―to present a colossal and factually dense report‖ would have been burdensome. This 
is particularly true for poorer countries. Presenting a major report would also take 
longer, thus limiting the number of reviewed states per session. The General 
Guidelines require national reports to set out the ―broad consultation process followed 
for the preparation of information provided‖.644 Alongside the national report, the 
review considers the OHCHR‘s compilation ten page report of UN information645 and 
the OHCHR‘s ten page summary of ―credible and reliable information provided by 
                                                 
643  ―As their name indicates, the guidelines include general requirements, inter alia the normative and institutional 
framework, particularly the scope of international human rights obligations identified as the basis of the review 
and their implementation, identification of achievements, best practices, challenges and constraints. The guidelines 
also include a description of the methodology and the consultation process at the national level, which should 
ensure consultation of civil society by the concerned State.‖ (Callejon, 2008:337). 
644 Human Rights Council Decision 6/102, ‗General Guidelines for the Preparation of Information Under the 
Universal Periodic Review‘, 27 September 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/DEC/6/102, para.A 
645 HRC Res 5/1 (2007), supra n.173, para.15(b) stating ‗information contained in the reports of treaty bodies, 
special procedures, including observations and comments by the State concerned, and other relevant official 
United Nations documents‘. 
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other relevant stakeholders‖. As Callejon (2008:337) notes, the OHCHR has a 
difficult task in condensing the collated information into ten pages. 
The UPR Working Group, consisting of all Council members and observer 
states, conducts the three-hour review, led by the Troika of rapporteur states. The 
Troika
646
 consists of three Council members, drawn by lots, each from different 
regional groups. Conducting the review with all Council members sitting as a working 
group rather than at a plenary session was a compromise to allow all members to 
participate without taking time away from other Council matters (Callejon 2008:334). 
A reviewed state may request that one troika member be from its own region, 
enabling countries to have a regional ally that understands its cultural sensitivities 
and/or issues relating to capacities for human rights protection and promotion. All 
African countries, bar Ghana, selected for review did indeed request a regional 
rapporteur during the UPR‘s first two sessions (Abebe, 2009:14). Conversely, a state 
may decline a position on the troika, as occurred where Pakistan declined to be part of 
the Troika reviewing India, owing to the long-standing political tensions between 
those two countries.  
The reviewed state‘s presentation is followed by comments, questions and 
recommendations from other states which the concerned state may respond to at any 
stage. NGOs do not actively participate in the review.
647
 The OHCHR compiles an 
outcome report within two days for the troika‘s and the reviewed state‘s approval. The 
report summarises which, if any, recommendations the state initially accepts or 
rejects. The state may reserve judgement on any or all recommendations. The report is 
then presented to the UPR Working Group for editing and adoption. At the next 
                                                 
646 Id. para.18(d). 
647 NGOs are entitled to observe the review in the room, and may conduct parallel events at the time of the review 
in the Working Group, but they are only entitled to take the floor later during the consideration and adoption of 
reports in the Council plenary. 
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scheduled Council Session, the report is considered and adopted. The reviewed state 
has two minutes to present its acceptance, rejection or reservation on 
recommendations and reasons, which are recorded in an amendment to the original 
draft as are states‘ written submissions. Member and Observer States are allowed to 
make comments on the outcome of the review and NGOs make ―general comments‖. 
These contributions are summarised in the report of the Council session and included 
in the final report, which is then formally adopted by the Council. 
 
9.1.3.2 Basis of the Review  
UPR is based on a number of instruments: the UN Charter, the UDHR, UN human 
rights treaties to which a state is party, a range of human rights regardless of treaty 
ratification, and states‘ voluntary pledges and commitments.648 Redondo emphasises 
the review‘s comprehensiveness as it incorporates legally binding and non-legally 
binding human rights standards. For example, voluntary commitments and pledges, 
take on a greater importance during the UPR than, for example as membership 
criteria. Some countries
649
 argued for international humanitarian law to be included, 
whereas other states
650
 insisted that review‘s basis should be exclusively human rights 
norms (Abebe, 2009:5-6). The IBP provides that UPR should take IHL into 
account.
651
 However, IHL often relates to issues such as conflict situations, and its 
relationship with human rights is not agreed upon by all states,
 
thus its inclusion could 
cause difficulties. Callejon (2008:336) comments that inclusion of IHL was outside of 
                                                 
648 Supra n.173, para.1 
649 For example, Switzerland. 
650 Including members of the African Group and some Western countries such as the US. 
651 Supra n.173, para.2 
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the Council‘s mandate as it does not have the competency to deal with this body of 
law. 
A broad consultation is undertaken with NGOs and other stakeholders, as set 
out in the General Guidelines. OHCHR summarises and publishes these submissions 
on its website. The summary is an official UN document, giving it more weight than 
NGO submissions to other treaty bodies. Sweeney and Saito (2009:207) note that 
most NGOs are satisfied with these summaries. The African Group, alongside other 
developing nations, argued against NGO involvement, emphasising the need for a 
peer-led mechanism (Abebe, 2009:10). Such positions were perhaps motivated from 
fear that NGO submissions would disproportionately affect developing nations. 
Poorer states, and countries with newer and weaker democracies, let alone those with 
autocratic rule, invariably have graver and more widespread human rights issues than 
richer, more democratic – i.e. Western – states. Developing nations might also argue 
that many of the main NGOs follow Western, liberal notions of human rights, and are 
funded by supporters and governments that push such rights. Although NGO 
involvement was enshrined in the IBP, the deadline for submissions has been far 
earlier than for state submissions.
652
  There are a number of practical considerations 
for this discrepancy, but it has caused some difficulties (Sweeney & Saito, 2009:207). 
Clearly, despite involvement, NGOs are not equal players in the UPR process. 
 The OHCHR‘s role includes overall supervision of the process, advice to the 
troika, as well as collection and compilation of information. A number of states 
contested such strong involvement, arguing that the process should be peer-led rather 
than directed by an administrative body. African countries argued that the OHCHR 
                                                 
652 The deadline for the 3rd and 4th sessions was five months prior to the review. It is six months prior to the 
review for the 5th session and seven months for the 6th session, see: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/NewDeadlines.aspx 
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―is not adequately accountable to Member States of the United Nations and its 
function is highly influenced by members of the Western Group and civil society 
organisations.‖ (Abebe, 2009:8) Despite this argument, the OHCHR‘s role remains 
integral. However, such discussions demonstrate the North-South divide, and 
developing nations‘ ongoing position that the UN was set up by imperialist, Western 
states for imperialist, Western states.  
 
9.1.3.3 UPR and Politicisation 
Gaer (2007:135) notes that, from the outset, states and non-state actors hoped that the 
UPR would ensure fair scrutiny of human rights in all states, and as such enhance UN 
human rights‘ credibility. In particular, the requirement for all member states to be 
reviewed was central to fulfilment of these expectations (Gaer, 2007:135). 
Universality and equal coverage distinguishes UPR from the treaty body review 
mechanisms already in place. However, the UN tends to view universality as devoting 
equal time, treatment and resources (Gaer, 2007:137). That view is problematic, as it 
can result in too much attention being devoted to states which do not proportionately 
require it while gross and systemic violations are occurring elsewhere (Gaer, 
2007:137). As has been discussed, the need for proportionate treatment is in many 
ways more important than equality.  
As a state-driven mechanism, UPR is an intergovernmental mechanism. 
Abebe comments that it is therefore ―a profoundly political undertaking.‖ (Abebe, 
2009:8)  Although the OHCHR plays a supervisory and information-sharing role and 
NGOs are consulted during the process, UPR remains a state-led process. Indeed, 
human rights experts are deliberately excluded from direct participation (Abebe, 
2009:8),
 
leaving states to analyse the information and prepare the outcome reports and 
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recommendations. It is analysis that is key to the process, as much of the information 
used in the UPR has already been shared within the UN human rights machinery 
(Gaer, 2007:136). Clearly, the modalities leave much room for potential politicisation, 
either through direct tactics used to protect allies, or indirectly through lack of 
expertise amongst the troika. 
Indeed, the troika rapporteur states placed a large reliance on their Geneva-
based diplomats, particularly developing states which could not afford to bring 
experts over to Switzerland for the review. Reliance on diplomats impacted upon the 
expertise and effectiveness of the troika, resulting in visible discrepancies depending 
on the troika‘s composition (Abebe, 2009:22-23). The outcome of each review 
depends on the troika‘s knowledge and expertise, and their protection from pressure 
or influence from the reviewed state or its allies. Gaer argues that the UN secretariat‘s 
role in this regard is essential, as is the information and expertise provided by NGOs 
and other relevant stakeholders (Gaer, 2007:136). 
 
 
9.1.4 The First Cycle 
The first UPR session was delayed from 2007 until April 2008. Thirty two states
653
 
were selected
654
 for the first two review sessions. The first review took place despite 
                                                 
653 States under review at the first session were, in order: Bahrain, Ecuador, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, Finland, 
the United Kingdom, India, Brazil, Philippines, Algeria, Poland, the Netherlands, South Africa, the Czech 
Republic and Argentina. States under review at the second session were, in order: Gabon, Ghana, Peru, Guatemala, 
Benin, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Pakistan, Zambia, Japan, Ukraine, Sri Lanka, France, Tonga, Romania and 
Mali. See the OHCHR extranet at: 
http://portal.ohchr.org/portal/page/portal/HRC_Extranet/6thSession/OralStatements/210907/Tab16 and 
ISHR, Daily Update, 21 September 2007, available at: 
http://www.ishr.ch/hrm/council/daily_updates/session006/21september2007.pdf 
654 The selection process, which accounts for geographical representation, the percentage of Council member and 
observer States and the status of development of States, was inordinately complex and required the creation of an 
algorithmic software programme that many delegations found very difficult to comprehend. For a summary 
explanation, as well as State and NGO responses, see ‗Main steps to be taken regarding the establishment of the 
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various procedural issues remaining (Abebe, 2009:8). A majority of states wished to 
begin the exercise whilst simultaneously conducting negotiations and consultations on 
the remaining issues.
655
 The Working Group made a number of procedural decisions, 
on issues where the IBP was silent, during the first session in order to enable the 
reviews to take place (Abebe, 2009:9). 
Although Switzerland and Colombia volunteered for review during the first 
session of the UPR Working Group, the order of review for other states was done by 
drawing lots. OHCHR designed a mathematical model for selection that take into 
account considerations such as regional representation, reviewing Council‘s members 
during their term of membership and accommodating volunteers.  
Reviewed states mainly had large delegations often including ministerial level 
representatives,
656
 demonstrating the seriousness afforded to the process (Sweeney & 
Saito, 2009:209). Abebe (2009:12) notes that the Council, OHCHR and states stressed 
the importance of ministerial representation, although the general feeling was that 
states should determine, rather than be directed, who to send. The types of Ministers 
representing states signified how the countries viewed the UPR. For example, 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs sent by Bahrain, Indonesia and Algeria showed that they 
viewed the UPR as a foreign relations exercise (Sweeney & Saito, 2009:209). Other 
states sent Ministers of Justice, thus affording the process the national legal clout that 
it deserved.  
                                                                                                                                            
UPR work programme (for the first year): draft Note from the Secretariat - version 11, 12 September 2008‘ on the 
OHCHR extranet. For a summary of the simulation process, see ISHR, Daily Updates, 12 and 19 September 2008, 
available at: http://www.ishr.ch/index.php?option=com.content&task=view&id=115&Itemid=176 
655 For example, the troika members‘ responsibilities prior to the actual review, the length of states‘ speaking time, 
and the preparations of the report of the Working Group, all required last-minutes decisions. 
656 For example, India--Solicitor General, the Netherlands--Secretary of State for Justice, Ecuador--Minister of 
Justice, Tunisia--Minister of Justice, Morocco--Minister of Justice, Finland--Secretary of State, and the United 
Kingdom--Minister of State. 
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Although each report was allocated one hour,
657
 Argentina, Ghana, Peru, Sri 
Lanka and Romania
658
 used at least double the allocated 20 minutes when presenting 
their reports, reducing the time for interactive dialogue (Sweeney & Saito, 2009:209-
210). Time constraints, particularly where state presentations overran the allocated 
period, resulted in many states being unable to participate in the interactive dialogue 
(Abebe, 2009:13). Some reasons for this will be examined in the following 
subsections, particularly in terms of politicisation of the UPR and the tactics used to 
fill a state‘s allocated time.  
Another issue was how reviewed states dealt with questions submitted through 
the troika. If states submitted written questions, the troika could amalgamate similar 
questions, or ask them in such an order as to allow various issues to be addressed. 
However, written questions were used almost exclusively by Western states, and even 
these states sometimes took the floor to repeat the questions where the reviewed 
country had not allocated time to deal with written questions (Abebe, 1009:13). Most 
states did not allocate time for written questions, and even where states did do so such 
questions were far less likely to be answered by the reviewed state than questions 
posed from the floor. Only the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan and South 
Korea directly responded to written questions (Sweeney & Saito, 2009:210). Ireland, 
noting the ineffectiveness in submitting written questions at the first session, changed 
tack and asked questions from the floor during the second session.
659
  Sweeney and 
Saito (2009:210) argue that circumvention of the troika changed those states‘ role 
                                                 
657 ‗Modalities and practices for the universal periodic review process‘, 9 April 2008, UN Doc. 8/PRST/1, para.7. 
This was a more flexible approach than the initial allocation by the President of 30 minutes for the presentation 
and 30 minutes for responses to questions. 
658 Whose Ambassador was the Council President who had allocated the time period for state presentation of 
national reports. 
659 See the compilation by UPR-info.org of state interventions related to human rights defenders, available at: 
http://www.upr-info.org/IMG/pdf/IA.HumanRightsDefenders_S1-2.pdf 
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from being independent rapporteurs to ―simply rubberstamp[ing] the draft outcome 
reports‖ after the review. 
 
9.1.4.1 The Initial Sessions  
The UPR Working Group‘s First Session was held in April 2008. The first review, of 
Bahrain, saw a tactic that had been previously deployed in Council sessions, whereby 
allied states fill the list of speakers in order to give positive responses to the state 
concerned. Such allies included Palestine, India, Pakistan, Qatar, Tunisia, the United 
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia, Algeria, Libya and Cuba, filled the 
list of speakers. Tunisia‘s review heard from so many of its allies660 ―that it appeared 
an exercise in filibustering‖ (Sweeney & Saito, 2009:210). This tactic undermined the 
process through blocking other states from asking questions or giving objective 
feedback. Moreover, it gave the impression that both reviewed states were beyond 
reproach and required few, if any, recommendations. The UPR‘s main objective, to 
―improve of the human rights situation on the ground‖, was severely undermined, as 
was the credibility of the mechanism. Both of these states are OIC members. That 
group frequently employs a tactic whereby group statements are repeated by many 
members in order to give the impression that the position is widely held. Council 
sessions are limited in time, but not nearly as restricted as UPR sessions. The impact 
of this tactic was even stronger at the first UPR session than during regular Council 
sessions. It resulted in few non-OIC members able to take the floor during these two 
states‘ reviews.    
                                                 
660 The first 15 countries to speak in the interactive dialogue were Kuwait, Palestine, Pakistan, Philippines, Chad, 
Saudi Arabia, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, China, India, Madagascar, Ghana, Mauritania, Bangladesh and 
Angola, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/21 (2008), paras.12-26. 
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 Tunisia‘s report demonstrated the lack of finalised modalities. An argument 
ensued on where to record recommendations rejected by the reviewed state. States 
disagreed with listing rejected recommendations in the paragraph containing final 
conclusions and recommendations as that would give rise to misperceptions. It was 
agreed instead that a separate paragraph would contain those recommendations 
rejected by the reviewed state (Abebe, 2009:15). That solution reflected the 
importance of achieving compromise in order to support the mechanism. 
Another issue related to recommendations arose in regard to attribution to the 
state making them. Western countries, in particular, routinely made recommendations 
as part of their statements (Abebe, 2009:16). The African Group argued that including 
recommendations without attributing them to the recommending state gave the 
impression that it had been accepted by all Working Group members. This was 
especially problematic for politically sensitive issues such as recommendations on the 
right to sexual orientation. The solution provided a compromise acceptable to all. That 
allows factual reporting of proceedings rather than giving misleading perceptions. 
The UPR Working Group‘s Second Session was held in May 2008. By the 
second UPR session, smaller states ―were less inclined to engage in interactive 
dialogues with states from regions other than their own.‖ (Sweeney & Saito, 
2009:211)
 
 Less powerful states were perhaps disinterested in other regions‘ affairs, or 
reticent about offending more powerful states and thus impacting upon their national 
interests. Other than Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, all of whom were influential OIC 
members with large numbers of political allies, African states rarely took part in non-
African interactive dialogues.
661
 To a lesser degree, GRULAC and Asian states, 
themselves slightly more powerful than African nations, stuck to dialogues on their 
                                                 
661 For example, in the review of Gabon, 13 of the 36 States that provided comments were from the African Group, 
whereas in the review of Peru, Algeria was the only African State to provide comments. 
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respective regional groups.
662
 However, EU states, major players on the world stage, 
tended to join most interactive debates. It is therefore somewhat ironic that Abebe 
(2009:3-4) argues that the UPR demonstrates that the Council offers African states the 
opportunity to go from being subjects of a condemnatory system to being participants 
in the human rights forum. 
A pattern emerges whereby weaker states, mindful of the power politics at 
stake and the potential ramifications of criticising other states, withdrew from the 
process, whereas stronger states felt better placed to voice opinions. Sweeney and 
Saito argue that lack of participation might reflect some states‘ lack of interest in 
human rights (Sweeney & Saito, 2009:211). While this may be true to some extent, 
many weaker states do join Council discussions at regular sessions on topics unrelated 
to their national or political interests. It seems more likely, from a realist perspective, 
that the UPR provides little incentive for weaker states to involve themselves in 
discussions which might affect other national interests. Unlike Council sessions, 
which are widely reported on and where taking a stance may further a state‘s 
reputation, the UPR sessions are less scrutinised and therefore criticisms earn little 
reward but carry a large risk to a state‘s foreign affairs.  
 
9.1.4.2 Politicisation and Other Issues 
Various tactics were used to deflect attention from sensitive issues or to protect states 
from particular scrutiny. Regionalism occurred within the UPR process in much the 
same way as it has throughout Council sessions and proceedings. Regionalism was 
once again particularly utilised by African and OIC members to protect allied states.  
                                                 
662 Of the GRULAC States, only Brazil, Mexico and Cuba tended to continually engage cross-regionally. Of the 
Asian Group, consistent cross-regional engagement was evident from Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Azerbaijan. 
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Use of multiple positive statements, often filling the allocated time, 
undermined the review‘s ability to improve human rights situations within reviewed 
states. Moreover, most statements contained both positive and critical comments and 
questions, with the positive aspects using valuable time that might better have been 
spent dealing with issues or offering practical advice. The first two sessions saw far 
more compliments than criticisms, with the percentage of positive comments by states 
far outweighing criticisms.
663
 Sweeney and Saito (2009:212)
 
note that the report on 
Sri Lanka, a state with gross and systemic abuses of human rights,
664
 heard more 
positive comments than critical interventions.
665
 One potential reform that would 
undermine the use of this tactic would be restricting oral statements to questions, 
criticisms or advice.  
Another example of politicisation occurred, again, through an OIC member 
using ―cultural sensitivities‖ to undermine human rights. Ecuador did not object to the 
recommendation on sexual discrimination during its review. However, Egypt argued 
that sexual orientation did not fall within the terms of the review unless it was 
included in a particular state‘s ―voluntary pledges and commitments‖,666 telling 
Ecuador that it could not accept the recommendation. That intervention undermined 
the UPR‘s central aim; effectively blocking the promotion of this right by diverting 
the discussion away from providing technical or advisory assistance. Egypt‘s 
                                                 
663 In the case of Brazil, for example, positive comments were approximately 10 times more numerous than critical 
observations. 
664 See, for example, Amnesty International, (2008b), examining ongoing gross and systemic violations occurring 
at the same time as Sri Lanka‘s UPR session. 
665 ‗Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Sri Lanka‘, 5 June 2008, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/8/46. For a summary of positive and: and critical statements, see 
http://www.ishr.ch/hrm/council/upr/upr_2nd_session_2008/upr_002_sri¨lanka_final.pdf  
666 For a summary of this debate, see ISHR, Monitor, Universal Periodic Review, 1st session Ecuador - Adoption 
of the report at 7-9, available at: 
http://www.ishr.ch/hrm/council/upr/upr_1st_session_2008/upr_001_ecuador_final.pdf 
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underlying motivation was to ensure that issues of sexual discrimination would not be 
raised with regard to itself or its OIC or African Group allies, many of which 
routinely discriminate on the grounds of gender or sexual orientation.
667
 Once again, 
―cultural values‖ were deployed in an attempt to avoid scrutiny. Sweeney and Saito 
(2009:212) claim that the intervention indicates attempts may occur for states to reject 
recommendations on the basis that, as Pakistan argued, they do not concern 
―universally recognised human rights principles‖.668 However, Pakistan‘s assertion 
can be easily refuted, for example using the UN Human Rights Committee‘s 
jurisprudence which has clearly accepted the universality of the right to sexual 
orientation.
669
 
One method employed to avoid scrutiny was ignoring an issue altogether. 
States are not required to answer questions during the interactive dialogue, resulting 
in selective responses to the issues raised. States often answered questions in clusters, 
thus allowing them to select questions. Some states
670
 allowed so many questions 
within each cluster that they avoided the majority of issues raised. Sweeney and Saito 
(2009:211) note that in the second session Gabon took all of the questions at the end 
rather than in clusters, yet it too avoided addressing many issues raised. As 
                                                 
667 See, Chapter 1, Section 1.1.1  
668 See ‗Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Pakistan‘, 4 June 2008, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/8/42, para.108, referring to recommendations in paras 23(b) on repealing provisions criminalising non-
marital consensual sex and failing to recognise marital rape recommendation made by Canada; 23(f) on 
decriminalising defamation (Canada); 30(b) on reviewing the death penalty with a view towards introducing a 
moratorium and abolishing it (United Kingdom); 30(d) on repealing the Hadood and Zina Ordnances (United 
Kingdom); 43(c) on declaring a moratorium on executions and moving towards abolition (Switzerland); 62(b) on 
decriminalising adultery and non-marital consensual sex (the Czech Republic); and 62(e) on prohibiting provisions 
of the Qisas and Diyat law in cases of honour killings (the Czech Republic). 
669 See, for example, Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 
(1994), ruling that sexual orientation is protected under General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), ‗International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights‘, 16 December 1966, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force 23 March 
1976, Articles 17(1) and 2(1). 
670 Including India, Brazil and Guatemala. 
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recommendations have already been made by the time of the interactive dialogue, 
states have little reason to answer difficult or sensitive questions as it will not affect 
the review‘s outcome (Sweeney &Saito 2009:211). 
Certain states asked the same questions at each interactive dialogue, which 
were often too broad to be of direct assistance to the review. The UK, for example, 
included a question on the role of civil society in the preparation of the national report 
while Slovenia asked a general question on gender integration. Standard, broad 
questions were perhaps aimed at avoiding selectivity, but they risk undermining the 
review‘s objective of dealing with each state individually. Interestingly, Western 
states frequently asked these broad questions, perhaps to pre-empt the South‘s 
assertion that developed nations use human rights machinery as a neo-colonial tool of 
oppression against developing states.  
Western states, despite their general power and strength, are in a minority at 
the Council. EU countries are particularly mindful to avoid conflict at the body. 
Western states‘ approach to the UPR has perhaps been overly careful to avoid 
accusations of selectivity or criticism of developing nations. One serious implication 
of that tactic according to Abebe (2009:20), an Ethiopian delegate to the Council, is 
that countries may interpret this as meaning that there are no criticisms of their 
national human rights. Interpreting lack of criticism as tacit approval may negatively 
affect a state‘s human rights, possibly resulting in a worse situation than if the review 
had not taken place. 
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9.2. Innovative Mechanisms - Special Sessions 
The Council‘s ability to deal with crises is central to the new body. However, Ghanea 
(2006:703) comments that negotiations on Special Sessions were somewhat sidelined 
in favour of discussions on peer review. Special Sessions were designed to allow the 
Council the time and flexibility to meet outside of plenary sessions to discuss grave or 
crisis human rights situations, either country-specific or thematic.  
 
9.2.1 Background 
Resolution 60/251 mandates that the Council ―be able to hold special sessions, when 
needed, at the request of a member of the Council with the support of one third of the 
membership of the Council‖671 This was expanded upon in the IBP672 which sets out 
how requests for special sessions should be given; that the session be convened 
between two and five days after the request and should not exceed six days; 
attendance is open to Council members, concerned states, observers, NGOs, and other 
specified non-state parties; modalities for draft resolutions and decisions; the need to 
seek consensus wherever possible; and that participatory debate occur which is 
―results-oriented‖ with the outcomes able to be monitored and reported on. 
Requiring one third of Council members‘ support empowers dominant groups 
and alliances to use this mechanism to achieve political aims because the larger the 
group, the more easily the one third threshold is achieved. Once again, this has 
manifested itself in the mechanism‘s use to keep the spotlight on Israel. This section 
will examine the Council‘s vastly disproportionate attention on Israel through the use 
of this mechanism. 
                                                 
671 Supra n.6, para.10. 
672 Supra n.173, Part V, Chapter D paras.121-128. 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.373 
 
Of the Council‘s first twelve Special Sessions, ten were country-specific and 
two were thematic. Arguably, there are more country-specific than thematic crises 
situations. Developing states typically called for country-specific Special Sessions 
despite the South‘s general position against country-specific focus. Of the first twelve 
special sessions, half were convened on Israel, two were thematic, and one each dealt 
with Darfur, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sri Lanka. Schrijver 
(2007:820) insists that when the Palestinian plight is considered, Western 
observations that the Council excessively focuses on Israel is questionable. However, 
owing to similar, if not worse, abuses ongoing elsewhere, Gaer (2007:135-136) argues 
that convening three Special Sessions on Israel in the Council‘s first six months raised 
serious concerns about the new body and its members. Indeed, then-Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan voiced his concerns at the Council‘s treatment of Israel in light of its 
silence on other grave situations.
673
  
  
9.2.2 The Special Sessions  
The First Special Session, on the human rights situation in the OPT, took place in July 
2006 immediately after the Council‘s First Session. The Session was called by 
developing states
674
 or their allies, such as Brazil and Russia, half of whom were OIC 
members. Many states took the floor over the two days, with the majority focusing on 
gross and systemic Israeli violations. South Africa, with its own history of gross and 
systemic human rights violations under apartheid, supported the session, arguing that 
                                                 
673 See, for example, UN Press Release, ‗Secretary General in Message to Human Rights Council Cautions against 
Focusing on Middle East at expense of Darfur, Other Grave Crises‘, 29 November 2006, UN Doc. SG/SM/10769-
HR/4907.See, also, Speech by Kofi Annan, 8 December 2006, in which he stated ―we must realize the promise of 
the Human Rights Council which so far has clearly not justified the hopes that so many of us placed in it‖. 
674 Algeria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; China; Cuba; Gabon; India; Indonesia; Jordan; Malaysia; 
Mali; Morocco; Pakistan; Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; South Africa; Sri Lanka; and Tunisia: 
‗Report on the First Special Session of The Human Rights Council‘, 18 July 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-1/3 
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―foreign domination is a denial of the right to [Palestinian] self-determination [and] 
fundamental freedoms and human rights‖.675 India‘s support for the session was 
motivated by concerns about its own national security, with that country expressing 
―grave concern at the deteriorating situation in West Asia‖.676 Sudan, perhaps seeking 
to deflect the spotlight away from its own abuses, argued that the ―Palestinian people 
should not be a sacrificial lamb caused by the silence of the international 
community.‖677 Cuba, Qatar, the Arab League, and OIC members all emphasised that 
inaction would affect the Council‘s credibility. Switzerland agreed with the OIC and 
its allies that violations in the OPT must be addressed, stressing that the body‘s 
credibility was at stake and reminding the Council of its mandate ―to respond to 
urgent situations of human rights‖.678  
Western states, other than Switzerland, while condemning Israeli violations, 
took a different position towards the convening of, and proceedings during, the 
session. Canada criticised the one-sided proceedings, arguing that it ―cannot accept 
the focus of the Council only on Israel.‖ France criticised the Council for divisive 
proceedings,
679
 insisting that Special Sessions should not be convened solely for 
political motives. The US expressed ―regret that we have to be here‖, arguing that 
Special Sessions ―should not face only one side of a conflict.‖680 Israel asserted that 
the session was convened for political reasons, mirroring Commission practices, 
saying ―it only took two weeks to bring us to the old Commission culture.‖681 
                                                 
675 South African delegate, 1st Special Session, 5 July 2006. 
676 Indian delegate, Id. 
677 Sudanese delegate, Id. 
678 Swiss delegate, Id. 
679 French delegate, Id. 
680 American delegate, Id. 
681 Israeli delegate, Id. 
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 Finland (EU) requested a vote on the session‘s draft resolution. The 
Resolution
682
 was adopted by 29
683
 votes to 11,
684
 with 5 abstentions.
685
 All Western 
countries voting against the Resolution, bar Switzerland who abstained. Brazil, 
Argentina and Uruguay emphasised that, despite their support for the resolution, they 
hoped the Council would not emulate the Commission by passing multiple resolutions 
on one situation.
686
 Japan argued that the ―text is one-sided and non-constructive‖ 
saying ―this way of conducting business does not serve the Council or this particular 
issue.‖687 Pakistan (OIC) ―could not understand the rationale of those who opposed or 
abstained‖ expressing ―dismay that … some Council members have political 
considerations‖ which affected their vote.688 
 One month later, the Council convened its Second Special Session. It again 
focused on Israeli violations, this time within Lebanon. Of the states which called for 
the First Special Session, only Brazil, Gabon, India, Mali, and Sri Lanka did not call 
for the Second Special Session. All states calling for the session
689
 were OIC 
members, with three exceptions: Russia, a long-standing critic of Israel, particularly 
due to Israel‘s ties with America; Cuba, a strong OIC ally and fierce US critic; and 
South Africa, which strongly identified with the Palestinian cause. OIC states calling 
                                                 
682 Human Rights Council Resolution S-1/Res.1, ‗Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory‘, 6 
July 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/Res/S-1/1 
683 Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zambia. 
684 Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
685 Cameroon, Mexico, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Switzerland. 
686 Brazilian delegate, supra n.675  
687 Japanese delegate, Id.  
688 Pakistani delegate, Id.  
689 Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, Cuba, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia: ‗Report of the Human Rights Council on its 
Second Special Session‘, 11 August 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-2/2, Part II, para.3  
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for Council action in Lebanon were joined by, amongst others, Argentina, Zambia, 
India, DPRK, and Ecuador. Cuba attacked the US and EU for supporting Israel, 
asserting that the resolution should be adopted by consensus or overwhelming 
majority to ―send out a clear signal to the world‖.690 China commented that ―if the 
Council doesn‘t act, people will ask what is the point of the Council‖691 Sudan 
attacked the US and the Security Council for investigating the situation in Darfur but 
not acting on Lebanon, although as discussed in Chapter 8 the investigation on Darfur 
was terminated.  
Switzerland again supported the Session, although this time arguing for ―a 
non-discriminatory approach‖.692 Finland (EU) neither condemned nor supported the 
session, but called for ―peaceful cooperation‖ and promotion of ―universal human 
rights without distinction‖.693 Australia was ―distraught by the one-sided nature of this 
session‖ arguing that holding a Special Session was unhelpful, particularly as the 
Security Council was dealing with the situation.
694
 The US supported Australia‘s 
assertions, calling the session ―unhelpful and potentially unproductive‖ and reminding 
the Council of the need for impartiality and non-selectivity.
695
 The session‘s 
Resolution
696
 was adopted by 27 votes
697
  to 11,
698
 with 8 abstentions.
699
 
                                                 
690 Cuban delegate, 2nd Special Session, 11 August 2006. 
691 Chinese delegate, Id.  
692 Swiss delegate, Id. 
693 Finnish delegate, Id. 
694 Australian delegate, Id. 
695 American delegate, Id.  
696 Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1, ‗The grave situation of human rights in Lebanon caused by Israeli 
military operations‘, 11 August 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-2/1 
697 Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zambia. 
698 Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
699 Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Switzerland. 
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 The Third Special Session, on Israeli violations in Beit Hanoun, took place in 
November 2006. States
700
 calling for the session were again from the South, OIC 
members, or allied states. Pakistan (OIC) stated: 
 
―It is under exceptional circumstances that the OIC and the Arab League have 
requested this session. Some say that too frequent special sessions will devalue 
the Human Rights Council, but if the human rights machinery cannot respond 
to violations around the world it will devalue the Council. It is eerie how gross 
and systematic human rights violations take place before, during, and after 
Council special session relating to Israel. Convening the Council is not an 
abuse. Not convening the Council would be far worse.‖701 
 
Other OIC states regretted the Council‘s failure to ensure its previous resolutions were 
implemented. Algeria (African Group) called on the Council ―to rise to the challenge 
of its mandate and confront these gross human rights violations.‖702 Switzerland again 
supported convening the session, arguing that it ―shows that we are willing to meet on 
acute world situations.‖703 Finland again demonstrated the EU‘s neutrality, neither 
supporting nor criticising the Session. Canada and Australia repeated earlier positions 
deploring the Council for its lack of objectivity, impartiality, and balance. Both states 
reminded the Council of its founding principles, saying that the body‘s actions were 
                                                 
700 Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Tunisia and Zambia: ‗Report of the Human Rights Council on its Third Special Session‘, 15 November 
2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-3/2, Part II, para.3  
701 Pakistani delegate, 3rd Special Session, 15 November 2006. 
702 Algerian delegate, Id. 
703 Swiss delegate, Id.  
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futile without adherence to these principles. The Third Session‘s Resolution704 was 
adopted by 32 votes
705
 to 8,
706
 with 6 abstentions.
707
 Although Japan and Switzerland 
pointed to the Resolution‘s lack of balance, the OIC welcomed its adoption by a two-
thirds majority, arguing that ―we can‘t all be wrong, can we?‖708  
 The Fourth Special Session was convened on the human rights situation in 
Darfur. More states called for this session than other sessions, and for the first time 
states
709
 calling for this session included countries from all regional groups. At this 
first session unrelated to Israel, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on the Council 
to address problems outside of the Middle East. Unlike the sessions on Israel, various 
states, typically Sudan‘s allies from the OIC or the African Group, expressed support 
for the country concerned. Again, unlike previous sessions, Western states supported 
the session. Palestine, Iran and Pakistan all used the session to attack Israel, and to 
criticise Annan‘s ―partial‖ statement about the Middle East.  
 At the Fourth Special Session consensus was reached on the draft text. 
However, the final text was in the form of a decision
710
 rather than a resolution, thus 
                                                 
704 Human Rights Council Resolution S-3/1, ‗Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military incursions in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the recent one in northern Gaza and the assault on Beit Hanoun‘, 15 
November 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-3/1 
705 Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zambia.  
706 Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. 
707 France, Guatemala, Japan, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Ukraine. 
708 Pakistani delegate, supra n.701  
709 Algeria, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, Cuba, Ecuador, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, the Republic of Korea, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay and Zambia: ‗Report of the Human Rights Council on its Fourth Special 
Session‘, 12-13 December 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-4/5, Part II, para.3 
710 Human Rights Council Decision S-4/101, ‗Situation of human rights in Darfur‘, 13 December 2006, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/DEC/S-4/101 
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carrying far less weight than the previous sessions‘ outcomes. Nineteen Council 
members
711
 spoke after the decision‘s adoption, all lauding the Council for its 
cooperative, compromising, and congenial approach. Most were careful to say this 
was a happy moment for both the Council and the people of Darfur. However, India, 
Saudi Arabia, China, and Tunisia, amongst others, cared more that the consensus 
―proved‖ the Council‘s legitimacy than about its impact on violations in Darfur.712 
The UK hoped that the Council would build on this constructive spirit to move away 
from solely focusing on the Middle East, and the President invited Council members 
to ―maintain this spirit when we deal with other situations.‖713  
 The Fifth Special Session adopted a Resolution
714
 on the situation in Myanmar 
by consensus. The Session took place after Myanmar‘s military junta violently 
repressed monks‘ peaceful demonstrations. The Resolution resulted in the Special 
Rapporteur on Myanmar‘s first invitation to visit the country since 2003 (Callejon, 
2008:340-341). The Sixth Special Session again focused on Israeli violations, this 
time in Gaza and Nablus. The Resolution
715
 was adopted by 30 votes
716
 to 1,
717
 with 
15 abstentions.
718
 Canada was the sole dissenting voice, once again rejecting country-
specific resolutions and emphasising the Council‘s founding principles. The Seventh 
                                                 
711 Including 7 OIC countries, 5 EU countries, including Cuba, India, Russia, China, and Zambia. 
712 All statements made at the 4th Special Session, 13 December 2006 
713 President Luis Alfonso de Alba (Mexico), Id. 
714 Human Rights Council Resolution S-5/1. ‗Situation of human rights in Myanmar‘, 2 October 2007, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/S-5/1 
715 Human Rights Council Resolution S-6/1.‘Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military attacks and 
incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip‘, 24 January 2008, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-6/1 
716 Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Zambia. 
717 Canada. 
718 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Republic 
of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
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Special Session was the first to deal with a thematic issue. It examined ―The negative 
impact on the realization of the right to food … caused inter alia by the soaring food 
prices‖ and its Resolution719 was adopted by consensus. The Eighth Special Session 
also adopted its Resolution
720
 by consensus, this time on the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the Ninth Special Session, once again 
focused on Israeli violations. Its Resolution
721
 was adopted by 33 votes
722
 to 1,
723
 with 
13 abstentions.
724
 Canada again cast the sole dissenting vote. The Tenth Special 
Session dealt with the second thematic issue. Its Resolution
725
 was adopted 31 
votes
726
 to 0, with 14 abstentions.
727
 The Eleventh Special Session was convened on 
Sri Lanka. It took until 2009‘s massacre of Tamils for the Council to call the session, 
despite Scannella and Splinter writing in 2007 of the ―growing deterioration‖ that 
required the Council‘s attention.728 The Resolution729 was adopted by 29 votes730 to 
                                                 
719 Human Rights Council Resolution S-7/1, ‗The negative impact of the worsening of the world food crisis on the 
realization of the right to food for all‘, 22 May 2008, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-7/1 
720 Human Rights Council Resolution S-8/1, ‗Situation of human rights in the east of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo‘, 1 December 2008, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-8/1 
721 Human Rights Council Resolution S-9/1, ‗The grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, particularly due to the recent Israeli military attacks  against the occupied Gaza Strip‘, 12 January 2009, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-9/1 
722 Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile, China, Cuba, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Uruguay, Zambia. 
723 Canada. 
724 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
725 Human Rights Council Resolution S-10/1, ‗The impact of the global economic and financial crises on the 
universal realization and effective enjoyment of human rights‘, 23 February 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-10/1 
726 Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, 
Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Uruguay 
727 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
728 Arguably, political mistrust between states ―prevented Council members from cooperating effectively‖ to deal 
with the Sri Lankan human rights situation. Scannella and Splinter use that example to demonstrate ―the dangerous 
double standards‖ at the Council.  
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12,
731
 with 6 abstentions.
732
 Those were the first dissenting votes cast on an issue 
other than Israeli violations. The Twelfth Special Session was again convened on 
Israel, and its Resolution
733
 was adopted by 25 votes
734
 to 6,
735
 with 11 abstentions.
736
 
 The first twelve Special Sessions were convened between 2006-2009. During 
this time, many gross and systemic human rights violations occurred that were not 
dealt with by this mechanism, or indeed at all by the Council. The violent repression 
of protests following Iran‘s 2009 Presidential elections was ignored by the Council 
despite well-documented human rights violations.
737
 Similarly, grave violations 
occurring in China, particularly surrounding the Beijing Olympics in 2008, did not 
merit the convening of a Special Session despite widespread coverage of the human 
rights abuses.
738
 Situations in these, and other, countries were not dealt with by the 
Council for political reasons. OIC members, including known grave abusers such as 
Iran, Libya, and Syria, were protected by their political and regional allies. Powerful 
states from the global South, including China and Zimbabwe, as well as the South‘s 
                                                                                                                                            
729 Human Rights Council Resolution S-11/1, ‗Assistance to Sri Lanka in the promotion and protection of human 
rights‘, 27 May 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-11/1 
730 Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia (Plurinational State of),  Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Uruguay, Zambia. 
731 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
732 Argentina, Gabon, Japan, Mauritius, Republic of Korea, Ukraine. 
733 Human Rights Council Resolution S-12/1, ‗The human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including East Jerusalem‘, 16 October 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-12/1 
734 Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
South Africa, Zambia. 
735 Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Ukraine, United States of America 
736 Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Republic of 
Korea, Slovenia, Uruguay. 
737 See, for example, ‗Iran: Arrests and deaths continue as authorities tighten grip‘, Amnesty International Public 
Statement, 14 July 2009, AI Index: MDE 13/072/2009 
738 See, for example, Amnesty International, (2008c). 
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allies, such as Russia and Venezuela, were also protected from scrutiny of their gross 
and systemic human rights violations. 
  
9.2.3 Politicisation of Special Sessions 
The first twelve Special Sessions were convened between 2006-2009. During this 
time, many gross and systemic human rights violations occurred that were not dealt 
with by this mechanism, or indeed at all by the Council. The violent repression of 
protests following Iran‘s 2009 Presidential elections was ignored by the Council 
despite well-documented human rights violations.
739
 Similarly, grave violations 
occurring in China, particularly surrounding the Beijing Olympics in 2008, did not 
merit the convening of a Special Session despite widespread coverage of the human 
rights abuses.
740
 Situations in these, and other, countries were not dealt with by the 
Council for political reasons. OIC members, including known grave abusers such as 
Iran, Libya, and Syria, were protected by their political and regional allies. Powerful 
states from the global South, including China and Zimbabwe, as well as the South‘s 
allies, such as Russia and Venezuela, were also protected from scrutiny of their gross 
and systemic human rights violations. 
While the Commission‘s bias was manifested in excessive resolutions against 
Israel,
741
 the Council went further by using Special Sessions for selective and 
politicised aims. Countries such as the DPRK (North Korea), Zimbabwe, Russia and 
China, meanwhile avoided scrutiny. An article on Zimbabwe in The Economist noted 
a main flaw regarding Special Sessions: 
 
                                                 
739 See, for example, Amnesty International, (2009). 
740 Supra n.738 
741 One quarter of all Commission resolutions concerned that state. 
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―True to form, the UN‘s recently revamped human rights council . . . which 
might have been expected to be taking keen interest in what is going on in 
Zimbabwe, has not even raised the issue. Unlike its discredited predecessor, 
the Commission on Human Rights, it has the power to call for an emergency 
session to address particularly egregious violations of human rights, for 
example in Zimbabwe . . . . In theory, calling an emergency session on 
Zimbabwe should not be so difficult . . . but with its 16 members, the 
organisation of the Islamic Conference, supported by the 13 African members, 
has a stranglehold over the Council. Together, they repeatedly fend off moves 
to look into the human rights records of Muslim or African countries.‖ 
(Opinion, The Economist, 2008) 
 
 Although the Council increasingly used this mechanism to respond to crises in 
2010, with sessions on Haiti, Ivory Coast, and Libya, those situations, as with the one 
in Sri Lanka, reached absolute crisis point before the body addressed them. Israel‘s 
human rights violations, on the other hand, were scrutinised regardless of whether 
they were an ongoing or crisis situation. Were this mechanism to be zero sum, with all 
grave and other situations able to be examined and to have time and resources devoted 
to them, then undoubtedly the six sessions on Israel would be justified and necessary. 
However, in practice, the Council has time and resources to allocate even-handedly 
according to need.  
Abebe (2009:32-33) comments that the African Group sought less emphasis 
on Special Sessions in light of the UPR‘s ability to deal with country-specific 
situations. However, the Group supported country-specific action on Israel through 
the Council‘s Special Sessions. Moreover, whereas the African Group supported a 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.384 
 
weak and non-condemnatory text on Darfur, it supported strong and one-sided 
resolutions on Israel.   
 The EU‘s position at Special Sessions reflected its tendency for neutrality 
during politically sensitive Council proceedings. EU members did not call for Special 
Sessions to be convened on Israel, although they did call for sessions on other issues. 
Despite voting against or abstaining on resolutions about Israel, EU countries often 
remained silent or made passive and neutral statements during sessions. Other 
Western states did speak about politicisation, bias and selectivity, with Canada, 
Australia and the US taking strong positions on those issues. Indeed, Canada twice 
cast the sole dissenting vote against resolutions on Israel. 
 States from other groups did not adopt group positions on Special Sessions. 
Cuba, for example, pursued political objectives by allying itself with the OIC against 
Israel. Other Latin American states expressed various positions on Israel, even 
changing their positions at different sessions. While India cited its own national 
security as motivation for supporting special sessions on Israel, other Asian states at 
times abstained or voted against such resolutions. Realists might argue that many 
states pursued their own national policies, often not tied to the issue at hand. Japan, 
for example, voted with the West despite making statements supporting the opposite 
position. That form of politicisation is unsurprising given the Council‘s nature as an 
inter-governmental body. More worrisome is the use of collective weight to achieve 
political objectives where such aims do not affect a member‘s national politics.    
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9.3 Summary  
The UPR and Special Sessions mechanisms were heralded as a break from the old 
body and a method for overcoming the Commission‘s failings and fulfilling the 
Council‘s mandate. Exploration of these two mechanisms has, once again, 
demonstrated that the Council sought to fulfil its mandate but was obstructed by states 
seeking to use these mechanisms for political, biased and subjective aims. The form 
and design of these mechanisms allowed them to be hijacked by states, groups and 
blocs seeking to further political agendas. Arguably, without reform, these 
mechanisms will undoubtedly be further misused.  
  
9.3.1 Mandate   
UPR aims to identify areas of weakness upon which the Council may provide 
recommendations, assistance or advisory services to enable countries to better fulfil 
their human rights obligations. Many observers have been keen to herald the UPR‘s 
success. That view is unsurprising, as the mechanism is central to the Council‘s 
credibility. UPR has enabled fact-finding, dialogue and information-sharing, but only 
to the extent that the states under review cooperated with the process. 
Recommendations on implementation of human rights and adherence to commitments 
and obligations have been made at all UPR sessions. The Council‘s promotion 
mandate was therefore fulfilled to some extents, with particular successes in relation 
to those states which would otherwise be ignored either due to their relatively benign 
human rights records or as a result of being shielded from scrutiny by allied states, 
groups or blocs. However, the process has been undermined by reviewed states either 
avoiding responding to criticisms or, indeed, preventing questions from being raised. 
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Assessment of the utility of this mechanism cannot fully occur until after the 
first full cycle, and even then judgements will be reserved until states begin to 
implement, or ignore, recommendations. The only true measure of success, according 
to Sweeney and Saito, is whether states implement the review‘s recommendations and 
report back on follow-up. It is clear that the initial UPR sessions did not go far enough 
to promote human rights. The reasons for this will be explored in relation to the 
politicisation of those sessions. 
 Special Sessions enabled the Council to take steps towards fulfilling its 
protection mandate through information-sharing, providing a forum for dialogue, fact-
finding, and recommendations. The body used those sessions primarily to deal with 
country-specific situations, but also convened sessions to discuss the impact of 
thematic issues on human rights. As such, these sessions did enable the body to fulfil 
its responsibility to address situations of human rights violations. However, the 
misuse of this mechanism to focus vastly disproportionate attention on Israel, 
combined with failure to convene sessions on other, often graver, situations in, for 
example, China or Iran, resulted in the body, once again, failing adequately to fulfil its 
protection mandate. Groups and blocs effectively blocked the Council from protecting 
human rights where the fulfilment of the body‘s mandate conflicted with regional or 
political objectives. 
 
9.3.2 Founding Principles   
UPR represents a compromise between radical and idealist proposals, and the need to 
encourage cooperation in order to ensure a universal, inclusive and cooperative 
mechanism. Focus on cooperation and dialogue resulted in states engaging with the 
UPR process, and the appearance of adherence to these principles. On closer 
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examination, however, a number of states emphasised the need for cooperation in 
order to ignore questions asked or to avoid critical statements. The need for 
inclusiveness and for a state-led reviewing process to some extent impeded promotion 
of human rights. However, without such cooperation it is doubtful that the UPR 
would have fulfilled as many, let alone more, of the body‘s duties.  
It has been argued that the UPR provides a mechanism that affords all states 
equal treatment (Gaer, 2007:138), but whether such equal treatment occurs in practice 
remains to be seen. Moreover, it is disproportionate for the Council to afford the same 
treatment and resources to, for example, Sweden and Somalia. Equal treatment 
appears to have been interpreted as devoting equal resources, rather than using the 
same benchmarks to review each state. In order to improve the effectiveness and 
credibility of the main UN human rights body, proportionate treatment must be 
afforded to states and their performance examined according to a limited number of 
benchmarks.  
 Special Sessions, unlike the UPR, will necessarily involve some degree of 
selectivity and partiality as they are convened to focus on single human rights 
situations, whether country-specific or thematic. The mechanism was designed to 
ensure that violations within situations would be addressed by the Council in order to 
protect universal human rights standards. However, the selectivity involved in 
convening Special Sessions resulted in clear bias and partiality against Israel, with 
focus on that state‘s abuses to the exclusion of time and resources being devoted 
elsewhere. Indeed, discussions within Special Sessions, and action taken at those 
sessions has been shown to have varied according to the subjective and partial aims of 
states, groups and blocs. The body clearly failed adequately to adhere to its founding 
principles both in the convening and conduct of Special Sessions. 
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9.3.3 Politicisation   
A North-South divide has already been demonstrated during UPR sessions. 
Developing nations seek to avoid condemnation, instead focusing on practical advice 
and assistance in implementing recommendation, while Western countries focus on 
tailored, specific recommendations (Abebe, 2009:31). Gaer (2007:138-139) argues 
that lack of trust at the Council will impact on the UPR‘s effectiveness and ability to 
achieve its objectives. The Council is already divided on politically sensitive issues, 
with ongoing tensions and mistrust between various groups and blocs. That 
atmosphere has affected, although not fully obstructed, the Council‘s proceedings and 
action on some sensitive human rights issues. As the UPR examines all states, 
including politically sensitive countries, the North-South divide will have some 
impact upon the mechanism.  
UPR has the potential to become politicised in a number of ways. The 
mechanism is likely to demonstrate a lack of even-handedness through its treatment of 
different states, particularly those countries singled out as ―enemies‖ of the main 
groups at the Council. The first sessions demonstrate regional tactics consistent with 
other Council proceedings whereby developing states, particularly OIC members and 
their allies in NAM and the African Group, protect each other through various 
methods. Those states took the floor to compliment allies, thus using the allotted time 
and blocking other states from asking questions or making recommendations. 
Similarly, states from the South have constantly emphasised lack of capacity for 
human rights protection and promotion in order to shield allies from criticism.  
Sweeney and Saito note (2009:219) another potential political tactic arising 
from the UPR. States have claimed, subsequent to the first UPR sessions, that 
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country-specific mandates, discussions and resolutions are no longer required. 
Amongst others, this position has been taken by the DPRK, the Philippines and 
China.
742
 Abebe (2009:31) comments that UPR should not be used to block Council 
discussions or action on grave situations of gross and systemic human rights abuses, 
nor should the review process be used by states to avoid other human rights scrutiny. 
However, developing states have long-sought to abolish country-specific resolutions, 
and despite failing to do so during the Council‘s creation, shifting the focus onto the 
UPR displays a worrying trend which may impact the Council‘s ability to take other 
forms of country-specific action. 
Politicisation occurred throughout both the convening and conduct of Special 
Sessions. Special Sessions on human rights abuses committed by Israel in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon and Syria, furthered the OIC agenda of 
retaining focus on these abuses in order to keep international attention on that state in 
order to further the Palestinian cause. Moreover, such focus also resulted in less 
attention being paid to other regional human rights violations and grave or crisis 
situations.  
Regional groups dominated proceedings at Special Sessions as they had done 
throughout regular Council sessions. The African Group, for example, continued to 
shield its regional ally, Sudan, throughout the Special Session focusing on the 
situation in Darfur. Collective positions were taken throughout almost all of the 
Special Sessions, with regional groups and political blocs seeking to further political 
objectives. Some groups and blocs focused on the need for human rights protection, 
                                                 
742 See the debate around the extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the DPRK in ISHR, Daily 
Update, 27 March 2008, at 11-12, available at: 
http://www.ishr.ch/hrm/council/dailyupdates/session_007/27_march_2008.pdf  
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but the same pattern emerged regarding states from the Global North which sought, 
during contentious sessions, to shield allies or to further unrelated political agendas.  
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CONCLUSION 
1. Assessment of the Council 
Assessment of the Human Rights Council‘s formative years has demonstrated that the 
body is failing to fulfil its mandate, particularly in terms of protecting human rights. 
The Council has not achieved the aims set forth in its guiding principles, nor has it 
adhered to the legal bases for its proceedings and mechanisms. The Council, created 
to replace the failed Commission on Human Rights, has not overcome many of its 
predecessor‘s shortcomings. Although the Council has, to some extent, fulfilled its 
roles and functions, the body‘s ability to utilise them to discharge its mandate has 
been affected by a number of interconnected problems. This thesis did not focus on 
reform proposals but rather on identifying the problems facing the Council. However, 
reforms to the body, its form, its mechanisms and its proceedings are needed for the 
Council to fulfil its mandate. If these problems are not addressed and dealt with 
during the Council‘s 2011 internal assessment, they will undoubtedly continue to 
undermine the body‘s work and credibility. Those problems include the body‘s 
composition and membership, politicisation, regionalism, and bias and selectivity.  
Mandate The Council‘s mandate is broadly divided into two parts: protecting 
and promoting human rights. The promotion mandate requires the body to assist states 
with implementing human rights and fulfilling their commitments and obligations. I 
have shown various ways in which the body sought to discharge this mandate. The 
assessment has, however, primarily focused on the protection mandate. Paragraph 4 of 
Resolution 60/251 requires the Council‘s to address human rights situations. This 
paragraph is key for the body‘s protection mandate. The Council is given tools to 
address those situations through, for example, Special Sessions, fact-finding, and 
making recommendations.  
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I have assessed fulfilment of the protection mandate by examining which 
situations the Council chose to address, the manner in which they were addressed, and 
the extent to which the Council adhered to the principles of universality and even-
handedness. The assessment has shown that disproportionate attention was focused on 
some states, such as Israel and the US, thus diverting time and resources away from 
other grave situations. Many grave situations were not addressed by the Council, for 
example in China, Zimbabwe and Russia. Moreover, even where the Council sought 
to discharge its protection mandate, it was at times impeded from doing so by states, 
groups or blocs shielding allies from scrutiny. 
The body did fulfil its roles and functions in relation to fact-finding and 
information-sharing, although states were able to block the Council from fulfilling 
these roles by refusing to cooperate with mandate holders, working groups and 
discussions within the body. The Council at times failed to provide formal 
recommendations on human rights protection, and was unable to ensure 
implementation of any recommendations made. Resolution 60/251 does not provide 
the Council with binding powers, thus negating its ability to do more than follow-up 
on implementation of recommendations and, exceptionally, to refer situations to the 
General Assembly or Security Council. As such, the body needed to discharge its 
mandate through other mechanisms, for example diplomatic pressure, but failed to do 
so even where vast efforts were put into place to ensure compromise agreements 
between groups, blocs and the state under discussion.   
Although Resolution 60/251 only gave the Council only non-binding powers, 
the body has been assessed in relation to its use of those powers to fulfil its mandate. 
Human rights fall under states‘ domestic jurisdiction other than in those exceptional 
cases where bodies such as the Security Council use binding powers, such as 
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sanctions or the use of force, to ensure compliance with obligations. The Council‘s 
non-binding powers should, in theory, provide the basis for the body fulfilling its 
mandate. However, states abusing human rights often ignored the Council‘s 
recommendations, or failed to be swayed by diplomatic pressure, resulting in little 
change on the ground particularly in relation to grave or crisis situation.   
Founding Principles  In order to combat the Commission‘s failings, and to 
balance the weakened reforms implemented at the new body, the Council‘s 
constituent instrument repeatedly mandated the body to adhere to the principles of 
impartiality, objectivity, non-selectivity and universality throughout its proceedings 
and work. I have assessed the body‘s adherence to these principles throughout its 
proceedings and work. 
The Council has failed to universally protect and promote human rights, 
particularly through its ignoring, or being prevented from addressing, many grave 
human rights situations. The Council has, moreover, not overcome the Commission‘s 
selectivity and bias in addressing human rights. Israel occupies a vastly 
disproportionate amount of the Council‘s time and resources, as occurred at the 
Commission. Human rights violations by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories are not disputed. However, the disproportionate focus on Israel within 
Council proceedings and mechanisms has been deliberate calculated to deflect the 
spotlight from similar, and often graver, human rights violations in other regions. The 
Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights were unable to 
convince Council members to avoid selectivity by giving proportionate attention to 
other human rights situations. 
The founding principles also include cooperation, inclusiveness and dialogue, 
which aim to overcome the Commission‘s culture of naming, shaming and blaming. 
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However, as has been demonstrated regarding the US, that culture is being repeated at 
the Council. Emphasis on cooperation has undermined the body‘s proceedings and 
mechanisms to the extent that states have refused to cooperate with the body or have 
used this principle to insist on weakened actions by the Council when seeking to 
protect or promote human rights. The Council has provided a forum for dialogue, but 
often that dialogue and information-sharing has been impeded by groups and blocs 
intent on naming, shaming and blaming rather than seeking constructive dialogue. 
Politicisation. Council proceedings and work have been undermined by 
politicisation from the outset. As an inter-governmental body, some politicisation was 
to be expected at the Council. However, national and regional political agendas have 
dominated Council proceedings, particularly on contentious or politically-sensitive 
issues. States and groups deploy various tactics to further national or regional political 
objectives. Political aims have thus far directed the Council‘s work, with Council 
members shielding allies as well as attacking other states for political motives. 
Powerful alliances ensure constant Council focus on certain human rights issues, to 
the detriment of other pressing human rights concerns. Despite widespread criticism 
from UN staff, states and various observers, politicisation has only increased over the 
Council‘s formative years.  
Regionalism. Many of the Council‘s attempts to fulfil its mandate have been 
undermined by states organising themselves by regional alliances. Regional and 
political groups have dominated the new body much as they dominated the 
Commission. Groups have placed national and collective agendas above the need for 
protecting and promoting human rights. Collective strength has been used to shield 
regional allies from Council scrutiny, or to focus the body‘s attention on issues 
collectively deemed important. Working in regional groups often results in use of the 
 Freedman, R., The UN Human Rights Council, 2011, p.395 
 
lowest common denominator, thus undermining the effectiveness of the Council‘s 
work.  
The Council‘s composition is based on geographic representation, which does 
not take into account the cross-regional political blocs generally comprised of states 
from the South. Divisions along regional and political lines mirror those at the 
Commission during its final years. A North-South divide has increasingly developed 
during the post-Cold War era. Emerging states from across various regional and 
political alliances have supported each other‘s positions on contentious or politically 
sensitive issues. In particular, the African Group and the OIC have dominated Council 
proceedings, directing its work in accordance with collective agendas. 
 
2. Moving Forward 
Many reforms proposals were not taken up at the Council‘s creation despite the clear 
need for the new body to overcome its predecessor‘s failings. This assessment has 
provided detailed evidence and analysis of the Council‘s failure to adequately fulfil its 
mandate. Having assessed the new body and identified the reasons for this failure, the 
conclusion can be drawn that the Council must be reformed in order for the body to 
effectively discharge its legal duties and achieve the aims for which it was created. 
Although I have not sought to offer reform proposals, the assessment has identified 
key areas in need of reform. It is hoped, albeit not expected, that the Council‘s 
internal review will identify the need for reformation of the body. However, it is 
likely that the body will largely continue in its current form, and as such I will explore 
the need for reform in forthcoming scholarship. 
Original Reform Proposals The Commission‘s failings ultimately rendered it 
unable to fulfil its mandate. Discussions on the Council‘s creation focused on how 
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best to overcome the pitfalls that had beset its predecessor. Radical reform proposals 
were not adopted, thus hampering the Council‘s ability to move beyond its 
predecessor. As the new body resembles its predecessor, albeit certain changes 
occurred and new mechanisms were created, it is not altogether unexpected that many 
of the same problems have arisen as plagued the Commission. States sought to keep 
the most radical reforms from being implemented, particularly those that would limit 
the Council‘s size and membership. Most importantly, states ensured that the body 
remained an inter-governmental forum. Allowing independent experts to replace state 
delegates would have radically altered the Council‘s composition, eliminating many 
of the issues that subsequently arose. Arguably, in light of this assessment, such 
reforms can be seen not as radical but rather as necessary for the body to have adhered 
to the legal duties and responsibilities ascribed to it. 
Form and Design The Council‘s form, as an intergovernmental body, is key 
for the body‘s legitimacy in the eyes of states and non-state actors, particularly those 
from the Global North who assert that human rights are used as a neo-colonial tool of 
oppression. However, that need for legitimacy must be balanced with the need for an 
effective body that is able to discharge its mandate. As such, the Council‘s form must 
be revisited, with a focus on whether a body consisting of independent experts, or 
indeed a different form altogether, would be better equipped to protect and promote 
human rights. The Council‘s design, with 47 member states all with equal votes, also 
serves to underpin the body‘s legitimacy. There again, the need for legitimacy must 
be balanced with the need for effectiveness. A smaller body would, arguably, be less 
politicised, and would be better able to discuss and take action on human rights issues. 
Membership . It has been widely accepted that the final nail in the 
Commission‘s coffin was Libya‘s election as the body‘s Chairperson. This followed 
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long-standing criticisms of known abusers sitting on the Commission as well as states 
seeking membership to avoid scrutiny of their own human rights record. Despite 
initial proposals that Council members should fulfil certain human rights criteria, the 
body‘s membership requirements focus on ―soft‖ criteria. Those requirements 
stemmed from the need for legitimacy and the adherence to Charter principles. Gross 
and systemic human rights abusers seemed undeterred by these ―soft‖ criteria from 
seeking membership, with countries such as China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
Russia and Libya elected during the Council‘s formative years. The presence of 
known abusers undermines the Council‘s credibility. Moreover, with many of the 
same members, and thus similar delegations, as sat on the Commission during its final 
years, the new body is unlikely to depart radically from its predecessor‘s practices. 
The need for membership criteria, or indeed a method for preventing known grave 
abusers from being elected to the Council, must be revisited. 
Proceedings Under the current system, states dictate the Council‘s 
proceedings. The assessment has demonstrated that Council discussions have been 
repeatedly used by states, groups and blocs for political aims, or indeed have been 
hijacked for unrelated political agendas. There is clearly a need to reform the body‘s 
proceedings, and indeed its mechanisms, to ensure that discussions cannot be segued 
and can instead remain constructive and aimed towards protecting and promoting 
human rights. Reformation of the body‘s proceedings must focus on implementing 
effective mechanisms to reduce, or even eliminate, politicisation. There are various 
potential reforms, and to detail them would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, for example, states could be prevented from giving individual statements 
unless they add to, or are different from, the group position given on their behalf. 
Another example would be to limit the time allocated to discussions under each 
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agenda item in order to ensure time and resources are adequately shared out, and that 
Special Sessions are used to address situations requiring greater attention. Focus on 
reforming proceedings will be central to enabling the body better to fulfil its mandate 
and to adhere to its founding principles.   
Powers  In its current form, and under Resolution 60/251, the Council does 
not have legally-binding powers nor enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
implementation of its recommendations. States are unlikely to agree to the Council 
being given such powers as this would encroach on domestic jurisdiction. One 
solution, perhaps, would be to increase the body‘s ability to place pressure on states to 
comply with human rights obligations and commitments. A change to the Council‘s 
working culture, and an increased ability to place diplomatic or other pressure on 
abuser states, would go some way towards this aim. However, should the Council 
continue in the direction that the assessment has identified, the option of binding 
powers might be considered in order to combat the body‘s ineffective pursuit of its 
protection mandate. 
 
3. Lessons to be Learnt   
The Council‘s problems are not only interconnected, but are also linked with 
problems facing other intergovernmental, international, and human rights bodies. 
Thus, this assessment is representative of broader problems within international 
institutions. Although comparison and contrast with other bodies goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis, parallels can be drawn which will enable better understanding of 
the context of problems facing the Council. The HRC was created with the specific 
intent and expectation that this body would overcome its predecessor‘s failings. That 
the body faces similar, and perhaps worse, problems to the Commission begs the 
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question as to whether such failings can be overcome within a body of this form and 
design. State sovereignty has hampered the Council‘s ability to fulfil its mandate, 
particularly in light of its non-binding powers. Moreover, the nature of an 
intergovernmental body, especially of the Council‘s size, results in powerful groups 
or blocs dominating and directing proceedings, impeding the body‘s discharge of its 
mandate where necessary to further collective aims or agendas.  
Throughout the assessment I have referred to UN human rights committees as 
providing a benchmark for best practice when dealing with human rights issues. The 
committees consist of expert delegates wholly independent from their sending state. 
Moreover, they deal with limited sets of rights which are applied on the basis of 
states‘ voluntary commitments to the relevant treaties. As such, these bodies are able 
to discharge their mandates far more effectively than the Council.  
The Council‘s problems, based in large part on its form and composition, are 
reflected elsewhere within the UN and other intergovernmental bodies. The 
conclusion arguably can be drawn that radical reforms are, in fact, necessary in order 
to create a body which will effectively fulfil its mandate. International relations 
theories have been used to demonstrate the competing aims of states, groups and blocs 
within international organisations. In light of the number of UN member states and 
the power of various groups and blocs, the assessment of the Council perhaps 
underscores the need to re-evaluate the utility and effectiveness of intergovernmental 
bodies. Despite the Council being created in order to overcome the failings of its 
predecessor, the body has repeated many of those same mistakes, and lessons must be 
learnt in order for other similar institutions.  
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4. Final Remarks.  
Council proceedings and mechanisms demonstrate that national and regional politics 
are of primary concern within the body. At times, such concerns are wholly unrelated 
to human rights. All areas of the new body have been undermined by selectivity, 
partiality, bias and politicisation, contradicting the Council‘s founding principles. 
While the Council‘s own internal assessment may focus on its achievements, it is not 
sufficient for the body to fulfil its mandate on some human rights issues only. There 
have been achievements, mainly on non-contentious issues such as the rights to 
adequate housing and safe drinking water and sanitation. However, the body has 
failed to address many gross and systemic violations, while paying disproportionate 
attention to other issues, during its formative years. Even where situations have been 
addressed, action has at times been blocked or weakened for political reasons.  
The Council‘s internal assessment will, to some extent, determine the body‘s 
future. It is unlikely that the United Nations will disband this new body so soon after 
its creation. However, reforms could eliminate some, if not most, of the issues 
currently undermining the Council. As an inter-governmental body, the Council will 
remain a political body. Nevertheless, reforms to its procedural rules could go some 
way to achieving de-politicisation. The Council already lacks credibility among states, 
NGOs and observers, hampering its ability to protect and promote human rights. 
Without change, the legitimacy and credibility of the Council is likely to reflect that 
of the Commission. 
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